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PART II.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS

OF

ASIATIC TURKEY AND ARABIA.

227

April to June 1911.

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Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Asiatic Turkey and Arabia.

Part II.

[12024]

No. 1.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 194.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 28, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 45 of the 17th January, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah reporting the commencement by a French syndicate of operations on the proposed Hodeidah-Sana'a Railway.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 14 E.)

Sir, *Hodeidah, March* 2, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 22 E. of the 20th June last, furnishing information on the Hodeidah-Sana'a Railway scheme.

On the 15th ultimo a party of fourteen engineers, French and Italian, arrived here to commence operations.

I understand that the Ottoman Government has decided not to grant a concession to any foreign company for the proposed railway for a limited number of years.

It would appear, however, that the Ottoman Ministry of Public Works at Constantinople have arranged with a French syndicate headed by David Leon Bey, of Paris, referred to in my above-quoted despatch of last year, to take in hand immediately on behalf of the Government the work of construction of the proposed harbour at Ras-el-Ketib, and the section of the railway between the latter place and Hujjeila, which it has been definitely decided to construct.

The above-mentioned syndicate will be reimbursed for its trouble and expense at the rate of £ T. 4,000 per kilom. This will include the cost of the harbour at Ras-el-Ketib, and the necessary buildings there and along the railway line.

According to the trace, the section of the railway between Ras-el-Ketib and Hujjeila, viâ Hodeidah, is about 116 kilom.

I infer that the Ottoman Ministry of Public Works have reserved to themselves the right of taking over the work of construction of the railway at any time they may choose.

No decision has been taken at Constantinople so far with regard to the continuation of the railway line to Sana'a.

The original scheme in which the railway was to have traversed the Wadi Sanfur to Mefak and thence viâ the Wadi Fersh to Sana'a, and for which a survey was made by the same French contractors last year, has now been abandoned as impracticable and too expensive.

A contract has for the present been made with David Leon Bey for a survey of the country between Hodeidah and Taiz, viâ Beit-el-Fakih, Zebeed, and Hais, and between Taiz and Sana'a, with a view to ascertain the practicability and utility of a railway line traversing these parts to Sana'a.

A party of French engineers will leave to-morrow afternoon for Beit-el-Fakih to survey the country and study the question of a railway in that direction.

This morning General Izzat Pasha, chief of the general staff in Turkey and appointed special commissioner and commander-in-chief of the Ottoman forces in the Yemen, cut the first sod of the railway at the site outside the town where it is proposed to build the Hodeidah railway station.

A number of Ottoman officials, civil and military, the foreign consular corps, the local mercantile community, and a number of Arab sheikhs and seyyids were present at the ceremony.

I learn from the chief engineer in charge of the construction of the railway that the section to Hujjeila and the harbour at Ras-el-Ketib will be completed within the course of the next eighteen months.

I have, &c.,
G. A. RICHARDSON.

[12029] No. 2.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 199.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March 28, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 161 of the 14th instant I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah, reporting further on the operations in the Yemen.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 16 E.)

Sir, *Hodeidah, March 6, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegram of the 26th February to your Excellency, reporting the relief of Menakha two days previously by a Turkish force under Colonel Riza Bey.

A Greek merchant who has been established at Menakha for many years has now reached Hodeidah from the latter place, and has furnished me with the following details.

It would appear from the above man's information that the town was under siege by Seyyid Yahya's levies for about one month. The garrison consisted of the 14th Nishanjee Battalion (old organisation), the 3rd Battalion of the 119th Regiment—temporarily detached at Hodeidah from Sana'a last December, but locked up in Menakha while trying to return to the capital—some 500 recruits that had arrived in December from Constantinople, destined for Sana'a, and a detachment of garrison artillery.

There were abundant supplies and ammunition to hold out for several months, and even fresh provisions were by no means scarce.

The rebels were kept at bay principally through the neutrality observed by the tribesmen inhabiting the mountains which surround Menakha, viz., Beni Sa'fan, Metwah, Beni Ismail, and Masar, and who, at the same time, afforded them no hospitality.

The Arabs in the three former places are chiefly of the Shafai and Dawoodia sects, and those of Masar principally Zeidi.

On the other hand, the powerful Beni Mukattil tribe occupying the mountain range to the south-east of Menakha, in their own interests, operated against the Zeidi rebels, with a view to dislodging them from their mountain homes. The above-mentioned

tribe is of the Dawoodia (a sub-division of Shiah) persuasion, is markedly hostile to their Zeidi co-religionists, and can easily muster 1,500 fighting men.

They at the same time profess no love for the Turk, but on the present occasion were glad to receive arms and food-stuffs from the Kaimakam of Menakha in return for the services rendered to the besieged garrison.

Colonel Riza Bey, who had six battalions with him, after leaving Hujjeila on the 21st February deviated to the west and ascended the Sa'fan mountains with the friendly assistance of Abdulla Bishir, the sheikh of that place. The force then descended at the termination of the Wadi Hajjan and climbed up to Wasil, which is on the lower slopes of the Masar range. Between Wasil and Menakha the road was clear of the insurgents.

Colonel Riza Bey entered Menakha on the 24th afternoon with two battalions, posting the other four along the road to keep his communications open with Menakha.

It will thus be seen that the Turkish force avoided the Wadi Hajjan, where the rebels were posted in great strength along the mountains commanding it, and, in doing so, encountered no opposition whatever in its advance on Menakha.

In the plains, Seyyid Hussein with 2,000 levies from the Kohra tribe co-operated with the military authorities against the rebels fortified in the Labab heights.

On the 27th ultimo General Ibrahim Pasha left Djabana for the front with three battalions of regulars, and will be joined with five other battalions at Obal. This force will operate against the insurgents that have rallied near the Anis boundary of Djebel Reima and clear the mountainous country between Hujjeila and Menakha.

Seyyid Yahya's levies now finding it almost impossible to take Menakha have abandoned the idea and have moved Sana'awards, and are concentrating their attacks on the outposts lying between the two above-mentioned places, viz., at Ijz, Mefak, Suk-el-Khamis, Buan, and Senam Pasha.

The garrisons at these places are small, and, although completely isolated during the past ten or twelve weeks, have been able to hold out owing to the rebels not assuming the offensive.

Heliographic communication between Sana'a and Menakha viâ Suk-el-Khamis, that had been partially maintained up to the end of February, has since been completely cut off owing to the insurgents having transferred the scene of their activities Sana'awards.

I am unable to obtain confirmation of the reports received and transmitted to your Excellency, announcing the fall of Anis, Damar, Rida, and Yerim.

General Izzat Pasha informed me this morning that he was only aware that the town of Yerim had actually been captured by the rebels, but added that some fighting was going on near Damar.

The garrisons in the El Hajjeh and El Hujjur districts it would appear are in a position to keep the rebels at bay, and the military authorities display no anxiety on their account, as they are well supplied with provisions and munitions of war.

Up to date, 13 battalions of Nizam infantry, 8,500 men strong, have been landed here for suppression of the revolt and operations against Seyyid Yahya's levies, and two battalions of 1,200 men in all disembarked at Mokha for service in the Taiz district.

I learn incidentally that it is proposed to send two field and seven mountain batteries to the Yemen, of which both field batteries and two of the mountain batteries have already been landed at the Djabana anchorage.

I have, however, no confirmation of the fact of the batteries of artillery referred to having arrived.

With truth and great respect, I have, &c.
G. A. RICHARDSON.

[11013] No. 3.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 3, 1911.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 27th September, 1909, relative to British jurisdiction over foreigners at Bahrein, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to enquire whether any further steps have been taken to relieve the sheikh of his responsibility in this respect in accordance with his request.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[11579] No. 4.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April* 4, 1911.

BAHREINIS at Bussorah.

See my telegram No. 81 of the 30th March.

His Majesty's consul at Bussorah should be kept informed of action taken by His Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople. Have orders for release of Bahreinis been sent?

[12603] No. 5.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 77.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, April* 5, 1911.

BAHREINIS.

With reference to your telegram No. 84 of yesterday, the Sublime Porte sent orders on the 2nd April directing the prisoners to be released on bail. His Majesty's consul at Bussorah has been kept informed, but I have not yet heard from him whether effect has been given to these orders.

According to Mr. Crow, vali instructed police to detain the men on their refusal to take out Ottoman papers, and directed that they should be reported as disturbers of the peace.

An accusation of applying by letter to Bahrein authorities for papers of protection was accordingly made against the men.

They were kept under arrest for six days, and then warrants were issued against them, describing them as Ottoman subjects, and charging them with "disturbing the peace."

[12725] No. 6.

Memorandum communicated by Mr. Lynch, April 6, 1911.

OUR latest information is that we have 4,500 tons, and the Turkish company 2,500 tons of cargo at Bussorah awaiting shipment to Bagdad. Over 80 per cent. of this cargo is British.

The steamers plying on the river are unable to cope with this traffic under present conditions. Meantime much loss is being inflicted on the owners of these 7,000 tons of cargo. If each of our three steamers were allowed to tow their full complement of barges (as some of the Turkish steamers have been doing of late) we should be able to deal with an additional 500 tons a-month, and this would probably suffice for immediate requirements.

The only obstacle to fair treatment of commerce in these regions is the refusal of the Turkish authorities to permit us to use the resources we possess. Their own resources are fully employed, and cannot be augmented in less than twelve months.

It doubtless suits Turko-German policy to hamper British trade interests in Mesopotamia, for thereby Britain's claims in regard to the future developments of the region are minimised, and trading opportunities remain in abeyance until such time as the German trader is better able to compete.

In accordance with the terms of the railway concession the Bagdad Railway Company has the right to transport material by way of the Tigris in their own steamers, and it is inevitable that they will try to safeguard the connection between their railway terminus at Bagdad and the Gulf by making this river service permanent. German competition may thus meet us on our own sphere on the river Tigris.

It appears, therefore, essential that we should strengthen our position by making good the privilege we claim of utilising our three steamers to their full carrying capacity, i.e., there should be no limitation to the number of barges they should draw.

In this connection our agent at Bussorah has advised us by letter of the 10th December as follows:—

"Mr. Crow carefully examined the files in the consulate regarding the question of towing barges, and found nothing therein that would preclude us from towing two or more barges with each steamer."

We believe there is nothing to preclude our doing so. Sir N. O'Conor, when negotiating for the right of adding a third steamer to our service under circumstances similar to those of the present time, deprecated any reference to barges lest the Turkish Government might seek to limit their number.

The very serious state of affairs arising out of this congestion of cargo at Bussorah offers an excellent opportunity for a settlement in the sense indicated.

I trust that the Foreign Office will deal with this matter without delay.

A question of much greater importance is that of our future position on the water communications of Mesopotamia.

The negotiations begun during the last months of Sultan Abdul Hamid's reign, at the instance of the Foreign Office, for the purpose of effecting an understanding between the Euphrates and Tigris company and the Turkish service, still remain incomplete. The form of the understanding, a fusion of the two companies into an Ottoman company under British control, was determined by the Minister of the Civil List with the approval of the Grand Vizier Hilmi Pasha. Negotiations ceased when the counter-revolution took place, and were reopened by the Cabinet, which took office with Hilmi Pasha as Grand Vizier. An agreement was drawn up and agreed to by the Cabinet, by whom it was passed on to the Chamber for ratification. The Chamber passed a resolution giving the Cabinet power to conclude the agreement, provided no fresh burden were placed on the finances of the country. This proviso had special reference to a clause of the agreement which set forth that, in the event of navigation being destroyed by irrigation, compensation should be paid by Government. This would, it was argued, lead to financial obligation on the part of Government. Proposals were at once made by the Euphrates and Tigris Company for obviating this difficulty. They met with no success.

It soon became apparent that the Cabinet wished to shelve the question, and the Foreign Office gave us to understand that further diplomatic pressure was undesirable —in any case for the time being.

Circumstances now appear to have changed. Negotiations are taking place between the British and Turkish Governments on the subject of the Bagdad Railway, and I gather therefrom that the relations of the two Governments are of a more friendly nature.

The question of the Bagdad–Gulf section of the railway, and that of the grand line of communication by way of the Tigris, cannot, I venture to believe, be treated except as part of one and the same great question. I therefore hope that the time has come for a definite settlement of the original negotiations between the Euphrates and Tigris Company and the Turkish Government, and that it will be found possible to fuse the companies on the lines approved by the Chamber. With a modicum of good will on the part of the Turkish Government, the difficulty of further financial obligation will readily find its solution.

H. PICOT.

March 29, 1911.

[12776] No. 7.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 79.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, April* 6, 1911.

BAHREINESE.

Referring to my telegram No. 77 of yesterday, I have received a telegram from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah reporting that on the 5th April he sent his dragoman to enquire whether instructions had been received, as sent from here, to release the natives on bail. The dragoman was told by the vali in reply that, as the case was criminal and tribunals could not be interfered with by the vali, His Majesty's consul must be wiser than the Minister for Foreign Affairs. His Excellency had received the telegram, which he would not pass on, but put it in his bag, paying no attention to it; he thought the Minister for Foreign Affairs was laughing at His Majesty's Ambassador, as he knew

quite well that under the constitution no interference with the tribunals is permissible. It was for the Minister of Justice to give the necessary instructions if the dragoman has the right to attend in such cases; and His Majesty's Ambassador should not accept such instructions from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was a fool to issue them.

The question of the attendance of the dragoman at the trial, which might be considered as an admission of our right to protect Bahreinese, is being made the subject of further representations by me, but seeing that the communication made by the vali, to which Mr. Crow refers in his telegram No. 56 (repeated to you in my telegram No. 66), was in writing, it is a question whether the issue raised as to our position in Bahrein by the vali would be considered to be satisfactorily solved by the admission of the dragoman to the trial. It might be advisable that we should insist on the position taken up in the vali's written communication being annulled by a written communication from the Minister for Foreign Affairs or from the vali on the spot.

[12781] No. 8.

Sir C. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 114.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, April 6, 1911.*

PERSIAN Embassy at Constantinople has informed Mahtashem-es-Sultaneh, who is my informant, that the Porte, in order to raise funds for the construction of a school and a hospital, intend to sell treasures at the shrines of Nedjef and Kerbela, which it has been decided to sell.

It is quite possible that Kerbela and Nedjef may be the scene of disorders in consequence, as the Shiite world will be deeply offended by such action.

[12603] No. 9.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 87.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April 6, 1911.*

DETENTION of Bahreinese at Bussorah.

Please see your telegram No. 77 of yesterday.

Release of Bahreinese on bail is not sufficient; you should at once press for their unconditional release. The delay of the Porte in this matter is creating a very bad impression, and they have already been too long in dealing with it.

[12913] No. 10.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, April 7, 1910.*

BAHREINESE at Bussorah.

In reply to your telegram No. 87 of the 6th April, it would seem that the Minister for Foreign Affairs in simply sending instructions for the release of the Bahreinese on bail wishes to evade any such settlement of the principle raised in writing, by the vali, as I had pressed for in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 81 of the 30th March. As to-day is Friday, I am seeing Minister for Foreign Affairs to-morrow, and I would suggest, with reference to my telegram No. 77, that I might now endeavour to secure a definite settlement of the question of principle involved by addressing him in writing, reminding him of the correspondence of 1874, 1893, 1895, and 1896.

[12790] No. 11.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, April 7, 1911.*

I HAVE had my attention called by Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the fact that of the treasures mentioned in my telegram No. 114 of the 6th April, a considerable part is composed of gifts from various princes and rajahs in India.

[12776] No. 12.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April 7, 1911.*

DETENTION of Bahreinis at Bussorah.

Please see your telegram No. 79 of yesterday.

You should demand immediate and unconditional release of Bahreinis, who were arrested for not taking out Turkish passports. This is really an offence of the vali and not of the Bahreinis, and you should insist that a severe reprimand be administered to him. If this is not agreed to, negotiation with the Porte about the Gulf will be out of the question, and we shall look after our own interests.

A note should be addressed to Rifaat Pasha at once, protesting in the strongest terms against the vali's insolence and hostility.

[12781] No. 13.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 92.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April 7, 1911.*

PLEASE ascertain confidentially what truth there is in report contained in Tehran telegrams Nos. 114 and 115 of yesterday and to-day regarding proposed sale of treasures of Kerbela and Nejef.

You should be careful not to criticise the proposal in any way and to make no official enquiry.

[13064] No. 14.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic. P. *Constantinople, April 8, 1911.*

KERBELA and Nejef treasure.

With reference to your telegram No. 92 of the 7th instant, I learn that some ten days ago the Sheikh-ul-Islam issued the fetva. My Persian colleague is trying to discover whether it appears from the inventory which, at the time of Nasr-ed-Din Shah's visit to Nejef, was made in conjunction with the Turks the ownership is vested with the Persian religious authorities or with the Turkish custodian of the shrines.

[13063] No. 15.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 86.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, April 9, 1911.*

BAHREINIS.

Rifaat Pasha, to whom I yesterday handed note as instructed in your telegram No. 91 of the 7th instant, told me that the Minister of Justice has now sent instructions.

A telegram which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah states that one of the Bahreinis is still detained, while the other two were discharged on the 6th April.

[13107] No. 16.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 214.)
Constantinople, April 2, 1911.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 438 of the 29th June, 1910, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum, reporting on the situation at Mush.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 16.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 16.)

Sir, *Erzeroum, March* 20, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which Mr. Safrastian, acting vice-consul at Bitlis, has addressed to me on the subject of the unjust treatment which the leaders of the Dashnakist party are alleged to be experiencing at the hands of the Ottoman authorities of Mush.

I venture to remark that the accusation of misappropriation of funds is nothing new, and finds credence nowhere more readily than among the Armenians themselves, so that, while Mr. Safrastian is undoubtedly correct in his assertion that disappointment with the constitutional régime is spreading among the Armenians, it is, I think, equally true that the mistrust of the Dashnakists is daily gaining ground among them.

I have, &c.

P. J. C. McGREGOR.

Enclosure 2 in No. 16.

Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor.

(No. 4.)

Sir, *Bitlis, February* 24, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report as follows upon the present state of affairs at Mush, and the relations of the local authorities towards the Armenian Liberals especially, and the Armenian element in general.

As I had the honour to inform you by my despatch of the 12th June last, as a result of the incident occurring between Tahir Pasha, the then vali here, and the Armenian Dashnaksutiun Committee leaders in Mush, the former in order to crush any resistance on the part of the latter, had managed to get some forged documents against the leaders in question, which charged them with having extorted money by force from the Armenian villagers of Kordakom, in Mush, and instead of using it for the benefit of the Armenian schools' fund, as it was meant, they appropriated it for their own illegitimate ends. From my subsequent reports you are aware, no doubt, as to how Tahir Pasha began to persecute the Liberals, and then how those persecutions ceased in consequence of definite orders from Constantinople.

I now understand on good authority that in July last the Minister of the Interior and the Dashnakist Central Committee at Constantinople agreed that both Tahir Pasha and M. Karmen, the Armenian leader in Mush, were to be removed from this province, and the dispute was thus supposed as settled.

Under the evil influence of one, Hadji Nazir Aga of Mush, a notorious Kurd against whom the Dashnakists waged a furious struggle, the judicial courts of Mush viewed the question in a different way. One, Kiazim Effendi, the examining magistrate at Mush, was dismissed by the intrigues of Tahir Pasha for not having sanctioned the imprisonment of the leaders in question as the vali wished, and for his having publicly stated that the ignorant Kurdish witnesses against M. Karmen were so well taught by somebody, and all six gave evidence in such similar phrases, that it appeared they came not from illiterate human beings, but from a perfect gramophone.

In vain Mgr. Kharakhanian, the well-known Armenian bishop of Mush, intervened in the matter, stating that the committee appointed for the collection of funds for the benefit of schools acted under his presidency, and that there was nothing unlawful in the transactions.

It was a foregone conclusion, it seems, that Armenian leaders were to be imprisoned or disposed of somehow in order to put an end to their untiring watchfulness in the agrarian disputes and others, which they rightly exercised on behalf of Armenia's oppressed peasantry. All claims of justice and convincing proofs of honesty put forth by M. Karmen and his companions were completely overlooked by the law courts of Mush, and therefore they were convicted on a charge of crime ("djinnet"), and their imprisonment was ordered pending trial.

M. Karmen had already left this province soon after the departure of Tahir Pasha from here; and to Gorun and other leaders implicated in the matter, they hid themselves since the beginning of January last, upon which the authorities at Mush are reported as undertaking perquisitions and searches after the old régime in various villages of Mush for the discovery of the required leaders.

This crying injustice towards such loyal Ottomans and patriots as Karmen and the like, who, since the proclamation of the constitution, have done all they could for the consolidation of the constitutional régime in this region in agreement with the Committee of Union and Progress for the enlightment of illiterate masses and a mutual understanding among the races, have aroused considerable discontent amid all classes of Armenians, who, since a certain time, are perceptibly growing disappointed at the procedure of the Liberal Government. The hopeful prospects and enthusiasm of former days is gradually giving way to suspicions and hatred. One cannot easily understand the reasons of the present authorities for their revulsion to the practices of Hamidian Government, and their departure from the liberal and humane professions of the early days of the new régime.

Ordinary brigands and thieves, such as Kurds of Khuyt, and the notorious criminal, murderer, and political agitator of more than thirty years, such as Musa Bey of Khevner, are still allowed to continue freely their nefarious work, whilst Armenian Liberals are being condemned to imprisonment upon unfounded charges.

(Confidential.)

Talaat Bey, the ex-Minister of the Interior, warmly thanked M. Karmen by a private letter some time ago for his services and patriotic efforts displayed in organising co-operation among the races, and after the incident with Tahir Pasha his Excellency proposed him the post of a kaimakam in Macedonia, whereas he is now being pursued as a criminal.

In my humble opinion, any Government in the world possessed of any sense of justice and common sense would not behave in such a discreditable manner.

All those who know Gorun closely agree that that militant fedai would scarcely submit to an unjust decision and consent to go to prison. Some weeks ago it was rumoured that as a demonstration of protest, he entrenched himself in Sasun with his armed band of twenty-five ready to fight any force which came to arrest him. Happily this rumour proved to be exaggerated.

It is still to be feared, however, should the Government persist in their blind and one-sided policy, Gorun may carry out his resolution, the consequences of which can, under no circumstances, be favourable to the general interests of this country.

I humbly venture to hope that sounder judgment may still prevail, and the documents of the case, which have just been referred to the indictment court here ("tribunal de la mise en accusation"), may equitably be revised and the decision of the Mush court repealed by exculpating and acquitting the Armenian committee leaders in question.

I have, &c.

A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

[13111] No. 17.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 218.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April* 4, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 503 of the 23rd July of last year, I have the honour to report that the permission granted last year for the use of diving apparatus in connection with sponge fisheries has been renewed for the period of one year from the 1st (14th) March, 1911.

In communicating this decision the administrative council have invited the general direction of the Imperial Ottoman debt to bring about as soon as possible a definite solution of the delicate question of the employment of diving apparatus in these fisheries.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[13144] No. 18.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 86.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, April* 4, 1911.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 90 of the 25th of last month, I have the honour to report that, in the course of a conversation which I had with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, I asked his Excellency whether he could tell me

what attitude the Russian Embassy was adopting at present on the question of the Samsun–Sivas railway.

M. Nératoff repeated what M. Sazonoff had already told me, as reported in my despatch No. 45 of the 21st February last, that the Russian Ambassador had been instructed to support the French group, that was endeavouring to obtain the contract for its construction, should the French Ambassador request him to do so. Though the Russian Government might consent eventually to a revision of the agreement of 1900 respecting the Black Sea Basin, there was, his Excellency said, no question at present of their abandoning the attitude which they had adopted in their recent negotiations with Germany with regard to the construction of lines from the Bagdad Railway in a north-easterly direction towards the Russian and Persian frontiers. Their consent to any modification of the 1900 agreement would naturally depend on the concessions which the Turkish Government might be disposed to offer them in return.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[13116] No. 19.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 223.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 5, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith summaries of events in the provinces of the Ottoman Empire during the quarter ended the 31st March, together with reports from His Majesty's consular officers at Adrianople and Aleppo for the same period.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 19.

Quarterly Report on Macedonia for January–April 1911.

Macedonian Budget.

THE budgets of the three vilayets for the financial year 1325 (1909–1910) shows an expenditure of £ T. 2,996,188·50, which is raised by the addition of payments relating to previous years made during this period to £ T. 3,165,791·61. The total revenues amount to £ T. 3,393,465·48, giving a surplus of £ T. 227,773·86, which surplus has been used to extinguish the remaining deficits of 1321 (£ T. 5,100·10) and towards the amortisation of the deficit of 1322 (£ T. 222,573·76). To the latter purpose the Ministry of Finance have contributed during 1325 £ T. 25,000, and towards the deficit of 1323 £ T. 7,500, making a total of £ T. 260,173·86 in the sum total of these deficits. They had in the end of 1324 figured at £ T. 347,405·07, and are now reduced to £ T. 87,231·21.

Though the special Macedonian Budget for 1325 was never ratified, it was used as the basis for the treasury service until the end of the financial year. As compared with its provisions, the receipts showed an increment of £ T. 269,349·48 and the expenditure an increase of £ T. 151,201·61. The net increase in the receipts for this year over those of 1324 is £ T. 108,309·22; while that in expenditure is £ T. 137,984·84.

Macedonian Crimes.

The political crimes recorded for the months of January and February amounted to seven for each month, the victims being mostly Bulgarians. The rigour of the winter may partly have accounted for this result, partly also the activity displayed by the gendarmes in hunting down bands, especially in the districts of Kassandra and Katerina, and partly also the increasing courage on the part of the villagers in indicating the whereabouts of bandsmen. In January there were several encounters on the Greek and Bulgarian frontiers, several cases of incendiarism and attacks on shepherds; in February hardly any encounters until the last days of the month, when at Kommanova and near Salonica there occurred several affrays. The month of March was characterised by some incidents on the Greek frontier, which, however, were amicably arranged.

By the end of January all the courts-martial in the Kossovo district were abolished, the last being that at Kotchana, which closed its career by sentencing seven Bulgarians to death. The Uskub court-martial took over the cases which still remained unheard.

Many cases of beatings, torture, ill-usage, and condemnations to minor sentences have been reported against Bulgarians on pretext of having weapons concealed, of being implicated in last autumn's dynamite and other outrages, or of belonging to secret organisations.

Macedonian Churches.

The application of the new law has not found absolute acquiescence, and three cases of disputed possession of churches occurred in the Monastir Vilayet in the month of January alone.

Salonica Vilayet: Boycott.

The Salonica guild of lightermen proclaimed a boycott in January against one of the American Hadji Daoud steamers on account of an incident which had occurred recently at Smyrna on board another vessel of this company; the boycott lasted for two days, and was then put a stop to through the active measures taken by the American consul.

Twice during the month of February and the month of March the Turks fired on Greek vessels entering the Gulf of Arta, but fortunately the incidents had no sequence.

Vodena Incident.

On the 19th January an incident occurred at the village of Vodena, which has given rise to a claim for damages by British subjects. After a meeting held at the municipality, at which a document was produced purporting to establish the villagers' right to cut down wood in certain forests, now belonging to British subjects, for household purposes, some 200 Vodenese proceeded to these forests, situated at Oshani and Podos, and devastated them during the next three days, cutting down and injuring the trees. They seem to have been instigated by the local Committee of Union and Progress from motives of hostility to foreign owners of land and property, and to have been encouraged by the local authorities, nor was the Vali of Salonica, though forewarned, able at first to prevent the devastation. The British subjects, Messrs. Canelli and Jacob Juda, who have been in undisputed possession of these forests for thirty years, have therefore been compelled to put in a claim for 300*l.* damages, apart from any further losses which may be incurred by the former in connection with his present endeavour to form a company in England to exploit these lands. The vali has admitted the illegality of the proceedings, and has had the local commandant and sergeant of police arrested; and the Sublime Porte, while also accepting responsibility, has referred the plaintiffs to the law courts, so that for the moment no further intervention is required on the part of His Majesty's Embassy.

Monastir Vilayet.

A commission of enquiry was sent in January to revise the sentences passed by the Monastir court-martial; it did nothing, however, beyond recommending some improvements in the extremely insanitary condition of the prison there.

Meanwhile, much dissatisfaction was caused among the villagers of the vilayet by the exaction of the so-called voluntary subscriptions for the Ottoman fleet, and there was also discernible a growing hostility to the influence of the Committee of Union and Progress. This hostility was openly expressed by the Mufti of Monastir, supported by the people, and the split which existed within the ranks of the party was accentuated by the local committee organ, the "Nehir Hakikat," whose violent articles directed against the Constantinople Committee and Cabinet, and advocating increased severity against the Christians, and especially Bulgarians, brought down upon that paper the hand of the Government armed with the provisions of the press law. The Vali Reshid Pasha and the Ferik continued to hold the balance between the two parties and to prevent any outbreak; the Mufti and his chief opponent, the chief of the police, were removed, and the old committee party only obtained an unfair victory by arbitrarily sending their list of candidates for president and officers of the party to Salonica, and so obtaining their own re-election.

Disarmament and Government Policy.

About the end of January a change came over the policy of the Government, and it became more conciliatory. The printing press at Monastir was reopened, and, although all Albanian papers remained still suspended, the most influential Albanian chiefs were allowed to return, and Albanian schools were allowed to be opened if funds

could be found to support them. An order was issued requiring all Albanians in the vilayet of Monastir to register their property; this was much resented, and at Dibra the peasants resisted the order, and some shots were fired; no one was hurt, but the dispatch of some soldiers to protect the officials engaged in carrying out the register gave rise to a false rumour that there had been a revolt among the troops.

The disarmament proceedings are shown to have been quite ineffective, both the Government and the adherents of the Opposition being actively engaged in re-arming their followers. On the Government side many Moslems had not originally been disarmed, and excuses have easily been found now to arm the bekdjis, tax-collectors, and land-owners, while, on the other hand, hundreds of weapons are coming in from Montenegro; 10,000 rifles were recently bought at Dibra alone, and the latest calculations available estimate the Bulgarian population to possess some 20,000 rifles, 17,000 revolvers, and 10,800 bombs of various kinds.

Religious Questions.

An endeavour is being made by the Roumanian and Albanian orthodox elements as an outcome of their nationalistic aims to obtain the same position as regards the Patriarchate as the Bulgars, and in particular to get the control of their ecclesiastical administration, and to have services held in the popular tongue. The Government for their own ends seem inclined to encourage these separatist aspirations.

Alphabet Question.

In conformity with the recent change to a more conciliatory policy, the Government have, while keeping the Arabic characters in Government schools, given permission for Latin letters to be employed in schools supported from Albanian sources.

Kossovo Vilayet.

A commission of enquiry was sent in the winter under Kenan Pasha into the disturbed districts; and as a result of its investigations, it is believed to have condemned the whole policy of repression advocated by the ex-Vali Mazhar Bey, whose removal to Adrianople was perhaps intended to placate the population. A general amnesty was proclaimed for all fugitives, and the Governor of Djakova proceeded to Beram to interview a number of these men; but they rejected all overtures, threatened a revival of revolt in the spring, and to a man refrained from availing themselves of the amnesty; on the contrary, they continued their propaganda and came to a sort of truce with the Bulgarians, but having no leaders they remained disunited, and have even fallen already to quarrelling among themselves.

Kossovo Vilayet: Bosnian Immigration.

Of the 1,500 families (8,000 souls) who immigrated into the vilayet by the end of 1910, 150 families returned to Bosnia; the Government finding the whole scheme a failure have allowed no more to immigrate, while the Austrian Government show no inclination to accept the immigrants back. The settlements have been planted in purely Christian (generally Bulgarian) districts, though only farms belonging to Moslem owners were purchased for the purpose. The immigrants have proved themselves to be a thriftless and worthless class, and the Government only regret the £T. 52,000 already spent on them.

Scutari Vilayet: Montenegrin Frontier.

The Vali of Scutari proceeded in December to Cettinjé whence he returned on the 2nd January, having signed with the Montenegrin Government a protocol whereby the Ottoman Government bound themselves to demolish a frontier post erected by their troops at Ezero in Montenegrin territory as a condition preliminary to further frontier delimitation proceedings; but no further negotiations are anticipated before the spring. Meanwhile, as an outcome of the pacification measures taken throughout Albania, sympathetic relations have been established between the Montenegrins and the Albanian mountain clans.

Albanian Rising.

While the country remained much agitated by the recent expedition of Torgoud Pasha, fresh cause for discontent was occasioned by the Government's decision to call out not only the young men between 21 and 26 for service, but also all

those past the age for active service up to 45 or 50 years of age, with a view to forming a territorial militia. They protested that the military service law was not retroactive, and once that they had to give up their arms they could not take them back again for military service; and the young men evaded service by flight to the hills or to Montenegro, or else by forming bands. Various acts of violence were reported in the end of February from the Mirdite district, and from Klementi, Hotti, and Kastrati, which became the rallying point of the disaffected. Several Turkish soldiers were killed in the Hotti district, and early in March an Albanian Moslem in Scutari itself shot two other soldiers who were making off with weapons purchased from him without payment. The Albanians who fled to Montenegro were said to be receiving a subsidy allowance of a florin a day.

About the middle of March more serious fighting took place at Mirdita, where the inhabitants attacked the Turkish garrison of Oroshi, whose withdrawal had been demanded, and was being, in fact, carried out in the direction of Scutari. Three Turkish officers were killed and several men; while some twenty more were blockaded in a half-way house. The kaïmakam with 1,100 men and five guns at once marched to the rescue, and entered Oroshi without great losses on either side.

The Government made use of this incident to detach the Moslems of Scutari from the Christian Albanians of the mountains, and by working on their mutual jealousies induced some 300 of the former to join the militia, but the enrolment was slow, and none of the country population could be prevailed upon to join the ranks.

In the last days of March a fresh outburst occurred in the same district; 4,000 Albanian mountaineers, aided by Montenegrins, took possession of several block-houses, after inflicting serious losses on the Turkish troops, and surrounded the small town of Touzi. Upon news of this outbreak the Scutari authorities prepared to defend that town, believing the rebels to be at hand, and summoned the people to arm and march out against them; 1,850 men answered the summons, but of these 1,300 merely carried the arms given them home; and the Christian population, alarmed at the town crier's apparently mistaken appeal to a "holy war," demanded the intervention of the foreign embassies at Constantinople. No further details have as yet been received here, but from latest press reports it would seem that the troops have marched on Touzi, where they have surrounded the rebels, whose surrender is expected immediately. The Montenegrin Government have formally declared that they are rendering no assistance to the Albanians.

A report has just been received from Monastir to the effect that 5,000 Albanians are in revolt in the highlands of Dibra.

Enclosure 2 in No. 19.

Memorandum respecting the Affairs of Anatolia.

SMYRNA.

CONSIDERABLE improvement has been noticeable in the working of the Smyrna law courts. No radical changes seem to have been introduced, but the Ministry of Justice exercises a more vigilant supervision, and promotion seems to depend less on favouritism than formerly. The judges and assistants are drawn from a better class than before the constitution, and have to pass through the law school at Constantinople, and the salaries of the assistants have been raised. Corruption has greatly decreased, and the large number of cases daily before the Correctional Court is a proof that charges can no longer be easily stifled by means of a bribe as in Hamidian days. The arrangement by which the foreign assessors in the Mixed Commercial Court now sit on either side of the President has also proved a success, the President explaining to them in French any intricate piece of evidence. Mr. Barnham, No. 4, January 23, 1911.

On the other hand, the sanitary condition of the town has not improved, and no suitable measures were taken either to purify certain sources of the water supply, or to clean the town when cholera was assuming large proportions, the excuse being that it was difficult to get the work done while a new municipal council was being elected. It is to be hoped, however, that should there be an epidemic during the spring something will be done, as a Mr. Barnham, No. 4, January 23, 1911

commission was sent at the end of January from Constantinople with large funds to be expended on sanitary work.

Mr. Barnham, No. 6, January 30, 1911.

Some attempt was made to collect the "temettu" tax from the agencies of the Oriental Carpet Company at Sivas and Konia, but representations to the Ministry of Finance by His Majesty's Embassy, pointing out that the company was an English limited company, secured immunity in both cases.

Mr. Barnham, No. 7. January 30, 1911.

Nothing had been heard of brigandage in the Smyrna district since October of last year, but in view of certain rumours current at Smyrna in the last days of January, special gendarmerie patrols were detailed to guard the roads between the town and the outlying villages, and other measures were decided upon with a view to creating an atmosphere of security.

Adana.

Mr. Koun, Mersina, No. 2; January 21, 1911.

The personal unpopularity of the Young Turk vali amongst his Moslem co-religionists, and a feeling which appears to have gained ground in Adana that the influence of the Committee of Union and Progress was waning, added to the free selling of fire-arms to Turks, gave rise to considerable alarm among the Armenian population. Towards the middle of January, a "mollah" was bold enough to proclaim death to the "giaours," which, he said, this time comprised the Young Turks, and the nervousness of the Christian population was further increased by a red paint mark ominously inscribed on certain Armenian houses.

Mr. Koun, No. 3. January 28, 1911.

The vali's attitude appears to have tranquillised the population. He published an article in the local paper under his own signature, qualifying the recent incidents as the puerile doings of irresponsible parties, but added that he would deal severely with any real disturbers of good order.

Mr. Smith, Adana, No. 2, March 6, 1911.

The progress of work on the section of the Bagdad Railway to Missis and beyond has been somewhat impeded by the floods, which have carried away the temporary bridge over the Seihun River and part of the framework of the permanent bridge over which the line is to pass. The damage done is estimated at between 4,000*l.* and 8,000*l.*, and it is said that the engineers will not reconstruct the temporary bridge, but proceed as quickly as possible with the permanent one. Meanwhile, work on the line to the east of the river will be delayed.

Erzeroum and Diarbekir.

Erzeroum.

Mr. McGregor, No. 1, January 7, 1911.

Tukizadé, a Persian Nationalist deputy, visited Erzeroum early in January, ostensibly on a pleasure trip, but the real object of his journey was to discuss matters with the local Committee of Union and Progress, and he visited the whole of the disputed frontier districts.

Great efforts are being made to increase the influence of the committee, which appears to be still fairly well established among the officials of the vilayet, one of whom, Nazim Bey, the Bash mudir of the Public Debt, a man of thinly-veiled chauvinistic opinions, has since been appointed "conseiller du comité" at Constantinople, and will probably perform the duties of extra-parliamentary leader of the committee party. (Mr. McGregor's No. 17 of the 20th March.)

Generally speaking, the committee is regarded with mingled fear and distrust by Christians and Moslems alike, while the Armenian Tashnakist Society, which works in with the committee, is daily losing its prestige. The committee are therefore anxious to increase their influence over the Armenians, while at the same time, in order to reassure the Moslem population, great respect is being exacted for all traditional usages of Islam.

No progress is being made in the agrarian question, and there is considerable rivalry between the two Armenian societies, the Tashnaksutiun and the Hinchak organisations, neither of which is really representative of Armenian public opinion, though the latter has a much larger following and does not seem to be hostile to the Armenian national institutions embodied in the Armenian Church, which is still looked to as the most trustworthy champion of Armenian interests.

The Kurds continue in their attitude of loyalty to their chiefs, and refuse to have any truck with the committee.

Mr. McGregor, No. 5, January 30, 1911.

An attempt was made to induce His Majesty's consul to identify himself with the committee by visiting their club at Erzeroum, and His Majesty's vice-consul at Bitlis was also approached direct by Young Turk officers on official subjects. The former refused the invitation, and the latter was warned to exercise caution in his conversations.

Mr. McGregor, No. 8, February 12, 1911.

Meanwhile the lawlessness among the Kurds, particularly in the Khuyt district, continues, and the authorities apparently no longer consider the ascendency of the Kurdish beys incompatible with the constitutional régime.

Diarbekir.

Mr. Matthews, January 17, 1911.

As instances of the committee's readiness to placate the Kurds it is proposed to transfer the seat of the Kaimakam of Midiat, a Christian town of 8,000 inhabitants, to a Kurdish village of 500 inhabitants, and, owing to the opposition of certain powerful Moslems, the Vali of Diarbekir was forced to dismiss the Christian mayor of that town who was appointed last year and replace him by a notoriously corrupt and reactionary Moslem notable—a member of the committee party. This created alarm among the Christian population, and led to protests from the Armenian community, in which, however, the Tashnakists refused to join.

Mr. Matthews, No. 2, February 2, 1911.

The severe winter caused terrible distress in the Diarbekir district, and all communications were cut off for at least six weeks.

Mr. Matthews, Telegraphic, February 21, 1911.

The German party to survey the route of the Bagdad Railway from El Halif to Bagdad passed through Mardin in March.

Mr. Matthews, Telegraphic, March 18, 1911.

Van.

Captain Molyneux-Seel, No. 1, January 9, 1911.

Early in January three inspectors of the Committee of Union and Progress arrived in Van, the principal of whom was one Kara Bey—an exponent of Pan-Islamism and former organiser of Armenian massacres—and apparently high in favour with Talaat Bey. Though a Russian subject, this individual was furnished with a Turkish passport to visit India and Afghanistan. Numerous secret meetings of the local committee took place shortly after the arrival of the three inspectors. Kara Bey, however, appears to have raised the suspicions of his companions by his apparent intimacy with the Russian consul. They thereupon demanded the funds and seals of which he was in charge, and secured his recall to Constantinople.

Captain Molyneux-Seel, No. 2, January 23, 1911.

Fearing for his life, Kara Bey was finally smuggled out of Van by the Russian consulate, after revealing interesting details in regard to the organisation and arms smuggling method of the secret Pan-Islamic Society, of which, he stated, Talaat Bey is the President.

Captain Molyneux-Seel, No. 4, January 30, 1911.

Measures for the repression of local brigandage have been taken, cavalry being sent from Van to pursue a band under Said Bey, a cousin of one Agha Bey, who was previously killed in an encounter with Government troops. Said Bey was captured, but soon afterwards escaped to the Persian frontier.

Captain Molyneux-Seel, No. 5, February 6, 1911.

Early in February His Majesty's vice-consul returned from a journey to Erzingan viâ Bitlis and Mush.

Between Van and Bitlis he found the Armenians in an improved and prosperous condition, but much discontented at the continued apathy of the Government in regard to the question of their stolen lands. On the other hand, the sense of personal security has made them insolent towards the Turks.

At Mush the land question is complicated by the claims of the Rayà Kurds for the restoration of the lands taken from them by their Aghas under the old régime. Here also the Armenians have assumed a most provocative attitude, while the Kurds still distinguish themselves by their fanaticism and ignorance.

The inhabitants of the small villages between Mush and Erzingan show signs of prosperity, some of the villagers having recently returned from Canada, whither they had emigrated, but here too the Armenians are adopting high-handed tactics *vis-à-vis* of the authorities. The Kurdish beys, too,

finding themselves deprived of their moral ascendency and pecuniary advantages, do not cease, at least covertly, to manifest their discontent with the new régime.

Erzingan, though small, boasts of considerable commercial development, there being weaving, tanning, copper ware and silk industries, Manchester cotton and copper for these being imported from England.

The Armenians of Erzingan have in the past been free from massacres, but their fears have now been raised by certain officials, who state that, in view of Armenian insolence, they cannot answer for the consequences.

The humouring and pampering of the Kurds is even taken by some of the more educated Armenians to mean that the local Government has doubts as to the permanency of the constitution, and wants to have the Kurds at their beck and call, should necessity arise.

At Van, the Armenian recruits are not given arms, but set to do menial work, and the courts of justice show no improvement, the officials being as apathetic, lazy, and incapable as ever.

Captain Molyneux-Seel, No. 6, February 27, 1911.

Captain Molyneux-Seel, March 13, 1911.

In February, a feeling of uneasiness was aroused among the Armenians owing to fears of a Kurdish rising in the spring, which, however, do not appear to be shared by the local authorities. This uneasiness was increased by a report current at Van in March that several hundred rifles and a quantity of gunpowder had been stolen from the citadel and presumably found their way into the hands of reactionary Kurds, a report which was strenuously denied by the local authorities, who, however, admitted their weakness in the absence of a vali or military commandant.

Another instance of the slackness of administration is the failure to bring to justice the Kurdish murderers of six Armenians who were killed at Adeljivas in October 1909, and the mock trial condemning probably imaginary culprits to death, who are not in the hands of the authorities, has added to the general dissatisfaction of the local Armenians.

Enclosure 3 in No. 19.

Report of Information respecting Syria received during Quarter ended March 31, 1911.

Druze Insurrection in the Hauran.

BY the end of the year the Druze rising seems to have been crushed by the large force sent to deal with it: the Druzes submitted to disarmament and furnished 1,300 recruits. But there remained a general apprehension in Damascus that they were only awaiting the withdrawal of the troops to reassert their independence. On the 5th March three of the 190 Druze prisoners in Damascus were hanged; Sâmi Pasha told Mr. Devey at the time that there would probably be three more executions, and these were in fact carried out on the 14th and 16th March. One prisoner was condemned to imprisonment for life, four to fifteen years, and about sixty-five others to terms varying from ten years to less than a year. The executions aroused some excitement among the Druzes, and there were some small demonstrations on the railway by groups of Druzes, who tried to stop the train carrying Fatih Pasha, the ex-commander-in-chief of the district, who had been transferred to Monastir. The Jebel Druze, however, remained orderly, and the administration appears to be carried on successfully, and by the 1st February some of the troops were already returning from the Hauran.

Bedouin Attacks on Hedjaz Railway and Kerak.

The subsidy for the protection of the Hedjaz Railway, the non-payment of which was the chief cause of these troubles, has now been paid to the Bedouins, but Mr. Devey reported on the 3rd January that there was talk of a punitive expedition, and on the 11th January he reported that there were almost daily skirmishes between troops and small bands of Bedouins. Mr. Satow heard that most of the Bedouins were still hiding near the town of Kerak, and that there would always be danger of further troubles unless the ringleaders—the heads of the Mejelleh tribe—were deported. The damage done to the railway is estimated at some 30,000*l.*; about sixteen stations were destroyed, some

rolling-stock burnt or injured, and the keystones of five bridges removed; the latter have been temporarily repaired, but would not be safe in case of floods. Mr. Satow received information that during the troubles at Kerak there were killed about 800 Turks, 100 strangers (from Damascus and elsewhere), 200 Bedouins, and 4 Christians. The Arabs had restored only about £ T. 300 and twelve mule-loads of loot. It appears that the first troops to enter the town also started looting Christian houses, but were stopped on complaint being made.

The Ansayriehs.

In the course of a tour in the north of the vilayet the Vali of Beirout paid a special visit in December to the Ansayriehs, who number about 80,000, and enjoy a certain amount of independence analogous to the former state of the Druzes. He endeavoured to persuade them to submit to assimilation to the rest of the Empire, but they asked for a delay till the spring before giving a definite reply to his exhortations.

Effect of Yemen Revolt in Syria.

Mr. Cumberbatch reports that, though, in the opinion of many, all Syrian Arabs cherish a separatist idea, he has no knowledge of any organisation for carrying it out, the only indication of the sentiment being a tendency to insist on the use of Arabic.

Mr. Cumberbatch received a visit from the Algerian Emir Abdullah-bin-Abdul-Kader-el-Hasani and his brother Emir Ali, of Damascus. Emir Abdullah was returning from exile at Rhodes, to which he had been condemned by court-martial in 1909 for connection with the "Mahommedan Union," and both brothers betrayed unmistakable animosity towards the Government and sympathy with the Yemen rebels; but they have, perhaps, not much influence outside their Algerian community.

German Murder Case.

The trial ended on the 24th January; one man was condemned to death, one to fifteen years' imprisonment, one to four, and three to three years. The death penalty was only secured by the firmness of the German consul, and is likely even yet to be quashed by the Court of Cassation.

Distress at Aleppo.

Owing to the severe cold and heavy snowfall during January great distress prevailed in Aleppo, the scarcity of fuel being a special hardship. The Government sent a small sum for relief, and the French Ambassador sent 40*l.* for French subjects. There was no destitution among British subjects.

Enclosure 4 in No. 19.

Quarterly Report on Arabia.

Revolt in the Yemen.

THE situation in the Yemen at the beginning of the year showed no signs of improvement. Armed bands continued their activity under Imam Yahya in the mountains, and under Seyyid Idrisee in the Tehama, whilst rebellious movements broke out in other parts of the vilayet. The mutessarif and commandant of Assyr, General Suleiman Pasha, was besieged in Ibha; Sana'a was also surrounded by the rebels, and telegraphic communications between the Yemen and the outer world were completely interrupted.

General Seyyid Pasha, who had been nominated mutessarif of the Assyr Sanjak in the place of Suleiman Pasha, was prevented by the hostility of the tribesmen from proceeding to Ibha. He attempted to arrange an interview with the Seyyid Idrisee, but the latter declined to receive him before the acceptance of a series of preposterous demands, such as the demolition of the Turkish forts on the Assyr littoral, and the withdrawal of Ottoman forces from the Seyyid's sphere of influence.

The necessity of military operations on a large scale became apparent, and the

Turkish Government decided to send an expedition of thirty-one battalions of infantry, five batteries of artillery, and three companies of mountain guns against the insurgents.

Field-Marshal Abdullah Pasha, who had been appointed Commander-in-chief in the Yemen, died at the beginning of February before he could start for his new command, and General Izzet Pasha was appointed in his place.

Early in February the rebels captured the heights giving access to Menekha and laid siege to the town, but on the approach of the Turkish troops they abandoned their position and retreated in the direction of Sana'a.

Turco-Italian Incident.

In August 1910 an Italian dhow was seized by a Turkish gun-boat in the act of landing contraband goods at Medi, about 100 miles north of Hodeidah. The Italian consul-general protested that the dhow had only put in to Medi for repairs, and, boarding it himself, he remained there for four days armed to the teeth.

The case was then referred to Constantinople, and on the 11th February, 1911, Baron Aliotti and Saleh Bey, the Italian and Ottoman commissioners, arrived at Hodeidah to inquire into the matter.

Contributions for the Ottoman Fleet.

During the recent pilgrimage proclamations were issued in nearly all the Islamic languages (Turkish, Arabic, Persian, Hindustani, &c.) calling on the pilgrims to contribute to the Ottoman fleet. The total realised was about £T. 9,000.

Enclosure 5 in No. 19.

Quarterly Report on Affairs in Mesopotamia.

Demolitions at Bagdad.

IT was reported on the 4th January that fresh encroachments on Messrs. Lynch's property were proposed by the authorities, the intention of the latter being to run a road through Messrs. Lynch's property, involving a further expropriation of about 400 square metres of land. With regard to former demolitions of Messrs Lynch's property, respecting which no agreement had been come to, inquiries at Bagdad elicited the fact that the expropriation was illegal, and Messrs. Lynch were therefore advised to take legal action against the municipality, and the suggestion was also made that as the Bagdad municipal loan was on the point of being concluded, a sequester might be laid on the latter for the amount necessary to cover the claim.

Messrs. Lynch's agent, however, reported that it was impossible to take legal action, as no reliable lawyer would take up the case for fear of the vali.

The Sublime Porte maintained that the expropriations had been carried out in accordance with the law, and denied any knowledge of the demolition of the property of Ahmed Ali Khan, whose case was made a subject of protest to the Sublime Porte at the same time as the case of Messrs. Lynch.

These statements of the Sublime Porte were refuted in a *note verbale* dated the 8th January, in which compensation was demanded, and Mr. Marling, in an interview with Rifaat Pasha, pointed out the impossibility of obtaining legal satisfaction at Bagdad, and suggested that compensation should be paid by the central authorities, or, failing that, that the money might be provided from the Bagdad municipal loan.

Mr. Marling at the same time obtained a promise that the further demolitions contemplated should not be proceeded with.

The matter was dropped for a while, so as not to prejudice negotiations then proceeding between Sir John Jackson and the vali for the irrigation contract, but when the latter were brought to a satisfactory conclusion, a claim was sent in to the Sublime Porte for 5,100*l.*, this sum being based on figures supplied by His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad.

There seemed, however, no immediate prospect of payment, as the loan had been referred back to the Council of State.

A memorandum was subsequently handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs complaining of acts of demolition and expropriation of property belonging to a Mr. Thaddeus, formerly in the service of His Majesty's consulate-general.

Mesopotamian Irrigation.

Sir John Jackson and Mr. Eady arrived in Bagdad on the 13th January to start negotiations for the contract for the irrigation works.

The vali, on the 23rd January, signed the draft agreement for the construction of the Mesopotamian irrigation works to be carried on by Sir John Jackson until the permanent contract were signed, and intimated his wish that the permanent contract should also be secured by Sir John Jackson.

A complication, however, then arose, as the contract signed by the vali was a draft only, and Mr. Eady was trying to throw it into shape for final conclusion, when Sir W. Willcocks, as representative of the Ministry of Public Works, claimed that the contract in its final form must be signed by him, and insisted on drastic modifications unfavourable to Sir John Jackson, and to which Mr. Eady would not agree.

The final form of the temporary agreement was, however, signed by the vali on the 13th February.

Recall of Nazim Pasha, Vali of Bagdad, and Arrest of Eram Bey.

On the 17th March, His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad telegraphed that Nazim Pasha had received orders from Constantinople to transfer the civil and military government to Youssouf Pasha, Vali of Mosul, that Nazim Pasha had apparently obeyed these orders, and that all was quiet in Bagdad.

Nazim Pasha left Bagdad for Bussorah on 21st March.

Eram Bey, Nazim's political secretary, was placed under arrest for a few hours—probably to put an end to his agitations on behalf of Nazim Pasha—and after his release left Bagdad with the ex-vali.

Sadun–Mubarek Campaign.

Two influential Arabs of Bussorah arrived at Koweit on the 26th January, deputed, it was said, by the Vali of Bussorah, at the request of the Vali of Bagdad, to settle the dispute between Sheikh Mubarek and Sheikh Sadun. It was subsequently reported that their efforts had been successful, about 500 Nedjdi raiders being disbanded by Sheikh Mubarek, and Sheikh Sadun having proclaimed that Koweit people should not be molested, as Sheikh Mubarek and the Muntefik had become friends.

Lawlessness at Bussorah.

The situation in the town of Bussorah at the beginning of the year was most unsatisfactory, and attacks were made by marauders on the bazaar and on the house of a Greek merchant under British protection. The vali refused to consider the representations of His Majesty's consul, and declared that such disturbances as had taken place were due to the by-election then proceeding and were inevitable. The vali maintained an attitude of hostility towards the consulate, and even behaved with great lack of courtesy to the admiral in returning the latter's visit at the consulate.

It was proposed to send a ship to Bussorah, but this step was anticipated by the dispatch of reinforcements from Bagdad to Bussorah. The vali was also warned to be more correct and courteous in his attitude towards His Majesty's consul.

This warning had a satisfactory result, and the vali, on the 18th January, offered to take the necessary steps for the discovery and punishment of the marauders.

Collision between Steam-ship "Haddon Hall" and Turkish Gun-boat "Marmaris."

On the 3rd February a collision took place in the river at Fao between the "Haddon Hall" of the West Hartlepool Line and the Turkish gun-boat "Marmaris." The "Haddon Hall" was to blame, the "Marmaris" being at anchor at the time, and the cause of the collision seems to have been the failure of the "Haddon Hall" to answer her helm.

A protest was at once made by the vali through the commodore and a claim put

in for £T. 25,000, including cost of the voyage to Constantinople for repairs and cost of replacing her temporarily at Bussorah. A survey which was made of the vessel put the damages at 2,500*l.*, and the surveyors reported that the repairs could be executed at Bombay to avoid expense. Including expenses to Bombay and return, the total cost was estimated at 3,000*l.* His Majesty's consul suggested a deposit of 3,000*l.* and a guarantee of any excess required by the Bombay dockyard authorities. To this arrangement the commodore agreed. But meanwhile Lloyds' representative at Constantinople gave his approval of instructions sent from the Ministry of Marine directing the ship to be released on 3,000*l.* deposit and a guarantee of a further 3,000*l.*, on the ground that it would be better to pay a lump sum and let the Turks execute the repairs, &c., on their own responsibility.

On the 20th February, however, the commodore, at the instigation of the vali, instituted legal proceedings for 25,000*l.*, the vali declaring that the matter was one between the Treasury and the company. Legal proceedings were postponed, and the vali subsequently offered a compromise, which still, however, included payment of consequential damages, for which His Majesty's Embassy maintained and the Minister of Finance admitted the company were not liable.

Meanwhile, Lloyds' agent at Bussorah reported that repairs could be done at Bussorah, which would save the expense involved in the voyage to Bombay. But if it were thought best to repair at Bombay, he recommended payment of a lump sum of 6,000*l.*, though this amount seemed excessive.

Reactionaries in Mosul and Suleimanie.

Sufwat Bey, the officer sent by Nazim Pasha to enquire into the affairs of the Mosul vilayet, began his campaign against the clique of corrupt notables who have hitherto been supreme in Suleimanie. Three members of the Administrative Council were suspended. This action produced an effect on Mosul, where the situation was exactly similar, and created a certain coldness between the military and the committee, which latter counted among its members several of the worst notables. It also produced violent articles in the reactionary organ, the "Nijah," against Nazim Pasha and against foreign influence and civilisation. This led His Majesty's consul to protest to the vali, and the Turkish editor expressed regret at what had been published and dismissed the Arabic editor, who was responsible for the articles.

Lighting and Buoying of the Persian Gulf.

In May 1910, Hikmet Pasha, Turkish commodore at Bussorah, informed His Majesty's consul of the intention of the Turkish Government to place a light at Fao. This was later developed into a more comprehensive scheme for buoying and lighting the bar of the Shatt-el-Arab. This work had always been carried out by His Majesty's Government, who now objected to the Turkish Government taking it over. Three of the British India Company's buoys at the bar were reported missing in 1910, and the British India Company officer sent to search for them died in November 1910 and was not replaced.

His Majesty's Government requested the British India Company early this year to lose no time in replacing the missing buoys, and it was settled that the British India Company should place a lighted buoy at the outlet of the bar. At the end of February the Turkish Government had nearly completed three large buoys evidently destined for the bar, together with a river barge with a light.

Major Cox protested to the captain of the "Marmaris," which was commissioned with the work of laying the buoys, pointing out that the work should be carried out by British ships, and that the work should be deferred until the latter had re-examined the channel. The captain replied that the two buoys now ready were intended for the inner bar and the 6-ft. patch, that his orders could not be disobeyed, and that the work was urgent owing to constant complaints of German ships. It seems that these two buoys would be both within Turkish territorial waters.

The admiral at Bombay, hearing of the action of the Turkish Government, enquired of the Government of India whether he should prevent the Turks carrying out their design, and at the same time pointed out that buoys would probably have to be laid outside the limits of territorial waters, but that Turkey, being one of the riverain Powers, could claim a joint right with Persia to the regulation of the entrance to the river.

The "Palinurus" and the "Odin" had orders to proceed to the spot with all speed.

Orders were given on the 23rd February by the admiral to the senior naval officer to prevent the "Marmaris" from interfering with the buoys at the bar, informing the commander that they were the property of His Majesty's Government.

Unfavourable weather prevented the immediate carrying out of the work by the "Marmaris."

Meanwhile the "Odin" arrived at Fao on the 25th February, and the commander erected a tide pole off Telegraph Creek without obtaining permission from the Turkish authorities.

On the 1st March the two buoys were laid down by the Turks, approximately in the positions occupied by the two inner buoys which had been lost.

Further buoys were prepared by the Turkish authorities and towed down the river ready to be placed in position, and they also announced their intention of placing pilots on the barge in course of preparation for the use of ships crossing the bar. This had been proposed by the commodore in 1910, when the whole scheme had been first mooted. A lighting apparatus was ordered for this barge, and on the 17th March a Greek inspector of lighthouses in the Red Sea arrived to inspect the barge which was being got ready with a view to placing a light on the bar.

Enclosure 6 in No. 19.

Quarterly Report on the Affairs of Africa.

The Italians.

A certain Guzman—a South American journalist, editor of a socialist paper in Tripoli—who had been expelled at the request of the Italian consul-general last July, returned on the 17th January. The Italians tried to arrest him but failed, and their protests to the vali were fruitless. The Italian Ambassador threatened Rifaat Pasha with a naval demonstration, but the incident ended with the apparently voluntary departure of Guzman on the 31st January. The attitude of the Italian press with regard to the position of the Italians in Tripoli seems to have aroused some indignation in native circles there, and provoked a bitter reply in a local Arabic paper complaining of this, of the conduct of Italian consular officers, and of the general evidences of Italian aspirations, and Mr. Alvarez says the Italians are not popular. Rumours appeared in the press here, and were denied, that the Italian Government had demanded the recall of the Vali of Tripoli.

Tunis Frontier.

The mixed delimitation commission arrived at Ghadames in February, and caused something of a panic, the use of the French flag by the Tunisian commission giving rise to a rumour that the place had been annexed by France.

The French in Wadai.

Reports were received from native sources at the end of January of the defeat and extermination of a force under the French flag near Dur on the 1st November, 1910. This force, which was estimated in one report at 700 and in another at 1,900 men, was apparently led against Dur by Berky (Berkei), a vassal of Asyl, the French protégé, with the object of plundering a caravan. As the men of Dur, who defeated them, belonged to the Senoussi society, the French consul at Benghazi made representations which resulted in the vali being instructed to warn the Senoussi not to engage in hostilities against the French on pain of Ottoman troops being sent from Fezzan to help the latter. Mr. Alvarez considers that the position of the French in Wadai is very grave. On the other hand, they seem to have scored a success over Sheikh Senoussi of Dar Kuty at Tata on the 12th January. It is said that the sheikh and 300 of his men were killed and 400 wounded, the French casualties being a lieutenant, a sergeant and sixteen men wounded, and eight tirailleurs killed.

The "Temps" of the 5th March complained of the occupation of Bardai, in Tibesti, by the Turks: but the report does not seem to have been confirmed.

Arms Traffic.

According to information received by the French consul at Benghazi a considerable trade in contraband arms and ammunition is carried on between Benghazi and Malta, arms being often even smuggled through the Customs as well as landed on different points of the coast, and the members of the Senoussi society in Benghazi have for some time past been laying in a stock of arms, powder and cartridges. Mr. Jones fears that some of the Maltese-British subjects in Benghazi are also interested in the trade. The French consul maintained, in conversation with him, that, in view of the hostilities in Wadai, a French warship would have the right of visit and seach of smugglers on the high seas, and that the Turks should exercise this right in Ottoman ports. The Mutessarif of Benghazi, with whom the French consul discussed the point, said he would require at least three coastguard vessels to deal with the evil.

Troubles in Fezzan.

Communications between Tripoli and Murzuk have been seriously threatened by the hostility towards the Government of three of the principal tribes of Fezzan—the Hassauna, Megarha, and Hotman—who, it appears, had given some trouble last year with regard to the payment of taxes, but had been compelled to submit. In March news was received that they had been joined by two more tribes, the Guayda and Zowayda; and a report dated the 7th February stated that bands of Arabs—said to belong to the Awlad Ali—from the Benghazi side of the Gulf, had plundered a place called Raghiba. The mercantile community were greatly exercised at the non-arrival of caravans from Nigeria and Wadai at Murzuk, and the general situation in Fezzan has been rendered worse by the abnormally heavy rains, which have ruined crops and roads.

Conscription.

The Imperial firman establishing the conscription was publicly read at Tripoli on the 16th February, and was followed by a great patriotic demonstration. Among the cries of the participants may be noted those of "Long live the Mussulman nation!" and "God protect us from foreigners!" which Mr. Alvarez considers very significant.

The Orthodox Community.

Owing to intestine divisions in the community and quarrels between the Ottoman and Hellenic Greeks, the Orthodox priest of Tripoli had had to leave. The community foolishly invoked the intervention of the Turkish authorities, with the result that the Patriarchate of Constantinople was invited to send a new priest, but, as Tripoli is under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Alexandria, the Constantinople Patriarchate refused to interfere. On the 18th January an Archimandrite, sent from Alexandria to investigate, arrived in Tripoli; but the vali, under orders from Constantinople, refused to receive him, and ordered him to leave Tripoli at once. He appealed to Mr. Alvarez, who succeeded in effecting a temporary compromise, by which the Archimandrite was permitted to remain a short while, but not to take part in any acts of public worship.

Murder of American Archæologist.

On the 11th March a member of the American archæological mission excavating at Cyrene was murdered. The authorities stated that the murderers (two Arabs) were known, and eighty men had been dispatched from various points to arrest them. At the American Embassy's request, His Majesty's consul at Benghazi has been authorised to take charge of American interests in this case. (The murdered man's name is variously given as Dickson, Deacon, and Decon.)

Enclosure 7 in No. 19.

Consul Samson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 22.)

Adrianople, March 31, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of your Excellency, the following report on the political and administrative state of this vilayet during the quarter ended this day:—

Political State.

Practically nothing of political interest has occurred during the past three months, and the situation remains, to all intents and purposes, unchanged from that described in my last quarterly report. The only noteworthy feature has been the continued increase of cordiality which characterises the relations between Greeks and Bulgarians. This by no means meets with the approval of the more enlightened classes amongst the Turkish population, amongst whom I find that the opinion prevails that it would have been more to the interests of the Greeks to range themselves on the side of the Government.

The Greeks, it is urged, have nothing to gain by uniting with the Bulgarians. This being the Turkish view, it is scarcely a matter for astonishment that the Government officials discourage by every possible means anything in the nature of a rapprochement between Greeks and Bulgarians, without, however, succeeding in arresting the movement. The Greek view may be summarised by a remark recently made to me by a prominent member of that community, who described it as "uniting in the face of a common enemy."

Union and Progress Committee.

Several prominent committeemen have recently been transferred to Salonica in various capacities. Their transfer is believed to be due to the influence of Hadji Adil Bey, formerly vali here, but now, as your Excellency is doubtless aware, secretary to the central Committee of Union and Progress. Amongst those transferred is Aziz Bey, recently kaïmakam of Lule Burgas, who has been appointed inspector on behalf of the central committee. Aziz Bey has been lately travelling in this vilayet, and I have had several opportunities of conversation with him. I gather from him that it is the opinion of the central committee that the local bodies in many districts have interfered unduly with the Government officials. There is no doubt of the correctness of this view. In certain districts in which under the old régime the preponderating influence was that of a large local land-owner, Pasha or Bey, this has been replaced by that of the members of the local committee, who insist on having their personal views carried out. The result of this is, that the task of the official in carrying on his work becomes increasingly difficult, particularly in the case of young kaïmakams, of whom there are many to be met with in the vilayet. It is intended in future to limit the action of the local committees to the political education of the people. So far as I have been able to learn, it is not for the present intended to take any steps with a view to preparing the ground for the parliamentary elections due to take place next year, beyond the formation at the various centres of committees, whose special duty it will be to watch over the interests of the Union and Progress candidates, and to lay before the people the programme of that party when the time comes for doing so. Although the feeling of dissatisfaction at the small progress made by the present Government in the internal affairs of the country, to which I have alluded in previous despatches, still continues, it cannot be said that the Opposition are making any real progress in the constituencies. Indeed, I venture to express my belief that in certain districts, notably in Gumuljina, their influence has actually declined.

Moslem Immigrants.

The settlement of Moslem immigrants in various parts of the vilayet which has been actively pursued during the past two years seems for the moment to have come to a standstill. Negotiations which were being carried on at the close of last year for the purchase of land for settlement purposes have been broken off, and I understand that the vilayet authorities are receiving many less applications than formerly from would-be immigrants. This state of affairs is, I venture to think, due more to the disappointment experienced by recent immigrants at their present situation than to any change of policy on the part of the Government.

Dissatisfaction at Xanthi.

A good deal of feeling has been aroused amongst the Greek population at Xanthi by the alleged discourtesy of the kaïmakam of that town to the newly appointed Greek Metropolitan. It is stated that the latter on paying an official visit on the arrival in his see to the kaïmakam was not received in the customary manner, and that there was an undue delay in returning the visit. The matter is a trifling one, but it has none the

less caused great irritation in Xanthi, which is practically a Greek town. The lack of courtesy displayed by the kaïmakam is, I think, to be attributed to the annoyance caused in Turkish circles by the Greco-Bulgarian rapprochement to which I have alluded earlier in this despatch.

Administrative State.

The greatest dissatisfaction continues to be expressed on all sides at the lack of method existing in the Government departments and at the indolence exhibited by the employés. The state of affairs gradually grows worse, and it is increasingly difficult for peasants to obtain the performance of even the smallest official act, such as registration of property, &c. It is no uncommon thing to meet a peasant who has been compelled to remain for some weeks in Adrianople before obtaining even an interview with a Government official. The judicial officials are, perhaps, the worst offenders in this respect, and the very poorest opinion is held by the public of their probity. A typical instance of the manner in which the work of the courts is carried out came to my notice yesterday. A Turkish subject, of Jewish extraction, was sentenced in May last to one year's imprisonment for fraud. The sentence was upheld by the Court of Appeal, whereupon the accused applied to have the case taken to the Cassation Court. This appeal was lodged in June last, but the papers in connection with it were not sent on to the Cassation Court until the 29th of this month, after a delay of nine months. The local court officials are unable to offer any explanation of the delay. The more enlightened Turks freely admit the shortcomings of the Government departments which they profess to deplore, explaining them by the statement that they have so few men capable of filling Government posts.

New Octroi Tariff.

The chief event of the past quarter from the administrative point of view has been the establishment of a new octroi tariff, as to which I have already informed your Excellency. I find that the objection on the part of the population of Adrianople is not based on their disinclination to see a tariff of this nature established, but on the rates fixed by the present schedule, which it is contended are far too high. Local merchants have telegraphed to members of the Chamber of Deputies protesting against the tariff as at present fixed, and I understand that a deputation is on the point of leaving this town for Constantinople, with a view to laying the matter before the Committee of Union and Progress. Although unwilling to admit the fact to foreigners, I understand that many of the higher Government officials here express the opinion that it would have been better policy to ask the consent of the European Powers before attempting to establish a tariff of this nature, the effect of which is tantamount to raising the customs dues at the ports. Should the vilayet authorities persist in their intention of extending the tariff to other towns in the district they are likely to meet with considerable opposition, protests having already been received from the municipalities of Lule Burgas, Demotika, Mustapha Pasha, and Dede Agach.

Gendarmerie.

The gendarmerie officers complain of the shortage of gendarmes in the district, for the proper policing of which, I understand from the commandant of the force, not less than 3,000 men are required. There are at present only 1,200 men available, and a considerable number of these are constantly employed on the work of the courts, serving summonses, &c., to the detriment of their proper police work. There is, however, comparatively little crime in the country districts. Two classes are now in progress at the gendarmerie school here for men who have already passed the school at Constantinople.

Reorganisation of Army.

During the month of March a commencement was made with the scheme of reorganisation of the army. Your Excellency is doubtless aware that whereas under the system hitherto existing all the troops in the Adrianople vilayet composed the IInd Army Corps, with head-quarters respectively at Rodosto, Kirk-Kilisse, and Adrianople. The latter town thus loses a certain amount of its military importance.

In consequence, however, of the lack of barrack accommodation at the other army corps centres—notably at Rodosto—there has been comparatively little movement of

troops, the reorganisation so far having been confined to the allotting of fresh numbers to divisions, battalions, &c., and the appointment of army corps and divisional commanders, most of whom have now taken up their appointments.

The troops stationed in this vilayet have furnished certain battalions of infantry, batteries of mountain artillery, and machine-gun companies to the Yemen expeditionary force.

I have already furnished your Excellency with details of the reservists, Moslem and non-Moslem, who are at present undergoing training at the various military centres in the district.

Officials.

Mazhar Bey, the vali, arrived here in December last from Uskub. The reputation which preceded him was an unenviable one, the severe treatment said to have been meted out to the inhabitants of the Kossovo vilayet during the recent disarmament being, correctly or otherwise, attributed largely to his influence. He has been at some pains to deny the truth of these reports, which, he states, are very much exaggerated. His activity, which is undoubted, finds another field in this vilayet. The first measure of importance undertaken since he assumed office is that of the octroi tariff referred to earlier in this despatch, which appears to be entirely due to his initiative. His personality is far from striking, and in conversation he does not give the impression of being possessed of exceptional ability. He is a thoroughgoing exponent of advanced Young Turkish policy, the keynote of which, as interpreted by him, would appear to be that of opposition to foreign influence. He has at least the courage of his convictions, having stated at a recent meeting of the vilayet council that the country wanted the money of foreigners, but not foreigners themselves. Although as an official he does not find favour with the landed classes amongst the Turks, yet, if sufficiently kept in check from the capital, his tenure of office seems to hold out distinct promise for the improvement of the district. Energetic and hardworking, he is more inclined to translate his plans into action than any official whom I have yet met, and his influence with the committee should be of assistance to him in doing so. His anti-foreign tendencies already alluded to render him somewhat difficult to deal with from a consular point of view, as he is inclined to be unreasonable where foreign interests are concerned. He is, however, at all times pleasant and courteous, and seems anxious to be on good terms with my colleagues and myself. Correspondence with his office is also less subject to delay than it has been under his predecessors. He is ably seconded by the Kaimakam of Adrianople, who appears to perform the duties of the recently abolished office of director of political affairs.

Public Works.

The repair of the roads undertaken by a French syndicate is proceeding, but the local authorities do not approve of the estimate for the road from Adrianople to Lule Burgas, on the ground that it is too high. I am informed that work in connection with the projected railway from Baba Eski to Kirk-Kilisse has been commenced during the past quarter.

Educational.

A school for the preparation of teachers for primary schools has been established in the Turkish quarter of the town, at which there are at present between fifty and sixty pupils.

Harvest Prospects.

The prospects for the wheat and barley crops are at present favourable.

I have, &c.

L. L. R. SAMSON, *Major.*

Enclosure 8 in No. 19.

Consul Fontana to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 2.)

Sir, *Aleppo, March 20, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the following short report upon the course of events in this district from the middle of December last up to the present time.

Towards the middle of December Prince George, brother of His Royal Highness the King of Saxony, accompanied by the Princess Maria Immaculata and their suite, including the Court chaplain, arrived at Aleppo from Damascus. They were welcomed on their arrival at the station by the vali, and an impressive reception was offered them by the troops on guard. They remained two days at Aleppo, whence they made a trip to Jebel Samaan, and the day after their return they left by train for Beirout. A banquet, at which the vali and the German consul were present, was given in their honour by Meissner Pasha, the chief engineer of the third section of the Bagdad Railway.

Since last autumn there has been a great influx into Aleppo of German engineers and employés connected with the Bagdad Railway. The German consul informs me that he has upwards of sixty bachelors now on the list of German subjects residing at Aleppo, besides the German families of which the heads are in the employ of the railway company. Meissner Pasha informs me that he is about to open a factory at Aleppo in connection with the railway which will give employment to upwards of 500 men, of whom the skilled mechanics and foremen will be brought chiefly from Germany. This factory will serve also as a means for introducing machinery into the country, as the mechanics employed therein will be able to set up and repair machines of all kinds. In accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants of Aleppo, it was decided that the Bagdad line should pass by Aleppo instead of through Tel Habesch, but at present it seems that the line is to pass through Muslémié, a village three hours from Aleppo, with a branch line to this town. The extreme severity of the winter and deep snow have rendered impossible any opening of work on the line itself, and I understand that orders have now been received to defer operations until the middle of next month.

A German company has applied for a concession for the electric lighting of Aleppo, and has even offered to start an electric tram service under certain conditions.

Towards the middle of January extreme cold, accompanied by heavy falls of snow, set in throughout this region, and lasted until the beginning of this month. Frost was continual, varying from 15 to 25 degrees Reaumur. Road and rail communication was cut off, all work was suspended in the town, the market and nearly all the shops were closed, and there was great suffering among the poor through lack of work and scarcity of charcoal. Charcoal was sold at eight times its ordinary price, and fresh vegetables were not procurable. I called upon the vali, and urged him to take instant measures with a view to relief work. He had distributed, he told me, Government grain to the value of £T. 450 among the various communities through their religious heads. And, at my urgent representations, he called a meeting of the Christian and Moslem notables, and raised a subscription which realised £T. 1,600. The French Government sent the French consulate 40*l.* for indigent French subjects, the Italian consul received 40*l.* from Rome for the poor in general, and about 50*l.* were subscribed by British subjects at Aleppo. Relief work undertaken by this consulate revealed want and misery painful to describe. Entire families were huddled together in one room, without firing and with insufficient clothing, bedding having been sold to purchase food. In one house a man and his wife were quarrelling over a piece of bread. In another a woman was found pounding up a soft saponaceous stone to mix into a paste with water for her children's food. Several persons were found dead from cold, and apparently frozen. The apathy of the bishops of the various rites was unintelligible, no one of them taking any initiative with a view to raising funds or starting serious relief work. The mortality among sheep and goats throughout the region north of Aleppo was very high. From among 270,000 sheep ordered by Aleppo merchants from the Mossoul neighbourhood only 30,000 passed the Euphrates, the remainder perishing on the way. Shepherds were found standing, huddled in their sheepskins, frozen to death. Many Aleppo merchants engaged in the sheep trade are now on the verge of bankruptcy.

As reported in my despatch No. 27 of the 25th November, 1910, the Vali Hussein Khazim Bey, soon after taking up his post at Aleppo, opened a campaign against the

local Moslem land-owners and notables, whom he arraigned in a newspaper as oppressors of the poor, threatening that, if they did not mend their ways, he would take them by the throat and throw them out of the vilayet. Since then he has vigorously upheld the cause of the poor peasants and the poorer classes generally, and, to repeat an expression used to me by a member of the administrative council, has practically turned the country upside down. The oppressors and oppressed seem to have exchanged places. The villages of the rascally Agas have been seized by the fellaheen, one land-owner, who possessed five villages, having now only one left to him. The nomad Arabs seem to have profited by this state of things, and to have possessed themselves of houses and landed property at the Aga's expense. So that the desire of the Ottoman Government that the wandering tribes should settle down appears, in some very small degree, to have been realised. Unfortunately villages, to the possession of which certain land-owners have undoubted legal rights, have been forcibly expropriated in this way. Questions between villagers and landlords have been referred to the administrative council, decision being invariably in favour of the former. When application is made by the landlord for a copy of the decision he is referred to the Council of State, if he is not satisfied with the mere reading of that decision in his presence.

The Moslem landlords and notables some days ago held a general meeting, in which they decided to declare war to the knife against the vali, and to subscribe £T. 500 to be expended in telegrams to Constantinople, denouncing his tyranny and demanding his recall. The Governor-General sent them word that if they would hand over the £T. 500 for relief work among the poor he would himself send in his resignation by telegram. His offer was refused, and long telegrams were dispatched by them to the Grand Vizier, the various Ministers, and to Nafi Pasha, deputy for Aleppo. A telegram was drawn up in favour of the vali and denouncing the Moslem notables, to which the signatures of various Christian notables were attached. And most offensive articles have appeared from time to time in the local press directed against the land-owners and Eshraf. A long poem, published in pamphlet form at the office of the "Shaab" newspaper, was distributed publicly in the streets a day or two ago. It bristled with insult towards the Moslem land-owners, calling them a rabble, or, to translate more literally, *canaille*. The vali was eulogised as a lion, and was encouraged to persevere in his war against the oppressors. The poem was signed by a Moslem, Sewas Zadé Mohammed Gemil Hilmi, who, invited to a meeting at the house of one of the Jabri family, was threatened with death, and so denied having written it. The following day a scurrilous article against the Eshraf and land-owners appeared in the "Shaab," the editor of which is a young Syrian Christian. Some time ago he offered to hire his paper for £T. 15 a-month to the Eshraf, on condition that he should uphold them and write against the vali. The Eshraf refused, thinking the price demanded excessive, and since then they have been continually attacked in the columns of the "Shaab."

Soon after the Moslem notables began telegraphing to Constantinople demanding the recall of Hussein Khazim Bey, the vali telegraphed to the Minister of the Interior stating that, if desired, he was quite ready to resign, but that, until he was called upon to resign, he intended to maintain the attitude which he had assumed towards the Moslem notables in pursuance of instructions received before taking up his present post. He received no answer, nor has he received any communication or enquiry from the Porte in connection with the telegrams dispatched by the Eshraf demanding his recall.

Hussein Khazim Bey has informed me privately that he does not expect to retain his post as Vali of Aleppo for more than three months from the present time, but that he intends to maintain during that period his policy of protecting the peasantry and people from the oppression of the land-owners and Eshraf. He has proved himself an honest and a courageous man, and has administered the vilayet with justice and with honour. His weak points lie in a certain vivacity of temperament, not to say rashness, which leads him to speak unguardedly, and to write as freely as he speaks. He tells me, with some bitterness, that he has little support and fights on with his hands tied, which I believe to be the unvarnished truth. His successor, whoever he be, will not be able long to retain the post of Vali of Aleppo unless he be granted fuller powers and more generous support.

It is regrettable that the town of Aleppo has been divided into two camps, on the one side the Moslem land-owners, notables and Eshraf, and on the other the Moslem people of the poorer classes, the leading officials and the Christians. It is to be feared that, if ever the opportunity presents itself, the upper class Moslems may vent their wrath, provoked by administrative rigour and newspaper licence and insult, upon the Christian notables and people.

Major Nyé, the British officer of gendarmes at Aleppo, was transferred to Smyrna some months ago. He was then on the point of resigning, as he was granted no sphere of action, nor were the communications or orders received by his colonel from head-quarters made known to him. He has not been replaced as yet. Seventy gendarmes (privates) of the 1st class have been drafted to Aleppo from the gendarmes' school at Beirout, having completed one year's study. But the general condition of the gendarme force in this vilayet leaves much to be desired, and the existing force is far from sufficient for the needs of the district.

I have, &c.
RAPHAEL A. FONTANA.

P.S.—I have omitted to mention that a German school is to be opened at Aleppo, the headmaster of which will be chosen in Germany, and that there is talk even of the opening of a German hospital.

R. A. F.

[13117] No. 20.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 224.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 5, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 908 of the 18th December last, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum reporting on the conflict which has arisen between the Armenian Schools of Bitlis and the Department of Public Instruction.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 20.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 19.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, March 24, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from the acting vice-consul at Bitlis reporting on the conflict which has for some time been proceeding between the Armenian community in that province and the local authorities, in consequence of the attempts of the latter to violate the scholastic privileges of the Armenian Patriarchate.

Mr. Safrastian's despatch shows that the policy of the authorities in this matter is identical with that being pursued in this province (see my despatch No. 96 of December, 1910), and he also calls attention to the mistrust and hostility displayed towards various Russian Armenians who have attempted to better the conditions of their co-religionists in Mush. I think it, however, but fair to remark that, in the case of Dr. Zavrieff, who appears to be a man of rare disinterestedness and abnegation, his difficulties in connection with the opening of a hospital at Mush have been caused in so small degree by the rapacity and jealousy of the Armenians in that district.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

Enclosure 2 in No. 20.

Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor.

(No. 5.)
Sir, *Bitlis, March 2, 1911.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 4 of the 24th ultimo, I have the honour to report as follows upon the educational question and other difficulties which the Armenian Ecclesiastical authorities are encouraging at the hands of the local government in this vilayet.

The administration by national councils of primary schools belonging to the Armenian community in the Ottoman Empire has been approved and ratified by the Sublime Port in 1863, in accordance with the article 45 of Armenian National Constitution.

Even under the blackest days of the old Government, the Armenians of this province, in Mush as well in Sairt, managed to keep intact their communal schools and their long-established privileges. During the first two years of the new régime, the provincial department of the Public Instruction (Méarif) here granted the subsidies assessed for Armenian schools through the bishoprics as desired by the latter. Since the August of last year, however, the directors of Méarif here, in Mush, Sairt, &c., have declined to pay the money through the bishoprics, and overlooking the privileges of the latter they now require that individual professors and teachers should furnish the Méarif Department with particulars required with regard to their biography and then get the allotted sums against receipts.

In September last the Armenian Patriarchate at Constantinople issued a circular to all provincial bishoprics instructing them to conform themselves to the letter of the national constitution, and definitely reject the direct intervention of the Méarif Department in the affairs of management of communal schools.

The affairs seem at present to have come to an *impasse*, both parties insisting upon their arguments. Several schools in towns and villages, the programmes and expenses of which were greatly enlarged on the expectations of State grants, are now in danger of being closed owing to the lack of funds, whilst the Méarif seems to be determined to grant the sums in question on one condition alone, that teachers should apply not through the bishoprics, but they themselves shall get the money.

An energetic Méarif official at Mush went so far as to enter an Armenian school a month ago and to capture a text-book of Armenian history as dangerous "Muzir." This last step, I regret to say, savours of Hamidian régime.

The local authorities, on the whole, seem to have adopted such tactics which are quite incompatible with the spirit of liberty and the requirements of the country, objections were raised against the employment of M. S. Zavarian, a Russian Armenian, and able agriculturist, whose presence in Mush during the last year as inspector of Armenian schools has been a blessing to the ignorant rural population. He has taught the people to grow grains and vegetables in scientific methods, and one year's experiment is reported as giving wonderful results in growing rice, tobacco, &c., and the beginnings of cotton growing in the vast plains of the Mush Sandjak.

Dr. J. Zavrieff, another Russian Armenian, the visit of whose mission to Mush and here in 1905 aroused a great uproar (see Mr. Heathcote's No. 19 of the 13th June, and No. 25 of the 11th July, 1905), arrived in Mush in autumn last with a view to open a hospital and to disseminate useful knowledge, helping the people in every possible way in such a filthy town as Mush. I understand that, as in 1905, he has large sums of money at his disposal, furnished by Armenian ladies of Tiflis and that further sums are forthcoming for the purpose. But the authorities have forbidden him to open a hospital on the ground that he is a Russian subject, all attempts to convince the authorities of the usefulness of his work have so far proved fruitless, and Dr. Zavrief is doomed to inaction in spite of his possessing means of serving the country.

As I had the honour to state in my preceding despatch, in addition to the persecution started against M. Karmen and his companions for collecting funds for educational purposes, it is difficult to understand the motives of the Government in raising difficulties against such gentlemen as M. Zavarian and Dr. Zavrief, both Daschnakist leaders, who, if encouraged, may be of great service to this province.

Since the revolution of 1908, the Young Turk Government is making immense sacrifices and efforts for the enlightenment of illiterate masses and for the development of the country, then why prevent such men in their enterprise, who have given more than a proof of their ardent attachment to the interests of this country and are doing their uttermost to facilitate the task of the State.

I still venture to submit the humble opinion that such mistakes and misunderstandings are only the inevitable phases of a state of transition, through which every country is liable to pass in one way or another in the process of its regeneration.

I have, &c.
A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

[13063] No. 21.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 94.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April* 10, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 80 of 9th April: Arrest of Bahreinese.

I assume release is unconditional and that the third will be immediately set at liberty.

[13526] No. 22.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 88.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, April* 11, 1911.

BAHREINESE prisoners at Bussorah.

In reply to your telegram No. 94 of yesterday.

Turkish authorities forwarded to Public Prosecutor papers of third Bahreini prisoner, against whom was brought charge of seditious attempt to persuade inhabitants to apply for protection of His Majesty's Government. Five years' imprisonment is minimum, and death maximum penalty prescribed for this offence.

Prisoner was, however, released on the 8th instant, his discharge being immediately ordered by the President of the Chambre de Mises en Accusation, acting on private instance of His Majesty's consulate.

I have enquired of His Majesty's consul at Bussorah whether release of prisoners was unconditional, though I presume this is so.

If prisoners have been released unconditionally we have lost our chance of obtaining settlement in our favour of question of principle by insisting, as pointed out in my telegram No. 79 of the 6th April, that dragoman should attend proceedings in Court.

It is now to be considered whether these Bahreinis should not, in view of their having been detained illegally and without warrant for six days, put forward a claim for compensation from the Turkish authorities.

[12725] No. 23.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 98.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April* 12, 1911.

LYNCH steamers.

Please report if you have had any reply with regard to Lynch's barges from the Turkish Government. Turkish company have 2,500 tons of cargo at Bagdad awaiting shipment and Messrs. Lynch 4,500 tons. You should insist on the permission being given at once in view of the fact that some Turkish steamers have been towing full complement of barges. Please inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that I am very unfavourably impressed by the unfriendly attitude of the Turkish Government in this and in other matters, which does not appear to augur a satisfactory conclusion of our negotiations with them.

[13526] No. 24.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office, April 13, 1911.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, reporting the release of the third Bahreini detained by the Vali of Bussorah.[a]

Sir E. Grey is awaiting the result of the enquiry made by Sir G. Lowther of His Majesty's consul at Bussorah as to whether the release of the three men was

[a] No. 22.

unconditional, and, in the meanwhile, he would be glad to learn the views of Viscount Morley on the question raised by Sir G. Lowther whether a claim for compensation on account of illegal detention should be put forward by these natives of Bahrein with the assistance of His Majesty's consul.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[13111] No. 25.

Foreign Office to Mr. Petrides.[*]

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 13, 1911.

WITH reference to the letter from this department of the 10th August last, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he learns from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople that the permission granted last year for the use of diving apparatus in connection with sponge fisheries in Turkey has been renewed for the period of one year from the 1st March, 1911.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[13924] No. 26.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 93.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, April* 15, 1911.

BAGDAD residency guard.

Please see my telegram No. 80 of the 6th instant.

His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad informs me by telegram (No. 46) of arrival to-day at residency of relief guard.

His Majesty's consul-general states that no obstruction was met with.

[14010] No. 27.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 96.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, April* 17, 1911.

BAHREINESE.

Referring to my telegram No. 88 of the 11th April, I learn from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah that the prisoners were all released in the ordinary process of law and unconditionally.

In pressing for a reply to my note of the 8th (see my despatch No. 241, of the 11th instant), would you wish me to demand that instructions should be sent to the Vali of Bussorah to accept Bahrein passports in future, and that we should be furnished with a notification in writing that such instructions have been despatched.

[14115] No. 28.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 229.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April* 9, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 223 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mosul, transmitting an article published in the official publication of the Mosul vilayet, the "Mosul," on the subject of the recent scandals at Sulaimaniah, and dealing with the state of affairs in Mosul and the attitude of the vali, Tahir Pasha.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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[*] Also to Sponge Trade Association.

Enclosure 1 in No. 28.

Vice-Consul Greig to Mr. Marling.

(No. 10.)

Sir, *Mosûl, March 8, 1911.*

IN my despatch No. 6 of the 7th February, I had the honour to report that Safwat Bey, the officer entrusted by Nazim Pasha with a political mission in this district, recently suspended at Suleimanieh three members of the administrative council, the president of the Court of First Instance, and the public prosecutor of the sanjak, for conspiracy to embezzle the proceeds of taxes and tithes, corrupt practices in connection with the appointment of minor officials, and the misappropriation of lands belonging to the State. Both Safwat Bey and Nazim Pasha were, in consequence, violently attacked in an article published on the 14th January in a local paper, at the instigation of corrupt persons in Mosul, who are alarmed at the prospect of a similar fate. Safwat Bey explained the reasons of his action at the time in a telegram to Nazim Pasha, dated the 10th January. After, and presumably as an answer to, the malicious article published here, Nazim Pasha communicated Safwat Bey's telegram to the authorities of this vilayet, who were directed to give publicity to it in their official publication, the "Mosul." It was inserted in that paper—I have reason to believe most grudgingly—on the 5th February. A copy of it, as printed in the "Mosul," is herewith transmitted together with translation. From this telegram it transpires that not only the president of the Court of First Instance, the public prosecutor, and three members of the administrative council, but also the president of the Criminal Court and the "naïb" are involved.

The three members of the administrative council, who probably played the most profitable rôle in this scandal, seemed to have used their official position solely for the financial advancement of themselves, their relations, and their friends. This they achieved by the following methods:—

1. By remaining in office indefinitely, although the law provides for the annual renewal of two of the four elected members of the council, Saïd Agha, Fetah Bey, and Abdurrahman Agha have been in office more than four years each.

2. By allowing no one to acquire the right of collecting taxes and tithes except their own nominees, who pay for this privilege a mere fraction of the sum which would accrue to the State were it put up to auction in the regular way, and, having no one to answer to but their own accomplices, have a free hand to squeeze the taxpayers. An instance is mentioned of a tax being knocked down to one of the confederates for only 25,000 piastres, although an outside bidder offered 70,000 piastres. Fetah Bey and Abdurrahman Agha are stated to have recently gone so far as to fill their own pockets by collecting taxes personally in certain districts and making fraudulent demands on the payers. And, again, one of Fetah Bey's sons has been appointed a mudir in the Suleimanieh district, although he was dismissed from a former position of trust owing to the discovery of a discrepancy of 60,000 piastres in his accounts; whilst another of his sons, who has been a tax-gatherer for twelve years in the same district, has never been called upon to furnish any accounts.

3. By paying only a small part of the taxes which they themselves owe—an important item, as they are amongst the largest land-owners and richest merchants in the district. It is recorded that Hadji Saïd Agha, who is believed to be one of the wealthiest men in the vilayet, has been in the habit of paying only 140 piastres as "tenettu" on values exceeding 120,000 piastres. The amount payable is really 5 per cent., and therefore he should pay 6,000 piastres.

4. By misappropriating land. The steps recently taken against them appear to have been the immediate outcome of their fraudulent claim to a piece of waste land on which Safwat Bey proposed to build a school. They seem to have been supported in this matter by the president of the criminal court, the president of the Court of First Instance, the "naïb," and the public prosecutor. The president of the criminal court is stated to have been their accomplice in other dishonest activities as well, and the "naïb" is accused of stealing 500 liras from the proceeds of this year's tithes.

The active dishonesty thus detailed was coupled with such utter neglect by the members of the administrative council of their administrative duties that 157 documents relating to military matters, contracts, travelling expenses of officials, &c., had been suffered to accumulate since March 1910.

It has been impossible to verify in detail the charges made in this astonishing

indictment, but strong presumption of their general truth exists (1) in the long-standing and admitted ill-repute of the Suleimanieh officials; (2) in the fact that dishonest persons in this town, whose mortification has found expression in vague and splenetic attacks on Nazim Pasha, have embarked on no attempt to disprove them.

The gravest fact lies, not in the condition of the subordinate sanjak of Suleimanieh and the conduct of its local administrators, but in the attitude of the higher authorities in Mosul itself, without whose connivance systematic robbery and oppression extending over years would be an impossibility. The truth is that the superintending administrative council of the town of Mosul, dominated by the notorious Sabonji Pasha, aids and abets the organised dishonesty of the administrative councils in various subordinate districts to their mutual profit and the ruin of the governed and of the Treasury. The superior administrative council in Mosul, again counts on support in Constantinople, without its own position would likewise be untenable. Thus the vicious circle is completed. Roman Catholic influence in Constantinople is a principal element in this support, which is the core of the evil, conferring on corrupt notables and officials free scope for rapacity, whilst the local Roman Catholic Chaldean archbishop enjoys in return their instrumentality in his propaganda. The compact is so well kept that Sabonji, the most fanatical Moslem in Mosul, and the archbishop are habitually mentioned in the same breath as recognised allies. Lest this compact with an unbeliever should damage him in the eyes of other Moslems Sabonji misses no opportunity to advertise his contempt for the archbishop's priests. This the archbishop recognises as necessary, and condones it.

As at Suleimanieh, the members of the Mosul administrative council have not been changed for four years, in complete defiance of all regulations. And even if an election were held, Sabonji and the archbishop have enough influence to ensure the maintenance of the *status quo*. The local Jacobite community recently agitated in the hope of effecting the removal of the present members of the council, and, as a result, the vali in January received from the Ministry of the Interior instructions in ambiguous language capable of interpretation either as "there must be an election of members for the council" or "the members of the council must be changed." This ambiguity has been the pretext for doing nothing. The Jacobites, however, continue to agitate, and they are energetically seconded by the defterdar, who, by struggling against the surrounding corruption, has offended nearly all the local notables and officials, winning the sympathy of everyone else including a considerable part of the military element. Needless to say, his conduct has been especially resented by Sabonji and the archbishop, who continue to do their utmost to undermine him by organising petitions against him. The efforts to obtain his recall have, however, hitherto failed owing to the personal friendship of the Minister of Finance, who on one occasion sent him *en clair* a telegram congratulating him on the misrepresentations made. At the same time, the support he has received has been insufficient for the accomplishment of anything approaching complete financial reform. But he has, I believe, during his year of office here, increased the finances of the vilayet to the extent of about 80,000 liras. In a recent conversation he assured me—with a request that I would give any possible publicity to his words—that, but for the influence of Sabonji Pasha, he could so largely increase the revenue of the district that it might shortly be self-supporting. He tells me Sabonji's method of enriching himself at the expense of the State is exactly similar, on a larger scale, to the methods followed by the notables of Suleimanieh, namely (1) by remaining permanently a member of the administrative council (this is the *sine qua non* of his influence), (2) by seeing to it that the local tax-gatherers are his own nominees, (3) by paying merely nominal taxes, (4) by compelling persons to sell him property at a low price, (5) by being in league with the worst characters in the district with a view to the carrying out of any project on hand.

With this miscreant the defterdar is powerless to deal or even to compel him to pay his taxes for the ludicrous, but very sufficient, reason that no action can be taken against him except by permission of the council, which he himself controls.

On the 19th January three inspectors from the Ministry of Finance appeared unexpectedly in Mosul and took up their abode in the house of the public debt inspector, M. van Haun, a Dutch subject. The local intriguers at once gave out that their coming was for the purpose of investigating frauds alleged by them to have been committed by the defterdar, whilst the defterdar believes that their object is to verify his own reports on the prevailing corruption and to ascertain the means of putting it down. Their names are Ibrahim Halil Bey, Mohammed Emin Bey, and Georji Bey. The latter is a Christian of Salonica. He and Mohammed Emin Bey have each spent six months in France learning book-keeping. Considering the special duty entrusted to them, the

most conspicuous feature of their conduct here has been the amount of time they have wasted.

They have examined the accounts of the defterdar's department and of the municipality, and are at present dealing with the post-office. The result of their investigations are as yet unknown.

If they report honestly and completely on the state of affairs here and the central authorities continue to do nothing, there will be clear proof that either gross and incorrigible apathy or else the same corruption prevails in the capital as in the provinces, that the financial prospects of the country are past praying for, and that its pecuniary distress is undeserving of sympathy or help.

In despatch No. 6 of the 7th February last I reported that events at Suleimanieh and the activity of a local reactionary paper have caused bitter antagonism between the local Committee of Union and Progress and the military element, the former identifying itself with the corrupt notables and officials, the latter upholding the conduct of Safwat Bey and Nazim Pasha. This antagonism continues, with the additional feature that the defterdar, prominent through his avowed opposition to the administrative council and the majority of his brother officials, including the vali, is now regarded as a thorough-going ally of the offended military element, notwithstanding the fact that he recently came into serious collision with Nazim Pasha for disagreeing with his fiscal experiments in the case of the Jaff tribe.

The attitude of the vali, Tahir Pasha, during and prior to this agitation is interesting. On arriving here (in October last) his first endeavour was to adopt a colourless attitude in the hope of conciliating all parties and committing himself irretrievably neither in the direction of reaction or reform. Seeing in Sabonji Pasha's counsels a danger of committal to conduct censurable by Nazim Pasha, he tried the experiment of effacing him—a step which pleased many rival notables, the whole mercantile community, and all the leading Christians, except the Roman Catholic Chaldean archbishop and his immediate associates.

For a short spell greater justice prevailed than ever before. The most was made of it. The Nestorian Christians of Alkosh saw their opportunity, and again pressed for separate registration as a separate community under Mar Shimun and liberation from the yoke of the Roman Catholic Chaldean archbishop; and the vali, acting on instructions long known to exist, but quietly ignored by the local authorities in obedience to Sabonji and the archbishop, gave orders for the recognition of some of them who were in Mosul at the time, and for the separate registration of the whole community by an official to be sent to Alkosh on purpose.

An enterprising Christian native, who has spent some years in America, and recently brought an ice-machine to this town, having for months been prevented from erecting it by the jealousy of certain notables and their dread of progress in any form, now obtained the necessary protection from their obstruction and completed his useful work.

The Roman Catholic Chaldean archbishop was denounced in the administrative council for falsifying in his books the ages of certain members of his community with a view to their exemption from military service, and his register was placed under seal for the purpose of an investigation, which unfortunately is still only pending.

But the eclipse of Sabonji was of short duration. For, some twenty years ago, Tahir Pasha was successively "nuktoulji," acting vali, and vali of this vilayet. He then had his fortune to make, and is known to have been, if no worse, no better than other officials of his school, and Sabonji was his *âme damnée*. In that is probably to be found the cause of the latter having now been able to recover a considerable part of his influence, Tahir Pasha being compelled, notwithstanding the honest intentions with which I credit him, to tolerate his partnership in government owing to the unfortunate circumstances of his past, which—as was felt at the time of his appointment to his present post—could scarcely fail to make his position here very difficult.

His Excellency, whether he was, gives the impression of being, if lacking in energy, at heart, anxious to deal honestly with his province. It will probably be his endeavour now to restrain his present associates from conduct provocatory of any outcry likely under present conditions to damage himself; and if his experience, suave personality, and aptitude for compromise enable him to succeed in this, Mosul under his administration will have less to complain of than before. It can, however, be taken for granted that Tahir Pasha possesses neither the liberty of action nor the energy necessary for the sweeping reforms, which can alone permanently benefit this district.

I have, &c.

C. A. GREIG.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 28.

Extract from the "Mosul" of February 5, 1911.

(Translation.)

Copies of Telegrams from Safwat Bey, Commanding the 23rd Brigade at Suleimanieh, to the Vali of Mosul (Tahir Pasha), and to the Commandant of the VIth Army Corps (Nazim Pasha).

(1.)

Telegram to the Vali of Mosul.

15th of Kyanun-i-Sani, 1326 (*January* 28, 1911).

I UNDERSTAND that a copy of the telegram, which I addressed to the Vali-Commandant of Bagdad, has been sent on to you, and I would ask you to take the steps necessary for its publication in the paper.

(2.)

Copy of the Telegram to Nazim Pasha above referred to.

28th of Kyanun-i-Evvel, 1326 (*January* 10, 1911).

But for enquiries made I should not have condescended to write about the man called Hadji Seyyid Agha, who is the ringleader of a clique of intriguers, and has been the sole cause of the trouble at Suleimanieh. This intriguer and Fettah Bey and Abdurrahman Agha, who have illegally possessed themselves of twelve pieces of land, have for four years been members of the administrative council, and really collect the tithes ("a'shar") themselves through the instrumentality of the judge ("naib") and other officials, whom they allow to acquire the farming of them in their interests. They take care that no one outside the administrative council should see the accounts of the revenue-farmers, and thus they are able every year to rob the Treasury of 9,500 liras. They restricted to their own circle the right to bid for the farming of the "zebh" tax, and knocked it down for 25,000 piastres, although an (outside) bidder offered 75,000 piastres.

Before assuming my temporary duties here I discovered, thanks to the help of Abdul Ghafur Agha, that whereas the receipts of the municipality for the year amounted to 98,000 piastres, in a return passed by the administrative council they were stated to be only 40,000.

On values exceeding 120,000 piastres Said Agha paid "temettu" to the extent of only 140 piastres. I had this raised to 750 piastres. The "temettu" receipts for this year show an increase of 28,000 piastres, and that although the taxes required from the poorer classes have been reduced.

It has been shown that the officers who collect the sheep-tax ("aghnam") and the tithes ("a'shar") are nominees of Seyyid Agha, Fettah Bey, and Abdurrahman Agha. On the same principle Fettah Bey's son, Tewfik Bey, is now Mudir of the Nahiyye of Navet, although a deficit of 60,000 piastres was found to exist in his accounts when he was removed from the post of acting treasurer ("mal mudiri") at Mamourch. His other son, Nouri Bey, has been a tax-gatherer for twelve years, and yet his accounts have never been audited, nor has the extent of his indebtedness to Government been the subject of any enquiry.

Abdurrahman Agha has gone to collect the sheep-tax to the east of Serchinar and in Karadagh district, although his position as a member of the administrative council legally debars him from doing so. He has not deposited the (usual) security, and he makes an (extra) charge of 24 "tehranis" (a "tehrani" = 2 tariff piastres) for the receipt given in acknowledgment of taxes paid on every hundred sheep.

Similarly, Fettah Bey has gone to collect the sheep-tax at Ghaver. He, too, has deposited no security, and makes an (extra) demand of 1 piastre for each sheep.

These men are microbes battening on the Treasury. Their treachery towards the Government and their oppression of the people are incalculable. They were much upset when I consulted the regulation which provides for the (periodical) renewal of members of the administrative council. On the 12th of Eylul, 1326 (September 25th,

1910) the Mouhassibiji of Kerkuk Sanjak came to Suleimanieh to look into their irregularities, and drew up a report, but it has been put away goodness knows where.

On days when the administrative council should sit, the members do not appear until I send policemen or gendarmes to fetch them. Since March they have allowed to accumulate 157 documents relating to military matters, contracts, officer's travelling expenses, as well as petitions from the victims of oppression. We dealt with sixty-five of these documents in two sittings.

Speaking of the violated rights of the Treasury, when I wanted a school-house of two stories with two class-rooms and ten other rooms to be built for the instruction of boys and girls on a certain plot of waste land in accordance with the law which expressly sanctions the use of waste land for that purpose, they (Seyyid Agha, Fettah Bey, and Abdurrahman Agha) were concerned because this would prevent their acquiring the land at a low price and building on it an inn. But your (Nazim Pasha's) fame has not been tarnished, for I have acted as justice and your exalted wish directed, and by permission of God the work is proceeding in accordance with the constitution, and they have been baffled.

It was the president of the criminal court who, in concert with certain officers since transferred, made common cause with Hadji Seyyid Agha (on other occasions). On the present occasion (in the matter of the school) he, the public prosecutor, the president of the Court of First Instance, and the "naib," who has appropriated some 500 liras from the proceeds of this year's tithes, abetted them (Seyyid Agha, Fetah Bey, and Abdurrahman Agha). Thank God they are reduced to impotence, but they have not failed to appeal to their several departments, and I should like to know whether it is right for such corrupt officials to be employed here.

It is for us soldiers not to suffer these rogues to oppress the people or to impair in any way the honour, majesty, and power of the Government.

[14119] No. 29.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 234.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 10, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 182 of the 22nd March, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, transmitting text of the permit to run steamers on the Euphrates River granted to Aga Jafer, with some observations thereon.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 29.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 12. Confidential.)

Sir, *Bussorah, March 18, 1911.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 49 of the 15th instant regarding the permission given to Aga Jafer, an Ottoman subject, for running steamers on the Euphrates, I have the honour to transmit translation of a copy of the permission in question, which was furnished to me privately.

I would observe that in this document nothing is said about shareholders' nationality. It distinctly states, however, that the owner of the steamers must be an Ottoman subject, and it also states that the permission carries no monopoly or concession, that it must not be transferred to foreigners, and that the holder cannot oppose the working of any other applicant. It is clear from my information here that at least three Persians have subscribed to the capital. According to my latest enquiries the present partners in the scheme are:—

Aga Jafer ibn Abdul Noby (Turkish),
Haji Mohd. Ali ibn Haji Mohd. Taghi Behdeshti (Persian),
Aga Mohd. ibn Mirza Abdullah Kazerooni (Persian),
Mirza Ali ibn Haji Mollah Hussein (Persian),

and the capital is from 20,000*l.* to 25,000*l.*

I am informed that the other persons mentioned in my despatch No. 30 of the 27th May, 1910, as interested in the concern, are no longer shareholders, but this is not yet confirmed.

I see nothing in the wording of the permission to prevent foreign capital being employed, although it may be the intention of the authorities to exclude it, provided the nominal owner of the steamers registered as such is a Turkish subject.

In regard to the action of the German firm of Wönckhaus and Co., agents of the Hamburg-American line here, in allowing Aga Jafer to use their premises for the construction of the stern-wheeler steamer which was recently launched, and for that of several barges, which I understand are also for him, I am informed privately that the consideration for this service is the free use by the German firm of Aga Jafer's steam launch on the river. This may or may not be the case. The capital in the undertaking is, according to my information, under 25,000*l.*, and there is little doubt that the Germans can, now or in the future, advance funds to Aga Jafer if ready money is required. I am taking steps to watch the development of their relations with him, and if anything noticeable occurs I will report further.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

Enclosure 2 in No. 29.

Minister of the Interior to Vali of Bussorah.

(Translation.)

Sir,

IN reply to the telegram of the vilayet of the 25th March, 1325, I have the honour to say that we have communicated with the Minister of Commerce and Public Works, who replies that you are to be informed as follows:—

The grant of a permission to Aga Jafer Chelebi, a merchant, who is stated to have applied for leave to run steamers on the River Euphrates, is approved, provided that he gives a written declaration, legalised before the notary public, to the effect that the vessels he runs carry the Turkish flag, and the owner is an Ottoman subject and subject to the present and future laws of the State, and that the said permission is not transferred to foreigners and carries no sort of monopoly or concession, and that if any other applicant appears he cannot interfere with his working, and the tariff of freights to be charged is examined and accepted by the administrative council of the vilayet and the chamber of commerce, and he gives a written guarantee to abandon and assign to the municipality such portion of his net yearly profits as shall be approved by the administrative council, and the original declaration as above is to be kept at Bussorah and a legalised copy of it to be sent to Constantinople. Please act accordingly and inform me.

MEMDOUH,
Minister of the Interior.

March 28, 1325 (21 Rebbi-el-evvel, 1327).

[14125] No. 30.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 240. Confidential.)

Sir, *Pera, April 12, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 149 of the 7th March last, I have the honour to transmit a copy of a despatch from Mr. Vice-Consul Richardson, reporting the result of the negotiations between the Italian and Turkish commissioners regarding the seizure of an Italian dhow.

I asked the Italian Ambassador yesterday what the result of the joint enquiry had been. His Excellency said that on some points the commissioners were agreed, though on others there were differences between them. There was, in his opinion, possibility of an understanding being arrived at. That would depend upon the mood in which the Turkish Government happened to be in, and whether their preoccupations elsewhere were serious.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 30.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 18 E. Confidential.)

Sir, *Hodeidah, March* 18, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 9 of the 15th February last, reporting the arrival here of the Italian gun-boat "Aretusa," and also of Italian and Ottoman commissioners in connection with an incident that had arisen between Italy and Turkey on account of the seizure and confiscation of an Italian dhow in the Red Sea.

After several conferences at Hodeidah between the respective commissioners referred to, at which the *procès-verbal* drawn up by the Customs Commission of Enquiry with reference to the confiscation of the dhow and its cargo, and all correspondence on the subject that had ensued subsequently between the Italian consulate and the local authorities were examined, it was decided to transfer the scene of enquiry to Midi, where the alleged act of contraband under dispute was supposed to have been committed.

On the 25th February, the "Aretusa," with Baron Aliotti, the Italian commissioner, on board, proceeded to Midi, followed by the Ottoman gun-boat "Rafahiyn," with Salih Bey, of the Turkish Foreign Office.

After a stay of ten days at Midi the Italian gun-boat "Aretusa" returned to Camaran, whence she sailed on the 7th instant for Massawa, the gun-boat "Rafahiya" returning to Hodeidah on the following day.

I inferred from the Ottoman commissioner, Salih Bey, who called on me the other day, that the negotiations in the matter under dispute had been broken off at Midi, owing to the unreasonable and obstructive attitude assumed by his Italian colleague.

It would appear that investigations at Midi elicited no definite result, owing to the Sheikh of Midi, whom the commissioners had expressly proceeded there to interview, flatly and defiantly declined to treat with either party or to furnish information as regards what happened at his port when the Italian dhow visited it in August last year.

This was indeed surprising in the face of the fact that the Italian consulate at Hodeidah, at some time or other during the correspondence on the subject, produced a declaration averred to have been issued by the Sheikh of Midi to the owner of the confiscated goods in the barque "Genoa," to the effect that that vessel had put into the port for repairs.

Salih Bey informed me that, in spite of what had occurred at Midi, he was of opinion that no further enquiry was necessary, and that he was convinced that an act of contraband had been committed, while the Italians had failed to prove the contrary.

The two commissioners are awaiting at Massawa and Hodeidah instructions from their respective Governments, and it is not improbable that their contention, in accordance with the terms of the protocol signed by the Italian and Ottoman Governments, will be now referred to His Majesty's Government for arbitration.

I might mention that Baron Aliotti imparted to me in confidence in a conversation that it was the intention of his Government to make a naval demonstration in the Red Sea in certain eventualities, and that two or three big cruisers had already received instructions to hold themselves in readiness for the purpose.

With truth and great respect, I have, &c.

G. A. RICHARDSON.

[14126] No. 31.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 241. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April* 11, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to enclose copy of the note which, as instructed by your telegram No. 91 of the 7th April, I addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, demanding the unconditional release of the three Bahreinese in question and the acceptance of their Bahrein passports.

As reported in my telegram No. 86 of the 9th April, two of the Bahreinese had already been released, while the third has now also been discharged.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs was apparently somewhat embarrassed at the possibility of being obliged to solve the question of principle as to the status of Bahrein raised by the Vali of Bussorah in his official letter to His Majesty's Consul, and seemed anxious to evade it by arranging to have the Bahreinese released without trial, as, it tried, we could have insisted on the presence of the British Dragoman, whereas, in the absence of a trial, it may be difficult to induce the Ottoman Government to admit in writing our special position in Bahrein, and, as set forth in my telegram No. 66 of the 25th March, the settlement of that question will probably be more difficult after we have parted with the leverage supplied by the present negotiations concerning the 4 per cent. customs increase.

As the correspondence shows, the Turkish Government has never advanced positive arguments to sustain its claims to Bahrein, and in its *note verbale* No. 34 of the 4th April, 1893, merely endeavoured to read into communications from His Majesty's Government admissions that the British claim is non-existent. The nature of the Turkish claim is apparent from the language of A'ali Pasha quoted in the Foreign Office despatch No. 40 of the 12th February, 1851, to Sir Stratford Canning, where it is stated that "A'ali Pasha said that the Maritime Chiefs in the Persian Gulf were formerly officers of, and paid tribute to the Sublime Porte, and if, as was reported, the Governor of Bussorah had taken any steps to negotiate with those chiefs for their return to allegiance to the Sultan, the Porte could neither disapprove nor disavow his conduct in that respect."

This language would apply equally to the chiefs of the Trucial Coast and even Muscat, if not indeed to Gwadur, and the original "allegiance" spoken of by A'ali Pasha probably refers to the fact that in 1530 or thereabouts the Egyptian, *i.e.*, Turkish Admiral, Piri Pasha, took Aden and sailed to Gwadur, Oman and up the Gulf, proclaiming the Ottoman Caliphate and inducing the various Moslem chieftains to acknowledge the supremacy of Solyman the Magnificent. At that time doubtless no distinction was made in those regions between the spiritual and temporal character of the Ottoman Sultan and Caliph and Turkish temporal power was certainly in abeyance in the Persian Gulf from then up to 1870–71 when Nejd (El Hassa) and El Bida'a were reoccupied. The present Young Turkey Government can scarcely officially advance purely Islamic claims while any other claim would be of equal value with that of His Majesty's Government to South-West Africa outside Walfisch Bay or to King Bell's Town in the Cameroons at the time of the Berlin Act of 1885.

It may then be advisable to insist on a written answer to our note of the 8th April, in which His Majesty's Embassy's *note verbale* of the 14th November, 1892, is referred to. In the latter the Porte was informed that Bahrein was "under the protection of Her Majesty the Queen." If the Turks have been so tenacious of their claim in the past when their position in the Gulf was very weak, it is to be expected that when they grow strong there by land and sea, we shall be confronted by a more vigorous assertion of their pretensions.

It would thus seem essential that the present opportunity afforded by the incident gratuitously raised by the Turks of definitely defining our position in the matter *vis-à-vis* Turkey should not be let slip, and it may even be expedient to give our status at Bahrein a more definite international character.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 31.

Sir G. Lowther to Rifaat Pasha.

M. le Ministre, *Constantinople, April* 8, 1911.

I HAVE recently had the honour to make verbal representations to your Excellency regarding the recent action of the Vali of Bussorah in arresting three natives of Bahrein.

According to the information which has reached me on the subject, the facts are the following:—

Three natives of Bahrein were arrested on the 19th March by order of the vali for having refused to take out Ottoman passports. His Majesty's consul sent to ascertain

the reason for their arrest, but was met with a refusal, and in reply to a further communication from His Majesty's consul to the effect that the passports of the individuals in question which were deposited at the consulate were in order, and requesting information as to the charges against them, his Excellency the vali informed him officially and in writing that the Ottoman Government did not admit the right of His Majesty's consul to afford protection to the natives of Bahrein.

After being kept under detention for several days administratively and without any judicial proceedings being taken against them, it would appear that, on orders from the vali, they were accused of "disturbing the peace" by having applied to Bahrein for papers of protection. The baselessness of this charge is obvious from the fact that the men's passports were deposited at the consulate as His Majesty's consul had already informed the vali.

Subsequently, warrants of arrest were issued by the juge d'instruction describing these inhabitants of Bahrein as "Ottoman subjects."

On the 28th March I informed your Excellency of the above facts which constituted a flagrant violation of the *status quo* in the matter, and on instructions from my Government requested that orders be sent to the vali to release the three natives of Bahrein and to accept their Bahrein passports.

Your Excellency caused me to be informed that instructions were sent to the vali on the 2nd instant to release the persons in question on bail.

His Majesty's consul, on enquiring whether these instructions had been received, was informed by the vali that, as the matter was a judicial one, he could not act on the instructions of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the matter, and that it was for the Ministry of Justice to send him instructions to admit the attendance of a British dragoman at the trial.

It is unnecessary for me to remind your Excellency of the previous correspondence on the question of Bahrein, including the communication made to the Sublime Porte in 1851 by Sir Stratford Canning, then Her Majesty's ambassador, on instructions from Lord Palmerston, the *notes verbales* of Her Majesty's Embassy No. 81 of the 11th November, 1892, and No. 55 of the 9th May, 1893, in which the relations between Her Majesty's Government and Bahrein are clearly stated.

Your Excellency cannot, I am convinced, approve of the attitude and language of the Ottoman Governor-General of Bussorah against which His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs directs me to protest in the strongest manner, and for which your Excellency will no doubt think fit to have him reprimanded for action which is not of a nature to facilitate the negotiations now in progress concerning questions interesting the two Governments in those regions.

I have consequently, in accordance with my instructions, to request that the three natives of Bahrein in question be released unconditionally and without any further delay, and that their Bahrein passports be accepted as heretofore.

I avail, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[14132] No. 32.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 18.)

(No. 247.)

Sir,

Pera, April 13, 1911.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 81 of the 7th instant, in which I had the honour to report the relief of Sana'a by the Turkish troops, I have now received a further telegram from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah stating that the relief force entered that city on the 4th instant followed by fifteen battalions under Izzet Pasha.

It was expected that the force operating from Taiz would reach Sana'a on the 8th instant.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[14010] No. 33.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 106.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April* 19, 1911.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 88 of the 11th April and 96 of the 17th April: Detention of Bahreinis at Bussorah.

You should put in a demand in the name of His Majesty's Government for some compensation to the natives of Bahrein for illegal detention, and you should also insist that instructions be sent to the Vali of Bussorah to accept in future Bahrein passports.

[14664] No. 34.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received April* 20.)

Sir, *India Office, April* 19, 1911.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th instant, regarding the intention of the Turkish Government to sell the treasures of the shrines at Kerbela and Nejef. In reply, I am to forward copy of telegrams exchanged with the Government of India on the subject, and to say that he concurs generally in the views expressed by the latter. He would, however, remark that, while it is the duty of His Majesty's Government to protect the legitimate interests of Indian Mahommedans in Turkey, the Turkish Government must be the sole judges of the effect likely or intended to be produced in the minds of their co-religionists in India, and it is neither the duty nor the interest of His Majesty's Government to instruct them in the matter.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 34.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, April* 12, 1911.

IT is reported that sale of treasures of Nejef and Kerbela shrines and construction of hospital and school with proceeds is intended by Turkish Government. Gifts from Indian princes are included in treasures. I shall be glad to have your views as soon as possible as to effect which will be produced in India.

Enclosure 2 in No. 34.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April* 14, 1911.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 12th instant.

Feeling of considerable resentment will, I anticipate, be created among Indian princes and Indian Mahommedan community by action of Turkish Government, if report is confirmed. It would, however, be better, in my opinion, that, except at earnest request of representative Indian Mahommedans, expressed publicly, there should be no direct intervention at present on the part of His Majesty's Government. Turkey might otherwise regard intervention as gratuitous interference in a question of religion.

[13643] No. 35.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 109.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 20, 1911.*

THE Turkish Ambassador called at this department on the 7th instant, and Sir A. Nicolson informed his Highness of the substance of my telegram No. 91 of the 7th instant to your Excellency on the subject of the detention by the Vali of Bussorah of three subjects of Bahrein &c.

Tewfik Pasha was told that unless the matter were speedily settled to the satisfaction of His Majesty's Government a very serious situation would arise.

His Highness promised to telegraph to Rifaat Pasha on the subject.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[15119] No. 36.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 260.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 19, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 247 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah reporting progress of the insurrection in the Yemen and of the operations being undertaken against the rebels.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 36.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 20 E.)

Sir, *Hodeidah, March 27, 1911.*

SINCE the relief of Menekha by the force under Colonel Riza Bey, quite a month ago, there has been very little to report concerning the operations of the expeditionary army against the rebels in the highlands of this province.

Although 20,000 infantry reinforcements and three or four batteries of mountain artillery have been landed here and dispatched to the front since the beginning of last month, the advance Sanaa-wards has been very slow.

In the meantime, the situation in the province of Assyr, from accounts received, has grown worse gradually, whilst the insurrection in the districts of El Hajjeh and El Hajjur, in the mountainous country to the north-west of the capital and along the south-eastern frontier of the vilayet, has been making rapid strides.

On the 9th instant General Izzet Pasha, accompanied by General Seyyid Pasha and a big staff of officers recently arrived from Constantinople, left for the front, to personally conduct the operations against the insurgents in the direction of Sanaa.

Izzet Pasha reached Menekha on the 15th, but not without incident, his party (that included the mayor of this town, Seyyid Ahmed Pasha-el-Sherai) being fired on by Arab tribesmen when about 10 or 12 miles outside Hodeidah.

Three of the culprits implicated in the above-mentioned outrage, that was apparently not directed against the generalissimo, but intended to be against Seyyid Sherai Pasha, have been arrested and brought here for trial.

Concurrently with Izzet Pasha's arrival at Menekha, the force under Colonel Riza Bey, about 5,000 or 6,000 strong, moved to the north—Sanaa-wards—and, after encountering some opposition from the rebels *en route*, established itself on the 18th instant at a position called Ijz—that is, six hours' march northwards from Menekha.

Between the 18th and 24th Colonel Riza Bey was only able to advance another

10 or 12 miles farther, to Suk-el-Khamis, and that not without meeting with stout resistance and severe fighting, the insurgents challenging every mile of his advance.

Suk-el-Khamis is a military outpost to the north-west of Menekha, and barely 15 miles from it as the crow flies, and is situated on the summit of a range of mountains in the El Heima district.

The garrison in the above town had been reported on the 15th instant to the Kaimakam of Menekha as being on its last legs and likely to surrender, as its stock of supplies had run out.

No details of the fighting that occurred during the march to Suk-el-Khamis are available here, the authorities exhibiting great reticence in the matter.

General Izzet Pasha has since advanced with another force to Suk-el-Khamis and joined hands with Riza Bey, but it would appear that he has been obliged to return to Menekha to divert his attention to the course of events elsewhere.

Rumour also credits Colonel Riza Bey as having left Suk-el-Khamis for Sonam Pasha—that is, 15 miles farther north and about the same distance from Sanaa—but afterwards forced to retrace his steps to the former place, owing to the concentration of the tribesmen in the heights round about.

On or about the 13th of this month a messenger arrived from the El Hajjeh district with a letter from an important sheikh reporting that the kaza was hard pressed by Seyyid Yahya's levies under the veteran leader, Nasir Mabkoth; further, that the Turkish outposts at Dhaflir, Shamir, and other places had already fallen into the hands of the rebels, who had invested the town of Hajjeh, which they were battering with cannon captured from the outposts round about.

I hear that Izzet Pasha has already dispatched two battalions to the relief of El Hajjeh from Menekha.

The fact of General Seyyid Pasha, who returned here yesterday from Menekha and starts to-day for Hajjeh, having been ordered to the latter place suddenly, points to the gravity of the situation there.

Five other battalions with some mountain guns have already been moved to Zeidyia and will accompany Seyyid Pasha, who has now been deputed to operate against the insurgents active in the above-mentioned locality.

The neighbouring kaza of El Hajjur, it would also appear, is not in a good position, where it is rumoured that the military outposts of Shahil and El Jahile [?] have surrendered.

Not much is heard of late of the activity of Seyyid Idrisee's bands infesting the Wayidat district.

The Kaimakam of Loheia, who not long ago proceeded with a small force to a place called Zahra, seven or eight hours' journey to the westward of his head-quarters, where the rebels had captured a convoy, has been unable to return, being more or less besieged there. The Hodeidah authorities, on the other hand, cannot spare troops to send to his assistance.

We have practically no news whatever here of the progress of the rebellion in the south-eastern frontier of the vilayet, although the intelligence received some time ago that most of the garrisoned towns had fallen to the onslaught of the rebels under Seyyid Abdulla Ibrahim, the Imam's principal lieutenant, daily gains credence.

About a fortnight ago the Kaimakam of Cunfuda reported to the Mutessarif of Hodeidah that the rebels in Assyr under Seyyid Mustapha had captured a Turkish position in the vicinity of, and to the south of, Abha, where severe fighting had taken place in which both sides lost heavily.

It is feared that Abha itself will succumb unless relieved very soon, but there appears to be no immediate intention to dispatch reinforcements thither or to undertake the offensive against the insurgents there professing allegiance to the Pretender, Seyyid Mahomed-el-Idrisee.

Rumours are current here that the Grand Shereef of Mecca will shortly leave with a strong force of tribal levies from the Hedjaz to co-operate with the Turks in suppressing the rebellion in the sanjak of Assyr and in crushing the influence of the Idrisee Pretender.

Ottoman gun-boats have shown great activity during the past month in patrolling the Yemen littoral, with the view to suppressing the arms traffic.

About three weeks ago information by telegraph was received by the local authorities from the Minister of War at Constantinople to the effect that a German steamer called the "Louise" [?] had sailed from Europe with a consignment of arms and dynamite apparently bound for Bussorah, but possibly destined for the Yemen rebels.

The gun-boats "Rafahiya," "Bafra," "New Shehr," "Ordu," "Yozgot," and the

torpedo-destroyer "Pek Shevket" have since been distributed over the eastern littoral of the Red Sea between the Straits of the Bab-el-Mandeb and Cunfuda, and are cruising about on the look-out for the above-mentioned steamer.

The cruiser "Hamidieh" is at Camaran, and will shortly return to Constantinople.

I have, &c.

G. A. RICHARDSON.

[15120] No. 37.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 261. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 18, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 241 of the 11th instant, my telegram No. 96 of the 17th instant and other telegraphic correspondence concerning the recent arrest of three natives of Bahrein by Jelal Bey, the Vali of Bussorah, I have the honour to forward copy of Mr. Consul Crow's despatch No. 14 of the 25th March on the subject. As will appear from the latter, the vali's action was evidently a deliberate attempt to enforce the contention that Bahrein is Ottoman, and his action was probably the outcome of instructions from the Central Government to the Bussorah authorities. It will be noticed that in the case of Khalil-bin-Ibrahim in 1908 the then vali informed Mr. Crow in writing that "his orders were to treat Bahreinese in Turkey as Ottoman subjects."

The present vali's communication (Enclosure No. 1 in Mr. Crow's No. 14 of the 25th March, 1911) is very curt and categorical and constitutes a definite written claim which it would be imprudent to overlook. Consequently as hinted in my telegram No. 96, it would seem advisable that we should insist on an answer to my note of the 8th April informing us officially and in writing that the Vali of Bussorah has been instructed to accept Bahrein passports.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 37.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 14.)

Sir, *Bussorah, March 25, 1911.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 56 of the 22nd March and No. 61 of to-day respecting three natives of Bahrein arrested by the vali I have the honour to report that, according to passports forwarded by them to this consulate, issued by the Sheikh of Bahrein and duly legalised by the political agent in that island, Issa is the son of Haji Ali-bin-Haji Ahmed-bin-Mehdy, Haji Mohammed Hussein is the son of Haji Ahmed, and Mohammed Salih is the son of Mohammed Ali. These persons are all natives of Bahrein who have proceeded to Bussorah on business and their Bahrein passports are dated the 22nd December, 1910, the 24th December, 1910, and the 3rd March, 1911, respectively.

In their letter to me the petitioners state that they are residing at Hamden and have property at Mohammerah and in Bahrein and proceeded to Bussorah on private business, that they were summoned by the Tabour Agassi to the vali's presence on the 6th (19th) March, who ordered them to take out nufus teskeres as Ottoman subjects, that on their refusal to do so the vali took a guarantee for their appearance on the following day when they were put under arrest and have since been detained by the police.

I sent my dragoman to see the commissioner of police in order to ascertain the reason of their arrest, but the commissioner of police said he had been ordered by the vali to give no reply to any person from the consulate who came to enquire about them.

I then wrote officially to the vali, copy enclosed, No. 20, asking him the cause of their arrest, and pointing out that they were natives of Bahrein, and their passports were in my hands and at his disposal, if he wished to see them, and I requested him to allow me to communicate with them, and give them the usual consular assistance, as natives of Bahrein enjoyed British protection.

The vali in reply, enclosed No. 1, stated that the Ottoman Government neither knew nor admitted that natives of Bahrein were under our protection.

The men have applied to me again to-day through their relatives, who state they have now been six days under arrest. The vali will not admit any interference on my part, and, as far as I am able to ascertain, no judicial charge has yet been made against them, and no action taken at the public prosecutor's office.

Under these circumstances I have no alternative, but to report their case for your Excellency's consideration, and to suggest that instructions may be telegraphed to the vali to admit our interference on their behalf, and to inform me of the charge, if any, made against them.

I would remind your Excellency of the case of Khalil-bin-Ibrahim, a native of Bahrein, who was taken for military service in 1908, and refer you to my despatch No. 93, of the 31st December, 1908, reporting his case. In that instance the vali in a letter No. 270 of the 24th December, 1908, informed me that his orders were to treat Bahreinese in Turkey as Ottoman subjects.

I conclude therefore that the vali, in the present case, is following the instructions he has received from Constantinople.

I have, &c.

F. E. CROW.

Enclosure 2 in No. 37.

Consul Crow to the Vali of Bussorah.

(No. 20.)

Sir, *Bussorah, March 21, 1911.*

I HAVE received a petition from Haji Issa-bin-Haji Ahmed, Mohammed Hussein-bin-Haji Ahmed, and Mohammed Salih-bin-Mohammed Ali-bin-Nasir, who state that they are subjects of the Sheikh of Bahrein, and have been arrested by the Turkish authorities.

The said persons have passports granted by the Sheikh of Bahrein and certified by the British political agent in that island. These papers are in my hands.

As your Excellency is aware the subjects of the Sheikh of Bahrein enjoy British protection. I have the honour to request your Excellency to allow my dragoman to communicate with them in order to give them the usual consular assistance, and to inform me on what grounds these persons have been arrested.

If you desire, my dragoman will show you their passports.

I have, &c.

F. E. CROW.

Enclosure 3 in No. 37.

The Vali of Bussorah to Consul Crow.

(Translation.)

(No. 1.)

Sir, *Bussorah, March 8 (21), 1327 (1911).*

IN reply to your letter of the 21st March, I have the honour to state that the Ottoman Government neither knows nor admits that the people of Bahrein are under the protection of the British Government.

JELAL.

[15384] No. 38.

Mr. Petridès to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

Ethelburga House, 91–3 Bishopsgate, London, April 24, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Louis Mallet's favour of the 13th instant conveying the news from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, that permission for the use of diving apparatus for sponge fishing in Turkish waters has been extended for another year.

This concession is of importance to the sponge trade in this country, but it is of even greater value to the Inhabitants of the Sporades Islands on whose behalf I have

previously written you, and I now desire respectfully to tender you my most sincere thanks for the exercise of your influence in their support.

I wish to take this opportunity of referring to your letters 21401/10 and 27807/10, replying to my letters to you of the 14th and 20th June last.

Even since that time there have been several attempts, sometimes accompanied by threats, to induce the islanders to submit to military conscription. These efforts to deprive them of the most vital of their cherished privileges they have steadily resisted.

I now have the gratification to inform you that advices have recently reached me that the Vali of Rhodes has announced that orders have been issued by the Imperial Government at Constantinople, that there is to be no disturbance of the existing régime in the Sporades Islands, and that the prevailing systems of taxation and administration are to remain unchanged, until the whole matter has been fully considered at Constantinople.

The islanders fully realise that this relief from the fear of oppression is entirely due to the beneficent influence of His Majesty's Government. I am asked to assure you that their gratitude is deep, sincere, and lasting, and to express their humble hope that they may continue to rely in the future, that as in the past your powerful aid may be extended to shield them from injustice and oppression, and to secure the survival of the rights and privileges they still possess.

I have, &c.
D. N. PETRIDES.

[14664] No. 39.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 113.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 26, 1911.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's telegram No. 83 of the 8th instant, regarding the proposed sale by the Turkish Government of the treasures of the shrines at Kerbela and Nejef, I transmit to your Excellency herewith copy of a letter from the India Office enclosing telegraphic correspondence with the Government of India on the subject.

His Majesty's Government concur in the view expressed by the Indian Government, that His Majesty's Government should not at present intervene in the matter, and your Excellency should not, therefore, make any mention of the matter at the Sublime Porte.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[16057] No. 40.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 280.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 26, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 88 of the 8th February, regarding the claims for demolition and expropriation of buildings belonging to British subjects at Bagdad by the municipal authorities, I have the honour to report that at every weekly reception at the Sublime Porte since that date I have urged upon Rifaat Pasha the necessity of the payment of these claims, and have invariably been met with the same reply that the Government would urge upon the municipality the necessity of paying them after a full examination, but that the Bagdad municipal loan was still being considered by the Council of State, and that until it had been approved by that body, and a new vali had been appointed to succeed Nazim Pasha, nothing more could be done.

I have also urged upon Rifaat Pasha that it would be only fair that a provisional payment should be made to the sufferers to enable them to begin rebuilding, but beyond receiving an assurance that the suggestion would receive consideration I have not been able to obtain anything from his Excellency.

The Government is apparently encountering considerable difficulty in connection with the selection of a new vali for Bagdad.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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* No. 34.

[16058] No. 41.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 281.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 26, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 516 of the 27th July, 1910, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Mr. Barnham, consul-general at Smyrna, enclosing details of a conversation between the British vice-consul at Rhodes and an inspector of the Ministry of Finance on the subject of the grievances of the inhabitants of the Sporades.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 41.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 36.)
Sir, *Smyrna, April 24, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a report which I have received from the British vice-consul at Rhodes, giving details of a conversation which he had held with an inspector of the Ministry of Finance who served on the commission appointed last year to enquire into the grievances of the inhabitants of the Sporades.

It appears that the report of the commission was referred to the Council of State, which has not yet arrived at a decision, but that any alteration in the constitution of the islands must have the sanction of Parliament.

Mr. Biliotti also forwards a return, which was drawn up by the late Vali Rashid Pasha at the time the commission was conducting the enquiry, showing the population of the twelve islands of the Sporades and the amount and nature of the taxes paid by each.

The assessment was based upon the documents claimed by the natives to be the firmans granting them their secular privileges.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 41.

Vice-Consul Biliotti to Consul-General Barnham.

(No. 10.)
Sir, *Rhodes, April 15, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 8th instant asking me, on behalf of his Excellency the Ambassador, whether the commission appointed last year to enquire into the grievances of the inhabitants of the Sporades had arrived at any decision.

I am in possession of no official information, nothing having been published on the subject, but from a conversation which I have had occasion to have with one of the members of this commission, an inspector of the financial department, who happens to be now here on a fresh mission, I gathered the following details as forming the basis of their report:—

1. That under the present constitution the Sporades isles cannot continue to enjoy an exceptional administration, but must be assimilated to the other parts of the Empire.

2. That besides this consideration, the lower class of the population was under the domination of a few influential natives, who turned it to their personal advantage to the detriment of the interests of the public. That these influential individuals, who almost always held the power in turns as Dimogherontes, were judges and parties; that under these circumstances the working class could make no progress, and not being able exactly to understand their own interests, allowed themselves to be led by their chiefs to oppose all advantageous innovations which the Government wished to introduce in their isles.

3. That the object of the Government was to ameliorate the condition of the

population in general in safeguarding the interests of the working class, and that when they shall understand the benevolent intentions of the Constitutional Government they would be decided to them and become loyal patriots. He added that hitherto whenever an innovation was proposed the presumption of the preceding Government was to ascertain not only whether it would entail an outlay on it, but if any income was likely to be derived therefrom, and not whether it would confer any benefit on the populations. On this principle, which was always in force, the aspirations of the inhabitants took a direction foreign to the Ottoman Empire, but these aspirations will, naturally, take another turn under a constitutional system in the Sporades, which has for its object to attract not only the attention but also the devotion of the natives of these isles, who are accomplished seamen, and will rival by lessening and perhaps annihilating for the Ottoman fleet.

4. He also mentioned the trade on sponges, which tends to be transferred from these isles elsewhere. He attributes this change to the numerous rates obtained by the moneylenders from the sponge divers, and above all to the additional tax of 3 per cent. on the value of sponges exported, half of which is paid by the vendor and half by the purchaser.

5. That natives especially complain of their destitution, of the barrenness of their islands, many of which are even deprived of fresh water, and declare that if the financial system under which they have hitherto lived were to be abolished they would be unable to have communal schools, medical men, medicines, &c., and would, as a consequence, be unable to continue to reside in their respective isles. In order to alleviate this difficulty the commission has suggested to the Porte, while assimilating these isles to the other parts of Turkey, to grant to each of them an compensation an annual sum of money equal to their respective annual income, which was considered to amount to the aggregate sum of 14,000 liras. Such an arrangement might satisfy the natives.

6. My interlocutor further pointed out that the documents on which the natives of the Sporades base their claims of revendication of privileges are not valid, as they suppose it. All firmans granting a privilege are drawn up in the name of the person who is to enjoy it, while the firmans in question are addressed to the authorities in consequence of the natives having complained of arbitrary taxes being levied from them, and that in order to evade all difficulties, the different taxes were converted into a fixed annual tribute. This was taking place many years ago, and since that time important changes had been introduced in these isles that it is full time that all such antiquated systems should cease to exist.

7. In conclusion, my interlocutor is of opinion that after the number of years that the system of a fixed tribute has been in force in the Sporades and required forces of law it cannot be abolished by a simple decree, but can be so only by a law enacted by Parliament.

The report of the enquiry commission was submitted to the State Council, which has not yet taken any decision.

I learnt from another unofficial source that the villages has just been instructed to suspend for the present the collection of the tax on sheep and goats which they had been lately ordered to levy from the inhabitants of the Sporades Isles.

Without entering into further considerations, I shall limit myself to state—

1. That there may be some truth in the statement that influential natives care more for their personal interests than for those of the general public.

2. That it will be very difficult to change the racial sympathy of the Greek inhabitants of the Sporades, and than the young men who are liable to conscription will be prevented with the greatest difficulty, as most of them are kept by their siblings out of their isles, especially in America, where they find a rich field for sponge fishing.

3. That it might be possible to induce the natives to accept in compensation the equivalent of their present annual income, but they would always dread that this equivalent might cease to be served one to them after they accept the change. A law enacted by the Parliament might assuage their diffidences.

I have, &c.

A. BILLOTTI.

[1804] 40

Enclosure 3 in No. 41.

TABLEAU indiquant les Droits fixes payés au Gouvernement ottoman sur la base des Firmans octroyés aux 12 Iles Sporades depuis la Conquête.

Noms des Iles.	Population.	Droits du Cadastre.	Exonération militaire.	Total.	Droits de Pâturage et Dime perçus pour les Ilots dépendants.	Droits sur le Bétail (Aghnam) perçus pour les Ilots dépendants.	Total des Droits perçus pour les Ilots dépendants.	Total général.
		Fr. c.	Fr. c.	Fr. c.	Fr. c.	Fr. c.	Fr. c.	Fr. c.
Halki	2,887	9,070 20	1,065 00	13,135 20	1,429 00	1,500 00	2,929 00	16,064 20
Symi	11,896	26,031 32	22,844 00	48,875 32	4,301 00	667 20	4,968 20	53,843 12
Tilos	1,196	13,979 13	5,731 00	19,710 13	..	..	..	19,710 13
Scarpanthos	8,071	50,652 10	21,242 20	71,894 30	4,315 00	2,173 00	6,488 00	78,382 30
Cassos	1,403	17,605 00	7,666 00	25,271 00	1,779 00	625 00	2,404 00	27,675 00
Casselloriso	7,870	40,695 00	21,077 13	61,682 13	10,681 00	140 00	10,794 00	72,476 13
Nyssiros	5,859	19,795 00	11,724 00	31,519 00	5,170 20	950 00	6,120 20	37,639 20
Calymnos	10,068	33,826 00	11,359 00	45,185 00	13,115 00	2,151 00	15,266 00	60,581 00
Astropalia	1,053	5,094 00	6,675 00	11,769 00	..	..	..	11,769 00
Leros	4,509	14,372 00	5,401 10	19,773 10	27,357 00	13,985 00	41,342 00	61,115 10
Patmos	2,203	20,131 08	6,201 10	26,332 18	..	..	..	26,332 18
Nisaro	12,746	20,188 11	6,841 05	27,029 19	6,850 00	1,700 00	8,550 00	35,582 19
Total	72,070	271,350 17	130,627 18	401,977 35	75,310 20	23,851 20	99,202 00	501,179 35

[16203] No. 42.

Consul Stevens to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Batoum, April* 14, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Caucasian newspapers report the receipt by the military authorities and the Offices of Ways and Means in the Caucasus of orders from St. Petersburgh to take in hand, with as little delay as possible, the repair of all roads converging towards the Turkish frontier.

The more special attention of the authorities is at the same time invited to those mountain roads leading towards the western confines of the Caucasus of strategic value, which, it is urged, should be forthwith rendered adaptable to vehicular traffic.

I have, &c.
F. STEVENS.

[16202] No. 43.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 101.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, May* 1, 1911.

KERBELA and Nejef treasure.

With reference to my telegram No. 83 of the 8th April last, I learn from the Russian Ambassador that, according to reliable information which has reached his Excellency from Bagdad, the fetwa has now been withdrawn regarding this question.

[16414] No. 44.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 25th April, 1911, relative to Abu Musa.

India Office, May 1, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 44.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, April* 25, 1911.

ABU MUSA. Please refer to your telegram dated the 28th March, 1911.

We will await draft reply to German Government. I transmitted to you and to resident, Persian Gulf, by mail of the 7th April, the draft of a note making separate proposal for compromise. Your observations on this are solicited; but other papers should not be delayed.

[14126] No. 45.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 4, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople relative to the detention by the Vali of Bussorah of three Bahreinis.

As Viscount Morley is aware, the three men have been released unconditionally, and Sir G. Lowther has been instructed to demand from the Turkish Government some compensation for them on account of their illegal detention, and to insist that instructions should be sent to the vali to accept Bahrein passports in the future.

In these circumstances Sir E. Grey considers that the proposal of Sir G. Lowther to take the opportunity afforded by this incident to define more exactly the position of His Majesty's Government as regards Bahrein, and even to give the status of His Majesty's Government in the island a more definite international character, presumably by declaring a protectorate over it, would be prejudicial to the present negotiations with the Turkish Government on the subject of the Bagdad Railway, and would also act unfavourably on British relations with Persia.

Such a step would constitute a violation of the *status quo* which it is the policy of His Majesty's Government to maintain, and the infringement of which by the Vali of Bussorah formed the ground of their complaint against that official.

Moreover, the fact that the Bahreinis have been released unconditionally is in reality a recognition by the Turkish Government of the right of His Majesty's Government to protect the subjects of Bahrein, a recognition which will be strengthened should the Turkish Government agree to pay the compensation demanded and to issue the desired instructions to the Vali of Bussorah.

Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive Lord Morley's observations upon Sir G. Lowther's despatch, and to learn whether his Lordship concurs in the view that it would be inadvisable further to define His Majesty's Government's position in Bahrein.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[17150] No. 46.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 107.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, May* 7, 1911.

RUMOURED theft from Mosque of Omar.

His Majesty's consul at Jerusalem telegraphs, in reply to my telegram No. 9, Confidential, to him of the 4th instant, that he believes that Captain Parker's party found nothing and took nothing away with them.

Mr. Satow adds that the Jaffa customs authorities, according to a report from His Majesty's vice-consul there, examined the party's baggage.

[17172] No. 47.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 286.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April* 28, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 214 of the 9th April, 1910, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout, transmitting a protest from the Lebanese residing at Beirout against their enrolment for military service.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 47.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 33.)
Sir, *Beirout, April* 18, 1911.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 15th March, and my reply No. 18 of the 25th March, 1910, on the subject of the exemption from military service of Lebanese settled in Beirout and other parts of the Ottoman Empire, I have the honour to report that last week I received a visit from a deputation of Lebanese residing at Beirout, who presented a petition (copy enclosed) praying that their case might have the kind and benevolent attention of your Excellency.

My reply was to the effect that the matter had been duly submitted by me to your Excellency last year, but that I would transmit to your Excellency the translation of

their petition to the Grand Vizier, an Arabic duplicate of which, numerously signed, they had left with me.

In the meantime I recommended them to send a small deputation to Constantinople to interview his Highness with a view to obtaining at least a suspension of the application of the regulations for a reasonable term of years if their complete exemption cannot be obtained.

I have since received a printed translation of the petition addressed to the Grand Vizier, which I enclose herewith, and I have heard that funds are being collected to defray the expenses of a deputation.

The present perturbation over this question after a year's calm is due to the activity being displayed by the officials of the "Nufuz," or Census Department, in the registration of the Christian inhabitants of all categories, including the resident Lebanese, in anticipation of this year's and future years' enrolment in the army which has induced many Lebanese families to leave Beirout to take up their abode within the limits of the Lebanon pending a definite settlement of this question, upon which will depend whether they return or remain away altogether.

As suggested in the third paragraph from the end of my above-quoted despatch, the demand of the Lebanese for reasonable time to make their arrangements to leave Beirout should they not wish their sons to serve in the army, should in fairness be conceded by the Sublime Porte, unless of course all Lebanese are to be exempted, and not only "natives" of the Lebanon, who, as your Excellency stated in your despatch of the 15th March, 1910, ought to be exempted by the Recruiting Law of 1886. The mere fact of being born in the Lebanon is apparently not admitted by the authorities as freeing them if they have subsequently become domiciled in Beirout.

In any case, a more precise explanation of what is meant by the definition "settled and married" (which is perhaps better rendered by the word "domiciled") should be given, and it would appear to me to be only fair, considering the circumstances of the case, that a specified term of years covering the period usually considered as the term of a generation, commencing from the establishment of the constitution, should be adopted to fix the liability of Lebanese domiciled in Beirout to the recruiting laws of the Empire.

I have, &c.
H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 47.

Lebanese Deputation to Consul-General Cumberbatch.

M. le Consul-général, *Le 12 avril*, 1911.

C'EST depuis cinquante ans que le Liban jouit d'une administration particulière, garantie par les Grandes Puissances de l'Europe, et il leur en garde une éternelle reconnaissance.

Le Gouvernement ottoman a toujours reconnu ces prérogatives aux Libanais établis dans les vilayets de l'Empire; mais un décret émané du Conseil d'État, il y a quelques jours, a violé ces privilèges en visant à nous inscrire dans les registres du cens des vilayets, et en ne nous considérant plus comme Libanais.

La ville de Beyrouth est encadrée dans nos montagnes et elle forme l'unique débouché de nos importations, de nos exportations et de nos communications avec le monde; nous ne pouvons nous en dispenser.

Les grandes villes attirent les étrangers, le besoin de la vie l'explique; mais l'étranger ne peut être astreint à se soumettre à une nouvelle mesure locale à moins que son législateur ne l'autorise; un Libanais ne peut, contre son gré, perdre son titre de Libanais, à moins que les signataires du protocole n'y consentent. Nous mettre donc dans l'alternative de mourir de faim ou de perdre nos prérogatives, c'est ce que la justice et l'humanité des Puissances signataires du protocole n'y souffriraient pas. C'est donc à ces Puissances seules qu'incombe le droit de changer ou de modifier, d'accord avec la Sublime Porte, la teneur de notre règlement. Le Conseil d'État ne peut de sa propre autorité annuler ce protocole ni l'interpréter.

Nous avons protesté contre ce nouveau décret du Conseil d'État; une copie en arabe de cette protestation est ci-jointe; la traduction vous sera remise bientôt.

Nous vous prions, M. le consul général, de vouloir bien en prendre connaissance et de transmettre les renseignements requis à son Excellence M. l'Ambassadeur

d'Angleterre à Constantinople pour appuyer nos justes réclamations auprès de la Sublime Porte.

Nous vous prions d'agréer d'avance, M. le consul général, l'expression de la plus profonde gratitude des Libanais qui vous présentent cette supplique, en leur nom et au nom de leurs compatriotes qui sont à Beyrouth.

Pour les Libanais, leur députation :
CHAKER AOUN.
JOS. F. NILOS.
GEORGES ATYEH.
Dr. AM. GEMAYEL.

[17175] No. 48.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 201.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May 2*, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad, submitting copy of a table of financial results prepared by Sir W. Willcocks, showing what he hopes will be achieved if his proposals are adopted.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 48.

Consul-General Lorimer to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 14. Very Confidential.)
Your Excellency, *Bagdad, March* 31, 1911.

SIR WILLIAM WILLCOCKS is now about to submit to the Turkish Government in final form a complete set of projects for the irrigation of Mesopotamia, and, in consonance with the happy and confidential character of our relations from the first, he has handed me in advance a table of financial results, showing what he hopes will be achieved if his proposals are adopted. I hasten to transmit to your Excellency a copy of this important document, which is so clearly drawn that it seems to require no explanation or comment on my part.

I will only remark that, in setting down the cost of the schemes, Sir William has not only, so he informs me, added 33 per cent. to the estimated expenditure according to Egyptian practice, but has doubled the result so obtained; and that the enormous margin of 166 per cent. has thus been allowed to cover interest charges during construction of the works and development of the country.

The expenditure shown in column 2 of the statement (cost of irrigation works) is such as properly might, and in India would, be met by Government itself.

The expenditure shown in column 3 of the statement (cost of agricultural works) is that involved in levelling fields, constructing distributory channels, extirpating weeds, &c.; and this secondary expenditure might either be borne by owners and occupiers of land, or undertaken by a land development company, agricultural bank, or other similar body, or met partly in the one way and partly in the other.

I have, &c.
J. G. LORIMER, *Political Resident in Turkish Arabia.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 48.

TABLE of Financial Results.

Name of System. (1.)	Cost of Irrigation Works. (2.)	Cost of Agricultural Works. (3.)	Total Cost of Irrigation and Agricultural Works.* (4.)	Area Commanded. (5.)	Net Rents, per annum.* (6.)	Percentage of Column 6 on Column 4. (7.)	Tithes, per annum. (8.)	Maintenance, per annum. (9.)	Tithes, less Maintenance, per annum. (10.)	Percentage of Column 10 on Column 2. (11.)	Value of Land at fourteen Years. (12.)
	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	Hectares.	£ T.		£ T.	£ T.	£ T.		£ T.
Feluja Hindia	5,084,580	5,500,000	10,584,580	550,000	3,080,000	30·0	770,000	165,000	605,000	11·9	42,900,000
Hai	2,757,980	2,500,000	5,257,980	250,000	1,400,000	26·7	350,000	75,000	275,000	10·0	19,500,000
Bussorah	1,996,960	900,000	2,896,960	90,000	504,000	17·4	126,000	27,000	99,000	5·0	7,020,000
Euphrates over-flow ..	425,000	250,000	675,000	50,000	280,000	41·4	70,000	30,000	40,000	9·4	3,900,000
Beled	2,118,240	1,700,000	3,818,240	170,000	952,000	24·9	238,000	51,000	187,000	8·8	13,260,000
Nahrwan	1,817,120	2,000,000	3,817,120	200,000	480,000	12·5	120,000	60,000	60,000	3·3	6,600,000
East Tigris tail	1,006,760	1,000,000	2,006,760	100,000	560,000	28·0	140,000	30,000	110,000	10·9	7,800,000
Navigation	48,380	..	48,380	..	..	..	..	5,000	..	..	..
Total	15,255,020	13,850,000	29,105,020	1,410,000	7,256,000	24·9	1,814,000	443,000	1,371,000	9·0	100,980,000

* Net rents are the rents with the tithes deducted from them.

The profit on the undertaking is calculated by the percentage of net rents on the total cost of the Irrigation and Agricultural Works, and is 24·9. Profit to the Government is calculated by the percentage of tithes minus maintenance on the cost of the Irrigation Works, and is 9·0. In addition to the direct gain on the Irrigation Works expenditure, the Government will profit by increased import duties and all other sources of revenue which accompany increased wealth among the people.

W. WILLCOCKS.

March 30, 1911.

[17176] No. 49.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 292.) *Constantinople, May 2, 1911.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad, submitting copy of a report by Sir W. Willcocks on the port of Bussorah, in connection with his general report on irrigation projects in Mesopotamia.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 49.

Consul-General Lorimer to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 15. Very Confidential.) *Bagdad, March 31, 1911.*

Your Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to forward for information a copy of a suggestive note on "the port of Bussorah," which Sir William Willcocks has lately written, and which will form an appendix to a general report on irrigation projects in Mesopotamia that he is about to lay before the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.

J. G. LORIMER,

Political Resident in Turkish Arabia.

Enclosure 2 in No. 49.

Note on the Port of Bussorah.

STEAMERS drawing over 5·5 metres of water cannot enter the Shatt-el-Arab and ascend to Bussorah owing to the Bussorah bar. Now, if a channel were dredged across the bar on the alignment taken by the steamers, which is nature's natural outlet for the waters of the rivers, it should not be a costly matter to keep it clear. I base this statement on the fact, noted in paragraphs 16 and 18 of the report, that the only deposit in the water is that brought down by the Karun river, for ⅔ths of the sediment carried by the Tigris, Euphrates, and Karkha is left behind in the marshes. No special study has been made of the subject of dredging across the bar, but from conversations with captains of the British India Company and examinations of the charts and information in their possession, I estimate that the quantity of soft mud to be removed in order to obtain a channel 130 metres wide and 10 metres deep would be 10,000,000 cubic metres on a length of 32 kilom. In order to obtain a channel 130 metres wide and 8 metres deep, we should have to dredge 7,000,000 cubic metres of soft mud on a length of 24 kilom. These quantities seem very small for so important a work, and would justify the Government in undertaking a serious examination of the question.

I cannot leave the question of the port of Bussorah without mentioning the fact that a channel 32 kilom. long and 1·5 metres deep along the ancient course of the joint waters of the Euphrates and Tigris would put the Euphrates in communication with the western head of the Khor Abdullah, and if a port were needed on this Khor, sweet water would be available far in excess of anything Port Said possesses. Similarly, by digging a channel 10 kilom. long through the desert south of the Khor Abdullah-Bubian bifurcation, Euphrates water could be sent down the Bubian channel where it travelled thousands of years ago.

W. WILLCOCKS.

[17183] No. 50.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 209. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May 3, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith enclosed copy of a despatch No. 26 of the 21st April concerning an alleged sacrilege by English excavators at the sacred Mosque of Omar, built on the reputed site of the Temple of Solyman.

His Majesty's Embassy has had no cognisance of the arrangements with the Ottoman Government under which Captain Parker has been carrying on these excavations, while at Jerusalem the excavating party have had no connection with His Majesty's consulate during the time of Mr. Bleeh or his successor, Mr. Satow.

Captain Parker's work has apparently had the approval of the committee, as two deputies of the committee *bloc* spent some months with him at Jerusalem last year. These two gentlemen, Habib Bey and Medjdi Effendi, are also the ostensible leaders of the dissidents in the committee party in the Chamber, and the former is reported to have stated at an official committee meeting held at the Chamber that he had been told by the correspondent of an important European organ that, if Djavid Bey resigned, capital for enterprises in Turkey would become abundant. This statement has been attributed to the local correspondent of the "Times," but I learn that that gentleman has never even met Habib Effendi, and that the latter's remarks are in some way connected with the Jerusalem incident. Captain Parker has, I am informed, declared that his excavations under the Mosque of Omar were carried out in virtue of a secret agreement with the present Minister of Finance. The whole matter bears a certain mysterious character into which local intrigue has entered, but it is unfortunate that the English name should have been in any way connected with such an incident.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 50.

Consul Satow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 26.)

Sir, *Jerusalem, April 21, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that considerable excitement has been evident among the Moslem population of this city during the last week, arising out of rumours that an act of sacrilege had been committed at the Harem-esh-Sherif, commonly known as the Mosque of Omar, by, or at the instigation of, the English excavators led by Captain Parker.

So many conflicting and exaggerating rumours are abroad that it is difficult to arrive at the truth of the matter. The story most generally current is that on the night of the 12th instant two gendarmes were seen at the door of the Mosque with three sacks, and that Captain Parker and an Armenian named Makasdar, in his employ, were seen at the gate of the courtyard of the Mosque near the St. Stephen's gate. It is believed that investigations had been carried out under the mass of rock, known as the "Dome of the Rock," round which the Mosque is built, and that some objects had been removed. There are the wildest rumours current as to what these objects were, the popular belief inclining to the version that these were the Royal insignia of the House of David.

As already stated, Moslem public opinion was greatly excited at these rumours, and angry demonstrations have taken place at the Serai against the governor and at the Mosque against Sheikh Khalil, one of the guardians, who are believed to have been privy to the attempt. Telegrams were also sent to all the vilayets of the Empire stating that holy relics of the Moslem faith had, with the governor's connivance, been removed by foreigners.

A commission, under the presidency of the military commandant, has been appointed to investigate the matter. The two gendarmes, Sheikh Khalil and the Armenian Makasdar, who had left for Jaffa, have been arrested and imprisoned. Search is also being made for a certain Salameh, the dragoman of Captain Parker.

With a view to quieting public opinion, proclamations have been issued by the governor and the Local Committee of Union and Progress, in which it is stated that the

authorities were occupying themselves with the question, and that the people should remain quiet. The committee proclamation also states that the enquiry is being held under its supervision.

The local Christian population, which is always easily alarmed, has been rather nervous, as the discovery of the alleged sacrilege was made just after the departure of the Moslem pilgrimage to Nebi Mousa, and it was feared that on the return of the pilgrims they might vent their wrath upon Christians in general. I do not believe that there is any ground for this alarm, as Moslem irritation has so far been directed against the governor. In any case the garrison has, as is usually the case at Easter, been temporarily strengthened.

It is believed that, as the result of this incident, Azmi Bey, the governor, may be removed. Sami Bey, the commandant of the gendarmerie, is also suspected, as it is believed that the gendarmes were employed with his permission.

Captain Parker and his associates left Jerusalem at the beginning of the week. Their operations have never ceased to be an object of interest to the population of Jerusalem, but they have been so successful in keeping their secret that nothing is known either as to their aims or as to the progress achieved. Their object in working up from Siloam has been believed to get under the Temple area, as the Mosque precincts are usually called, and a plausible explanation of the present occurrence is that, finding the subterranean passage which they were following bore away from the Mosque, they were obliged to carry out operations from the Mosque itself.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

P.S.—There was a panic in the city at midday, arising out of an affray at the Mosque between fellahin and soldiers who tried to prevent them entering. The latter fired some shots in the air, which caused shopkeepers to close their shops in alarm. Everything is now quiet.

H. E. S.

[17592] No. 51.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 9.)

Sir, *India Office, May 9, 1911.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th instant upon the subject of the status of Bahrein, and the effect which a formal definition of it at the present juncture might have on the impending negotiations with Turkey and on British relations with Persia.

As regards Turkey, Viscount Morley feels some diffidence in expressing an opinion, since this Office has not cognisance of all the facts. But the impression which he has formed is that His Majesty's Government have to reckon—and whatever they may do will continue to have to reckon—with the persistent hostility of the Young Turk party, whether under a constitutional régime or a military dictatorship. He further believes that the only prospect of a satisfactory solution of the Bagdad Railway problem lies in a preliminary agreement with Germany, and that, if that is secured, while it will no doubt be necessary to pay all outward respect to Turkish susceptibilities, they can in practice be treated as negligible. It is, therefore, rather the manner in which the declaration of a protectorate over Bahrein might react upon our relations with Germany than its direct effect on the Turkish Government that his Lordship would consider.

From this point of view, it is no doubt desirable to avoid raising any controversial question unnecessarily, and Lord Morley agrees that if the Porte admit our claim to compensation, and issue the desired instructions to the Vali of Bussorah, they will in fact have recognised our protectorate, the formal declaration of which might in that case be made part of the general settlement in the Gulf to be proposed later. But if the Porte reject our claim, as, in his Lordship's opinion, they probably will, it will be necessary to take immediate action in support of it; and he would suggest that His Majesty's Government should thereupon declare the protectorate, and seize and detain Turkish vessels in the river and Gulf until compensation is paid.

I am further to suggest that the Turkish Government should not be permitted to delay their reply unreasonably. It was as long ago as the 19th April that Sir E. Grey instructed Sir G. Lowther to address them.

As regards the Persian Government, Lord Morley would suggest that they might be disregarded if the contingency referred to above should arise. The declaration of a protectorate will doubtless be unwelcome to them, but they have not themselves shown any particular desire to conciliate His Majesty's Government, and as His Majesty's Government have decided to stand out of the Khoremabad Railway concession, the most important question now open with Persia will probably not be prejudiced.

I am, &c.
ED. MONTAGU.

[18440] No. 52.

Aide-mémoire communicated by Tewfik Pasha, May 13, 1911.

TEVFIK PACHA avait déjà entretenu son Excellence Sir A. Nicolson du mouvement des navires de guerre de Sa Majesté britannique dans le détroit de Fav.

D'après les informations parvenues ultérieurement, ces vaisseaux de guerre y ont installé des mâts pour signaux et des bouées, et ont même tiré, le 6 avril dernier, un coup de canon aux alentours desdites bouées.

Le Gouvernement Impérial juge qu'au point de vue juridique la convention turco-persane de 1263 a reconnu à la Turquie la propriété du Chat-el-Arab et du détroit de Fav ; car l'article 2 de ce traité, après avoir reconnu Mohammerah et Djéziret-ul-Hizir à la Perse, ajoute que les navires persans auront le droit d'aller et de venir en toute liberté dans ce fleuve depuis l'endroit où il se jette à la mer jusqu'à l'endroit où aboutissent les frontières des deux États.

Cette clause établit donc que si l'île de Djéziret-ul-Hizir a été cédée, le fleuve lui-même a été retenu comme propriété ottomane, car autrement on aurait dû stipuler la faculté de libre passage pour les navires des deux parties et non pour les bâtiments persans seuls.

Si même cette manière de voir était contestable, il est évident qu'en droit la propriété des fleuves servant de frontière appartient par indivis aux Puissances riveraines, ce qui exclut pour un État tiers tout droit d'y faire des actes de souveraineté, tels que pose de balises, bouées et mâts.

Tout en ne méconnaissant pas l'utilité au point de vue de la navigation de l'établissement de signaux indiquant les parages du fleuve où les navires peuvent passer sans inconvénient, le Gouvernement Impérial estime toutefois que le fait de les installer par des navires de guerre étrangers constitue une atteinte aux droits de souveraineté de la Turquie, étant donné que le Chat-el-Arab est essentiellement ottoman, ou appartient du moins par indivis aux deux États riverains.

Il serait donc plus conforme aux principes du droit international que la pose de balises, mâts et bouées fût opérée par des navires de commerce, après une entente avec le Gouvernement Impérial ou tout au moins avec les deux États riverains, et qu'en tout cas on ne tire plus de coups de canons dans le Chat-el-Arab.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 13 *mai*, 1911.

[18256] No. 53.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 15.)

(No. 315.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May* 9, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 299 of the 3rd May, 1911, concerning the sacrilege committed by English excavators at the Mosque of Omar at Jerusalem, I have the honour to enclose an account taken from "La Turquie" of the distinctly animated discussion which took place in the Chamber yesterday on the subject.* The special heat imported into the debate was apparently due partly to the religious sentiments connected with the Mosque of Omar, which, perhaps, after Mecca and Medina, is one of the spots most sacred to Islam. The responsibility for the actual contract of Captain Parker would seem to be shared by the Cabinets of Kiamil Pasha,

* Not printed.

58*

[17975] No. 51*.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received May* 12.)

Sir, *India Office, May* 11, 1911.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram that has been received from the Government of India regarding an application made by Messrs. Wönckhaus to the Sheikh of Koweit for permission to send a business agent to that town.*

In Viscount Morley's opinion, it is alike impolitic and impossible to attempt to exclude German commerce permanently from Koweit, but it is very important that it should, if possible, be prevented from obtaining a foothold there until the status of the place has been regularised and a settlement regarding the terminus of the Bagdad Railway arrived at. He therefore agrees with the Government of India, to whom he proposes to address the telegram of which a draft is enclosed.†

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

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* Government of India to Viscount Morley (Telegraphic), May 6, 1911. † See No. 69* [20232].

Hilmi Pasha, and that of the present Grand Vizier, but no light has been thrown on the action of the existing local authorities, who apparently connived at the violation of the mosque, which was outside the area of archæological research provided for in the contract. In reply to telegraphic enquiries, Mr. Consul Satow informs me that he believes that nothing was found or taken away by Captain Parker's party, whose luggage was examined by the customs authorities at Jaffa.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[18257] No. 54.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 316.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May 10, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 155, Confidential, of the 9th March last, relative to the Chester scheme, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith an article from "La Gazette financière," of the 2nd instant, dealing with the question.*

The writer of the article sets out to expose what he holds to be the underlying motives for the promotion of a scheme which, he maintains, is obviously incapable of realisation in practice. No one, he contends, can seriously mean to construct and exploit a network of railways which must involve an annual deficit of some 100,000*l*. The real intention of the concessionnaires, he maintains, is to use the time to be allowed under the contract for surveys to prospect for mines, and then to say that they find the project is too difficult, and to ask for concessions over the best mineral areas as compensation for their time and trouble.

Whatever may be the deep designs of Mr. Chester's backers, the purpose of this article is quite clear: it is to instil a note of alarm into the minds of the deputies, and to rouse parliamentary opposition at the moment when the scheme is to be submitted for the sanction of the Chamber. It is, in all probability, inspired by the German Embassy and the Anatolian Railway Company, who are not in the least anxious to see feeders for their own line built by outsiders, and are still less inclined to allow the construction of a rival port at Youmourtalik, just opposite their own port at Alexandretta.

The existing parliamentary crisis will no doubt cause the presentation of the Chester scheme to be shelved for the present session, and I am inclined to think that the Grand Vizier and the opponents of the project generally hope, by continued postponement and delay, to disgust Mr. Chester and his group, and thus cause the disappearance of the plan by a lingering though natural death.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[18258] No. 55.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 317.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May 9, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Aleppo in regard to the situation at Antioch, where considerable alarm has arisen among the Christian population owing to the threatening attitude of certain of the Moslems inhabiting the district. His Majesty's consul first informed me of Dr. Martin's reports on the gravity of the situation by a telegram of the 19th ultimo, and I at once acquainted the Minister for Foreign Affairs with the serious nature of the news I had received. Mr. Fontana added in his telegram that the acting vali at Aleppo had requested the military commandant to send reinforcements at once to Antioch. No further news was received from Aleppo until the evening of the 27th ultimo, when a telegram from His Majesty's consul showed that Dr. Martin feared the worst, while on the other hand no troops had been sent from Aleppo to Antioch. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom I spoke on the matter the same evening, denied that the situation was in any way abnormal, and Rifaat Pasha's view was confirmed by the

* Not printed.

Minister of the Interior, to whom I mentioned it, and by my American colleague and the Constantinople representative of the British and Foreign Bible Society, whom I saw next morning in consequence of a further telegram from Dr. Martin that, though no actual riot had begun, people were fleeing from the town and taking refuge in the mission garden. There are American missionaries at Aintab, Alexandretta, and Suedia, but neither Mr. Carter nor Mr. Peat had received any information of an abnormal situation at Antioch or in the district.

At the same time I telegraphed to Mr. Fontana that, while the central Government admitted that there had been dissensions among the local officials at Antioch, they declared that there was no reason for the alarm felt by Dr. Martin.

His Majesty's consul, replying on the 1st instant, said that his Russian colleague had been asked on the 28th April by the head of the Orthodox Church at Antioch to intervene on behalf of public security, but added that the chief of police at Aleppo and a colonel of gendarmerie with thirty gendarmes had now arrived at Antioch.

Nothing further has been received from Mr. Fontana, and I think it may be assumed that the local authorities have for the present taken the measure of any danger that may have existed.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 55.

Consul Fontana to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 12.)

Sir, *Aleppo, April 25, 1911.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 20 of the 19th instant, reporting that I had received a letter and a telegram from the Rev. Dr. James Martin at Antioch describing the situation there as very serious, and urging the advisability of the dispatch of a war-ship to Swedia, I now have the honour to report more fully upon the state of affairs at Antioch as described by Dr. Martin in two letters which he has addressed to me.

In a letter dated the 15th instant Dr. Martin wrote that he was daily visited by respectable people who called his attention to the state of the town, telling him how Christians in the streets of the various quarters were rudely accosted by Moslems, who told them that there would be a massacre at the Greek Easter, saying: "You have but ten days to live, and then your property will be ours"; that the soldiers in garrison were very few and insufficient for the maintenance of order when all the Moslems were armed; that the kaïmakam, accompanied by a military escort, had patrolled the town at night, believing that mischief was brewing; and that he (Dr. Martin) intended to postpone his projected departure for Aleppo and to telegraph to me any developments in the situation.

I at once called on the vali and communicated to him the contents of Dr. Martin's letter, urging him to telegraph to the Kaïmakam of Antioch and to increase the force of regular troops stationed there. He wired to the kaïmakam, Tewfik Bey, asking whether public security was threatened, and he promised to urge the commandant to send reinforcements to Antioch. He informed me that there was a split among the authorities there, and that he had already ordered the Kaïmakam of Harem and the Acting Kaïmakam of Jebel Simaan to proceed to Antioch and hold an enquiry. As a matter of fact, the Antioch officials are divided into two parties, the one siding with the kaïmakam and the other with the mal müdiri, who has quarrelled with Tewfik Bey, a man of little authority or ability. On the evening of the 19th instant I received a telegram from Dr. Martin couched in the following terms: "Confirming my letter of Saturday, still feeling very unwell. No force. Prompt remedies needed; sea salts best." I at once sent a dragoman to the acting vali, urging him to take immediate measures to obviate disturbance at Antioch and to dispatch the required reinforcement. He again telegraphed to the kaïmakam and promised to urge the commandant to send off troops, but this was not done. I telegraphed to your Excellency the same evening.

Dr. Martin again wrote to me on the 22nd instant acknowledging the receipt of a telegram I had sent him, and stating that the Kaïmakam of Antioch had sent for him and that they had conversed together on the situation. Tewfik Bey said that there was no cause for alarm. Dr. Martin assured him that there was a reign of terror in the town and terrible apprehension of another massacre, and that though he was no

alarmist (which I sincerely believe to be true) he had thought it his duty to telegraph to the British consul. Dr. Martin pointed out that all the orderly elements in the community commended the good intentions of the kaïmakam, but that there was no sufficient force at hand in view of the Moslem population being armed. Tewfik Bey replied that he had sixty gendarmes, and considered those sufficient for every eventuality.

Dr. Martin's letter continues: "Meantime, evidence was brought to me by numbers of people which all confirmed me in the opinion that my telegraphing you, Sir, had been necessary. The most trustworthy people assure me that even soldiers are dropping remarks confirmatory of the widespread apprehensions. I am making a list of the threatening speeches which, in different parts of the town, have been addressed lately to Christians by Moslems, all to one and the same effect"—a massacre to take place—"just after the Greek Church Easter."

Repeated instances have occurred where a Moslem in the country, being friendly towards some Christian in Antioch, has sent, or has come, and told that Christian he had better come out of Antioch to the country for a time, as there was going to be trouble in Antioch.

To-day a very respectable man brings me the remark, confidentially let fall by a Christian member of the local Committee of Union and Progress, namely, that the Moslems of Kusch (a neighbouring mountain district of some eighty to ninety Moslem villages) have been saying that "on the fall of the present Sultan, which is early expected, they are to descend upon Antioch to massacre."

The same informant tells me that a Greek Churchman, wishing to earn a little money, asked leave of the gendarmes or the police to set up in a field by the river, opposite the barracks at some distance, a merry-go-round for young people's entertainment during Easter week, but was told he had better not do so, as they could not promise to be able to protect him.

Friends inform me, nevertheless, since the arrival of your telegram, which seems to be not secret, the kaïmakam appears to have waked up to some sense of responsibility at least, and that comparatively a feeling of security has in the minds of the people taken the place of fear.

It is much felt, however, that the governor has no adequate forces at command here.

I have, &c.
RAPHAEL A. FONTANA.

P.S., *April 29.*—I have held back this despatch, which was ready for the post on the 27th April, as at noon on that day I received an alarming telegram from Dr. Martin to the effect that the worst fears were justified as to the situation at Antioch, which I at once communicated to your Excellency by telegram marked "urgent"; and at the same time I telegraphed to Dr. Martin asking whether any rioting had actually occurred, and whether he and British and Hellenic subjects were in danger. Meanwhile, I sent a dragoman to read a copy of Dr. Martin's telegram to the Acting Governor-General, to urge him to take instant action, and to inform him that I must consider him responsible for the lives of British and Hellenic subjects at Antioch, as he had had full warning from this consulate of the likelihood of disturbances there. My urgent telegram addressed to your Excellency was returned to me by the telegraph office, where the cavass was informed that all telegraphic lines of communication with Constantinople were interrupted. I at once took the telegram to the acting vali, whom I found at his house together with the commandant, and requested him to have the telegram sent to the office with orders for its immediate dispatch; and I urged Ismail Pasha and the commandant to take drastic measures, such as the dispatch of troops from Alexandretta to Antioch (a distance of some seven hours). They promised to do all that was possible, and proceeded to the telegraph office, where they remained for four hours trying to communicate with the Antioch authorities. No employé, however, was at the Antioch telegraph office. In the evening at about 8 o'clock telegraphic communication was reopened, and Ismail Pasha received telegrams from the Kaïmakam of Antioch, the Committee of Union and Progress, and the Acting Kaïmakam of Jebel Simaan, and the Kaïmakam of Harem on mission there, declaring that public security left nothing to be desired. The colonel of gendarmes with thirty mounted men and the chief of police were nevertheless dispatched the same evening from Aleppo to Antioch. Earlier that evening I received an answer to my urgent telegram to Dr. Martin, in which he stated that all were in danger, that people were fleeing from the town and numbers

crowding into his grounds for refuge. This I at once communicated to the acting vali.

Yesterday a telegram was received by the Russian consulate at Aleppo from the head of the Orthodox Church at Antioch, an Ottoman subject, couched in the following terms:—

"The fear and trembling here were at the highest yesterday; we applied to the authorities, who gave us what assurances were possible; two Moslem intriguers have been arrested; force available weak; we beg you to intervene in the public interest."

This morning I received from Dr. Martin a letter dated the 25th instant, of which the following is an extract:—

"Evidence accumulates confirming my worst fears. On Lord's day morning, the 23rd, messengers had arrived here bearing to the Greek Church priests, &c., a letter from a Greek Church priest in a Christian village in the Moslem district of Kusair (which I named in my letter to you of the 22nd, which I hope you received). The priest wrote in greatest dismay, begging his co-religionists do whatever they could for them; Moslem preachers from Antioch were, he said, going about in the Moslem villages ordering the people to arise after five days and massacre the non-Moslems. Out of some eighty villages in Kusair only two are Christian. The authorities here were informed. Gendarmes or soldiers were sent to apprehend the two Moslem preachers, and they returned yesterday bringing one or both of them. A Moslem from Kusair of some position came and gave informations to the authorities here confirming it—that massacre had been preached—and signed his informations, adding that if called on he was ready to repeat the same even in Constantinople. So I hear on good authorities. The few military men in Antioch are not on friendly or helpful terms with the kaimakam. The latter was responsible for the virtual emptying of the Antioch garrison of all troops some months ago. Soldiers are now much needed."

I would add that great resentment is expressed by the Aleppo authorities against Dr. Martin, whom they accuse of exaggeration and misrepresentation. I am of opinion, however, that the Antioch authorities have deliberately deceived the acting vali as to the situation there, and that Dr. Martin has represented that situation in its true light.

R. A. F.

[18331] No. 56.

Sir C. Greene to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 36.)

Sir, *Copenhagen, May 10, 1911.*

YOU will recollect that Sir Alan Johnstone, in his despatch No. 152 of the 21st November, 1909, called your attention to a proposed expedition to the lands bordering on the Persian Gulf, under the auspices of the Royal Danish Geographical Society, and that he subsequently reported in his despatch No. 160 of the 22nd December the result of an interview which he had had with M. Scavenius, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, in obedience to your instructions.

I have now the honour to inform you that, having noticed the article, of which a translation is enclosed, in the "Politiken" of the 29th ultimo, announcing the intended dispatch of the expedition in October next, I reminded Count Ahlefeldt that his predecessor in office had been requested to furnish His Majesty's Government with information as to the scope of the undertaking, and I asked his Excellency to be good enough to cause me to be put in communication with the promoters of the affair. I added that I observed from the newspaper article that it was intended to apply for the protection of the British Government in order to penetrate into the country, and that some of the members of the exploring party were to be Englishmen.

Count Ahlefeldt said that he would ask Professor Olufsen, the secretary of the Geographical Society, to place himself at my disposal and to give me particulars. His Excellency added that he supposed the main interest which His Majesty's Government would have in the proposed expedition would be that it should in no way countenance the introduction of arms into the country.

I shall have the honour to report again as soon as I have seen Professor Olufsen.

I have, &c.

CONYNGHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 56.

Extract from the "Politiken" of April 29, 1911.

(Translation.)

A Danish Expedition to the Persian Gulf.

The Committee of the Geographical Society dispatches its First Expedition.

Interview with Professor Olufsen.

THE committee, which was constituted a year ago, includes Admiral Richelieu, President; Professor Olufsen, Secretary of the Geographical Society; Consul Valdemar Glückstadt, and M. M. L. Frimodt.

Professor Olufsen has made the following statement:—

"The object of the committee is to send out geographical expeditions, and at the same time to ascertain how the commerce of Denmark can be developed in unknown lands. We are dispatching an expedition, with this double aim in view, to the Persian Gulf, to Oman and Hadramaut, starting from the town of Muscat in South-Eastern Arabia. The well-known Danish explorer Carsten Niebuhr travelled through Arabia in the eighteenth century. In Omar and Hadramaut British interests are strongly represented, and we must apply for the protection of the British Government in order to penetrate into the country. The expedition will consist of Lieutenant Davidsen, of the artillery, and Mr. Raunkiaer (*stud. mag.*), both of whom know Arabic and are well fitted both for travelling and study. The remaining members of the expedition will be Englishmen. First Lieutenant Davidsen will map the country. It is owned by Sultans, and, although the trade routes to the East have passed round it for centuries, is entirely unknown. In olden times there was a certain civilisation in those parts—that of Sheba (Queen of Sheba). No doubt traces will be found by the expedition in inscriptions, ruins, &c., which may also prove important. Student Raunkiaer has made a speciality of the study of commercial geography, which has taken so great an extension in Germany. He is quite young, but very efficient and intelligent. He will study the people, their habits, customs, and specially their trade, and the field which the latter may offer for European enterprise. All that part of Arabia is a sort of colonial warehouse, providing coffee, dates, and other southern fruits; and generally articles which we and others require without any steps having ever been taken to enter into closer relations with the country.

"The steamers of the East Asiatic Company pass close by on their regular routes. Here, as in so many other places on this globe, there is an opening for Danish energy and enterprise.

"The expedition will in all probability sail for Aden in a steamer of the East Asiatic Company, and will start, at earliest, on the 1st October in order to be home again in the spring of 1912. That is the best time to go. From Aden the expedition will proceed to Muscat, and push from there into the interior. The committee's work is supported by the subscriptions of private well-wishers.

"We hope to secure real work for Danish interests. A small country which dispatches a small and modest expedition can, perhaps, do more useful work than the costly and pretentious arrangements of a great country."

We annex a map of the regions near the Persian Gulf* where the expedition dispatched by the Expeditions-Committee of the Geographical Society will reclaim new ground—Oman and Hadramaut. The interior is, according to geographers, a desert, but probably contains great oases and remains of an ancient civilisation dating back to 500 years B.C. The members of the expedition, First-Lieutenant Davidsen and student Raunkiaer, will travel on camels and asses. The travellers start in October and expect to return in May 1912 (see article).

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* Not reproduced.

[18640] No. 57.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received May 16.)

3, Salters' Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, May 15, 1911.

Sir,

WITH reference to previous correspondence on the question of accumulation of cargo at Bussorah, I have the honour to inform you that we have received the following telegrams from our agent at Bussorah:—

11th May.—"Communication has reached us to the effect that the authorities have given permission to tow two barges, but the Governor of Bussorah will require bond through the British consul at Bussorah that permission temporary to relieve existing accumulation only, and it will not be allowed serve as precedent. We are in communication with our firm at Bagdad regarding bond."

12th May.—"Referring to our telegram of 11th, Bagdad advise do not give guarantee until after consultation with London. The British consul at Bussorah knows nothing. Can you ascertain whether conditions emanate from the Sublime Porte or the Governor of Bussorah? Telegraph definite instructions."

I should be glad to know if any communication of this nature has reached you from His Majesty's Embassy in Constantinople.

I have, &c.
H. W. MACLEAN,
Secretary.

[18818] No. 58.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 114.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, May 17, 1911.*

LYNCH'S barges.

I am now informed that permission for Lynch to tow two barges in order that accumulation of cargo may be dealt with (see your telegram No. 98 of the 12th ultimo) has been granted, and is being made use of, instructions having been sent from Constantinople to Bussorah and Bagdad on the 8th May.

[18818] No. 59.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Lynch Brothers.

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, May 17, 1911.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 15th instant, relative to the accumulation of cargo at Bussorah, I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople has reported to-day by telegraph that instructions were sent on the 8th instant to Bussorah and Bagdad to allow your firm to tow two barges to work off the accumulation. Sir G. Lowther adds that he has ascertained that this arrangement is now in force.

His Excellency makes no mention of any bond being required from your firm, as stated by your agent at Bussorah.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[18952] No. 60.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 18.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, May 17, 1911.*

WITH reference to Admiralty letter of the 22nd ultimo, enclosing copy of telegram from the commander-in-chief, East Indies, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to forward herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State,

copy of a letter dated 22nd April, which the commander-in-chief has addressed to the Government of India relative to the question of the terminal port of the Bagdad Railway.

Copy has also been sent to the India Office and Committee of Imperial Defence.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 60.

Rear-Admiral Sir E. Slade to Admiralty.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *"Highflyer," at Koweit, April 22, 1911.*

BE pleased to lay before his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council the following remarks on the general state of affairs in the northern part of the Persian Gulf. Now that our survey of the entrance to the Shatt-el-Arab is finished, it is possible to compare the plan with that of Koweit, and to draw certain conclusions. I have consulted the officers who made the survey, and I have visited both places recently, and I have discussed the question with Colonel P. Z. Cox, the political resident in the Persian Gulf. I have in consequence formed the opinion that it is impossible to dissociate the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab bar from the general question of the terminus of the Bagdad Railway, and that the two matters must be considered together if we are to arrive at a sound opinion.

2. The first question that arises is that of the correct boundary between Persia and Turkey. The work of the commission assembled under the treaty of Erzeroum to delimit the frontier between those countries was abortive, and in any case its report cannot be considered to be a very valuable instrument, as the map by which it was supposed to be accompanied is missing. The sketch map illustrating the text is hopelessly inaccurate, and only leads to trouble, since it appears that the Turks have a copy of it, and will doubtless try to put it forward as having conventional force.

By this treaty Turkey is understood to claim, amongst other things, the whole waterway of the Shatt-el-Arab from bank to bank, and Turkish officers have tried to enforce it by requesting British officers who were surveying to remove a tide pole which they had erected on the Persian shore. This contention, as far as I know, is most unusual, for the line of demarcation between two States bordering a stream is usually the centre of the fairway, or midway between the low-water marks on either side.

Until this point is settled, it is impossible to say exactly where the respective territorial waters end, but, however the matter is decided eventually, it does not appear that Turkey can justifiably claim that the whole of the approaches to the river pass within her territorial limits.

3. An examination of the survey of the bar, which has just been completed, shows that there is a good channel into the river, with a least depth on it of 13 feet at low water. The rise and fall of the tide is about 9 to 10 feet, which will allow vessels of from 21 to 22 feet draught to enter the river at high water. As far as I know, there is plenty of water in the river for any class of ship which is likewise to trade to the Gulf. The length of the shoal water over the bar is 1½ miles, and, as the bottom is soft mud, there should not be any difficulty in increasing the depth on the bar by dredging to 15 or 16 feet, which will admit any vessel up to 24 or 25 feet draught. This would be ample for all practical purposes.

4. At Koweit there are two places at which the harbour might be made. One of these is at Shweikh, where vessels drawing 19 to 20 feet can enter at high water. The depth of water there over the bar is about the same as over the bar of the Shatt-el-Arab, and the distance to be traversed in shoal water is less in the former than in the latter place. The bottom, however, is hard instead of soft, and it is not possible for quite such heavy draught ships to enter Shweikh as can enter the river. The anchorage at Shweikh is good but small, and there is little room for expansion. It is exposed to the north-east, from which quarter a nasty sea will reach the anchorage—not enough to render it unsafe for shipping, but sufficient to interfere with lighterage.

5. The other possible situation for a harbour at Koweit is the Dubat Kathama, where vessels drawing 24 to 25 feet can lie at about 1¾ to 1¾ miles from the shore. This anchorage is more exposed than Shweikh, but it has not a bar and there is more room in it. If Koweit were to become an important port, as would be the case if it were the terminus of the railway, it would probably be necessary to construct a breakwater for the selected harbour.

6. At Shweikh, ships would lie close to the shore, and the length of quays or jetties would not be very great. At Kathama, ships lie a long way out, the water is very shoal, and the shore is low and marshy, so that it would be necessary to undertake considerable work on shore to make it suitable for a large amount of trade.

Since Bussorah is in the river these difficulties do not exist. Quays would be easy to construct there, weather would not interfere with the work, and ample room exists for expansion.

7. Koweit appears to have been selected by the Germans in the first instance as the only suitable place for the terminus of the railway, and it was this apparently which dictated our present attitude towards the Sheikh and Turkey. Why Germany took that view I do not know, unless it be that she thought that she would have more chance of obtaining an independent position at Koweit than if the terminus were at Bussorah.

8. Last year we allowed the buoys on the Shatt-el-Arab to get into a very bad state, and the chart was not kept up to date, so that ships frequently stranded as they crossed the bar. It would appear that Germany then saw her opportunity, and arranged that her ship-owners should complain to Turkey of the inefficient state of the buoys and press her to put things in order. She did this without any reference to Great Britain, with the obvious intention of substituting Turkey for ourselves as the power controlling the waterway.

Since Turkey is only too anxious to annoy us in these parts at the present moment, she was glad to fall in with the suggestion, and the result is that the Turkish buoys have been placed alongside ours, and the vali has demanded, as stated in the political resident's telegram dated the 27th March, 1911, addressed to the Foreign Department of the Government of India, that we should remove our buoys and marks, as Turkey alone is responsible for the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab.

9. As I have already indicated, there is not any difficulty in so improving the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab at comparatively small expense as to admit any small steamers that can reach and use the harbour at Koweit. If Germany and Turkey can make good the claim of the latter to the sole control of the navigation of the river, and if Bussorah is made the terminal port of the railway instead of Koweit, then the control that Great Britain would exert over the undertaking through her predominant influence in the terminal port will vanish. It is obviously not Germany's policy to make a parade of this nor to appear to take any interest in it, and for tactical purposes she will doubtless continue to put forward Koweit as the only possible port.

When once the Turkish claim has been recognised, she will be in a position to obtain from Germany such assistance as is necessary to finance and control the works for the improvement of the river. In a very short time the works, if properly administered, will more than pay for themselves. If the line from Zobair to Koweit be not constructed, it is probable that the money saved (say 70 miles at 6,000*l.* a mile = 420,000*l.*) will be more than sufficient to do all that is necessary in the river. We shall then have the port and the approaches to it entirely under German-Turkish control.

10. From these considerations it is evident that the chances of Bussorah being eventually chosen as the terminal port are very great, and it seems most important not to allow Turkey to assume the whole control of the river. The best way of checking this appears to be to make Persia object to such an assumption on the part of Turkey, and to put Great Britain forward as her delegate in the matter. The latter, as owning about 85 per cent. of the trade of the river, can also speak on her own behalf, and in this way it may be practicable to place the control of the navigation into the hands of a commission, as suggested in my letter dated the 24th March, 1911, formed of delegates of the three Powers, Persia, Turkey, and Great Britain, with the British delegate as president.

11. It is hardly likely, however, that Germany will acquiesce in this arrangement, in which case we shall have to admit her on the commission. It must then be arranged to put a fifth Power on the commission, in order that there may be an uneven number of delegates, and that the chances of questions being hung up through an equality of votes may be obviated. This other Power must be either Russia or France, preferably the latter, but Russia has the greater claim, and will probably have to be chosen.

A British engineer should be appointed as engineer-in-chief for charge of works in connection with the improvement of the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab, with a sufficient number of subordinate officials of British nationality under him to ensure the administration being carried on as we should wish it. I think we might be able to press this, having in view all that we have done for the navigation of the river in the past.

12. It is most unfortunate that we should have allowed the upkeep of the buoys and charts to go by default; had we not done so, this question might never have arisen; but as it has come up I do not see any way out of it but to take steps to ensure that neither Germany nor Turkey shall have her own way unchecked. The model of the Danube Commission might be taken throughout as that of the proposed commission, and I think that it would not interfere in the politics of this region any more than the Danube Commission has done in the politics of the Danubian principalities.

13. It must be recognised that the creation of such a commission and the commencement of works to improve the river will still further lessen the chances of the railway being brought to Koweit, but it may still be possible to attract it there by offering to make Koweit a free port, and by giving facilities for the construction of harbour works on an adequate scale. But it is probable that a similar amount of money spent on the river would bring in a better return, and, except for difficulties of ownership and general administration which are likely to arise on account of the peculiar idiosyncrasies of the Turk, Bussorah would appear to be a better place than Koweit in every way.

14. In following the precedent of the European Commission of the Danube, it must not be forgotten that Sulina, where the principal works of the commission are situated, is a free port, and there does not seem to be any reason why a similar port should not be established either on the Persian or Turkish side of the mouth of the river, preferably the former, in order that it should be more under British control. This port would afford very considerable convenience to merchants, particularly to those who may wish to load their ships deeper than the bar will admit.

15. The position of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company must also be considered and safeguarded to the utmost of our power. Looking at it from a naval point of view, the security of the oil company is more important than anything else in the northern part of the Gulf. The oil company will probably be obliged to dredge the bar if this is not done by anyone else, and we shall have to see that restrictions are not put in their way. One effect of the Turkish claim to the whole of the waterway from bank to bank will be that while the oil company's concession is in Persia, the steamers loading will be in Turkey, and the opportunity for friction and trouble will not be lost by an enterprising vali if he wished to annoy us.

16. I have assumed throughout that it is certain that a branch line will be built to Bussorah from Zobair, whatever place is ultimately selected as the terminus. Unless we have a share in the construction of the last section, therefore, it is quite possible that we shall find at the last moment that the branch line has become the main one and that the section between Zobair and Koweit has been abandoned.

17. Even after the section to Koweit has been built, if the navigation of the river is improved so as to admit deep-draught ships without risk, Koweit will probably be abandoned by the trade in favour of Bussorah, on account of the greater facilities which exist at the latter place.

18. The conclusions that have been forced upon me by the above considerations are as follows:—

(1.) That, from a seaman's point of view, the harbour of Koweit offers very few advantages, if any, over the river, and that if the navigation of the river is improved, the latter will not be inferior in any respect.

(2.) That as the natural terminus of the railway is at Bussorah, the trade will go there in preference to Koweit, whatever we may do to prevent it, provided that the former provides facilities over the latter.

(3.) That it is imperative to take steps at once on our own initiative to regularise the situation as regards the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab.

(4.) That the river should be placed into the hands of a commission, preferably consisting of the three Powers: Persia, Turkey, and Great Britain.

(5.) That, failing this, a commission should be constituted on the lines of the European Commission of the Danube.

(6.) That a British engineer with suitable assistance should be appointed to advise on and undertake works for the improvement of the navigation of the river.

19. It now becomes necessary to consider the steps that we should take to bring Turkey to terms if she should become recalcitrant.

Firstly, all signs of Turkish sovereignty might be removed from the shores of the Persian Gulf, Bubiyan, and Um-Kasr handed over to Sheikh Mubarak, and that chief at the same time properly safeguarded. This can be done without any increase of the present force in the Gulf, but it would probably only irritate the Porte without being in any way effective.

Secondly, we could occupy Fao and the adjacent country, and inform the Porte that unless they quickly came to to terms we should blockade the river and stop the trade of Bussorah and Bagdad. This would probably reduce the Turks to reason, but, if we had to enforce the blockade in order to make them yield, it would severely injure our trade for the time, and for that reason would be very unpopular with our own people and with the Arabs. We should require a force of troops to carry out this scheme.

Thirdly, we could take advantage of Turkey's difficulties in Arabia and threaten her line of communication to Hodeida. If carried out, this would result in the loss of Southern Arabia to Turkey and probably also that of the whole of the peninsula, for it is unlikely that having once turned the Turk out of Southern Arabia, the Arabs would stop before Mecca and Medina were once again in their hands. This would be a very extreme measure to take; but, at the same time, it is that which would be most likely to be immediately effective. It is a course, however, which I would hesitate to recommend unless another were not possible.

I have, &c.
EDMOND J. W. SLADE.

[19377] No. 61.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 327.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May 11, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana, reporting on the general condition of the Adana vilayet.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 61.

Vice-Consul Smith to Consul-General Eyres.

(No. 14.)

Sir, *Adana, May 3, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward the following brief report on the general condition of affairs in this vilayet, in the hope that it may be of interest as giving an idea of what is being done by the local government, and what they intend to do in the future for the development of the province.

It is not to be expected that during the absence of the Governor-General, Djemal Bey, in Constantinople, anything fresh will be initiated, and it is certainly to be hoped—a feeling which is general amongst the more educated part of the population—that he will return to this post, for, without his hand to direct matters and his energy to keep the other officials up to the mark, it is very probable that many of his projects will not be carried through.

The great majority of the Turkish inhabitants of this town are passively opposed to the present Government at Constantinople, and the Governor-General is not popular with them. Whilst he was here the natives were afraid to give expression to their opinions, but since his departure, and especially since the newspapers have shown that political affairs are in a somewhat disturbed condition at Constantinople, they have begun to speak more openly. I do not believe that the committee has many hard and fast adherents here. The commandant of the local nizam battalion does not hesitate to speak in private against the present régime, and I believe a good number of the other officers share his views. The General Commanding the Adana Redif Division—Hamdi Pasha—is a man of no energy, and, having been reduced after the constitution from Ferik to Lewa, has no cause to favour the Government which deprived him of his rank. The cadi, who acts as vali during the absence of Djemal Bey, is an Albanian, and apart from his position as cadi has no influence with the people. I do not mean to imply that there is any possibility of the local Turks becoming actively hostile to the Government, but it is to be anticipated that should affairs change in any way at Constantinople, the great mass of local Turkish opinion would be strongly in favour of such a change.

Bagdad Railway.—The work on this section is progressing steadily, if slowly. The line has been laid up to a point 10 kilom. from Yenidjé and 15 kilom. from Dorak.

The earthwork and ballasting are well advanced between this point and Missis, and construction trains pass over the whole of this part, with a break at Adana where the River Seihun is not yet bridged. The company expect to have the section Dorak–Osmanié ready for traffic in another seven or eight months, and as there are no natural obstacles in the way except the bridges over the Seihun at Adana and the Jeihun at Missis, it is probable that their expectation may be fulfilled. The various station buildings are now being put up, and though not particularly well suited to the country, they are substantial and well built.

A short time ago I was informed by one of the Germans employed on the construction near Dorak that work was expected to begin from Ulu Kishla on the Konia side of the mountains, and simultaneously from Dorak on the Adana side, in another three months. Great difficulties are being experienced in this section through the mountains, and I believe that the final trace of where the line is to pass has not yet been definitely adopted. Up to the present the idea was to follow the Chakit Su Valley; but the way there is blocked by a mountainous mass which is full of springs, and the levels there are continually changing. This German informed me that it was quite possible that the original plan of bringing the line through the mountains by way of Gulek Boghaz would be adopted after all.

Mines.—An English mining engineer, representing the Anglo-Ottoman Development Syndicate (Norton, Griffiths, and Co.), has been prospecting for mines in this vilayet for the past six or seven months. Quite recently what may prove to be important deposits of iron ore have been discovered in the neighbourhood of Payas, and he has secured options for his syndicate over a considerable part of the possible field. A French company is also prospecting in that neighbourhood and has also secured an option. I have been told by this English engineer that the deposits are good and that the mine should be worth developing. The manager of the above Anglo-Ottoman syndicate is on his way out here with a view to inspecting the iron fields at Payas, and it is probable that the company will try to obtain a concession to work this property. This land is quite close to the line which the proposed Alexandretta-Osmanié branch of the Bagdad Railway will be obliged to follow.

Harbour at Mersina.—On the departure of the Governor-General some weeks ago, the inhabitants of Mersina petitioned him to take steps to induce the Government to construct a harbour at Mersina, having in view the loss which the trade of their town would sustain through the new harbour at Alexandretta. The vali promised to do so, and has since telegraphed from Constantinople to the effect that a port would be constructed at Mersina as well as Alexandretta. Though the construction of such a harbour appears improbable, this telegram has had the effect of quieting the feelings of the traders at Mersina.

Agriculture.—An agricultural school is being constructed on the model farm about 2 miles outside Adana. This farm has an area of about 500 donums (about 110 acres), and 1 per cent. of the tithes are set aside for its upkeep. The school is to cost £T. 6,000, and ought to be ready for the first classes in September next. The number of pupils is to be from 200 to 300, and the course of instruction to last for four years. Instruction is to be free and pupils will be kept at the expense of the Government. A number of applications to attend this school have already been received. Should this experiment be continued and efficient instruction provided, it should in a few years time have a very good effect in introducing improved methods of agriculture in this part of Turkey. Besides the above sum of £T. 6,000, the Government spent about £T. 3,000 in buying agricultural machinery from England. This is to be sent to different parts of the vilayet, where such machinery is at present unknown, with a view to encouraging farmers to introduce it on their farms. The Governor-General wishes to enable the smaller farmers to buy steam ploughs, &c., and intended to obtain sanction for the agricultural bank to assist them to do so. At present only the larger proprietors can afford to buy machinery, and the idea was to induce groups of the smaller farmers to combine to buy the necessary machinery. The Agricultural Bank would buy the machines in the first instance and hand them over to the farmers, taking a mortgage on their properties for the value, which would be repaid by annual payments in a period of ten years. Should the plan come to anything it would enable the farmers to get better results from their lands and should lead to a largely increased importation of agricultural machinery, most of which comes from England.

Embankments.—The Construction Company for the Bagdad Railway last year obtained a contract of £T. 10,000 for the construction of embankments along both banks of the river above Adana. This was a very necessary work to protect the town from the usual spring floods, and is now nearly completed. The total length of the

embankments is about 5 kilom.; they are made of earth and are about 10 feet high and 12 feet wide at the top. Included in this contract is the building of several stone breakwaters into the river just north of the town so as to slightly divert the current, which flows directly on to Adana. The whole work should be finished by the end of the present year.

Proposed Works.—Application has been made to Constantinople for a grant of £T. 30,000 to be spent in straightening the course of the River Seihun a few miles south of Adana by means of about 7 kilom. of canals. The river here makes several wide turns, and the bed is not deep enough to carry away all the water. This year, as usual, damage estimated at over 100,000*l.* has been done to crops by the floods in this part of the plain. The idea is now to make one straight cutting for the river so as to hasten the flow of the water.

Irrigation.—Five or six German engineers have been employed during some six months in making surveys for irrigation works in the plain lying to the south of Adana. They have now finished their surveys and reports, but I am unable to state whether they have been approved, and whether the work will be actually carried out.

Municipality.—An orphanage to hold about 350 children is being built in the vicinity of the town at a cost of about £T. 6,000; this should be finished by the end of the year. The International Hospital Committee has also in view the building of a new hospital in the same neighbourhood to replace the present building which is both by situation and structurally quite unsuited to its requirements. No steps have, however, yet been taken to give effect to this plan. During the past six months great progress has been made in the rebuilding of the ruined parts of Adana, and new houses are rapidly springing up in the quarter which was burnt. Advantage is being taken of the circumstances to widen the streets, and this will do much to improve the appearance of the town. This rebuilding seems to have only started in earnest about six months ago; possibly the establishment of branches of the Deutsche Orient Bank and the Banque d'Athènes in Adana about that time enabled the natives to obtain the means to build which up to then had been lacking.

Government Land.—A number of natives here have lately made a proposal to the Government to purchase, for the sum of £T. 200,000, the ex-Sultan's chiftliks in the neighbourhood of Anavarza, north of Hamidié. This chiftlik has an area of about 1,200,000 donums (about 270,000 acres), and lies along the right bank of the Jihan River. It is said to be the best part of the rich Hamidié plain, and with proper drainage and development to be capable of producing large returns of cotton and grain. The commandant of the local nizam battalion here—Enver Bey—who is much more eager to make himself the intermediary for the obtaining of various concessions in the vilayet than he is to train the troops under his command, is also trying to get financial backing to buy these chiftliks to be worked by a company, but it is highly improbable that he will meet with any success.

There is a great deal of Government land in the vilayet, and the authorities are disposed to sell it, but only to Turkish subjects; as none of the latter in this province are capable of providing the capital for large undertakings, the matter remains at a deadlock.

I have, &c.,
IAN M. SMITH.

[19379] No. 62.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 330.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May* 13, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to His Majesty's Embassy, reporting on the probable plan of campaign of the Ottoman expeditionary forces in Assyr.

I have, &c.,
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 62.

Major Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 37.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May* 11, 1911.

WITH reference to the concluding paragraph of the report on the Yemen operations forwarded with my No. 30, I have the honour to submit the following remarks on the probable course of the intended operations in Assyr:—

The first object of the operations in that province must be the relief of Abha, where the garrison has been besieged for some six months.

Between Abha and the sea lies Sabyeah, the Pretender's stronghold, which threatens the flank of any force advancing direct on Abha either from the north or south.

The general plan of campaign seems to be the convergence of two such forces on Abha, while battalions are landed at various points on the coast to protect their flanks.

The northern force is that of the Sherif of Mekka, and consists of Arab tribesmen, of whose numbers there is no reliable indication, supported by two or three Nizam battalions of the Hejaz Division and some guns. For the protection of his march as far as Confuda, the Fekke redif battalion, embarked at Mersina on the 8th April, has been disembarked at Lit about the 16th April, and three battalions (I/79 from Beyrout, and II/78 and the Missis redif battalion from Mersina) were disembarked at Confuda about the 17th April.

The southern force is probably that of Said Pasha, who, as mentioned in my previous report, was sent from Hodeidah, viâ Zeidiyeh, to operate in the district of Hujjeh. He probably had with him the battalions which arrived in Hodeidah too late to take part in the relief of Sana'a, and is said to have had eight or nine battalions altogether. It appears that the pacification of Hujjeh, with the co-operation of the columns from Sana'a, has already been accomplished, and that Said Pasha is now marching north.

For the protection of his left flank the redif battalions of Sis and Yarpuz were landed at Loheia early in April.

The redif battalions of Marash and Bazarjik, which passed Port Said on the 1st May, should also have arrived some days ago. Their destinations are said to be one for Confuda and one for Loheia.

Above we have eight of the twelve battalions previously reported by me to the War Office as forming a reserve division for the Yemen expeditionary force. The other four are, the Minister of War tells me, all of the old IV Ordu, and are at the present moment at Aleppo, but that they are on the point of being dispatched.

A few days ago a battery of six guns was also sent from Aleppo to be shipped at Beyrout for this expedition.

I have, &c.,
G. E. TYRRELL, *Major*,
Military Attaché.

[19386] No. 63.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 337.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May* 17, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 247 of the 12th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah giving an account of the siege and relief of Sana'a.

I have, &c.,
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 63.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 23 E.)
Sir, *Hodeidah, April* 12, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to confirm my cablegram of the 8th instant, informing your Excellency of the relief of Sana'a on the 4th by a force under Colonel Riza Bey.

It would appear that the above force encountered no resistance whatever in entering Sana'a itself, the Arabs, who were apparently in some strength in the heights to the south, having hastily retreated northwards with the approach of the main army.

On the 2nd instant, General Izzet Pasha telegraphed to the Hodeidah authorities reporting severe fighting a few days previously between the troops under Riza Bey and the insurgents near Nebi Shaib, a mountain fastness (the highest in the Yemen) commanding the village of Metneh and the Turkish fortified outpost of Senam Pasha from the west, and about 22 miles to the south-west of Sana'a.

According to the local authorities, the rebels, who were under three of the Imam's principal leaders, were severely defeated, and had over 1,000 killed including all three commanders.

I am of opinion that the Arab losses have been greatly exaggerated by the Turks, who publish no casualties amongst the troops.

Riza's force met with further opposition on the 3rd instant at the village of Musajid, 10 miles to the south of Sana'a, but easily succeeded, by the free use of its artillery, in dislodging the insurgents from their positions, and putting them to flight.

The two reverses mentioned above evidently caused the remainder of the rebel bands near Sana'a to evacuate their positions and retire to the west, thus enabling the relieving force to enter the capital without opposition, and which it did on the afternoon of the 4th.

General Izzet Pasha with the main army, comprising some fifteen infantry battalions with several guns, arrived at Sana'a on the following afternoon.

The relief of the capital was celebrated with general rejoicings, and a grand review of all the troops in garrison was held by Izzet Pasha on the morning of the 5th.

The following details of what took place at Sana'a have been furnished to me by one who was present there and went through the seige.

The first manifestation of the present revolt under Seyyid Yahya was the appearance of armed bands in the vicinity of the capital, on or about the 12th January last, that prevented the post from Hodeidah reaching its destination, and forced it to retire on Metneh or Senam Pasha. Coincidently with this coup, the rebels invested the town of Sana'a from all sides in great strength, and cut off all communications with Menekha and Taiz to the south, as also with the garrisoned towns in the north.

The besieged garrison consisted of four infantry battalions, seven batteries of artillery of all kinds, and two squadrons of cavalry. The native battalion recruited in the Yemen last summer proved to be useless. As soon as the trouble commenced, two-thirds of the battalion deserted and joined the Imam, after a futile attempt to blow up their barracks. The military authorities immediately caused the remainder of the corps to be confined in the principal fortress as a precautionary measure. Only a few non-commissioned officers, old residents of Sana'a, and who had their families there, remained loyal to the Government, and were allowed to be at large.

The vali, Mahomed Ali Pasha, proclaimed a state of siege at Sana'a on the 12th January, ordered that the gates of the city be closed, and prohibited all exit from it. At the same time he caused to be arrested and confined in a fortress several prominent Arabs, including some in the employ of the Government, on suspicion of having been in correspondence with the Imam Seyyid Yahya.

On the 13th January the vali, with a force of about 1,000 men and four guns, made a sortie outside the Hodeidah gate, that is, to the west of the town, and engaged the rebels in a severe fight, in which, it is said, that they (the rebels) lost over 500 men, including four important sheikhs. This estimate, however, needs confirmation, and is apparently the official one issued at the time. The Arabs, I infer, suffered principally through the Turkish artillery fire, and attempted to rush the guns, but failed badly. The losses on the Turkish side were trifling.

This, I believe, was the only occasion in which there was any serious fighting between the besieged garrison and the insurgents throughout the siege.

The rebels concentrated in the direction of the town of Randah and the village of Shaoob, lying to the north of Sana'a, but confined their activity from the start to sniping at the walls of the town, especially at night. The garrison used to reply by rifle fire, but sometimes used to amuse themselves by keeping up a desultory bombardment of the villages round about and any portions of the enemy that came in sight. Very little damage used to be done, although quite a quantity of ammunition was expended.

On the 30th January, according to my informant, two small outposts at a place called Assir, situated on the crest of the mountain ridge overlooking the town of Sana'a from the west, were attacked and captured by the Arabs, the small garrisons occupying these being forced to surrender after their stock of ammunition was exhausted. Two

guns and a Maxim, it is stated, fell into the hands of the rebels, who afterwards removed these south to bombard the Turkish fortified post of Senam Pasha.

Later, on the 12th February, a detachment of 250 Arab troops (?), probably Syrian, evacuated a position in the neighbourhood of Metneh owing to lack of supplies, and in endeavouring to reach Sana'a were obliged to surrender to the Arabs near the village of Mind, just outside Metneh, after their ammunition had run out.

On the 20th March the Turks occupied a ridge to the east of Sana'a, called the "Donkey's Back," and shelled the village of Shaoob to the north all day.

On the 26th March General Mahomed Ali Pasha, with a force of about 1,000 men and five guns, made a sortie to the south-west of the capital, destroyed the village of Safiya, and bombarded another called El-Hadda that was affording hospitality to the insurgents. About mid-day he was obliged to retire rather suddenly owing to the advance of a strong body of the enemy on his right flank.

On the 29th March the Turks again occupied the ridge to the east called the "Donkey's Back," and kept up a fire with their artillery on the houses and towers of the village of Shaoob, that were apparently strongly held. The infantry advanced towards the village at noon, but made very little progress. Later in the day another battalion made a sortie from the northern gate of the town in the direction of Shaoob, and came in close quarters with the rebels. The troops retired at sundown, bringing in the heads of four Arabs, which the authorities caused to be hung up at the four principal gates of the city.

In addition to the various sorties referred to above, on the 3rd April, being the day previous to that of the entry of the relief force into Sana'a, Mahomed Ali Pasha, with two battalions and five guns, tried to occupy the villages of Safiya and Assir, but was obliged to retire owing to the greater strength of the enemy.

This may have only been intended as a reconnaissance by the Pasha, and, if so, certainly served its purpose, as on the following day, i.e., the 4th April, heavy firing behind the Assir ridge on the Hodeidah road was audible in the forenoon, and later to the north, in which direction the Arabs were hastily retreating.

About mid-day the rebels abandoned the Assir ridge, commanding Sana'a from the south-west, and the relief force under Colonel Riza Bey entered the town a few hours later without opposition.

As regards losses sustained by the garrison during the siege, I learn from a fairly reliable source that the total number of wounded admitted into hospital since the siege amounted to forty-three. The number of men killed during the various sorties made did not exceed fifty or sixty, and the total casualties 200.

My informant criticises the arrangements made by the Turks for the defence of the town of Sana'a, where, with a force considerably below 6,000 all told, they tried to defend a perimeter of 12 kilom. In his opinion, it was, indeed, possible for the Arabs to have taken the place by assault at any time if they were able to use their guns.

The rifle shooting of the troops was very poor, and their artillery practice worse. I am able to confirm the above opinion from my experience up at Sana'a. The Turks burst their time-shrapnel about 1,000 feet in the air, where it was quite harmless to perhaps anything but an aeroplane. The common shell used had very little effect on the houses and towers round about Sana'a. It would appear that in a single day Mahomed Ali's force fired off at least 3,000 shells in the bombardment of Shaoob, and on other occasions but little less, disposing of barely 200 or 300 Arabs.

The enemy, on the other hand, had not the vaguest idea of making war, nor had they any particular plan of campaign.

Without the slightest pretence to cohesion, the Arabs do not pay the least attention to the orders of the Imam or to those of their leaders. Each man fights independently as he thinks fit, his chief object being to avoid risking his "skin" any more than he can possibly help.

What appeared to have scared the Arab rebels most were dynamite cartridges with a friction fuse attached, which the Turks laid down at intervals all round the walls of the town. A shepherd one day trod on one of these, which immediately exploded and blew him up, making the enemy very cautious about approaching the walls thereafter.

Throughout the siege there appears to have been no particular scarcity of supplies, the authorities having taken the timely precaution of laying in a plentiful stock of grains and other foodstuffs during the past year when the crops were abundant.

I have, &c.

G. A. RICHARDSON.

[19391] No. 64.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 342.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May 17, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 317 of the 9th May, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Aleppo, reporting on the precarious situation at Antioch.

I venture especially to draw your attention to the remark in the last paragraph to the effect that there is "a section of the Committee of Union and Progress so angry at the kaïmakam as that they are willing to perpetrate any horror in the town in order to discredit him."

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 64.

Consul Fontana to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 15.)
Sir, *Aleppo, May 3, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 12 of the 25th ultimo concerning the situation at Antioch, to your Excellency's telegram of the 30th April, and mine in reply No. 27 of the 1st instant, I now have the honour to submit extracts from a letter received by me from the Rev. Dr. James Martin, dated the 29th instant, giving further details as to the state of affairs in that town. As reported in my telegram No. 27, the head of the Antioch Orthodox Church telegraphed on the 28th April to the Russian consulate at Aleppo that there had been the greatest terror there, and that he had made representations to the authorities who had given him what assurances were possible, and requesting the intervention of the consulate in the interest of the public security. And, on the evening of the 27th ultimo, the Kaïmakam of Antioch sent the commander of the gendarmes and the president of the correctional court to Dr. Martin to express thanks for his action, and to assure him that, having discovered that evil really was purposed by a section of the community, he had taken measures to preserve the peace, and had applied to the Aleppo authorities for reinforcement. My Russian colleague has received information to the effect that the president of the Committee of Union and Progress at Antioch is bitterly hostile to the kaïmakam, Tewfik Bey, who appears to have insisted upon the right assessment of taxation affecting certain local landowners, by whom the Mal Mudiri is supported in his strife with the kaïmakam. The acting vali told me yesterday that certain of the Antioch officials and members of the committee were now accusing Dr. Martin of being in league with Tewfik Bey.

I have written to Dr. Martin suggesting that, in the event of his hereafter receiving reliable information as to any dangerous movement on foot among the Moslems at Antioch, he might himself impart such information privately and in a friendly way to the sub-governor, and then communicate it to this consulate.

"On the 27th, the Kaïmakam of Harem (or Kefrat-Kheiren) called on me, accompanied by another official. I understood that this kaïmakam had been sent by the vilayet to investigate affairs as between the kaïmakam and public treasurer here, and it seemed that his commission included enquiry into the state of the town as to which I had telegraphed you, Sir.

"The Kaïmakam of Harem began his conversation as believing the Kaïmakam of Antioch and disbelieving and blaming me, asking me first, 'What did those women who came to you say to you about the state of the town?' I answered no women had come to me; but that my informants were men, leading men of different sects and denominations, and to the number of nine or ten, some one day, some another.

"Before concluding, I said some plain things to them, however, when they asked me whether I could say that the informations I had received were established facts. I answered that my informants were among the most respectable and credible men in Antioch, but that I did not consider that, in Antioch, where a massacre had two years ago occurred without any precedent sign, and during which my own house was threatened by the murderous mob, that one ought to sit still and quiet until he could present legally formal proof as to the substance of the *fama clamosa*. 'Oh, of course not,' they replied. 'When a disturbing element is only a spark it may be extinguished if taken in time, whereas, if allowed to become a flame, it may be impossible to put it out.'

"A little while after they left I received your urgent telegram. The terror in town was reaching a dreadful height. People had fled from town that day, and numbers were pressing into our grounds as refugees. This was the substance of my reply wired to you. When my urgent telegram was sent out by me the official at the telegraph office was not found in his place, but had gone playing, it being a holiday at Government House. I think, however, my telegram was dispatched before the evening. Moslems were scowling in the streets, and were procuring or repairing firearms, and buying ammunition. There had been a Moslem from Antioch preaching massacre in the Kusair district; and now in the afternoon of the 27th, a Moslem was accused of announcing in a street of Antioch a massacre, in presence of a number of people, Christians included. He was taken up to the Government House, and, I was told, admitted this.

"This massacre, as announced, was not to be confined to Armenians, but to extend to all non-Moslems, and without distinction of age or sex.

"Before sunset on that day, the 27th, the Kaïmakam of Antioch sent to me the 'Rais-al-Giza,' president of the correctional court and the commander of gendarmerie, to say to me that it was now found that I was right, to give me the Governor's thanks for my action, and to assure that, having now discovered that evil was purposed by a section of the community in the town, he had taken measures to preserve the peace, had applied to the Central Government at Aleppo for soldiers, and that meantime the gendarmes (thirty-six persons, I understood), divided into four companies, would patrol the town.

"The minds of the people were not easily composed, however, and a considerable number of refugees spent the night on our grounds, and some also, but fewer, last night (the 28th).

"I have means, Sir, of knowing something of what goes on in different communities and circles here. It was, I believe, on the afternoon of the 27th, some time before the Governor's messengers came to me, that we were informed there was a section of the Committee of Union and Progress so angry at the kaïmakam as that they were willing to perpetrate any horror in the town in order to discredit him, and that their wrath and enmity against him personally was deadly. Perhaps this, too, was discovered."

I have, &c.
RAPHAEL A. FONTANA.

[19393] No. 65.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 344.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May 17, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 316 of the 10th instant relative to the Chester scheme, I have the honour to inform you that the proposed arrangement, as modified by the Government, was communicated to the Chamber of Deputies on the 15th instant and referred to the Commission of Public Works for a report.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[19397] No. 66.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 348.)
Sir, *Pera, May 17, 1911.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 82 of the 20th March, 1911, and your telegram No. 98 of the 12th April, I have the honour to report that I urged on Rifaat Pasha the necessity of allowing the Euphrates and Tigris Navigation Company to tow two barges, pointing out that Messrs. Lynch had been unfairly treated in the matter of the fusion scheme, that, as the Turkish company had also 2,500 tons awaiting shipment, there could be no question of commercial rivalry, and that it was obviously desirable in the interests of trade to help Messrs. Lynch to work off their accumulation of some 4,500 tons. I hinted that a refusal would be open to an interpretation of unfriendliness, and might unfavourably affect the present pourparlers.

After consulting the Grand Vizier and his colleagues, Rifaat Pasha informed me that it had been decided to allow Messrs. Lynch to tow a second barge until the accumulation of 4,500 tons is worked off, and that the limitation was based on the idea of bargaining which, it appeared to him, also animated His Majesty's Government in the matter of the existing negotiations.

It will, however, be difficult for the Ottoman authorities to determine exactly when the last of the 4,500 tons has been shipped to Bagdad, and, in the ordinary course, the permission would seem likely to extend beyond that amount of cargo.

Instructions, as reported in my telegram No. 114 of to-day's date, were sent on the 8th instant to the authorities of Bagdad and Bussorah, and His Majesty's consul at the latter place informs me that Lynch's steamer left for Bagdad on the 15th May, towing two barges.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[15143] No. 67.

Note communicated to Mr. Huth-Jackson.

(Confidential.)

ON the 10th May Sir Edward Grey addressed to Sir G. Buchanan a despatch informing him of the terms on which His Majesty's Government are prepared to agree in principle to the initiation of negotiations between the promoters of the proposed trans-Persian Railway in this country and in Russia.

These terms include (1) a modification of the alignment for the railway originally suggested by the Russian group interested; (2) provision for a break of gauge at the point where the railway will enter the British sphere of influence in Persia; (3) an understanding on the part of the Russian Government that they will not, without a previous understanding with His Majesty's Government, entertain or support any proposal for a line in the neighbourhood of the Perso-Afghan frontier within the Russian or neutral sphere in Persia; (4) the support of Russia to demands to be made by Great Britain of the Persian Government for certain branch lines to be connected with the proposed railway in the British and neutral spheres; (5) the internationalisation of the main line and of the branches in the neutral sphere and the retention by Great Britain of the control of those in the British sphere; and (6) equality of treatment for British and British Indian trade passing over the line and its branches.

Sir G. Buchanan was authorised to inform the Russian Government of these conditions and to convey their general sense to the Russian promoters of the scheme, making it, however, clear to both that His Majesty's Government express no opinion as to the financial or commercial aspects of the question, which are matters to be examined by the syndicates who may desire to participate in the enterprise.

A. NICOLSON.

Foreign Office, May 23, 1911.

[17592] No. 68.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 23, 1911.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th instant, relative to the effect which the formal proclamation of a British protectorate over Bahrein might be expected to produce at the present juncture on the negotiations impending with Turkey on the subject of the Bagdad Railway and on British relations with Persia.

The reasons for which Sir E. Grey would deprecate the modification of the *status quo* which this step would involve are set forth in the letter of the 4th instant from this Office, and I am to point out that the recognition by the Turkish Government of the right of His Majesty's Government to protect Bahreinis in the Ottoman Empire forms, as Viscount Morley is aware, one of the conditions on which it is proposed to insist in return for British participation in the construction of the maritime section of the Bagdad Railway.

This last consideration offers, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, a further motive for

abstaining at this moment from a modification of the *status quo* which could not fail to re-act unfavourably on the negotiations in progress and he would accordingly prefer to postpone, till he has received the reply of the Turkish Government to Sir G. Lowther's demands, the decision as to what the next step in the matter should be (assuming, for the moment that the nature of that reply will be, as Lord Morley anticipates, such as to necessitate action of some kind).

In the meanwhile Sir G. Lowther will be instructed, in accordance with your suggestion, to press the Turkish Government for their answer.

Sir E. Grey does not share the view expressed in your letter that the question of the enforcement of the right of His Majesty's Government to protect Bahreinis in Turkey is one which should be regarded from the point of view of its effect on British relations with Germany rather than with Turkey, because he is unable to perceive what justification the former Power could allege for interesting itself in a matter which does not appear to concern it at all and it would further, in his opinion, be injudicious to admit in any way the validity of such a claim.

Sir E. Grey notes Lord Morley's opinion that the only prospect of a satisfactory solution of the Bagdad Railway question lies in a preliminary agreement with Germany.

As regards this point I am to observe that His Majesty's Government are not at present discussing the Bagdad Railway with Germany, but have before them certain proposals from the Turkish Government in regard to the Gulf section. It is clear that it is necessary to deal with the Turkish proposals in the first instance before initiating any discussions with Germany; otherwise there would be two sets of negotiations proceeding concurrently which would probably lead to confusion. Sir E. Grey considers that as soon as His Majesty's Government are in a position definitely to formulate to the Turkish Government their requirements in connection with their participation in the last section of the Bagdad Railway, it would be well to inform the German Government that these requirements must be met before any agreement can be reached on the subject and to express to them the hope that they will use their influence at Constantinople to secure a satisfactory reply to these demands.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[20093] No. 69.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 25.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, May 24, 1911.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a letter dated the 26th April, 1911, which has been received from the Commander-in-chief, East Indies, respecting the general situation on the Trucial Coast of the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 69.

Rear-Admiral Sir E. Slade to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *"Highflyer," at Sirik, April 26, 1911.*

BE pleased to lay before his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council the following remarks on the general situation on the Trucial Coast of the Persian Gulf.

2. Reports from the ships and boats stationed on that coast show that everything is quiet there, and as far as can be seen the Dibai incident has not had the effect of inflaming the Arab against the European as stated in some of the Indian newspapers. It is quite true that the Sheikh of Dibai is still trying to prevent any Europeans from settling in his town, and in this he is probably encouraged by the owners of the pearl dhows, who fear investigation into their method of dealing with the divers, most of whom are said to be slaves. It is, however, more bluff than anything else, and if the question were taken in hand seriously I feel sure that a settlement could be arrived at without more bloodshed.

3. I would suggest that the best way of bringing this about would be to proceed

with the erection of the wireless telegraphy station, the site for which was selected by Captain A. T. Hunt in conjunction with the sheikh. The latter definitely agreed to allow the telegraph to be installed as part of the terms of the ultimatum which was accepted by him on the 29th December, 1910. If he is not made to abide by these terms he may give considerable trouble in the future, when it may become necessary in the interests of the whole Trucial Coast to force the various sheikhs to accept a certain measure of British control for their own protection against foreign Powers.

I think the difficulty of dealing with them has been exaggerated, and is not so great as would appear at first sight. Although looming large on paper, these sheikhs are in reality very small men. They have not any cohesion, and each town acts almost entirely in what it considers to be its own interests, quite independently of anything that the others may think.

4. The question which is likely to arise in a very short time is that of the pearl fisheries. Great Britain has policed and maintained order on these banks for nearly a century, but as long as we have not a definite status *vis-à-vis* the Arab tribes who use them which is recognised by foreign Powers we cannot enforce our control over any vessels on the banks who may fly the colours of France, Germany, or other European countries. Firms in both France and Germany are reported to be considering whether they shall fit out pearling expeditions for the Persian Gulf, using dredges and all sorts of modern appliances, which, if carried out, would probably mean the speedy working out of the banks.

5. The Arab tribes who fish the banks are almost entirely dependent on the result of the season's work for their livelihood, as agriculture or other pursuits are not possible for them. Even if the banks be not worked out, the competition introduced will seriously threaten the welfare of the divers.

6. Of the tribes who regularly fish on the banks, Great Britain nominally controls the greater number. Others, such as those on the Katr Peninsula, have not made treaties with us, but they probably would do so with some little persuasion. Others again, as at Al Katif, are under Turkish control; and lastly there is Koweit, the position of the sheikh of which is doubtful, to say the least of it, at the present moment.

7. As I have already pointed out, cohesion does not exist amongst the tribes, and they cannot and will not act together. It therefore follows that, unless we are prepared to see them subjected to a competition which can but have one ending, the ruination of the Arab owner, and to see the prestige of Great Britain, as the Power that has for nearly a century looked after the interests of all the tribes in the Gulf, pricked like a bubble the moment that we find ourselves face to face with another European Power, we must take action beforehand and make such a position for ourselves, not only *de facto* but *de jure*, that we can impose the conditions under which the pearl fishing shall be carried out by everybody who may wish to use the banks.

8. In the first place it seems to be necessary to proclaim to the world at large our protectorate over the Trucial Coast by issuing an Order in Council as is being done with respect to Bahrein. The order will have to be drawn on a very elastic basis, and the resident in the Persian Gulf will have to be given very large discretionary powers at first with regard to the administration. Some sort of control over the administration of the chiefs will have to be introduced, and it is for this reason that I have urged the establishment of the wireless telegraphy station at Dibai as a commencement.

9. The greatest difficulty with which we shall be faced will be that of the status of the pearl divers, and in this matter we must show ourselves to be patient and somewhat more tolerant than usual. It would appear that only two alternatives face us. One is to introduce administrative action on the Trucial Coast slowly and carefully so as to bring the tribes more effectively under British guidance; and the other is to leave them alone and let their only property be exploited by none too scrupulous foreign firms, who would not care for the traditional owners of the pearl banks as long as they could make as much as possible out of them, and for Great Britain to lose every vestige of prestige that she may possess.

10. In the second place we should enter into treaty relations with the Katr chiefs, and induce them to act with us in this matter, and to depute us to represent their interests on the banks, agreeing to abide by our regulations. If they would accept a full protectorate treaty, so much the better. Similar action should be taken with regard to Koweit in so far as deputing us to act for the sheikh is concerned. As regards Bahrein, I have considered that place as definitely under British protection in a way that cannot be disputed.

[20232] No. 69*.

Enclosure in India Office Letter.—(Received May 26.)

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, May 19, 1911.*

KOWEIT. Please refer to your telegram dated the 6th May.

Proposed instructions are approved.

It should be made very plain by Sheikh that he is not within jurisdiction of Bussorah. It is not possible to make stipulations which Resident, Persian Gulf, proposes, but Sheikh might reply, if further move is made in the matter by German consul at Bussorah, that he regards himself as within sphere of consul at Bushire in matters requiring consular intervention.

11. We should then issue and enforce regulations on the banks very similar to those which are already customary amongst the Arabs, but they should be published so that all should know of them. In particular, the use of any dredge or other mechanical appliance for obtaining the oysters should be prohibited. The natural history of the oyster beds should also be investigated scientifically, as has been done in Ceylon, and the extent and position of all the pearl-bearing beds in the Gulf definitely ascertained. In this way it is possible that gradual improvements may be introduced into the fisheries and the yield of the banks increased.

12. An opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown dated the 11th February, 1905, and transmitted to the Government of India on the 31st March, 1905, upon the question of the pearl fisheries clearly points to the necessity of organising them in such a way as to make Great Britain's prescriptive rights effective. If we do not do so, and let the matter stand over until what appears to be a more convenient season, the opportunity will go by for ever, and action will be left too late to save British position and prestige. It is for this reason that I venture to urge the Government not to let the time pass before taking the initial step with regard to Dibai until all memory of the results of opposing Great Britain has passed away.

I have, &c.

EDMOND J. W. SLADE.

[20360] No. 70.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 350.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May 18, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mosul, relative to the impending visit of the Catholic Chaldæan Patriarch to Europe, and possibly to England.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 70.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 22. Confidential.)

Sir, *Mosul, April 27, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency it has come to my knowledge that Youssef Emmanuel II, the Roman Catholic Chaldæan Archbishop frequently mentioned in despatches from this vice-consulate, proposes shortly to visit Europe.

If his tour is extended to England, as seems to be contemplated, it is not unlikely he may endeavour to be received by His Majesty the King, and before leaving Mosul he may apply to this vice-consulate for letters of recommendation of some kind.

Should he do so, I should be unable to comply in any way with his request, considering he has done nothing to earn, and much to forfeit, any claim to esteem, much less honour, in England.

The considerations by which my present remarks are prompted include all those that were stated in a private letter, dated the 10th January, 1909, addressed to your Excellency by Colonel Ramsay, then consul-general at Bagdad, a copy of which is herewith transmitted for facility of reference. The previous conduct of the Patriarch has been aggravated by the recent determined campaign of calumny and misrepresentation by which his agents have endeavoured to prevent the establishment near 'Amadia of the Archbishop of Canterbury's Mission, which does not attempt to proselytise and cannot be regarded as interfering with any honest Roman Catholic interests.

The Patriarch is likely to be accompanied on his tour by Daoud Youssefané, the Roman Catholic deputy for Mosul, who in September last sent a telegram to the Ministry of the Interior making various complaints against myself—amongst others, that in the course of a tour made last summer I visited the Nestorian Patriarch. A translation of this telegram, which reached me through a confidential channel, is herewith enclosed.

I have, &c.

C. A. GREIG.

Enclosure 2 in No. 70.

Consul-General Ramsay to Sir G. Lowther.

(Confidential.)

Dear Sir Gerard Lowther, *Bagdad, June* 10, 1911.

I AM taking the liberty of writing to you an unofficial letter, because I think you ought to know what follows, although I cannot make it the subject of an official reference.

The Patriarch of the Roman Catholic Chaldæans at Mosul is officially called Youssef Emmanuel II, Chaldæan Patriarch of Babel. He is now on his way to England, and I understand that his ambition is to be received by the King.

Mr. Young informed me that the Patriarch gave him to understand that he meant to ask him for "official letters of recommendation," and that he would have some difficulty in giving them for the following reasons:—

"(1.) His determined efforts, backed by every kind of intrigues with the local authorities, to prevent the journey of Mar Timotheus to his diocese in Malabar were reported to you by Mr. Rassam in January 1908. (2.) You have also seen a copy of the Patriarch's now famous sermon against the Protestants delivered here in 1907. He now denies its authenticity, but, unfortunately, his constant attitude towards the little Protestant community, and in particular towards the English Mission, resembles the sermon more closely than his protestations. (3.) It might not be easy to obtain proof of his persecution of the Nestorians, but I fear there must be some truth in the reports which constantly reach me. In conversation the day before he left he practically admitted giving presents to the notorious Reshid Bey (*vide* despatch No. 1 of the 1st January to Constantinople.)

"In short, though my relations with his Beatitude have been, and are, most friendly, I trust he will not press his request for official introductions, because, even allowing that the reports of his unprincipled intrigues, tyranny, and persecution may be strongly coloured by religious bias, it remains pretty clear that his treatment of the smaller Christian communities is most decidedly not of a kind to entitle him to any special mark of consideration in England—a circumstance to which it seems desirable, however unpleasant, to call attention."

I advised Mr. Young, in the event of the request being actually made and pressed, to refuse it, and say plainly that he could not give such letters to a person who appears to use his influence against those institutions and persons in whom we were interested. As a matter of fact, the Patriarch has left without asking for any letters of recommendation.

A translation of the sermon to which Mr. Young refers was sent to the embassy with my despatch of the 24th January, 1908. It appears to have been aimed at the Archbishop of Canterbury's Mission, which is harmless, as it does not attempt to proselytise, and against the Church Missionary Hospital at Mosul, which must have been a blessing to the people.

Your Excellency may perhaps agree with me that the Foreign Office should have their attention called to the character of the Patriarch, as it may perhaps be considered desirable to show him no particular honour, even if it is not thought wise to tell him that we consider we have no cause to be grateful to him.

I believe it was reported in the "Times" of the 23rd December that the Jacobite Patriarch had been received by His Majesty: he has a considerable following in India, but I do not think that the Chaldæan Patriarch can claim consideration on similar grounds.

Yours, &c.
J. RAMSAY.

Enclosure 3 in No. 70.

Mosul Deputies to Turkish Ministry of Interior.

(Confidential.)

THE British vice-consul at Mosul has for three months been travelling amongst the Kurdistan tribes. He has visited the Nestorian Patriarch at Julamerk, the Barzan sheikh, and other tribal chiefs. He has taken steps to establish an English Mission School at some important centre in Kurdistan. He has now returned to Mosul. As

such conduct might have undesirable consequences, we would call attention of the Ministry to this matter.

MOHAMMED ALI.
DAOUD YOUSUFANI.

Mosul, September 30, 1910.

[20436] No. 71.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 49.)

Sir, *Cairo, May* 20, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a note, drawn up by the Director of the Intelligence Department of the Egyptian War Office, on the Turkish campaign in the Yemen. With regard to the revolt in the sanjak of Asir, it would appear from reports from native sources that the Turks have taken no steps to deal with the situation pending a settlement in the Yemen. At the present moment, however, there are signs that reinforcements are being moved to Kunfidah both from north and south, and there seems to be some probability that a campaign will now be conducted against the Emir Mohamed Idris.

I have, &c,
MILNE CHEETHAM.

Enclosure 1 in No. 71.

Note by Egyptian Intelligence Department.

THE attached note on the campaign in the Yemen has been compiled in this office from such official reports as are available, supplemented by accounts obtained from local sources.

Between the optimistic reports of Turkish supporters and the exaggerated accounts of the Imam's well-wishers, an appreciation of what has actually happened has been a matter of some difficulty.

L. O. F. STACK, *Major*,
Director of Intelligence, Egyptian Army.

Intelligence Department, War Office,
Cairo, May 15, 1911.

Enclosure 2 in No. 71.

Memorandum respecting the Campaign in the Yemen.

EARLY in January the decision was taken to send an expeditionary force to quell the rebellion which had broken out in the Yemen.

By that time the garrisons in the interior were practically confined to their stations, and communication between Hodeidah and Sanaa had been interrupted.

Garrisons.

The total force on the spot was, approximately, 20,000, the garrisons of any importance being—

Hodeidah.	Hajjil (west of Amran).
Menakha.	Moka.
Mahfak.	Taiz.
Suk-el-Khamis.	Kataba.
Bauan.	Ibb.
Sinan Pasha (Matnah).	Yerim.
Sanaa.	Dhamar.
Amran.	Dogran.
Hajja (north of Amran).	

Composition of Force.

The expeditionary force under orders was composed of 34 battalions (24 regular and 10 reserve), 6 mountain batteries, 3 machine gun companies, 1 company of engineers, and 2 sanitary companies: a total of about 22,500 of all ranks.

It was placed under the command of Ferik Izzet Pasha, Chief of the General Staff, who is said to be a capable, level-headed man and one of the best of the Turkish generals. He served previously in the Yemen as chief of the staff to Ahmed Feizi Pasha, spent some years in Germany, and is very highly thought of.

His chief of the staff is Mirahi Ami Bey, who commanded the Samsun Refif Brigade in the Albanian operations last year.

The force was divided into three divisions, respectively under the commands of—

Lewa Ibrahim Pasha (General Officer Commanding 4th Division at Dedeagatch).
Mirahi Hamdi Bey (formerly commandant, Bulgarian frontier).
Mirahi Riza Bey (who previously saw a good deal of service in the Yemen).

The difficulty of providing transports, and the large number of redifs electing to pay the £ T. 50 exemption money for service outside Europe owing to reluctance to serve in the Yemen, caused a certain amount of delay in moving the reinforcements. The first contingent did not sail till the 21st January, and it was not till the end of March that the bulk of the force arrived.

Four Turkish gun-boats, intended for patrolling purposes in the Red Sea in connection with gun-running, were also dispatched.

The Imam's numbers.

The Imam was said at the outset to have 50,000 men in the field, but it is probable these numbers are exaggerated. At the same time, when it is remembered that most of the Turkish garrisons were besieged simultaneously, the over-estimation cannot be very great.

Plan of Campaign.

The plan of campaign appears to have been to move a column, as soon as sufficient troops had landed, to the relief of Menakha, which is strategically the key to Sanaa, and, whilst awaiting further reinforcements, to strengthen the position there and secure the line of communication with Hodeidah.

To land another column at Moka for the purpose of relieving the garrisons at Ibb, Yerim, Dhamar, and Douran, and clearing the country to the south.

On the arrival of Izzet Pasha with the main army, to make a general advance on Sanaa. In this advance it seems to have been the idea that the southern column should co-operate.

Gabbana, some two hours to the north of Hodeidah, was utilised (owing to cholera having broken out among the garrison at the latter place) as the port of disembarkation for the main column destined to the relief of Sanaa.

First Stage of the Advance.

Towards the middle of February sufficient troops had arrived to enable Riza Bey with a flying column of six battalions and other details to commence his advance to Menakha, which is about 100 miles from Hodeidah, and thus half-way to Sanaa.

On arrival at Huggeila, where the hilly country (Jebel) begins, Riza Bey's column, hearing that the Imam's adherents were strongly posted on the heights along the Wadi Hajjan, turned northwards, made a detour through the hills in order to avoid the main road which runs along the dry bed of the stream, and rejoined it some miles further on at Wisil, from whence the route to Menakha was open. The latter, after a siege of over a month, was reached on the 24th February.

The enemy, evidently discovering too late that their flank had been turned by this manœuvre, which was made possible by the friendly co-operation of Abdulla Beshir, Sheikh of Su'fan, withdrew in the direction of Sanaa.

Menakha, perched at an altitude of 6,000 feet on a narrow ridge joining two distinct mountain ranges, is well situated for defence against an enemy not in possession of modern guns. The garrison at the time of the investment consisted of close on

1,500 infantry and a detachment of artillery, with a supply of food-stuffs and ammunition sufficient to hold out for several months. A few days before the arrival of Riza Bey's relief column it had successfully withstood a general assault.

Riza Bey, sending two battalions into the town, posted the remainder to keep open his line of communication and to facilitate the march of reinforcements. The wire between Hodeidah and Menakha was also repaired.

Second Stage.

On the 27th, eight battalions under Ibrahim Pasha left Gabbana to operate south-east of the Huggeila–Menakha road, where a large body of the rebels had rallied on retiring from Menakha.

Izzet Pasha, the commander-in-chief, reached Hodeidah at the end of February, and, after some days' stay there, proceeded with further reinforcements to Menakha, from whence, somewhere about the third week in March, the main army began its advance on Sanaa.

The bulk of Imam's forces in the meantime had been vigorously concentrating their attacks on the smaller garrisons on the road between Menakha and Sanaa, such as, Mahfak, Suk-el-Khamis, Banan, and Sinan Pasha, and had drawn their investment round Sanaa more closely.

The latter town, which is well fortified and was reported to have had a garrison of 1 squadron cavalry, 4 battalions infantry, and 3 batteries artillery, with plenty of food-stuffs and ammunition, had been invested more or less since the 12th January, but owing to its superiority in guns was not subjected to a general assault, and had been able in consequence to make some effective sorties.

Information is scarce as to the amount of opposition met with by the main army, but so far as can be judged by the slowness of its progress its advance must have been disputed, the most serious engagement being at Matnah (or Sinan Pasha), about 10 miles from Sanaa, on the 3rd April, where evidently the insurgents made their last efforts to frustrate the attempt to relieve Sanaa. Here a heavy defeat was inflicted on the enemy, who drew off to the north-west. In the fighting between Menakha and Sanaa the enemy's casualties are reported to have been 1,500, whilst the Turks lost a third of that number.

On the relief of Sanaa, a column was dispatched to clear the country to the north and north-west and to raise the investment of Amran and El-Hajja. This object was effected, but, to again judge by the time taken, determined opposition must have been met with.

The Southern Column.

News regarding the southern column is scanty. On landing at Moka, leaving Taiz on its right, it appears to have marched straight to Ibb, which it relieved, and thence to Yerim, Dhamar, and Douran. At Dhamar and Seraglish, further north, it seems to have met with and successfully overcome a good deal of opposition. It was not till two days after the relief of Sanaa that this column was reported to be within one day's march of that place.

Telegraphic communication was restored with Hodeidah on the 11th April, but the censorship is evidently strict, as very little news has transpired except that officially communicated to the Constantinople press.

The Situation.

Although there is no doubt the Turkish troops have been uniformly successful and the garrisons invested have been relieved throughout the district, the best informed native opinion from the Yemen inclines to the view that the revolt is far from crushed. They say that the tribesmen will withdraw to the inaccessible mountainous country to the north and north-west of Sanaa, wherein is situated the Imam's head-quarters, and where the whole countryside is entirely devoted to him. The Imam's strongly fortified capital stands on the summit of Jebel Shehara (some 8,000 feet high). It is said that there is only one possible road of approach, and that this is practically impregnable. From here he and his tribesmen will defy the Turkish forces and await a favourable opportunity to again strike a blow for their independence, or, at any rate, some form of autonomy, which is the least that they will be satisfied with.

If this appreciation of the situation is correct, and previous history also endorses it, it would seem that the Ottoman Government will have to permanently maintain a very large garrison in the country until such time as Hodeidah is connected to Sanaa by railway, and communications in general are improved. At present only that section of the line as far as Huggeila has been definitely decided on, no decision having as yet been come to as regards its continuation to Sanaa. It is estimated that this first section (of which Izzet Pasha cut the first sod on the 2nd March) will take eighteen months to complete.

Intelligence Department, War Office,
Cairo, May 15, 1911.

[20361] No. 72.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 353.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May 22, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 315 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Jerusalem reporting the departure from that town of the commission appointed to enquire into the incident at the Mosque of Omar and the transference of the commandant of the Jerusalem gendarmerie to Beirout.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 72.

Consul Satow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 30.)
Sir, *Jerusalem, May 12, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 29 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to report that the commission appointed to enquire into the mosque incident left this city on the 10th instant. It has not been possible to obtain any information as to the results arrived at.

Although reports have been current that the governor had been dismissed, he is still here. I am inclined to believe that he will remain, although he may himself later ask to be transferred elsewhere.

Sami Bey, the commandant of the gendarmerie, has been transferred to Beirout. It is believed locally that this transfer has been made in connection with the mosque incident. It seems, however, more probable that this is only the result of a decision previously arrived at. Sami Bey had already been once appointed to Beirout and then returned to Jerusalem at the request of the governor, presumably on the ground that his local experience might be useful during the Easter festivities. He will be no great loss as he, as one of the leading members of the local committee of Union and Progress, interfered in all branches of the administration to the detriment of the gendarmerie service.

I have been twice approached by the Catholic Armenian Bishop with a request that I would intervene on behalf of Makasdar, the dragoman of Captain Parker. I have, however, declined to interfere, feeling that it would be both useless to do so, as the matter was in the hands of the commission, and also that any intervention on my part might give rise to false impressions. His case, however, seems a hard one, as, whatever he may have done, he was only acting as a subordinate.

I have, &c.
H. E. SATOW.

[20373] No. 73.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 365.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May 24, 1911.*

I RECENTLY reminded Rifaat Pasha that I was still awaiting a reply to my note of the 8th April, transmitted to you in my despatch No. 241 of the 11th April, with

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[20367] No. 72°.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 359.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May 24, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith summary of an article which appeared in the "Tanzimat" of the 18th May, dealing with the Bagdad Railway.

This article is from the pen of Lutfi Fikri, who, I would point out, is one of the leaders of the original Opposition.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 72°.

Précis of Newspaper Article.

THIS morning's "Tanzimat" has an article by Lutfi Fikri Bey on the Bagdad Railway. The writer pooh-poohs the idea that the series of our agreements recently concluded with the company constitute a triumph for Hakki Pasha's Government. The first three were quite clearly favourable to the Germans. As for the fourth, which constituted the alleged triumph, inasmuch as the Germans waived a right which stood in the way of the 4 per cent. customs increase, and which was supposed to be calculated to conciliate England and France, it has unfortunately pleased nobody. Proceeding to more detailed criticism, the writer in the first place complains that the Government had no right to conclude these agreements without recourse to Parliament. True, there is officially no guarantee in the case of the Osmanie–Alexandretta line. But the convention for the Helif–Bagdad line is a new and independent one, and as it imposes financial obligations on the State it ought to have been submitted to Parliament. The Alexandretta Harbour convention, too, gives the company the right of imposing what amounts to compulsory taxation on the public, which will have to use the company's quays whether it likes them or not; and such taxation requires to be sustained by law. Had these ill-considered agreements been submitted to Parliament, they would have been amended in many particulars. It must not be forgotten that the Osmanie–Alexandretta concession was Turkey's trump card. The Germans being without an outlet on the Mediterranean, the Government might have secured in return for this concession many amendments in the old Hamidian agreements concerning the main line, *e.g.*, as regards the system of guarantees, which as at present arranged is an incentive to extravagance and gives no encouragement to activity on the part of the company. Even the advantage of having no guarantee to pay on the Alexandretta line is illusory, for the company in its desire to make that line pay will be tempted to charge cheap rates on the other guaranteed lines, and the Government will have no defence. Article 11, dealing with joint tariffs, is not obligatory, and no advantage can be expected of it.

Another blot on the agreement is Hakki Pasha's entire failure to take cognisance of the alleged undertaking given by Germany at Potsdam not to build any line between the main Bagdad line and the Persian frontier. The Government might have used the Osmanie–Alexandretta concession to make Germany waive her right of preference over all concessions for lines emerging on the sea between Mersina and Tripoli. Had it done so the alleged undertaking given by Germany would have lost its importance, because the Government would have been left in a position to grant concessions for the lines which Germany undertook not to build to any other company, starting its line from the Mediterranean seaboard.

Lastly, even the great object of conciliating the English has not been achieved after all! The English are not satisfied with their share in the proposed Bagdad–Bussorah line. Had the Government first ascertained England's conditions, it need not have thrown away uselessly what it has newly given to the Germans. If the English do not accept the proposal made to them it will end, as the inspired "North German Gazette" says, in Germany's constructing the line after all. So the upshot of the whole matter is that nothing is changed and Germany has got two new concessions into the bargain. Such is the Government's triumph! One cannot help recalling Gia Pasha's couplet:—

"Alas, in this game we've again lost the toss!
I see nought that we've gained in the midst of our loss!"

May 18, 1911.

regard to the arrest and detention of three natives of Bahrein, and it was important that this matter should be cleared up before the general negotiations regarding the Persian Gulf proceeded. I explained to him that the understanding on which we had been working was the observance of the *status quo*, and this arrest of the natives of Bahrein constituted a breach of this *status quo*. I must therefore ask that the act of the vali should be disowned, and that it should be clearly laid down that the Bahrein passports would be recognised in the future.

To this Rifaat Pasha replied that the Porte had committed no act which constituted a breach of the *status quo*, that the men in question had been arrested on a properly formulated charge, had been found innocent, and had been in due course released. A similar incident might take place anywhere. I replied that the vali's note to His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, which quoted the view of the Ottoman Government, constituted the breach of the *status quo*. Rifaat Pasha asked me to let him have a copy of this note, which I did later. The note is as follows: "I have the honour to state that the Ottoman Government neither knows nor admits that the people of Bahrein are under the protection of the British Government," and I pointed out in the note that the vali quoted his Government's views.

Rifaat Pasha argued that an isolated act or communication on the part of a vali could not modify the *status quo*. To this I observed that it was then easy for the Porte to reply that instructions had been sent to the vali not to commit any breach of the *status quo*, and to add that Bahrein passports would be accepted in the future. His Excellency replied that he was quite prepared to send instructions to the vali not to raise any questions which would constitute a breach of the *status quo*, but he was at a loss to understand what was meant by the recognition of Bahrein passports, as passports were not asked for or controlled in those portions of the Empire, and they had no knowledge of any previous recognition of passports issued in Bahrein. I explained that by recognition of the passports it was implied that in the case of the arrest of a native of Bahrein he should, on stating whence he came, be allowed to invoke the assistance of the British consular authorities.

I said that if my note remained unanswered, the note of the vali and the arrest of the men in question might be in the future quoted as establishing the rights of the Porte in the matter, which met with the rejoinder from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that with equal justice might my note be held to establish the rights of His Majesty's Government in the matter.

His Excellency remarked that he could not appreciate the utility of endeavouring to arrive at a settlement of this one question in the Persian Gulf when we were about to endeavour to arrive at a settlement of all of them, and he was evidently most disinclined to put anything on paper, and I gathered from his Excellency that, if he did so, his reply would be of a contentious nature.

I reminded his Excellency that we had on more than one occasion made it quite clear to the Porte that Bahrein was under the protection of Great Britain.

Referring to the question of some compensation to be given to the men in question, which I had put forward verbally, Rifaat Pasha repudiated all liability for such. He maintained that no claim of such a nature could exist anywhere. There had been a properly formed charge against them, which had been examined, but had not been substantiated. No other course could have been followed, but because the charge had not been upheld was no reason for granting compensation. It would not be granted in England or any other country he knew of.

His Excellency promised to examine the note of the vali when I should send it him, and I will return to the subject again with his Excellency on an early occasion.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[20894]

No. 74.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 30.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, May 29, 1911.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a

letter, dated the 11th instant, which has been received from the Commander-in-chief, East Indies, respecting buoys and lights in the Shatt-el-Arab.

A copy has been sent to the India Office.

I am, &c.
C. I. THOMAS.

Enclosure in No. 74.

Rear-Admiral Sir E. Slade to Admiralty.

(Confidential.) *Commander-in-chief's Office, Bombay, May 11, 1911.*

Sir,

WITH reference to Admiralty telegram of the 8th instant relative to the buoys and lights in the Shatt-el-Arab River, be pleased to lay the following remarks before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty:—

2. None of the buoys laid by the Turks are a danger or impediment to navigation.

3. With regard to the question of the sufficiency of the British buoys in themselves for the purposes of navigation, I would observe that the British buoy which marked the inner bar, and which was missing, has not been replaced by another British buoy, and the Turks have now placed one in the position which it ought to occupy. I may mention that the committee on the lighting and buoyage of the Persian Gulf, which reported in May 1909, recommended the provision of an acetylene gas buoy as inner bar buoy, to be similar to that marking the outer bar. If an acetylene inner bar buoy be placed the British buoys will be sufficient, and the lighting of the bar will be satisfactory for the purposes of navigation.

4. At present the inner bar is hardly sufficiently marked at night, and navigation is difficult. It is not impossible, however, to go in and out during the dark hours, as many ships do so.

5. With regard to the approaches to the bar, it was recommended that a lightship should be moored 4 or 5 miles to seaward of the gas outer bar buoy. Although not absolutely necessary, this would greatly facilitate making the bar in the thick weather, which is not uncommon in those parts in the winter.

6. A copy of this letter has been sent to the Government of India.

I have, &c.
EDMOND J. W. SLADE.

[20868] No. 75.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 30.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Earl of Crewe, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India dated the 11th May, 1911, relative to Nejd affairs.

India Office, May 29, 1911.

Enclosure 1 in No. 75.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir H. McMahon.

(Confidential.) *Bushire, April 20, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of an interesting report received from the political agent, Koweit, in which he narrates the purport of conversations which passed between himself and Abd-ul-Aziz "Bin Saud" in the course of some days' halt by Captain Shakespear, at the latter's camp, during a recent tour in the Koweit hinterland.

2. The report reaches me just as I am leaving for Koweit, and I would prefer to defer comment until my return, merely observing that Bin Saud's emissary, Mashuk,

referred to at the end of paragraph 3 of the report, did present himself at Bushire about six weeks ago with a verbal message purporting to come from Bin Saud.

In any case having regard to existing instructions he would have received no encouragement; and as a matter of fact, though his bearing suggested that he was what he professed to be, he carried no credentials or other proof of his identity, so that I had no means of being sure of his *bona fides*, and therefore treated him with due circumspection, merely giving instructions that as an Arab stranger in a foreign country he should be supplied with anything he needed in the way of food pending his departure by the next steamer.

Enclosure 2 in No. 75.

Captain Shakespear to Lieutenant-Colonel Cox.

(Confidential.) *Koweit, April 8, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report below, for the information of Government, the substance of a number of long and intimate conversations which took place between Abd-ul-Aziz-bin-Abdur Rahman-as-Saud, the Wahabi Amir of Nejd, and myself, when, during my recent tour, I spent some days in his camp.

2. I would first observe that Abd-ul-Aziz gave me the impression of being endowed with a particularly straightforward, frank, and generous nature, and such is his reputation among the Bedouin tribes in Central and Eastern Arabia, corroborated, moreover, by every sheikh from whom at various times I have made incidental enquiries. He treated me most hospitably, and in the most genuinely friendly manner, sparing no pains to make my stay with him as pleasant as possible. He and his brothers did not show a trace of the fanatical spirit which might have been expected from the ruling Wahabi family, and his advisers, and the heads of his forces also treated me and my men with the most cordial friendship; all my questions regarding their country, its customs, resources, &c., were answered in the frankest manner, whilst I was free to wander among the tents and converse with all and sundry without apparently arousing a part of that suspicion which generally attaches to a foreigner amongst Arabs of the interior. I feel convinced of the correctness of this impression, for I frequently discussed matters of doctrine, custom, and religion, which are held to be anathema by the Wahabi sect, and was always answered with calm and intelligent reasoning without a trace of fanatical heat. My object in stating the above is to show that my relations with the As-Saud family were of a sufficiently intimate description to leave no doubt of their insincerity in what passed between us: indeed, I was habitually addressed as "Brother," and if I had been one in fact I could not have been treated more as one of the family.

When Abd-ul-Aziz, after some conversations on general politics, began to ask my opinion on the relations between the British Government and Turkey, the aims of the latter, our views on the same and the like, I said at once that I had not come to discuss politics, but to enjoy touring in the desert, and meet him if possible on his native hearth in order to see how Arab chiefs lived in the desert; moreover, I had no sort of authority to discuss politics with him, for we had no political relations with Central Arabian chiefs, and so far as I knew desired none, provided they were content with their own affairs and country and did not force us to protect our interests among the chiefs along the coast-line as had been necessary in former times, when the Wahabi power under Faisal-bin-Turki had interfered in Oman and Bahrein affairs. Abd-ul-Aziz said he quite understood my position, but would be grateful if I would hear what he wanted to say, and then, if I desired to send on his views to my superiors afterwards, I could please myself; but that he was glad of the opportunity to "show his heart" fully in conversation, for he had already sent a secret messenger to Bushire to reopen the old relations with the resident, but that the man carried no letters, and his instructions had only been to see the resident personally, intimate generally that the As-Saud wished to enter into relations with the British Government, and that anything more formal than this might be conducted through the political agent at Koweit. The man's name, he told me, was Mashuk, and he left Abd-ul-Aziz secretly (that is, his purpose and destination were unknown even to the Amir's brothers and entourage) about the last week of January.

4. Seeing that he was bent upon having his say, I explained to Abd-ul-Aziz that I presumed his object was (much the same as that of other Arabs) to bring about some form of relation with the British Government, which would enable him to repudiate any more patent allegiance to the Sultan which the Turkish Government might in the

future require of him or his house; if such was the case, I was as nearly certain as I could be without a reference to Government or a discussion that His Majesty's Government, while always desirous of peace, would not support him, and would not enter into Central Arabian affairs, for they had always confined themselves to their interests on the coast-line, and had never, so far as I knew, challenged any Turkish claim to the ordering of affairs in Central Arabia; moreover, being on amicable terms with that Government, they would be averse from anything of the nature of an intrigue against it. Consequently he must not expect the slightest support from His Majesty's Government, that from his isolation in Central Arabia he knew little or nothing of the affairs of nations, that he was not in a position to judge such matters, and though my words might be unpalatable I felt bound to tell him plainly at once to save future disappointment. Having enjoyed his hospitality and been treated as his intimate friend, it would not be fair to him if I permitted him to gather an impression that having discussed political matters with a British Government official he would obtain any support or countenance from that Government or that they would even consider the discussion seriously, when I felt almost certain that the British Government would do nothing to disturb the existing state of affairs. I reiterated my opinion as given above on several occasions, and Abd-ul-Aziz always received it as tendered in good faith and without resentment.

5. Abd-ul-Aziz first pointed out that his suggestions had the approval of his father Abdur Rahman-bin-Faisal, with whom alone he had discussed them, for his brothers had not been as yet taken into his confidence in the matter. From separate conversations with them, however, I am convinced that they are of his mind and would certainly support him. In passing, I would observe that though both Abd-ul-Aziz and his father Abdur Rahman are known and spoken of as "Imam" or "Amir" indiscriminately the actual power and government of Nejd is almost entirely in the hands of Abd-ul-Aziz, his father having virtually abdicated the position of ruler in favour of the son.

6. Abd-ul-Aziz recounted a good deal of ancient history, of which I give an abbreviated version below, arranged, as far as I have been able to locate it in time, chronologically.*

1814–19. He began with the invasion by Ibrahim Pasha, and said that after the Egyptians
1824. had been expelled from Nejd his ancestor Turki-bin-Abdulla reconquered most of the
1831. original Wahabi dominion, including Hasa, Katif, and most of the Oman coast from Katar to near Muscat, thus removing all signs of Turkish power, and that he then made a treaty with the British Government.

1834. Shortly after this Turki was murdered by Mashari, and he in turn was killed by Faisal-bin-Turki, father of Abdur Rahman and grandfather of Abd-ul-Aziz, who now
1838. rules Nejd. Soon after his accession Faisal was attacked by the Egyptians under
1842. Khurshid Pasha and being defeated was taken away a prisoner to Cairo. Faisal, having succeeded after some years in obtaining a pardon, returned to Nejd, and was at
1843. once acclaimed as Imam. He also renewed the old treaty with the British Government and established his rule over the whole of the territory formerly under the sway
1852. of Turki-bin-Abdulla. He reconstructed the fort of Baraimi in Oman and with the concurrence of the British Government received a tribute from the Sultan of Muskat of
1859. 15,000 dollars per annum. Though at this time Faisal was in frequent communication with the British Government he was not permitted to assist Mahomed-bin-Abdulla to
1861. his rights in Bahrein, the British resident having already placed one of the Khalifa family in power. The British Government however, in proof of its amity, punished the Bahrein sheikh when he proceeded to make attacks on the mainland of Katif and Hasa which were then Wahabi property.

It was at about this time that the British Government showed how close were
1865. their relations with Nejd by sending one of their officers (Colonel Lewis Pelly) to Riadh and he renewed the old treaties and friendship though not by an actual written
1866. document. Soon after this visit Faisal died and Abdulla his son succeeded him and though he at first kept up the former friendly relations with the British Government was fool enough to make overtures to the Turks, after he had quarrelled with the English about Baraimi and Muscat and because he was also in difficulties with his brother Saud, who held part of Nejd and was better liked by the people. Finally, Saud
1869. defeated Abdulla, who then went to Midhat Pasha, Vali of Bagdad, and got him to
1870. invade Nejd on his behalf. When the Turks came to Hasa all the As-Saud family

* A reference to Mr. Saldana's précis of Nejd affairs in Part I of the "Historical Materials for the Persian Gulf Gazetteer" of October 1904 will be useful as a companion to what follows.

were at feud with each other and the Turks therefore easily seized Hasa and Katif, 1871.
but they went no further west towards Nejd. The Turks would never have been able to come by land and it was not right on the British Government's part to have allowed them to come by sea, as British ships have always guarded that and refused to allow armed expeditions on it. Saud represented this to the resident at Bushire and threw himself on his protection, but as the English would not listen to his representations he tried to make an arrangement with the Turks, who promised much but did nothing. In their usual way they wanted Saud to come in person to Bagdad so as to imprison him there and then take the whole of Nedj; and, when they had agreed to his brother Abdur Rahman-bin-Faisal going in his place with the promise of a safe 1872.
conduct they did actually imprison the latter. By this time the Arabs had seen that the Turkish officials, high and low, were not to be trusted, and so joined Saud with a view to an attack upon Hasa in order to recover by force what they could not get by diplomacy. Saud, however, was afraid to venture this for the Turks would probably kill his brother in Bagdad, and also because the English would not stop Turkish troops coming into Hasa by sea. When Abdur Rahman was released after three or four years 1874.
captivity at Bagdad and landed in Hasa he found that the Arabs loathed the Turks and were ready to join him against them. As the Turks were weak owing to sickness and deaths he attacked Hasa fort, but before it could be reduced the Turks brought more troops and he left for Riadh. Saud then died and Abdur Rahman became Imam but there was continual war between him and his brother Abdulla-bin-Faisal who still 1875.
loved the Turks. Abdulla gradually became stronger, and finally was acknowledged as ruler; he made peace with all his relatives except his brother Abdur Rahman. It was 1880.
during these years of trouble between the sons of Faisal themselves and between the As-Saud and the Turks in Hasa that the Ibn Rashid family of Hail, formerly vassals of the Wahabi ruler, became so strong and eventually took Kasim and Boraidah. Abdulla-bin-Faisal tried to reassert the power of the As-Saud but Mahomed-Ibn-Rashid 1882.
was too strong. At the same time there were more dissensions between Abdulla and his relatives, so that Abdulla became weak and the sons of Saud-bin-Faisal took the 1887.
power from him; but, Mohamed-Ibn-Rashid to help Abdulla attacked Riadh, took it, 1888.
and thus became ruler of practically all the country formerly belonging to the Wahabis. He also took Abdulla-bin-Faisal off to Hail. Abdur Rahman-bin-Faisal then made an effort to restore the power of the As-Saud, and succeeded in retaking Riadh from 1890.
Ibn Rashid's people, but he was strong enough to maintain his position and finally was utterly defeated by Ibn Rashid and had to take to the desert, where he wandered 1891.
about with his family until they took refuge with Mubarak in Koweit. When Mahomed-Ibn-Rashid died the tribes which he had held together by his superior political acumen, 1897.
began to drift apart and the As-Saud saw their opportunity. After a considerable amount of intrigue Abd-ul-Aziz-bin-Abdur Rahman, who had been living with his younger brothers and father for some years in Koweit, left secretly with about thirty 1902.
chosen men for Riadh, which by a *coup de main* he captured in a night, and on proclaiming himself, was hailed with joy by the people as their legitimate ruler. The settled people of Nejd (Southern) who were tired of Ibn Rashid's rule flocked to him and he soon had a considerable force with which he drove Ibn Rashid's representatives from town after town until in a year he had again made the As-Saud family a power to be reckoned with. He then recalled his father Abdur Rahman and his brothers and proceeded to win back what he could from Ibn Rashid. He was soon master of Aridh, Sadair, Washm, Hautah, Mahmal, and eventually of Kasim. The surrounding country acknowledged him and most of the adjacent Bedouin tribes came under his banner. He so increased his power that Ibn Rashid appealed to the Turks and a Turkish force was sent into Kasim overland which together with Ibn Rashid's force was utterly routed at Boraidah. Following upon this the Turks sent a larger force again into June 1904.
Kasim under Mushir Faizi Pasha, but fighting did not take place as Abdur Rahman met the Mushir and an arrangement was made between them by which parties of this force were left in Boraidah, Anaizah, and some of the other towns of Kasim. Shortly afterwards Abdur Rahman went north and had an interview with the Vali of Bussorah at Safwan, in which nothing of consequence took place. The Turkish troops in Kasim dwindled owing to disease and deaths and eventually after agreeing to leave behind their arms were given a safe conduct out of Nejd by Abdul Aziz and Mubarak, who sent them from Kasim to As-Safa and thence to At-Towil near Koweit and thence to December 1906.
Bussorah by land.

7. Since this evacuation there have been no signs of Turkish authority in Nejd and Abd-ul-Aziz has so consolidated his power that his word is law over the whole of

Nejd from within two day's march of Hail to the Persian Gulf coast line, excepting only the actual towns of Hofuf, Katif, and where the Turks maintain garrisons, and as far south as the Wadi Dowasir. In 1910 the Sharif of Mecca made an expedition to Kasim, whether in his own personal interests or at the instigation of the Turkish Government is not known for certain, but finding Abd-ul-Aziz too strong for him, he left hurriedly after an exchange of presents. Abd-ul-Aziz was hampered owing to the Sharif having in his power his brother Saud, treacherously captured and handed over by the Ateyba Bedouin. I am assured by Abd-ul-Aziz that no documents passed between him and the Sharif regarding the revenues and Government of Kasim. All the reports published in the Egyptian and Turkish papers are pure fiction invented by the Sharif to save his own face after he had safely returned to Mecca. He asserts that he made no professions of being the vassal of the Sultan and being a Wahabi does not admit the Sultan's Khalifate in Islam. The Wahabis hate the Turks only less than they hate the sheikhs of Persia for the infidel practices which both have imported into the true and pure faith revealed in the Koran.

8. Abd-ul-Aziz reverted frequently to the letters which his father Abdur Rahman had sent to the Resident at Bushire about the time of the appointment of a political agent at Koweit and regretted that we had not met his friendly advances with the cordiality of former times. He said that he had given me their history for so many years to prove that the As-Saud had always been in friendly relations with the English and that they had always cordially hated the Turks, but once the latter had effected their lodgment in Hasa by sea and were able to maintain their position there by the same means they had not been able to eject them. The As-Saud had frequently mooted the idea of open hostilities but had each time come to the conclusion that an expedition would be fruitless until the ability of the Turks to bring in troops by sea was limited, and that was only possible through the English. The As-Saud bitterly resent the Turkish occupation of Hasa for two main reasons :—

(a.) The district forms part of the As-Saud ancestral territory as much as Aridh and is by far the richest ;

(b.) The Turkish occupation deprives the Ruler of Nejd of the natural port to his dominions, and makes the proper control of the Bedouin tribes between the sea and Riadh impossible, with consequent detriment to the commercial prosperity of Nejd.

9. Abd-ul-Aziz also told me that he was not alone in his hatred of the Turks, for all the Princes of Arabia were in correspondence with each other regarding a combination to attack the Turks simultaneously and drive them out of the country for good and all. He frequently had letters from the Imam Yayah, from Seyyid Mahomed-al-Idrisi from the chiefs of the tribes through whose country the Hedjaz Railway runs, and the responsible Arabs in Hasa and Katif, begging him to assist in making successful a general revolution throughout Arabia. Even Ibn Raschid had made overtures to the same effect, but Abd-ul-Aziz said he was not prepared to commit himself yet, as he had the unhappy recollection of how the Turks came to be in Hasa before him, and desired to give them no opportunity for a further advance into Nejd.

10. The As-Saud had no ambitions towards an increase of dominion north, west, or anywhere except over Hasa and Katif. But above all they desired to be in relations with the British Government, so that the Turkish Government would hesitate to oppress them or to interfere in their affairs in Nejd. Abd-ul-Aziz cited Sheikh Mubarak's position as nearly as possible representing what he desired, adding that the As-Saud were really better off than Mubarak, for they had no dealings whatever with the Turks, did not fly their flag like Mubarak, and did not admit even the Khalifate of the Sultan. He appealed to the English on the ground of long previous relations and because they were always for peace and justice and could be trusted to keep their promises. The new régime in Constantinople had already shown its aggressive policy, and he feared that before very many years there would be another attempt to subjugate Nejd. Though the Wahabis had formerly fought us in regard to the coastal chiefs' affairs, they saw the benefit of our rule amongst them, and had no wish to alter the present position, though Abd-ul-Aziz mentioned having received letters from Dibai, whose sheikhs had written, after the "Hyacinth's" gun-running incident, asking to be taken under his protection.

11. He was quite prepared to accept a British political agent, but as the Turks at present occupied the only two ports which belonged to the Wahabis, he could only suggest such an appointment in either Katif or Ojair after the Turks had been made to evacuate Hasa. When that auspicious event should take place he would gladly welcome the British flag as a sign that he would no longer be molested by

Turkey. He went on to point out that if the As-Saud controlled Hasa and a British officer resided at one of the ports we should benefit largely by the increased trade which would result from a settled and effective power over the Bedouin, who make the trade routes to the interior so insecure at present.

12. I have given above what passed in some detail, for it seemed of importance to record a discussion at first hand with a man who at present rules Central Arabia, and in the course of which he expressed his views and ambitions with absolute frankness. It will be of advantage to refer in this connection to the correspondence noted in the margin.* Unfortunately I had no papers with me in the desert, and it was therefore impossible at the time to follow all Abd-ul-Aziz's references to previous appeals to the residency. Since my return I find that he does not seem to have exaggerated his side of the case so much as was my original impression.

13. On enquiring how he reconciled the regular receipt of a Turkish annuity with the claim to absolute independence, Abd-ul-Aziz said that the annuity dated from the time of his father's (Abdur Rahman-bin-Faisal) incarceration in Baghdad, was given then for his living expenses, and has continued ever since as personal to Abdur Rahman, it amounts to only £ T. 60 per mensem. The As-Saud have never received anything else from the Turks in the way of decorations or subsidies, and on his father's death Abd-ul-Aziz proposes to allow his subsidy to lapse. What correspondence they have had with Turkish officials has been of a diplomatic nature, either to effect the removal of troops on the pretext of a show of submission or to smooth over other difficulties as they arose. If the English had kept up their old relations and brought the As-Saud under their wing, as desired by them, none of these shifts and expedients would have been necessary.

14. In concluding, I would venture to remark that a serious consideration of the Central Arabian problem seems to be called for in the light of recent events in Hauran, in Yemen, and perhaps also in Irak. All reports point to an ever-increasing unrest and hatred of Turkish pretensions. If a combination were to take place between the principal leaders in Arabia—and the fact of a serious discussion of a simultaneous revolt between men of such widely divergent religious tenets as the Imam Yahyah and the Wahabi Imam makes such an union at least possible—I am inclined to the opinion that a revolt is not only probable but would be welcomed by nearly every tribe throughout the Peninsula. The idea of a simultaneous rising to drive out the Turks would certainly, I think, hold the Arabs together until their object was accomplished, at least in Eastern Arabia. Whether the Turks would be able to regain their position seems uncertain, but from all I can learn hatred of the Turks seems to be the one idea common to all the tribes, and the only one for which they would sink their own differences.

The strength of Turkey in Arabia has hitherto always been her ability to play off one tribe against another, but now it appears that this cardinal fact seems to have penetrated the unsophisticated brain of the Arabs, so that any suggestion for inter-tribal war which can be traced to a Turkish source is at once suspected, and the more likely for that reason to defeat its own object.

15. From our own point of view in the Persian Gulf I venture to think that, with the As-Saud established in Hasa and in friendly relations with us, our position would be considerably strengthened, there would be an absence of the present attempts at intrigue between the trucial chiefs and the Turks, and there is no doubt that Ibn Saud's power in the hinterland would render the main caravan route to the interior so safe that trade, already almost entirely British or Indian, would benefit materially.

16. Before parting I informed Abd-ul-Aziz that I would forward his view to my superiors, but I did not anticipate any answer of the nature he desired for the reasons already given. He replied that he was content to wait, as he knew that whatever answer might be returned it would be a true one, and he preferred the truth from the English to the equivocation experience had taught to expect from the Turks.

He particularly requested that the matter might not be discussed with Sheikh Mubarak, as he would be likely to draw false inferences and perhaps divulge it to Turkish officials.

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* Government of India to Viscount Morley, dated March 26, 1911; Bahrein letter, dated November 7, 1905; Koweit letters, dated August 18, 1901, and August 28, 1906; Bushire letter, dated September 16, 1906; enclosures to Bagdad letter, dated September 29, 1906; Koweit letters, dated November 20, 1906, and May 15, 1907; Bushire letter, dated June 22, 1907.

[21081] No. 76.

Sir A. Wilson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

Dear Sir Edward, *Admiralty, May 30, 1911.*

AS the meeting of the Persian Gulf Sub-Committee has been postponed, I am sending you a draft of a proposed note to the Turkish Government about the control of the Shat-el-Arab for your consideration in connection with Admiral Slade's report of the 22nd April.

I am inclined to think that this question might advantageously be taken up with the Turks in a friendly manner quite independently of the question of the Bagdad Railway, but it is a matter entirely for your judgment whether you would like it to be brought before the committee or not.

Believe me, &c.
A. K. WILSON.

Enclosure in No. 76.

Proposed Note to Turkish Government on the Navigation of the Shat-el-Arab.

UP to the present the whole cost of surveying the approaches to the Shat-el-Arab has been borne by the British Government, which has made surveys at intervals since 1827, complete surveys having been made in 1827 and 1890, and a number of partial surveys in the intervening years.

The buoys were also placed and maintained by the British India Steam Navigation Company.

At the beginning of this year, 1911, complaints having been made that some of the buoys were out of position, the Turkish Government sent a man-of-war to place new buoys and a dhow to act as a light-vessel, and at about the same time the British Government ordered a new survey to be made by the Indian Marine and one of His Majesty's ships, and the buoys to be replaced in position.

The channel is now properly marked, but the result of buoys and light-vessels being laid by the officers of two nations acting independently must necessarily tend to create confusion and add to the dangers of navigation. Some international agreement as to the control of the river is therefore very desirable.

The nations principally concerned in the navigation of the Shat-el-Arab are Turkey and Persia, whose territories adjoin the river, and Great Britain, who is the owner of about 85 per cent. of the vessels trading in the river, and who has also special interests in the Persian Gulf.

It is probable that when the Bagdad Railway is commenced the trade passing through the river will be largely increased, and the Turkish Government will no doubt agree with His Majesty's Government that the time has come when the responsibility for the maintenance of the buoys, making periodical surveys of the river, and any works necessary for the improvement of the channel should be regularly defined.

The recent survey made by the Indian Marine, as mentioned above, has shown considerable alterations in the depth of water since the last survey, and it is reported that there is now a channel with a minimum depth of 13 feet at low water spring tides. This shows the necessity for making frequent surveys, and also makes it probable that, as soon as the amount of trade in the river has increased sufficiently to justify the cost, works of some kind may be desirable to make the improvement in the depth of water permanent.

The cost of making the surveys, maintaining the buoys and light-vessels, and any necessary works would, in accordance with the usual custom, be most properly defrayed by a small tax on a scale to be agreed upon levied on all vessels using the river on their arrival at either Turkish or Persian ports.

His Majesty's Government would therefore propose that, as a preliminary, a joint commission should be appointed consisting of representatives of Turkey, Persia, and Great Britain, with an engineer of experience in works connected with the control of rivers, to examine and report on the steps necessary to improve the navigation of the river, to prepare estimates of the cost, and to make recommendations as to the composition of the board to be permanently established to control the navigation of the river and the amount of the tax to be levied.

[21239] No. 77.

Messrs. Lynch Brothers to Foreign Office.—(Received June 1.)

3, Salters' Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, June 1, 1911.

Sir,

WITH reference to previous correspondence on the subject of the demolition of our premises at Bagdad, I have the honour to report that we continue to receive advices from our agents pointing out the urgency both in our interests and in those of the Turkish Government of making a start without further delay in rebuilding the premises. Should this delay continue, it will be necessary to make special arrangements for the accommodation of our office staff during the whole summer, and this will greatly increase our claim on the Turkish Government. That claim, as got out by our agents in consultation with His Majesty's consul-general, amounted to £T. 2,396, made up as follows:—

	£T.
Site, value of khan and offices, and other land expropriated	456
Cost of rebuilding	1,445
Losses of rent and claims for disturbance, &c.	495
Total	2,396

In our letter of the 10th March last, we requested that His Majesty's Ambassador in Constantinople might be desired to obtain from the Turkish Government at least such a sum by way of instalment as would suffice for the rebuilding of the premises. The work could then be pushed through at once. We understand that His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad is now in Constantinople, and is therefore available to supply any information which may be desired on this question. We should therefore be obliged if a telegram could be sent to His Majesty's Ambassador conveying the purport of this letter.

We have, &c.
LYNCH BROTHERS.

[21465] No. 78.

Note communicated by Tewfik Pasha, June 2, 1911.

LES navires de guerre britanniques continuent leur mouvement à Fao et remontent maintenant le Chat-el-Arab.

Ils y lèvent la carte, font des sondages, placent des bouées, fixent des phares et se livrent à des actes contraires au droit international. Tout dernièrement encore, le gun-boat "Odini" a avancé, dans le Chat-el-Arab, du côté de Bassora à 1 heure et demie de Fao à l'intérieur, y a levé la carte et laissé un signal portant les couleurs rouge et blanche; il s'est rendu à Zindjé.

Cette manière d'agir, qui ne fait que prendre journellement de l'extension, cause au Gouvernement Impérial bien des inquiétudes.

Il est à espérer que le Gouvernement anglais voudra bien donner les instructions nécessaires pour faire cesser ces mouvements des navires de guerre britanniques.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres, le 2 juin, 1911.

[20894] No. 79.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office, June 3, 1911.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he has received a letter from the Admiralty forwarding copy of a letter, dated the 11th ultimo, addressed to that department by the Commander-in-chief, East Indies, making certain suggestions respecting buoys and lights in the Shat-el-Arab, which, it is stated, has also been communicated to the India Office.

I am to state that Sir Edward Grey would be glad to receive in due course an expression of the views of the Earl of Crewe on the proposals put forward by Rear-Admiral Slade.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[20894] No. 80.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, June 3, 1911.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th ultimo relative to buoys and lights in the Shatt-el-Arab.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive in due course an expression of the views of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the suggestions put forward by the Commander-in-chief, East Indies, in the letter copy of which was enclosed in your communication.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[21676] No. 81.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 52. Commercial.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, June 5, 1911.*

BUOYS in the Persian Gulf.

Referring to my despatch No. 133, Commercial, of the 29th ultimo, His Majesty's consul at Bussorah reports that ground exists for fearing that the Ottoman authorities are contemplating the removal from the bar of the British buoys.

[22096] No. 82.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 7.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Earl of Crewe, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India dated the 18th May, 1911, relative to the situation on the trucial coast of the Persian Gulf.

India Office, June 6, 1911.

Enclosure 1 in No. 82.

Commander-in-chief, East Indies, to Government of India.

"*Highflyer*," *Sirik, April 26, 1911.*

BE pleased to lay before his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council the following remarks on the general situation on the trucial coast of the Persian Gulf:—

2. Reports from the ships and boats stationed on that coast show that everything is quiet there, and as far as can be seen the Dubai incident has not had the effect of inflaming the Arab against the European, as stated in some of the Indian newspapers. It is quite true that the Sheikh of Dubai is still trying to prevent any Europeans from settling in his town, and in this he is probably encouraged by the owners of the pearl dhows, who fear investigation into their method of dealing with the divers, most of whom are said to be slaves. It is, however, more bluff than anything else, and if the

[21966] No. 81*.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 6.)

Sir, *India Office, June 3, 1911.*

IN continuation of the letter of this Office dated the 12th ultimo, as to arrangements for the conservancy of the Shatt-el-Arab, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to address you regarding the further correspondence marginally quoted* that is now before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

In so far as concerns the wording of the Treaty of Erzeroum (1848), the Earl of Crewe recognises that it might be taken to imply the right of Turkey to control the Shatt-el-Arab from bank to bank, subject only to free liberty being accorded to Persia to navigate it.

This view might find support in the suggestions of the mediating commissioners in 1850, regarding the boundary in the neighbourhood of Mohammerah. In this connection I am to solicit reference to the correspondence ending with this Office letter of the 20th August, 1910, and to say that the Earl of Crewe does not altogether share the opinion of his predecessor on the question therein discussed. That the Turks are in possession of the commissioners' map, which would appear to assign to them the whole of the river, is undoubtedly inconvenient, as is also the circumstance that the two Powers pressed the Porte in 1850 to accept the commissioners' line. But the Porte declined to do so, and in his Lordship's opinion the situation thus created must be held to be governed by the communication made to them in 1869, when the representatives of the Powers handed in a map on which no line at all was drawn. This identic map seems to have been the basis of all subsequent discussions; and Lord Crewe sees no reason for going behind it, or for permitting the Turks to go behind it, to an earlier map, which their own ill-judged action had caused to be superseded. It might further be pointed out to the Turkish Government, if necessary, that by their rejection of the line proposed in 1850 they have allowed a situation to grow for sixty years in which mid-channel has, without challenge, been accepted by local usage as the boundary, and that this is consequently the *status quo* on the observance of which His Majesty's Government must insist.

As regards the approaches to the Shatt-el-Arab, as distinct from the channel, there may be presumed to be no question but that Turkish and Persian rights are regulated by general considerations of international law, instead of exceptional treaty stipulations. Subject, therefore, to any observations of Secretary Sir E. Grey, Lord Crewe does not consider that, as between Turkey and Persia, the case presents any special difficulty.

As regards, however, the privileged position of Great Britain the ground is not so secure. British enterprise has in the past done all, or most, of what has been effected to secure the navigability of the Shatt-el-Arab, but the upkeep of buoys and charts and the provision of lights might have been carried out with greater thoroughness (with the result that the present situation might have possibly been avoided), and it seems certain that, whatever services Great Britain might render in future, they would not be held from any legal standpoint to substantiate a claim upon her part to control the waterway between two independent countries. Lord Crewe would therefore suggest that, while Great Britain may reasonably insist on equitable treatment in view of her past services and the magnitude of her shipping interests, she should admit the legal rights of Turkey and Persia and act as suggested in the telegram of the Government of India dated the 16th instant, namely, induce Persia if possible (1) to object to Turkey's claim to assume the whole control of the river, and (2) to accept Great Britain as her delegate in the matter. The possession of equal influence with Turkey would presumably be sufficient to obtain acceptable arrangements in the Shatt-el-Arab, since otherwise its navigation might be made impossible, and if no international commission were set up the situation would not be so likely to arise in which another European Power might claim to intervene.

As regards the important question raised by the naval commander-in-chief's report as to the superiority of Bussorah as compared with Koweit as the terminus of the Bagdad Railway, Lord Crewe feels some doubt whether the report should in itself be regarded as of a decisive character. Though he speaks with some diffidence on the

* Admiralty to India Office, May 17, 1911; Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Government of India, Telegraphic, April 25, 1911; Government of India to Viscount Morley, Telegraphic, May 16, 1911.

point, he imagines that there must remain at least an element of uncertainty as to the stability of conditions at the bar, and it is more than likely that in course of time the navigability of the river will be detrimentally affected, if not destroyed, by works of irrigation. The matter appears to call for further careful consideration between the departments concerned.

Copy of this letter is being communicated to the Admiralty and the Board of Trade.

I am, &c
R. RITCHIE.

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question were taken in hand seriously I feel sure that a settlement could be arrived at without more bloodshed.

3. I would suggest that the best way of bringing this about would be to proceed with the erection of the wireless telegraphy station, the site for which was selected by Captain A. T. Hunt in conjunction with the sheikh. The latter definitely agreed to allow the telegraph to be installed as part of the terms of the ultimatum which was accepted by him on the 29th December, 1910. If he is not made to abide by these terms, he may give considerable trouble in the future, when it may become necessary in the interests of the whole trucial coast to force the various sheikhs to accept a certain measure of British control for their own protection against foreign Powers.

I think the difficulty of dealing with them has been exaggerated, and is not so great as would appear at first sight. Although looming large on paper, these sheikhs are in reality very small men. They have not any cohesion, and each town acts almost entirely in what it considers to be its own interests, quite independently of anything that the others may think.

4. The question which is likely to arise in a very short time is that of the pearl fisheries. Great Britain has policed and maintained order on these banks for nearly a century, but as long as we have not a definite status *vis-à-vis* the Arab tribes who use them, which is recognised by foreign Powers, we cannot enforce our control over any vessels on the banks who may fly the colours of France, Germany, or other European countries. Firms in both France and Germany are reported to be considering whether they shall fit out pearling expeditions for the Persian Gulf, using dredges and all sorts of modern appliances, which, if carried out, would probably mean the speedy working out of the banks.

5. The Arab tribes who fish the banks are almost entirely dependent on the result of the season's work for their livelihood, as agriculture or other pursuits are not possible for them. Even if the banks be not worked out, the competition introduced will seriously threaten the welfare of the divers.

6. Of the tribes who regularly fish on the banks Great Britain nominally controls the greater number. Others, such as those on the Katar Peninsula, have not made treaties with us, but they probably would do so with some little persuasion. Others, again, as at Al Katif, are under Turkish control; and lastly, there is Koweit, the position of the sheikh of which is doubtful, to say the least of it, at the present moment.

7. As I have already pointed out, cohesion does not exist amongst the tribes, and they cannot and will not act together. It therefore follows that, unless we are prepared to see them subjected to a competition which can but have one ending, the ruination of the Arab owner, and to see the prestige of Great Britain, as the Power that has for nearly a century looked after the interests of all the tribes in the Gulf, pricked like a bubble the moment that we find ourselves face to face with another European Power, we must take action beforehand and make such a position for ourselves, not only *de facto*, but *de jure*, that we can impose the conditions under which pearl fishing shall be carried out by everybody who may wish to use the banks.

8. In the first place it seems to be necessary to proclaim to the world at large our protectorate over the trucial coast, by issuing an order in council as is being done with respect to Bahrein. The order will have to be drawn on a very elastic basis, and the resident in the Persian Gulf will have to be given very large discretionary powers at first with regard to the administration. Some sort of control over the administration of the chiefs will have to be introduced, and it is for this reason that I have urged the establishment of the wireless telegraphy station at Debai as a commencement.

9. The greatest difficulty with which we shall be faced will be that of the status of the pearl divers, and in this matter we must show ourselves to be patient and somewhat more tolerant than usual. It would appear that only two alternatives face us; one is to introduce administrative action on the trucial coast slowly and carefully so as to bring the tribes more effectively under British guidance; and the other is to leave them alone and let their only property be exploited by none too scrupulous foreign firms, who would not care for the traditional owners of the pearl banks as long as they could make as much as possible out of them, and for Great Britain to lose every vestige of prestige that she may possess.

10. In the second place, we should enter into treaty relations with the Katar chiefs, and induce them to act with us in this matter, and to depute us to represent their interests on the banks, agreeing to abide by our regulations. If they would accept a full protectorate treaty, so much the better. Similar action should be taken with regard to Koweit in so far as deputing us to act for the sheikh is concerned. As

regards Bahrein, I have considered that place as definitely under British protection in a way that cannot be disputed.

11. We should then issue and enforce regulations on the banks very similar to those which are already customary amongst the Arabs, but they should be published so that all should know of them. In particular, the use of any dredge or other mechanical appliance for obtaining the oysters should be prohibited. The natural history of the oyster beds should also be investigated scientifically, as has been done in Ceylon, and the extent and position of all the pearl-bearing beds in the Gulf definitely ascertained. In this way it is possible that gradual improvements may be introduced into the fisheries, and the yield of the banks increased.

12. An opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown, dated the 11th February, 1905, and transmitted to the Government of India on the 31st March, 1905, upon the question of the pearl fisheries clearly points to the necessity of organising them in such a way as to make Great Britain's prescriptive rights effective. If we do not do so, and let the matter stand over until what appears to be a more convenient season, the opportunity will go by for ever, and action will be left too late to save British position and prestige. It is for this reason that I venture to urge the Government not to let the time pass before taking the initial step with regard to Debai until all memory of the results of opposing Great Britain has passed away.

Endorsed by Marine Department.

(Secret.)
Copy of the foregoing forwarded to—

The Foreign Department.
The Chief of the General Staff.

Simla, May 12, 1911.

Enclosure 2 in No. 82.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Bushire, April* 30, 1911.

AT the conclusion of my letter of the 8th January, on the subject of the Debai incident, I stated that I should shortly be visiting the trucial coast again in connection with the Abu Musa case, and would then have an opportunity of gauging the effect of recent events on the public mind. I have since carried out the visit and now beg to lay the following before the Government of India.

2. On the coast generally I found conditions perfectly normal, and the untoward incident at Debai appears to have had no harmful reaction on the rulers or the inhabitants of the other principalities. The sheikhs themselves were as usual principally concerned with their own individual interests and wants, and if they did take the trouble to make any enquiries from me regarding Debai affairs it was with an air of deference and detachment. They would ask, for instance: "Did Government intend to appoint a British officer for the coast? When was the telegraph station to be installed?" and so on.

3. At Debai itself, outwardly and commercially, the position appeared to be quite normal. When I landed the usual friendly or curious crowd was collected on the beach, and the life of the port seemed to be pursuing the even tenor of its way; one heavily laden steamer had just discharged cargo and left, another was discharging during my sojourn, and the British India Steam Navigation Company's agent at Lingah informed me a day or two later of the fact that the company's steamers were at present taking more cargo to Debai than usual. The community of petty Persian traders who, subsequent to the visit of the admiral and myself, had temporarily betaken themselves to Lingah and Bunder Abbas—after sending a mendacious round-robin to various vernacular papers—had all returned and were again plying their accustomed callings. The British Indians, too, seemed to have quite forgotten the events of two months ago, and were solely concerned with the settlement of their petty commercial claims. The only concrete vestige of the recent outbreak lay in the fact that the relations of the late Sheikh of Debai, Makhtoom-bin-Hashar, who had always been a thorn in the side of the present ruler, and who had openly attributed the trouble with His Majesty's ship to the ineptitude of Sheikh Butti's rule, and averred that it could never have

happened under the régime of their deceased kinsman, still remained in camp at an oasis 7 or 8 miles inland. They were, however, expected to return after my visit, and I have no doubt have done so ere this. Meanwhile, their presence can well be spared.

So much for the general situation at Debai.

4. *The Attitude of the Chief himself.*—The main difficulty throughout has been the unreliable personality and self-satisfied incompetence of Sheikh Butti-bin-Sohail. I do not think that in the abstract he has any wish to be otherwise than on cordial terms with Government and their representative, but provided always that he be left alone to enjoy what revenue falls in his way and be not asked to take any tiresome measures to prevent his subjects conducting themselves in any truculent way they please. If he is asked to take any action at all inconvenient to himself or to assert his authority as ruler in any particular manner, he has always failed to do so except under the strongest pressure. As an indication of his natural attitude of mind I may quote the following recent instance:—

As the Government of India are aware, it was the inauguration of the oppressive Persian tariff of 1903 in the Persian ports which made it possible for Debai to supplant Lingah as a distributing centre of merchandise for the Arab coast. This was facilitated by the intelligent policy of the late ruler, Sheikh Makhtoom, who made Debai a free port as far as customs duty was concerned, and contented himself with the levy of a warehouse or wharfage fee on each package landed. During the last few years the imports have continued to increase, and the primitive accommodation provided has gradually become quite inadequate—specially covered accommodation—and this has been a frequent source of complaint from British traders at Debai. During the past winter, which has been an abnormally wet and stormy one, a great deal of damage has thus accrued to perishable cargo lying on the wharf, and to mitigate this the drainage of the floor and the provision of more roofing has become an urgent necessity. On my recent visit I was asked to exert influence with the sheikh to induce him to meet the merchants' wishes in this respect and was assured by the traders that all they wanted could be done for 300 or 400 rupees, but that the sheikh could not be got to go to the expense. When I pressed the matter upon the sheikh his first rejoinder was to the following effect:—

"The roofed accommodation which I have provided is quite sufficient for the Debai cargo. It is true that I take warehouse fees on all packages, but I see no reason why I should spend money on the preservation of cargo which is intended for distribution to other ports. I do not want such cargo here, and if traders choose to bring it that is their lookout."

After a good deal of discussion he ultimately promised me to comply with the representations of the traders in such a way as to remove their grounds of complaint, but it remains to be seen whether he will carry out his promise without further pressure.

I must apologise for this diversion, but it supplies a useful illustration of the type of character with which one is dealing.

5. *The Appointment of a British Agent.*—The only apparent and specific outcome of the recent events is that the sheikh has been astute enough to make use of the "Hyacinth" incident as a pretext for a professed inability to answer for the safety of a European at Debai, and thus indirectly to suggest to us that the appointment of any British official, whether for political or telegraph work, is not feasible for the present. Thus when just before my visit the British India Company, in the ordinary course of routine, sent a Eurasian employé to relieve the Persian who was acting as their agent at Debai, the sheikh, who had received early information of his coming from the Persian whom he was intended to replace, had him met on board with a civil letter to the effect that, owing to the resentment still felt by the inhabitants who had lost relations in the recent fight, he was unable for the present to ensure the safety of any European, and therefore could not allow him to land. It is, of course, conceivable that the sheikh's statement might have some foundation, but judging from what I saw and heard myself a few days later, I cannot help thinking that his professed apprehensions were not altogether *bonâ fide*, and that he is simply making use of the incident of the 24th December in order to bring about a postponement of the appointment of the European whom he thought Government might contemplate sending, either to take charge of the existing agency or to manage the telegraph station.

6. Recent happenings have at all events placed beyond doubt what I always, to some extent, apprehended, namely, that the Sheikh of Debai does not welcome the idea

of closer British supervision over the trucial coast, and that this sentiment is probably shared by the other sheikhs. It is naturally a difficult one for the latter to express frankly to the representative of Government, especially having regard to the considerations on which it is based, but the Sheikh of Debai, seeing that the "Hyacinth" incident has provided him with a useful indirect peg on which to air the sentiment, is making the most of the opening afforded him. The grounds underlying it were adumbrated in my telegram dated the 3rd March, 1909, and are not far to seek. They are undoubtedly based on the fear that whereas at present we are represented by an Arab native agent, who, by long residence on their coast, and intermarriage with the daughters of the community, has become more or less a member of it; on the other hand, if a British officer were appointed with a more pretentious house and flagstaff, the institution would become an ever-present reminder to the negro diving fraternity that in the case of real oppression they had a ready refuge at hand, with the result that generally speaking the treatment, by the Arab element, of this oppressed class would have to undergo amelioration.

7. Ten years ago our position on the trucial coast was specifically taken into review by the Government of India, and, in the course of the correspondence which then ensued, my predecessor wrote on the 12th December, 1902 :—

"For all practical and necessary purposes the trucial chiefs may be considered to be under our protection, and there is no necessity to make this protectorate more formal unless and until future developments in the Gulf make it advisable."

In the decade which has since passed there have undoubtedly been a good many developments, and, while all around them the maritime communities have made some measure of progress in the direction of civilisation, the trucial chiefs have practically stood still. There has been no want of effort on the part of the representative of Government to cultivate and keep in touch with these sheikhs, and I personally have been afforded much better opportunities than my predecessors for doing so. For whereas formerly the personal association of the resident with them was as a rule limited to one formal visit during the year, my own visits have been very much more frequent. I have made two extensive land journeys at different times through their hinterland and have had to visit the coast frequently in connection with the collection of material for the Gulf "Gazetteer." I know them all well individually, and in questions of succession and internal politics *inter se* they seem to be no less ready than of old to look to the resident for arbitration in their disputes and difficulties and to accept his decisions. But so far as their external relations are concerned and the display of any inclination on their part to move with the times, I regret that I can see no change at all. They remain in the same condition of bigoted ignorance as they did ten years ago and show not the least inclination to emerge from it.

8. To revert for a few moments to past events. The Government of India are aware that Mr. New was appointed vice-consul at Lingah with the idea that we should be able to use him also for occasional sojourns at Debai, and thus make a beginning for a better order of things. Although I was not entirely free from misgiving, I was hopeful when I addressed Government in November that if I took Mr. New down to Debai in the "Lawrence" and stayed there a few days until he had had time to get on terms with the sheikh, I should be able to induce the latter to make him welcome there for a period and that this would prepare the way for regular periodical sojourn.

When the attack on the landing party of His Majesty's ship "Hyacinth" was reported, all my hopes in this direction were upset, and it seemed to me either that the idea of bringing about better representation on the coast must be banished altogether for a long time to come or else that the British officer must be installed as an item of the measures taken by us in connection with the attack on our bluejackets. The Government of India considered the latter course out of the question, and meanwhile, as was inevitable in any case, the incident has since been made the subject of much organised misrepresentation and hostile comment in the Turkish and vernacular press, and we seem further removed than ever from the certainty of being able to instal a British representative by friendly means. Moreover, as far as Debai is concerned and its present sheikh, I fear that the same considerations will hold, so far as they apply in regard to the project for the installation of a wireless telegraph station.

9. In this connection I would observe that, even if it were not indispensable that

the clerk in charge of the wireless should be an Englishman, a station could hardly be inaugurated without a flag to cover it or a guard to protect it, and under existing conditions, sceptical as I am of the *bona fides* of the sheikh's apprehensions, I doubt whether it would be wise to attempt to carry the measure through without the discretion and wherewithal to use *force majeure* if necessary. But in any case I gather from his Excellency the commander-in-chief that, even if the wireless station for Debai receives early sanction, there will be no question of its erection before the beginning of next cold weather, so that we have several months before us in which to watch the situation.

10. In the meantime, I trust the Government of India will be pleased to take into their wise consideration the whole question of our relations with these chiefs and the policy which we can best adopt towards them henceforward. I venture to express the personal view that, although many inconveniences will doubtless be attendant upon a tightening of our present easy control over them, the march of events and the developments of the general political outlook in the Gulf region make it advisable, and in any case will ultimately oblige us to take definite action in that direction. Already foreign merchants, *e.g.*, Messrs. Wönckhaus, the German firm; Messrs. Rosenthal, the French pearl dealers; and our own subjects, Messrs. Gray, Paul, and Co., have either sent or desired to send European representatives to embark in the trade of the trucial coast; yet at present the Government of India, and the resident as their representative with the trucial sheikhs, possess inadequate constitutional and legal equipment for the exercise of functions which they may at any time be called upon to perform.

In this connection the enaction of a simple order in council would now seem called for.

11. But while, on the one hand, the disinclination of the trucial sheikhs to be subjected to any closer British supervision than that which they now enjoy, or suffer from, is largely based on ignorance and on considerations which will not stand the test of examination by the light of present day civilisation; and while, owing to the increasing intensity of that light, our credit as a civilised Government will ultimately oblige us to make our supervision more exacting; yet, on the other hand, we shall doubtless wish to put ourselves, as far as we can, in the shoes of the rulers of these benighted principalities and regard with what sympathy we may their fear of the search-light. At any rate we need to make the process of evolution as easy for them as we can and to let it operate in the way calculated to draw upon ourselves the minimum amount of resentment and unpopularity. As far as I can see at present, and having regard to the unreliability of the present sheikh, any proposal that might be made in the near future for the location of a British officer at Debai, even as a periodical sojourner, will probably be met with opposition, real or engineered, and I fear there will be no greater certainty of putting the measure through by purely amicable means than there was in December last, and that the installation of a telegraph station at Debai with European staff will be a little less delicate operation.

12. In these circumstances, it occurs to me that the little enclave of Zora, between Ajman and Hamriyeh, may be considered to offer us a convenient base and more simple means for the location of our telegraph station and the insertion of the wedge of more effective control.

The situation and history of the Zora tract will be found described in the Persian Gulf "Gazetteer." Its occupation has always been such an apple of discord among the sheikhs themselves that we have been obliged to prohibit such occupation. Its position is central, and it possesses a good Khor on the Ajman side for the use of native craft; while an anchorage could probably be found at some point off it, which would be no worse than those existing at other ports along that coast. On shore we should start with a spacious and unobstructed tract of ground, and it seems conceivable that if we were to make the place a free port for the import of merchandise for distribution we might gradually gather round us a community of peaceful Indian and Arab traders, and that the place under our ægis might thus become a convenient centre for the spread of influence and civilisation, by example and contact, rather than by any sterner measures.

The start would be made by the landing and installation of the staff and guard for the wireless station, with their gear and the necessary E. P. tents for their accommodation at the beginning of the cold weather. At the moment of their disembarkation the sheikhs of Ajman and Hamriyeh, in the first instance, and then the trucial sheikhs generally, would be notified personally that, in order that the telegraph system might interfere as little as possible with their sensibilities or the populations of their towns, we had decided

to locate it at Zôra, and required for it from all of them the respect and protection to which it was entitled under treaty. Once our telegraph station was installed the rest would gradually follow, automatically, and we should thus be rendered quite independent of the co-operation or opposition of the Sheikh of Debai and his community.

The Government of India may, perhaps, think the idea a visionary one, but it seems to me to possess convenient possibilities, and I submit it respectfully for consideration. It will, of course, be understood that, in the foregoing paragraph, I have merely indicated very roughly the line on which, I think, we might proceed, and it goes without saying that should the suggestion commend itself to Government these lines would need to be carefully plotted out.

With apologies for the length of this communication, of which I am sending a copy to his Excellency the naval commander-in-chief, in that it has a bearing on the wireless question.

[22277] No. 83.

Sir C. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 165. Secret.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, June 4, 1911.*

I ASKED the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon whether there was any progress to report in the matter of the Russo-German negotiations and whether I might inform you that he would not definitely conclude them without again consulting you.

M. Neratow replied that he had already submitted to you the only point of any real importance, namely, that with regard to the retention or abandonment of the term "Konieh-Bagdad Railway." He had had no further conversations with Count Pourtalès since he had last seen me, and it was his intention not to commit himself with regard to this particular point till the very last, and then to see whether it was possible to retain the word "Konieh" without causing a rupture of the negotiations. He thought that the negotiations would probably last for another two or three months.

On my pressing him to speak of the other articles of the draft agreement, M. Nératow told me that Count Pourtalès had proposed that, as the railway would reach Bagdad in five or six years' time, and as the branch line from Sadijeh to Khanikin would be completed in another two, Russia should engage to construct and finish the Khanikin-Tehran line in two years from the completion of the Sadijeh-Khanikin line, or in ten years from now. This, M. Nératow said, Russia could not undertake to do, as, in view of the mountainous country through which it would have to pass, it would be impossible to construct it in so short a period as two years. As regards the financing of the line, M. Nératow is apparently in favour of an international syndicate, and the text will probably be modified so as to recognise the right of Russia to invite the participation of foreign capital. His Excellency also seems anxious to keep Germany out of such a syndicate.

M. Nératow said that it would probably be necessary to tone down the text of the article dealing with railways running towards the Russian and Persian frontiers, so as not to offend the susceptibilities of the Porte. The wording of the article would be rendered somewhat vaguer, but, in order to prevent any possible misunderstanding, its real meaning might be explained by an exchange of secret notes.

I suggested that this same procedure might be followed with regard to the words "financial and economic sacrifices," so as to render it quite clear that they conferred on Russia the right to refuse her consent to the 4 per cent. customs increase. M. Nératow, however, declared that this was quite unnecessary, and that any mention of the 4 per cent. customs increase in connection with them would only restrict their scope.

In the course of our conversation M. Nératow informed me that some of the members of the Russian group interested in the trans-Persian Railway would shortly visit London, and enquired whether His Majesty's Government had attached any conditions as to the English financiers with whom they might negotiate. I replied

that, so far as I was aware, they were free to negotiate with whatever group of English financiers they pleased, but I presumed that the results of their negotiations would have eventually to be approved by His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[22208] No. 84.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 8.)

Sir, *India Office, June 7, 1911.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter from the political resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, with its enclosure,* regarding the desire of the Wahabi Amir of Nejd for closer relations with the British Government.

The objections to a policy of adventure in Central Arabia are not less strong than when the question was under consideration in 1904 (see correspondence ending with Sir A. Godley's letter of the 29th April, 1904, to your address). But in view of the intractable attitude of the Turkish Government in the Persian Gulf, it is important that His Majesty's Government should leave none of the weapons at their disposal unexamined, though the question of employing one or more of them at any particular time must require separate consideration, and it is evident that one of the most powerful of these is such a response to the overtures now made by Abdul Aziz-bin-Saud as would render the position of the Turks on the Arabian coast of the Gulf untenable.

Captain Shakespear's letter seems worth consideration from this point of view, but the negative attitude which, as described in paragraphs 4 and 16, he adopted towards the proposal was strictly in accordance with the orders of His Majesty's Government, and if the Government of India wish to recommend a departure from it they will no doubt submit their recommendations in due course.

I am, &c.
H. RITCHIE.

[22359] No. 85.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Earl of Crewe, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India dated the 18th May, 1911, relative to the treasures of the shrines of Nejef and Kerbela.

India Office, June 8, 1911.

Enclosure 1 in No. 85.

Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April 14, 1911.*

PLEASE refer to your secret telegram of the 13th instant to the address of the Chief Secretary to the United Provinces Government. Confidential enquiries are being made by this Government, but to date it has not received any representations on the subject of the anticipated despoliation of the shiah shrine by the Turkish Government. If rumour is correct and it becomes widely known it must cause great dissatisfaction. His honour the lieutenant-governor is therefore of opinion that strong objection should be made against the sale of these treasures.

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* See No. 76.

Enclosure 2 in No. 85.

Government of the Punjab to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April* 15, 1911.

PLEASE refer to your telegram of the 13th April.

It is presumed that proposal of Turkish Government does not directly affect shrine funds administered by resident in Turkish Arabia; but even so, the appropriation of other gifts to the shrines might easily be followed by claims for surrender of this endowment, which on every ground would be most undesirable, besides undermining the influence of resident. Present proposal of a Sunni Government to appropriate shiahs' offerings, even if Turks loyally carried out announced intentions, would probably excite shiahs' feeling, and alienate it from Turks and their friends.

There would be certain advantages in this, but lieutenant-governor, on the whole, considers that we should protest against any appropriation of gifts of Indian Mahommedans unless we are given a full opportunity to consult Indian donors as to their wishes. Our position will be strong, if Turks still persist.

Enclosure 3 in No. 85.

The Secretary, All-India Shiah Conference, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Lucknow, April* 17, 1911.

AN annual meeting of the Central Standing Committee of the All-India Shiah Conference was held on Saturday, the 15th instant, in the Conference Office, Lucknow. Moulana Soyyid Aga Husan Sahib, Mujteked, was in the chair. The following resolutions were passed unanimously:—

Proposed by Moulana Soyyid Najmul Hassan Sahib, Mujteked, seconded by Nawab Murtaza Hosain Khan, Oudh ex-Royal Family.

1. That this committee puts on record its keen sense of indignation and alarm at the recent "patwa" reported to have been issued by the Sheikh-ul-Islam of Constantinople disposing of the treasures of the shiah shrines at Kerbela and Nejef for the purpose of building schools and hospitals, and vehemently protests against this mischievous and ill-guided innovation which has the effect of not only provoking a ferment in the shiah world and seriously offending the religious susceptibilities of that community, but also of shaking the friendly relations between the two great sects of Islam, and begetting serious political complications between the two great Mahommedan Powers of Turkey and Persia.

2. That this committee looks with feelings of consolation and grateful admiration upon the just and sympathetic attitude of Great Britain in protesting with the Porte against this mischievous innovation and strongly hopes that the influence of Great Britain will dissuade the Porte from giving effect to it.

3. That copies of these resolutions may be submitted to the Government of India and the local government, and that they may be also published in all the leading newspapers of India.

Enclosure 4 in No. 85.

Resident at Hyderabad to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April* 28, 1911.

YOUR telegram dated the 14th instant.

The Shiah conference in Northern India has apparently already protested against Turkish Government's action. I have, however, consulted Seyyid Hussein Bilgrami, a leading shiah, and he considers the Turkish Government are quite right, especially as accumulation of abomination has arisen around shrine. In Seyyid Bilgrami's opinion the shiah ulema will hesitate to condemn move, and in that case all will be well. There is not any special excitement on the subject in this part of India as far as I can ascertain.

Enclosure 5 in No. 85.

Anjuman Tahzibul Ekhlak to Government of India.

Respected Sir, *Benares, April* 25, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to state that I am directed by the Anjuman Tahzibul-Ekhlak, Shiah of Benares, to submit to you the annexed resolution passed by the Anjuman on the 23rd instant, and to request you to kindly bring this important matter to the notice of the Government.

I have, &c.

MOHAMMAD AKIL, *Secretary.*

Resolution.—Anjuman Tahzibul-Ekhlak, Shiah of Benares, on the 23rd April, 1911, expressed its discontent and regretted on the order or opinion of the Sheikh-ul-Islam of the Turkish Government to use the treasures of Kerbela and Nejef for the establishment of colleges and hospitals, and, as a rayiyat of the British Government, it humbly requests its benign Government to kindly take the matter into its kind consideration and to take necessary steps therein.

Enclosure 6 in No. 85.

Moulvi Seyyid Nasir Hosein Mujtehed to Private Secretary to Viceroy.

(Telegraphic.) *Lucknow, May* 1, 1911.

AS president of the meeting of the shiah community held yesterday morning, I am desired to transmit to you the two following resolutions adopted by the said meeting, the first for being laid before His Excellency the Viceroy, and second with a view of transmission to the Porte through His Excellency:—

Resolution No. 1.—"This meeting, in which are assembled together the shiah mujteheds, ulemas, princes, members of the legal profession, merchants, and representatives of all classes and grades of the Shiah community, most respectfully invites the attention of the British Government to the far-reaching consequences that are bound to flow from fatwa recently issued by Sheikh-ul-Islam, of Constantinople, sanctioning the appropriation of the treasures of Nejef and Kerbela for the purposes of establishing schools and hospitals, which will affect the shiah community all over the world in general and the shiah subjects of the British Empire in particular. This meeting may be permitted to point out that said treasures are the result of the accummulation for centuries of the offerings made from time to time exclusively by shiah kings, princes, merchants, &c.; that not less than 10 per cent. of which consists of those made by the shiahs of India; that no fraction of the said treasures was ever contributed by a non-shiah subject of the Turkey Emperor. They are essentially in the nature of a trust to appropriate which the Turkish Government can have no legal pretension, and that their inviolability is secured by a treaty entered into between the two Powers, Persia and Turkey. It is to be noted that the fatwa relates only to shiah shrines and does not affect other Islamic shrines within the Turkish dominions. Proposed by Nawab Jafir Ali Khan, Talukdar Sheshmahal Wazir dynasty; seconded by Prince Surriakadder, nephew of ex-King Oudh, supported by Seyyid Ali Muhammad, late C. S. and barrister; unanimously passed."

Resolution No. 2.—"This meeting in which mujteheds, ulemas, princes, members of the legal profession, merchants, and representatives of all classes and grades of the shiah community are assembled together, most humbly and respectfully begs to express to the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Turkey, through his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General, that the fatwa recently issued by the Sheikh-ul-Islam, sanctioning the appropriation of the Nejef and Kerbela treasures for the purposes of establishing schools and hospitals, has spread gloom and sorrow over the entire shiah world, and considering the adverse effect that will follow from the said fatwa being put into operation upon the friendly relations of the two great communities, trusts that the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan of Turkey will not give effect to the

said fatwa. Proposed by Mr. Hamid Ali Khan, barrister; seconded by Seyyid Wazir Hasan, B.A., Vakil High Court; supported by Nawab Seyyid Shahan Shah Hosain, B.A., Vakil High Court; unanimously passed."

Enclosure 7 in No. 85.

Nawab Badshah Nawab Razvi to Private Secretary to Viceroy.

(Telegraphic.) *Patna, May 5, 1911.*

PLEASE submit to his Excellency the resolution of the shiah community of Patna, assembled in a meeting held on Thursday, the 4th instant, at the premises of Madrasa Sohmania, under the presidency of Nawab Seyyid Badshah Nawab Razvi, that they have read with alarm and deep concern the fatwa of the Sheikh-ul-Islam at Constantinople, relating to the disposal of the sacred treasures at the shrines of Nejef, Assraf, and Kerbela, to which they offer emphatic protest as an evolution (?ebullition) of their religious feelings and the sanctity of their shrines, and that they rely on their benign Government for help in this matter.

[21676] No. 86.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 214.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, June 9, 1911.*

BUOYS in Persian Gulf.

Please refer to your telegram No. 52, Commercial, of the 5th June.

You should warn Porte that a war-ship will be sent to the spot under orders to prevent any actual interference or tampering with British buoys.

[21676] No. 87.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 9, 1911.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 29th ultimo, relative to the question of the buoyage and lighting of the Shatt-el-Arab, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he has received a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople from which it appears that there is a danger that the Turkish local authorities at Bussorah may attempt to remove the British buoys which have been placed at the bar of that river.

I am accordingly to request that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty may be moved to send immediate instructions for the dispatch to the spot of one of His Majesty's ships with orders to prevent, if necessary, any tampering or actual interference with British buoys.

I am to add that Sir E. Grey has addressed a telegram to Sir G. Lowther to warn the Sublime Porte that these instructions will be given.

It will only be necessary for the ship to visit the spot and ascertain that the buoys have not been interfered with. Sir E. Grey recognises the inconvenience of keeping a ship at the place, but he thinks the fact of a ship having been sent, even if it does not remain for more than a day or two, will, combined with the warning given by Sir G. Lowther, probably deter the Turks from interfering with the buoys.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[22630] No. 88.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 383.)
Sir, *Constantinople, June 2, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 344 of the 17th ultimo, I have the honour to report that a motion was introduced yesterday in the Chamber, bearing seventy signatures, for the immediate discussion of the Chester Railway scheme. Strong opposition was at once manifested in the House to this proposal, which was defended by Zohrab Effendi, who pointed out that the scheme was no new one, but a very old one, which the Senate as well as the Chamber had had ample time to study; that the Chester group were so disheartened at the difficulties and delays they were encountering that a further postponement of discussion might lead to their abandoning the project altogether, and that such postponement would merely do the country harm.

The Grand Vizier intervened at this point to say that he had personally had this scheme barely six months under consideration. He had approached the American Ambassador, when the scheme was first brought before him, with a view to arriving at some agreement on the unsettled question as to whether American citizens committing crimes or offences in Turkey are amenable to American or Turkish courts. The negotiations were proceeding satisfactorily on this point, and the Grand Vizier announced that the Imperial Iradé for the Chester concession should, by agreement with the American Government, only be issued when the diplomatic question had been settled. It would, however, his Excellency added, be very useful and profitable if the Chamber found that they could in the meanwhile terminate the debate on the scheme.

The Chamber were not of this opinion, and, by a vote of 76 against 64, rejected the immediate discussion of the scheme, and shelved it until next year. If the object of the Government was, as suggested in my despatch No. 316 of the 10th May, to wear out the Chester group and cause them to withdraw their proposals, they would seem by this vote to have succeeded; and I am informed that Mr. Chester is leaving Constantinople in disgust at this decision.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[22632] No. 89.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 385.)
Sir, *Constantinople, June 3, 1911.*

RIFAAT PASHA asked me on the 1st instant whether I had received any instructions as to the reply to be given to the Turkish Government regarding the Bagdad proposals, as he had understood from Tewfik Pasha that their dispatch was imminent.

I replied in the negative, and added that it would much facilitate the discussion of the matter if he could send me a satisfactory reply to my note regarding the arrest of the natives of Bahrein, which His Majesty's Government was still expecting. His Excellency said that he trusted that His Majesty's Government would not press for a reply, as this really formed part of the general question of our position in the Persian Gulf, on which his Excellency hoped we were about to open conversations.

I repeated that the breach of the *status quo* had been committed by Turkish authorities, and it was essential that the matter should be put right at once. His Excellency said he had communicated to the Ministry of the Interior the copy of the note written by the Vali of Bussorah to His Majesty's consul in that town, the text of which I quoted in my despatch No. 365 of the 24th May to you, and his Excellency said he could inform me privately that the Minister of the Interior had immediately sent instructions to the vali to be careful not to raise any questions which constituted a disturbance of the *status quo*, and I could rest assured that nothing of the kind would occur again. I replied that, this being so, I could not see what objections he could have to putting this on paper, together with the assurance I had asked for that in future Bahrein passports would be recognised by the Turkish authorities. But I was quite unable to obtain anything further from his Excellency.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[22633] No. 90.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 386.)

Constantinople, June 4, 1911.

Sir,

IN reply to your despatch No. 144 of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to report that on receipt of the instructions contained in your despatch No. 284 of the 20th September last I spoke to the French Ambassador with regard to the situation in Samos, and suggested that it might be advisable to send either a deputation of consuls to enquire into the state of affairs there, or for one of the interested Powers to delegate a consular officer, say from Smyrna, to proceed there to conduct an enquiry. M. Bompard was, however, evidently opposed to this idea, as he thought it might only tend to increase the dissatisfaction felt in some quarters against the Governor.

The Russian chargé d'affaires had no special views on the subject, but said he had reported on the matter to his Government. But from neither of my colleagues have I since heard anything.

Although the Turkish Government maintain in the island more troops than they are strictly entitled to maintain, their argument is that it is only by this measure that peace can be secured.

Since the date of Mr. Marling's despatch No. 10 of the 3rd January I have received no complaints from the island.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[22634] No. 91.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 387.)

Pera, June 6, 1911.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 353 of the 22nd ultimo relative to the recent incident at the Mosque of Omar, I have the honour to report that, in the course of the final sitting of the Chamber on the 3rd instant, the Minister of the Interior made a statement on this subject.

Halil Bey stated that the commission had finished their enquiry and submitted their report, which showed that the authorities had been guilty of negligence, in consequence of which the Governor of Jerusalem had been recalled, and the commandant of gendarmerie handed over to the military council, while the actual criminals had been sent for trial to Beirout.

No definite statement of any theft from the mosque was made by the Minister, and it may be that in fact nothing was taken away, for the Governor of Jerusalem, whose version, as given to the Ministry of the Interior, is said to agree with the report of the commission, affirms that no theft occurred.

In any case, the Minister's explanation was accepted as sufficient by the Chamber, and the incident may be officially considered as closed, but its local effects will, as Mr. Satow shows in the enclosed despatch, take a considerable time to disappear, and it is most unlikely that Captain Parker will be allowed to resume his excavations in August next.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 91.

Consul Satow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 36.)

Jerusalem, May 26, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that on the afternoon of the 24th instant printed copies of a telegram received by a certain Moussa Shefik el-Khaldi from the three Jerusalem deputies were circulated in this city. This telegram simply stated that the governor and the former commandant of the gendarmerie had been dismissed.

Moussa Shefik belongs to the el-Khaldi family, which is one of the leading Moslem families in Jerusalem. At the time of the mosque incident he and some others formed a kind of informal committee, and put themselves into communication with the

authorities at Constantinople. The Mufti, who represents the other leading family, that of el-Huseini, contented himself with telegraphing to all the vilayets in the Empire.

The interest and resentment aroused by the incident do not yet appear to have died down. Even among the more educated Moslems the idea seems to prevail that something of value has been removed, and, this being so, it is not surprising that among the peasantry the wildest statements should be current.

There appears to be among the latter a certain amount of ill-feeling against English people in general. Two incidents have recently occurred which confirm this belief. In the first case an English tourist, who had gone to visit some caves situated in the hills at some distance to the west of Bethlehem, after meeting with some incivility from the peasants whom he encountered on the way, was, on his arrival at his destination, prevented from visiting the caves by armed fellaheen, who stationed themselves at the mouths of the caves. No force was, however, used. The second incident occurred to a French traveller, who kindly mentioned it to me. He, too, was off the beaten track, some 10 miles east of Bethlehem towards the Dead Sea, when he met with peasants who were most anxious to know whether he was English or French. They were satisfied with the declaration of his dragoman that he was French. He understood, however, that had he been English things would have been made unpleasant for him. Under the circumstances, I have thought it advisable to send a circular to British tourist agents and hotel-keepers, warning them that reasonable precautions should be taken in the case of persons who wish to visit places off the beaten track.

The same feeling was also apparent at the mosque, where two English ladies were sketching by permission of the acting governor and under the protection of a gendarme and a consular cavass. The fact being reported to the acting head of the Evkaf Department, he at once sent orders to have them stopped. This was done politely, but the incident was, nevertheless, a vexatious one, as a week previously a German had been allowed to sketch without any objections being raised.

I have seen a statement made by Captain Parker to the "Times," according to which he intends to resume excavations on the 1st August. I venture to submit that, under present circumstances, this would be an injudicious proceeding, unless the Ottoman authorities are prepared to guarantee that it would be attended with no unpleasant consequences either for Captain Parker or for British subjects in general.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[22643] No. 92.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 396.)

Constantinople, June 7, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the acting British vice-consul at Bitlis telegraphed on the 4th instant to the effect that during the last five days a state of absolute anarchy and rebellion had been prevailing at Khuyt. Besides two murders reported by him on the 1st instant, eleven Armenians, including women and children, had been killed by the Moslem community there, and he thought there might be some murders committed by the rebel chiefs.

Moreover, the Kurds had closed the roads at Mush and Bitlis, so as to stop the free passage of the Armenians on their way to protest to the local authorities.

Mr. Safrastian added that there was a danger of the extermination of the Armenian population in the district and of the disorder spreading over the neighbourhood if the local Government continued to maintain their attitude of "criminal indifference."

However, on the 5th instant, Mr. Safrastian telegraphed that three battalions of infantry had been ordered to Khuyt, and that mountain artillery had been ordered there from Mush. It would therefore appear that the Turkish Government intend to act resolutely, in accordance with the intentions ascribed to them in the enclosed article in the "Jeune Turc."*

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

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* Not printed.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[22652] No. 93.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 145. Commercial.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 7, 1911.*

AMONG the many questions discussed during the final session of Parliament on the 3rd instant was that of the construction and prolongation of a railway from Ada-Bazar (where the short branch line from Sabanja, on the Anatolian Railway, at present ends) to Bolu and onwards towards the Black Sea, a distance of about 200 kilom. altogether.

The inner history of this question is as obscure as that of all other similar matters in this country, but, so far as I can ascertain, the chief promoter of the scheme has been Moukhtar Bey, Director of Railways in the Ministry of Public Works. It was certainly he who induced M. Huguenin, who showed no particular eagerness to accept the contract, to submit a plan to Berlin, whereby the Anatolian Railway Company were to build the line for a kilometric guarantee of 15,000 fr. and the right to double the local line between Haidar Pasha and Pendik. It was this last concession which moved M. Huguenin, but his directors in Berlin refused to undertake the work; thereupon the Turkish Government stated that the kilometric guarantee would be secured on customs revenues, which induced the Berlin board to change their mind.

The convention, as submitted to Parliament, merely stated that it was for the construction of a railway from Ada-Bazar to Bolu and some 135 kilom. further, to a terminus not yet decided upon, and for the doubling of the Haidar-Pasha–Pendik line, while the kilometric guarantee had been fixed at 15,000 fr.

In this form it was, after some discussion, voted by the Chamber as a matter of urgency, but the conflict with the Senate, described in my despatch No. 391 of the 6th June, then supervened, and the convention has therefore not received the sanction of the latter body.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[22647] No. 94.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 400.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 8, 1911.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 203 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copies of two despatches from His Majesty's consul at Damascus, reporting on the present state of the relations between the Turkish authorities and certain Bedouin tribes and the consequent movement of Turkish troops into their country.

This is the latest information which has reached His Majesty's Embassy from the Hauran.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 94.

Consul Devey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 15.)

Sir, *Damascus, March 29, 1911.*

A FORTNIGHT ago forty-six Bedouins accused of taking part in the Kerak insurrection were brought here, and the prisons being found overcrowded, it is now announced that about sixty of the Druzes who were recently sentenced to longer terms of imprisonment are to be sent for confinement to Rhodes.

It is not unlikely that some among these sheikhs may be condemned to capital or other severe sentences by court-martial. The Mudai-Ummni, Mustafa Bey, is still at Kerak investigating.

With reference to the outbreak last December (*vide* my despatch No. 59), one may here reflect that the withholding of the usual subvention to the Mejalli Bedouins was the immediate cause of damage to the extent of nearly 80,000*l.* to the Hedjaz Railway.

[23056] No. 94*.

Government of India to the Earl of Crewe.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, June 12.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June 8, 1911.*

PERSIAN Gulf surveys. See your telegram dated the 15th May, 1911.

Reference is invited to correspondence enclosed in weekly letters dated the 20th and the 27th April, respectively, from Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.

Arrangements to ensure survey work being begun at earliest possible date next season are being made. My personal view is that areas which it is proposed to omit should be surveyed. It would, in my opinion, be well to show the Turks, if our negotiations with them are likely to prove abortive, that our claims in the Gulf are not going to be neglected by us. Your instructions are solicited, as I am not precisely aware how negotiations stand at present.

In parenthesis be it noticed, however, that the receipts from Haj pilgrims have totalled about 100,000*l.* during the last four months. I draw attention to this point, because I hear that all subvention and allowances (Khuwa) to Bedouins are to be suppressed once for all and for ever. This may again provoke further attacks upon the Hedjaz Railway.

I may add that the Bedouins are generally suffering severely from the past unusually cold winter. It is calculated that they have lost millions of sheep, goats, and various animals, while the palm trees of some districts have suffered greatly. Thus, those of the tribes who bring in some taxes to the vilayet will be in a worse position than before.

I have, &c.
G. P. DEVEY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 94.

Consul Devey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 21.)

Sir, *Damascus, May 23, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a small force of one battalion Nizam infantry, supported by a squadron of cavalry, and some mule mounted troops, with one or two mountain guns, has just been dispatched from Amman to overawe discontented Bedouins of Sarhan, Kharshan, and Haduri tribes (sub-sections of the Beni Sakhr tribe), towards the Wadis Ainata and El Khalil, which are said to be east and south-east of the Hedjaz Railway beyond Amman.

I have not been able to ascertain the numbers of these units yet, but will report in due course if able to do so.

I have, &c.
G. P. DEVEY.

[20373] No. 95.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, June 12, 1911.*

WITH reference to the letter from this department of the 4th ultimo, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith a copy of a further despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, reporting verbal representations which his Excellency has made to the Turkish Government on the subject of the arrest and detention by the Vali of Bussorah of three natives of Bahrein.

I am to state that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, this question should not be left over for settlement in the general negotiations regarding the Persian Gulf, nor be allowed to remain in its present unsatisfactory position. He would accordingly propose to instruct Sir G. Lowther to address a written communication to the Turkish Government, requesting that he may be informed whether the Vali of Bussorah has been reprimanded for his action, as was desired by His Majesty's Government in his Excellency's note of the 8th April last, asking for an assurance that no difficulties will be raised in future in regard to Bahrein passports, and further demanding that a small compensation should be accorded to the Bahreinis for their illegal detention.

Sir E. Grey would be glad to learn the views of the Earl of Crewe on this proposal.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[23002] No. 96.

Enclosure in India Office Letter.—(Received June 13.)

The Government of India to the Earl of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 10, 1911.

FOLLOWING report, dated the 6th instant, received from consul at Bussorah :—

"Impression is growing, though I have no definite information, that Turkish authorities will attempt to remove British buoys from bar unless action is taken on our part."

If necessary, Admiral will no doubt act on instructions which he has already received (see telegram dated the 2nd March, 1911, from Admiralty), that no interference with existing British buoys is to be allowed.

[21239] No. 97.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 221.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, June* 13, 1911.

PLEASE see your despatch No. 280 of 26th April regarding demolition of Lynch's premises at Bagdad.

I have received a further urgent request from Messrs. Lynch for an advance to enable them to start rebuilding. In asking for this advance the firm point out that, unless they rebuild at once, special accommodation will have to be provided for their staff. This would, of course, increase their claim.

The claim has already been too long delayed; you should urge Porte to make immediate settlement, and also point out to them that unless Lynch begin rebuilding at once their claim against them will increase.

[23116] No. 98.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 401.)
Sir, *Therapia, June* 10, 1911.

MR. LORIMER'S report of the 10th April last, enclosed in my despatch No. 313 of the 9th ultimo, gave a disquieting account of the state of security in the Muntefik country in Lower Mesopotamia, where preparations were in progress to dam the Hai Canal, in the hope of thus starving Sadun Pasha's revolted tribesmen into submission. A recently received despatch (copy enclosed) from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah shows that this plan was abandoned towards the end of April, and that steps were being taken to prepare river steamers and launches for a military action against the Muntefik. Further information received to-day by telegraph from Mr. Acting Consul Matthews states that on the 17th ultimo three guns and 190 troops were dispatched from Bussorah up the Euphrates by one of the armoured river steamers, which was accompanied by a steam launch, and that an inconclusive action took place with the Arabs not far above Sukeshiukh. A second armoured vessel was dispatched on the 6th instant from Bussorah to support the expedition, but, as owing to the falling river the steamers will be obliged to return within fifteen or twenty days, it seems improbable that any real success can be achieved against the tribes in revolt.

It appears from Mr. Matthews' telegram that Sadun Pasha had succeeded in winning back the allegiance of some of the tribes, but, as it was stated on reliable information that Sadun is himself besieged at Nassrie, it is to be concluded that they are again in revolt against his authority.

Mr. Matthews adds that the Ottoman authorities appear to be quite unable to cope with the situation.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 98.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 26.)
Sir, *Bussorah, April* 29, 1911.

REPORTS from up-river state that the Turks have abandoned all idea of closing the Hai Canal, and that the soldiers in camp at Kut-el-Amara have left for Hai. The Muntefik Arabs are said to be thoroughly disorganised and divided amongst themselves. Sailing vessels proceeding by the Euphrates through the Muntefik country continue to be blackmailed by the riverain Arabs. No taxes are collected. Sadun Pasha is said to be collecting his forces to meet Bin Saoud or Sheikh Mubarek, in the event of their attacking him.

Ali Suad Bey, the newly-appointed Mutessarif of Amara, who lately arrived from Hassa, has now taken up his new post. He acted as vali here during the absence of Suleyman Nazif Bey in Bagdad last year.

Instructions were sent from Bagdad to the naval commodore at Bussorah to protect with iron plates the steamers "Frat" and "Resafa" and the two steam-launches "Birinji" and "Ikinji," which were purchased by Sir William Willcocks for his irrigation works. The "Frat" and "Resafa" are to be armed with two ordinary and two machine guns each, and the launches "Birinji" and "Ikinji" with two quick-firing guns each. When ready the vessels are, according to orders received here, to be dispatched to Kut-el-Amara for use against the Muntefik Arabs. The vali informed me that the launch "Birinji" was being equipped for use as a military post-boat on the Euphrates, and that the plates were only intended to protect her against any desultory firing from the banks. In view, however, of the preparations which are being made, it seems more reasonable to suppose that Yusuf Pasha contemplates carrying out a military expedition against the Muntefik Arabs, and that the heavily armed and plated launches will be dispatched down the Hai Canal in order to operate in the heart of the Muntefik country.

The "Marmariss" has visited Kurna several times lately and proceeded as far as Medina, where, I hear, she fired her guns and made other hostile demonstrations against the Arabs.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

[23219] No. 99.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 23.)

Sir, *India Office, June* 14, 1911.

IN continuation of this Office letter of the 8th instant, giving cover to correspondence from India regarding the recent *fatwa* of the Sheikh-ul-Islam ordering the sale of the treasures of the shrines at Kerbela and Nejef, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward copy of a telegram that has been received from the Government of India enquiring whether the *fatwa* has in fact been withdrawn.

I am to ask what answer the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs wishes to be given to the Government of India.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 99.

Government of India to Earl of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 10, 1911.

SEE telegram dated the 1st ultimo from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, forwarded with letter dated the 5th ultimo from Secretary, Political Department, India Office.

Report from Bagdad residency surgeon states that no knowledge of *fatwa* regarding sale of shrine treasures being withdrawn is indicated by extended local

enquiries at Kerbela and Nejef, and that report is not confirmed by Russian consul-general at Bagdad. Well-informed Moslems, the residency surgeon adds, regard the *fatwa* as an unofficial one, which it is practically impossible to execute.

We shall be glad to know whether the *fatwa* has really been withdrawn, in view of protests received from the Shiah community in India.

[23219] No. 100.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 228.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, June* 16, 1911.

SALE of treasures at Nejef and Kerbela (see Constantinople telegram No. 101 of the 1st May).

Please inform me by telegraph whether fetva ordering sale has really been withdrawn. Viceroy is anxious for information.

[23719] No. 101.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 17.)

Sir, *India Office, June* 16, 1911.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th instant regarding the attitude of the Turkish Government towards the question of the status of natives of Bahrein.

In reply I am to say that the Earl of Crewe entirely concurs in the course of action proposed by Sir E. Grey.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[23747] No. 102.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 143.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, June* 18, 1911.

PROPOSED sale of treasures of shrines at Kerbela and Nejef.

Please see your telegram No. 228 of the 16th June.

I am informed by Persian chargé d'affaires that the Grand Vizier has given him satisfactory assurances verbally that the consent of the Persian religious authorities would be sought before any sale of the treasures took place. The question of the formal withdrawal of the fetva did not arise, as the Sublime Porte did not admit its existence. I consider, therefore, that it would be well to say nothing about the matter at the Porte, in view of the contents of your telegram No. 92 of the 7th April of the statement reported above.

[23776] No. 103.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 407.)
Sir, *Constantinople, June* 13, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty vice-consul at Van, reporting an intrigue connected with dealings in land by the Russian bank at Urmi, which may involve the Turkish Government in a future political question with the Russian Government.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 103.

Vice-Consul Molyneux-Seel to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 13.)
Sir, *Van, May* 29, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency an account of an intrigue alleged (not openly) by the local government to have taken place, and which will perhaps throw some light on the attitude of the Ottoman Government with regard to the proposed Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

On the occupation of the "Nevahi-i-Jedide" by the Turks, a number of Persian khans were expelled, and the inhabitants who had hitherto been working as slaves on the estates of the former were emancipated and the lands given over to the cultivators as their own property. It is now said that these khans who had withdrawn into Persia, being in want of money, have accepted the proposition of the Russian bank at Urmi to purchase the title-deeds of the lands from which they have been expelled. This transaction of the bank is said to have been completed, and the Turkish authorities see in this an intrigue which will involve them in a future political question with the Russian Government.

The present peasant holders of these lands are in possession, of course, of no sort of title-deeds.

The commandant of the frontier gendarmerie, Mehmed Niazi Bey, has been recalled and will be arraigned before a court-martial charged with illegally extracting sums of money from the inhabitants of the Nevahi-i-Jedide, and of conniving at the lawless acts of brigands.

The idare-memouru of Ushnu has resigned his post, and the frontier commissary has asked for him to be replaced by an exceptionally honest (?) and capable official.

I have, &c.
L. MOLYNEUX-SEEL, *Captain.*

[23777] No. 104.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 408.)
Sir, *Constantinople, June* 13, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 396 of the 7th June, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum, transmitting copy of a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Bitlis, reporting on Kurdish lawlessness and official apathy in the Bitlis vilayet.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 104.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 39.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, June* 3, 1911.

IN my despatch No. 8 of the 12th February, I had the honour to forward to your Excellency copy of a report from Mr. Safrastian, acting vice-consul at Bitlis, on the subject of the anarchical conditions prevailing in the district of Khuyt and the apathy displayed by the local authorities.

The good intentions frequently proclaimed by the Vali of Bitlis do not seem to have led to any improvement in the situation since then, and I have now the honour to enclose copy of a further despatch from Mr. Safrastian, showing that the complaisant attitude of the Government towards the Kurds is bearing fruit in the shape of increasing oppression of the Armenian peasantry, not only in the districts of Khuyt, but also in those of Khizan and Kharzan.

With regard to the Armenians of Khuyt who had petitioned the authorities for protection, I understand from a telegram received to-day from Mr. Safrastian that two of their number have just been murdered, presumably at Bitlis.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

Enclosure 2 in No. 104.

Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor.

(No. 11.)

Sir, *Bitlis, May 25, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 3 of the 30th January of this year respecting the state of the district of Khuyt, I have the honour to report that the things there are evidently drifting from bad to worse, always to the discredit of the local authorities and in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the Armenian peasantry in Khuyt.

At the beginning of the current month, rumours of a military expedition to Khuyt were reported as being started by the military authorities here with a view to intimidating the lawless Kurds, who were preventing Armenians of the district from ploughing their lands recently restored to them by the civil court here.

Whether the scheme of a punitive expedition to Khuyt really existed or not I am unable to say. It appears, however, that the guilty Kurds of Khuyt, probably informed of the rumoured expedition by their high-placed sympathisers in this town, were seriously disturbed. The guilty parties involved in the murders of soldiers and zaptiehs of last year fled to the mountains, and flocks of sheep and cattle were carried to the Plain of Mush and sold there cheaply for fear of plunder by the soldiers, who, they thought, would raid their homes.

Two weeks passed and the threatened expedition was not dispatched, and it became manifest that the whole affair was an untruth. The Armenians of the villages of Taghavank and Lordentzor, in Khuyt, who, after a long struggle, had won their case in the matter of lands, the ownership of which was disputed by one, Hajdi Amaré, and his Belekli Kurds, were prevented by the latter to plough their land under threat of murder and violence. They therefore petitioned the vali to give them protection against their Kurdish oppressors. It appears, however, that the local Government is not willing to suffer another outrage by sending some gendarmes to Khuyt, who may be attacked and killed by Kurds as in December last.

The notorious Musa Bey, who is believed to be in the background of all this Kurdish lawlessness, is as defiant to the authorities as ever; recently summons were issued again by the criminal court of Mush requiring him to appear before that court. But he briefly told the gendarmes, who presented him the summons, not to enter his house again with such a mission. He is further openly harbouring in his house one Kurdish murderer, Khalo, who last year killed an Armenian of Ardonk, in the Plain of Mush, and is now condemned to death.

Situation in Kharzan.—In face of the avowed inaction of the Government, even in cases of flagrant breaches of the law, the Kurdish population in certain parts of this province seems to be inclining to its old methods of handling the Christians at their own pleasure, to avenging them for the protests which were raised against them by the Christians in the early days of the new régime. Thus, some three weeks ago, two Kurdish scoundrels, Djindo and Shimo, attacked the Armenian village of Seleud, in Kharzan (sanjak of Sairt), burned the village school and tried to rob the church. The frightened villagers appealed to the Kaimakam of Kharzan, who, according to a trustworthy source, sent only some gendarmes to see and report about the facts. I have since not heard yet the arrest of the assailants.

I am further informed that an Armenian girl of minor age was recently abducted in Kabeljoz (Southern Sasun), and the district authorities have not been able, or rather willing, to restore the girl to her parents.

Matters in this way seem to have come to a deadlock in Khuyt, Khizan, and some other districts of this vilayet.

Judging from the general situation and the unfortunate turn of affairs as they appear to have taken, I humbly venture to remark that the local authorities seem, either on their own initiative or on account of the tacit neglect of the Central Government, to be reverting to the Hamidian policy of giving the Kurds a free hand. The latter are openly disregarding the order and the law, and, if the former continue their time-honoured inaction, fresh acts of aggression on the part of Kurds may be looked for.

I have, &c.

A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

[23778] No. 105.

Sir G. Lowther to Edward Grey.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 409.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 13, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 342 of the 17th May, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Aleppo, reporting further in connection with the recent panic among the Christians at Antioch.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 105.

Consul Fontana to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 21.)

Sir, *Aleppo, May 31, 1911.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 15 of the 3rd ultimo, quoting extracts from a letter addressed to me by the Rev. Dr. James Martin concerning the recent panic among the Christians at Antioch, I now have the honour to report that, since then, the Kaimakam of Antioch, Tewfik Bey, has been recalled, and is now at Aleppo. The acting vali, Ismail Pasha, told me in private, that there had undoubtedly been some menace of trouble at Antioch, that Tewfik Bey, as well as the Kaimakam of Harem, and the Acting Kaimakam of Jebel Samaan, had persistently denied in their telegrams the existence of any insecurity, and that he had been misled by them. My Russian and American colleagues received information to the effect that the president of the Committee of Union and Progress at Antioch was the bitter enemy of the kaimakam, and the unscrupulous mover of menace to the Christians in the hope of discrediting the kaimakam, and giving rise to some disturbance which would precipitate his dismissal. Tewfik Bey, after his recall to Aleppo, came to see me, and gave me the following information. Nahad Aga Kusairi Zadeh, one of the Antioch agas, had been condemned by court-martial for prominent participation in the massacre there in 1909. He was imprisoned for a time, but eventually amnested by the Sultan. Soon after Tewfik Bey's appointment to Antioch, Nahad Aga nearly succeeded in obtaining the post of mayor of Antioch, but failed owing to the veto of the kaimakam, who considered him unworthy for the post. Nahad Aga, who is of a family of "Mushaih," and consequently looked up to by the local Moslems, afterwards joined the Antioch Committee of Union and Progress, and succeeded in having himself elected president. He then declared war on the kaimakam who, though an honest official, produces the impression of a man of insignificant parts. The committee, composed largely of ignorant and undecided persons, were mostly drawn in the wake of the president, one member, an aga named Neshet Effendi Twaisali Zadeh, using all his influence to that end. Thus it was that the president of the correctional court informed Dr. Martin that there was a party in town that would stand at nothing. "If they wanted a book from off a table they would smash, if necessary, the table, however costly, to reach the book, however worthless."

After some measure of confidence had been restored at Antioch by the arrival of the Aleppo colonel of gendarmes with reinforcements, the recall of the kaimakam, and the departure of Nahad Aga to Aleppo, Dr. Martin brought his wife here for a few days' rest, and came to see me. He confirmed the information I had already received as to the antecedents of Nahad Aga, his share in the massacre, his conviction, and amnesty, and his vindictive intriguing as head of the Committee of Union and Progress. I took Dr. Martin to call upon the vali, Kiazim Bey, who returned to Aleppo from Constantinople last Sunday, and was received with acclamation by a great concourse of people at the railway station. Dr. Martin related to him simply the whole narrative of Moslem excitement and threats, Christian terror, and the machinations of the ex-criminal Aga, elected President of the Committee of Union and Progress. The vali listened kindly and attentively, and assured us that the information he had already received coincided for the most part with Dr. Martin's statements. He added, however, that Dr. Martin had very probably been led by nervousness, attributable to all that he had passed through during the massacre of 1909, to exaggerate what danger may have existed recently at Antioch. To this I ventured to demur, pointing out that Dr. Martin was a man of tried courage and experience. And I then informed Kiazim Bey that, as I had the honour to report to your Excellency by

telegram, No. 19 of the 9th instant, threats had been uttered against the life of Dr. Martin by certain Moslems at Antioch. The vali asked Dr. Martin who were the Moslems in question. He replied that he had been informed by certain Christian notables, whom he had known for many years past, and who were in touch with the local Committee of Union and Progress, that the president of that committee and Neshet Effendi were incensed, and had vowed vengeance against him for making known to the British consul at Aleppo the perilous situation at Antioch. They accused him of being in league with the kaimakam, who, nevertheless, had stoutly denied in his telegrams to the acting vali the existence of insecurity at Antioch. Tewfik Bey denied, and at the same time sent delegates to thank Dr. Martin for the action he had taken, and to say that he was justified in his apprehensions. I urged the vali, who, I noticed, was struck with Dr. Martin's sincerity and lucidity, to take such measures as would ensure the personal safety of Dr. Martin on his return to Antioch. The vali assured me that I might depend upon him fully, and told us confidentially that he intended to visit Antioch in about a fortnight, and to take drastic action there.

According to Dr. Martin various Christian families are making preparations to move from Antioch for good, and the re-establishment of any lasting feeling of security there will be most difficult. "The tigers," he says, "have been glutted with blood, and they are but awaiting the moment to gorge themselves again." The appointment of a strong kaimakam able to cope with and cow the local agas as Kiazim Bey has cowed the eshraf here, might suffice to restore security and confidence, at least, for the time being.

I have, &c.
RAPHAEL A. FONTANA.

[23780] No. 106.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 412.)
Sir,
Therapia, June 14, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have, in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 214 of the 9th instant, warned the Sublime Porte that a ship of war will be sent to visit the spot where British buoys have recently been laid at the head of the Persian Gulf, with instructions to prevent any tampering with these buoys.

I have now received a telegram from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, dated the 11th June, in which he informs me that the "Marmaris" has been dispatched up the Euphrates to make a demonstration against the Arab tribes, and that there is little likelihood of any attempt being made for the present to move the buoys.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[23781] No. 107.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 413.)
Sir,
Therapia, June 13, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 396 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to report that I have received further information, dated the 10th June, from the acting British vice-consul at Bitlis relative to the situation at Khuyt.

He states that an infantry battalion and mountain artillery are prepared for action under the orders of the Governor-General, who has called upon the rebel chiefs to explain their conduct, and to hand over the murderers inculpated in the recent occurrences. Failing this, active operations are expected immediately.

Apprehensions are entertained locally of reactionary disturbances unless decisive and immediate action is taken in Khuyt, where the anti-Christian agitation is increasing.

From Melazgerd it is reported that seventy-four Circassians have been killed in an agrarian dispute.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[23783] No. 108.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 415.)
Sir,
Therapia, June 14, 1911.

SINCE the removal of Nazim Pasha from Bagdad early in the year the post of vali of that district has remained vacant, and the Government seem to have been experiencing some difficulty in filling it.

Recently articles have appeared in some of the local papers describing the benefits which Nazim Pasha has conferred on the city and district during his administration, and petitions from Bagdad have been drawn up and presented to the Government demanding his recall.

It has, however, been decided to send Djemil Bey, the present Vali of Adana, to succeed Nazim Pasha at Bagdad, and it seems that this appointment has now received Imperial sanction.

The new vali is known to be an ardent Young Turk, and great things were expected of him during his administration at Adana, but these hopes were not fully realised. But I have understood from Armenian quarters that his treatment of that section of the community has been fair, and the manner in which Adana has been restored to a condition of relative prosperity is probably in some measure due to his energy.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[21239] No. 109.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Lynch Brothers.

Gentlemen,
Foreign Office, June 19, 1911.

WITH reference to your letter of the 1st instant respecting the demolition of your premises at Bagdad, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople has been instructed to press the Turkish Government for an immediate settlement of your claim.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[24078] No. 110.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Government of India.—(Communicated by India Office, June 20.)

Sir,
Mohammerah, May 27, 1911.

I HAVE the honour respectfully to submit herewith two copies of the papers forming the material obtained on which to base our reply to the German rejoinder in the Abu Musa case, together with a copy of my covering letter of this date to the Government of India.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure 1 in No. 110.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Sir A. McMahon.

Sir,
Mohammerah, May 27, 1911.

I HAVE the honour at length to submit the material collected for our reply to the German rejoinder in the Abu Musa case, together with my observations on it.

2. When I telegraphed from Henjam at the end of March that I had collected the local material and that the writing of it up would occupy some days I did not realise that it would prove to be quite the intricate task which I have found it to deal with all the

small points used in the German communication. When at head-quarters I am subject to incessant interruption, and I have only been able to complete the report by coming for a few days to the Shat-el-Arab and working in quiet on the "Lawrence."

The German rejoinder was a formidable document if read by itself, but when studied by the light of the papers already recorded a great deal of the substance fell out of it, and I have seen no reason to alter the appraisement which I made of it in Enclosure 1 to my note of the 19th February, 1910, submitted to His Majesty's Foreign Office.

So far as I can judge, the fundamental points of our case remain unshaken and the papers now submitted will, I hope, be found to supply a not unsatisfactory reply, to accompany our offer of compromise.

To save time, I have ventured to forward two copies of the papers by the same mail to the Political Secretary, India Office.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX,

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure 2 in No. 110.

Brief Comment in Summary of the fresh Arguments and Evidence now submitted.

IT seems unnecessary to do more than take up the thread from the point where it was left by my note submitted to His Majesty's Foreign Office on the 12th February, 1910, to which I beg reference.

The "issues" referred to below are those framed in that note.

Issue (a).—1. The right to jetsam and flotsam. It is shown by documentary and testamentary evidence that in the Gulf the right is levied by the local inhabitants and their overlord, if he can, and sees fit to do so, takes his share. It is shown also that no one but the ruling sheikh has been recognised in this connection, but that he ("Sagar") in virtue of the arrangement by which he allowed Salim the income of Abu Musa, has left the levy to him.

2. The rejected version of the oxide concession dated the 6th April, 1898, is shown to have been drafted by Abdullah-bin-Hassan Sumieh himself, and to have been rejected by Abdul Latif specifically on account of the unwarrantable claim therein put into Salim's mouth, of formal ownership. The final version of the concession was then drafted by Abdul Latif himself.

3. What the German note calls "revenue from mother-of-pearl and canary seed" is shown to be a mistranslation. It should be "ground rent from storage of 'muhar' and 'zinni' oyster-shells." The "muhar" and "zinni" are two species of pearl-bearing shells. The word for canary seed "kazni" is somewhat like "zinni."

Sheikh Sagar specifically allowed this to go to Salim as part of the income of the island.

4. The mica lease was given with the ruling sheikh's knowledge and consent, and Sheikh Salim was allowed to take proceeds as part of revenue of island. It proved to be a mare's nest and fizzled out.

Salim's enjoyment of the income of the island, with the consent and subject to the pleasure of the ruling sheikh is not disputed.

I may mention here for the information of Government—it has been considered unnecessary to mention it in the evidence—that a change has come about in the relations between Sheikhs Sagar and Salim.

Sheikh Sagar's son Khaled, Sheikh of Ras-el-Khaima, having died of consumption, Sagar sent his uncle Salim there temporarily to take charge as deputy-governor. Soon after his arrival there his son committed a murder in connection with a love affair. Sheikh Sagar wanting to have the murderer tried and punished, Salim in order to save his son set himself up adversely to Sheikh Sagar and placed himself on the defensive. It being the pearling season and all his men away, Sheikh Sagar took no punitive action and eventually made terms with Salim and allowed him to remain as Sheikh of Ras-el-Khaima. He has accordingly ceased to pay him any pension and withdrawn Abu Musa from his enjoyment.

I do not think we need mention this as the development is still fresh and had better be left to crystallise quietly.

Issue (b).—A quantity of similar evidence has been obtained in refutation of the mercantile and clerical evidence furnished in the German rejoinder.

Issue (c).—The memorandum of association proves never to have been completed or even seen by the other partners—and never to have been acted upon. Hassan himself now [? never] claimed (to Abdul Latif) to be entitled to act on it, nor even mentioned it in his remonstrances. As an authority in Hassan's hands it did not exist. We concede that Hassan up to a certain point was managing partner, but this monopoly contract was a new departure, beyond his powers.

Issue (d).—Requires no fresh evidence. It is further argued.

Issue (e).—Important evidence has been produced in the shape of Malcolm's deed of partnership corroborated by a letter of Hassan Sumieh, showing that Hassan himself drew up and inserted a prohibition against the sale by any partner of any share without the express consent and signature of the other partners. In the case of his purchase of Yusuf's share and transfer to Brown, he neglected to comply with this condition; it is therefore invalidated in any case by his own provision.

Issue (f).—Is combated. No evidence is needed.

P. Z. COX.

May 27, 1911.

Enclosure 3 in No. 110.

Remarks on the German Exposition of those Facts in the Case which, they consider, are not disputed by either Party.

1. Sheikh Sagar at the time intended to drive Sheikh Salim out of Abu Musa by force, but was prevented from doing so by the British resident in the Persian Gulf.

Yes; indirectly prevented. Sheikh Sagar was reminded by the British resident that the principles of the maritime truce applied to the islands, and was informed that he must not let his quarrel with his uncle lead to a disturbance of it. Sheikh Salim was given pacific advice of a like nature. But for his fear of our displeasure, it would obviously have been a simple matter for Sheikh Sagar, who at that time had all his tribesmen at his back, to send two or three dhows full of armed men to Abu Musa and eject Sheikh Salim or bring him away. The latter had no following with him at the time or means of defending himself. But the British political authorities know by experience that if these Arab sheikhs are allowed to send armed tribesmen to sea in boats, their followers inevitably get out of hand and probably start firing on or looting innocent craft, and thus disturb the maritime truce generally. We have, in consequence, been obliged to make it an invariable rule not to agree to the passage by sea of dhows full of armed men, unless it be with the express consent of the resident and in the presence, if necessary, of one of His Majesty's ships. As a matter of fact, it would probably have saved a good deal of subsequent trouble in this case had the resident allowed Sheikh Sagar to take what steps he pleased against Sheikh Salim, merely sending a ship to the spot to make sure that, apart from their quarrel, there should be no disturbance of the general peace. Such, it will be remembered, was the course pursued when Sheikh Sagar evicted Hassan Sumieh's workmen in October 1907, His Majesty's ship "Lapwing" being deputed to see that no lawlessness occurred; but in 1883 the fact probably was that the resident had no ship at his disposal at the moment and therefore took the next best course he could, namely, to sterilise the dispute by strictly warning both parties that they must not break the maritime truce. But because Sheikh Sagar loyally bowed to the British representative's wishes in this direction, he cannot reasonably be thereby held to have forfeited rights which he possessed as ruling sheikh and which he could have made good but for our action. Were it to be contended that Sheikh Salim acquired Abu Musa under such conditions, it would be equivalent to saying that he had been made a present of it by the British Government.

2. The revenue from the Island of Sir Abu Nuair, said to amount to 200 dollars, was also assigned to Salim.

I would rather say "expected to bring in" than "said to amount to."

3. Son of the British consular agent at Shargah.

Residency agent, not "consular agent."

4. The rent was paid regularly and received by Sheikh Salim.

Rent was admittedly received by Sheikh Salim, whom Sheikh Sagar allowed to keep whatever revenue came in from the island.

5. This share was, on the 10th October, 1907, sold by Hassan Samieh to Thomas Brown, a British subject.

On the 10th October, 1907, that is, eight months after the cancellation of the concession. (It will be shown later on (Item 69) that Hassan, by his own admission, had no right to sell this share.)

6. 2,000 to 5,000 tons of red oxide were to be delivered to Wönckhaus annually for four years from the mines on Abu Musa. The company had also contracted with another party to deliver 400 tons a-year for five years to India.

This is a misleading representation of the facts. Except for a quantity of 2,000 tons which Hassan had already contracted to supply to another party, at the rate of 400 tons per annum, Wönckhaus acquired an absolute monopoly of the output for four years, and a preferential right to renew at the end of it.

7. The ostensible ground for this step is a complaint made by Isa to the sheikh that the contract for delivery of red oxide had been made with Wönckhaus without his sanction.

It was both his interests and those of Isa-bin-Abdul Latif which formed the "ostensible ground" for Sheikh Sagar's action. (See also item 7 of British memorandum.) The sheikh gave his own reasons for withdrawing the concession; they were, that Hassan had given a monopoly which he had no authority to do and had thus made it evident to the sheikh that his own rights over Abu Musa might be endangered by the continuance of the concession in such unsafe hands. He in fact realised that Hassan was acting in a way calculated to prejudice his interests, and in his later letter of the 26th March to Hassan (annex 16 of first German memorandum) in reply to Hassan's protests, he explained himself further. He said he had concurred in the original concession because all the parties were British subjects, and thus every one concerned was under his own control or that of the British Government; but he objected to the admission into the concern of the subjects of a foreign Power over whom he would have no control. He feared that the mines might go out of his possession: and it is clear that the apprehension was not altogether an empty one, for in their letter to the sheikh dated the 13th October, 1907, Messrs. Wönckhaus wrote "We have paid to them (Hassan, &c.) very considerable advances . . . . , and we consider that the oxide lying on the seashore is our property *and that the mines and the concession are security for the said advances.*" Again, when Messrs. Wönckhaus's employé, Brown, attempted to land at Abu Musa on the 22nd October, 1907, with Haji Ali Tashankar and a number of men from Lingah, and was prevented by the resolute attitude of the sheikh's guards, he was reported by Lieutenant Gabriel to have had with him a German flag which he intended to erect at the oxide mine or over the accumulated mineral. Lastly, when Dr. Listemann, consul for Germany at Bushire, addressed Sheikh Sagar direct on the 19th November, 1907, protesting at his action, he wrote that Messrs. Wönckhaus having purchased a share in the mining company, now had a "madkhal" (means of entry) directly into the working of the mines. Messrs. Wönckhaus's claims and action were obviously calculated to bring the sheikh up against the provisions of the treaty of the 6th March, 1892, with the British Government. (See also item 68.)

The grounds of complaint advanced by Esa-bin-Abdul Latif were briefly—

(1.) The grant by Hassan of a monopoly which he had no authority to grant.
(2.) Hassan's failure to consult his partners.
(3.) The fact of Hassan signing himself as "owner and holder" of the concession.

8. Sheikh Sagar on the 3rd October, 1907, again ordered that the work should cease.

The words "and that he should remove his coolies and gear within ten days" might be added.

9. Thereupon about the 20th October.

After "the 20th October," the words "Hassan having taken no notice of his warning" might suitably be inserted.

10. The boats containing the sheikh's armed forced were towed to Abu Musa by the British war-ship "Lapwing."

The reasons which made it expedient that one of His Majesty's ships and a representative of the residency should be present were explained in count 4 of the British memorandum—but *vide* also item 1 above.

11. Two employés of the firm of Robert Wönckhaus and Co. . . . . were received with bullets by the sheikh's armed men and forced to turn back.

The said employés had no business to be where they were. It was only after they had persistently ignored repeated shouts of warning that some shots were fired over their heads. Mr. Brown who was also one of the parties, is a British subject, and would doubtless have complained to the residency if he had thought he had any legitimate ground for so doing. He has never done so.

(A.)

Position of Sheikh Sagar with respect to the Company of Lessees from the point of view of Private Law.

It is stated in the British memorandum . . . . that it was only as the representative of Sagar, and while he acted as Regent during the latter's pilgrimage, that Sheikh Salim concluded the lease agreement.

What the British memorandum said was:—

"Salim declares that in granting the lease of 1898, he merely acted as proxy for the ruling sheikh, then absent on pilgrimage to Mecca. . . . . It thus appears that Salim did not conclude the lease of 1898 in the capacity of owner, but in that of Regent. . . . ."

Salim himself wrote:—

"When I leased the mines of Abu Musa I was officiating on your behalf, and the concession was given by proxy for you; and I was well aware that on your return from the pilgrimage to Mecca, if you considered my action in the matter of the concession was good, you would confirm what I had agreed to, and if in your opinion it was objectionable you could annul it, either at the time, or at any other time."

It will be seen later on in these papers that the grant in some capacity by Sheikh Salim in December, in 1898, of a concession for exploiting "mica" in Abu Musa, has to be admitted. (It was never reported to the residency and came to nothing.) At the time of its grant Sheikh Sagar had returned from his pilgrimage, and states that he was consulted by Sheikh Salim and approved of the grant. But he, Sheikh Sagar, being present, we cannot maintain in this case that the concession was granted by Sheikh Salim as Regent. The natural explanation is this: Sheikh Salim admittedly was allowed to reside in the island as tenant and enjoy the produce, subject always to his own loyal behaviour and to the will and pleasure of Sheikh Sagar. In the case of the oxide concession the position would be that Salim gave the concession after obtaining the concurrence of himself as Regent, and subject to Sheikh Sagar's confirmation. In the case of "mica" concession he gave it after consulting Sheikh Sagar, who was himself present.

As regards Sheikh Sagar's letter of the 11th October, 1902, to the British resident. His statement that Salim granted the concession "as Regent" would still stand so far as it went, and the motive of its assertion is quite an intelligent one, and quite different to the far-fetched one that the German rejoinder seeks to put on it. They say that being under the mistaken belief that he was prohibited by the treaty of 1892 from entering into such transaction with anyone but a British subject, and Nakhoda Ali being a Persian subject, he was anxious to persuade Colonel Kemball that Nakhoda Ali was not a concessionnaire at all, and that if there had been any fault it was Salim's and not his. The only basis for this view is a garbled version of a remark said to have

been dropped by Sheikh Sagar, and there is no real foundation for the hypothesis at all.

To go back to the letter itself and Colonel Kemball's letter, to which it is a reply. I would explain that business with the trucial chiefs is carried on almost entirely through the residency agency. Direct letters between the resident and the sheikhs are of comparatively rare occurrence, and when they are necessary the resident's letters are always sent to the agent under flying seal (or accompanied by a copy for the agent's record) for delivery. Similarly the sheikh's reply addressed to the resident direct is given to the agent to close and forward. No sheikh would think of answering a letter of the nature of this one (Colonel Kemball's) without consulting the agent before replying. In this particular case, too, Sheikh Sagar knew that the agent himself was personally and financially interested, and consulted him fully as to the terms in which he had best reply. In the proof of this we have the fact the Sagar's letter, above quoted, is found to be written on the agent's office paper bearing the Government of India watermark. It is obvious that unless Sheikh Sagar wanted to quarrel with Abdul Latif, the answer must be what the latter wanted and advised, and what Sheikh Sagar said to the resident, in other words, was:—

"What you have heard about the Abu Musa oxide concession being in the hands of Nakhoda Ali, of whom I know you have a bad opinion, is not true; the concessionaires are three of your own people, and I supposed your agent had given you the necessary details of it. In case you may notice that the concession was executed by Salim and not by me, I would explain that Salim granted it with full powers as Regent for me during my absence at Mecca, and it is still operative, and has my support, so I hope you will not think it necessary to make any difficulties about it."

His object was not to disclaim responsibility at all, but, on the contrary, to make it clear to Colonel Kemball that the concession was in order, and had his own approval.

As a matter of fact, so far as we were concerned, there was no ban whatever against Nakhoda Ali, *qua* Persian subject. The position at the time in this regard is set forth in item 26 following.

13. Sheikh Sagar increased this allowance by the revenue of Abu Musa, including that derived from the red oxide mines.

This statement is correct.

14. Memorandum of Sheikh Sagar, dated the 22nd February, 1898.

This is a clerical error. It should, of course, be 1908.

15. Attention must be called to an inaccuracy in the text of the British memorandum.

There is no such inaccuracy. What Sheikh Sagar stated was (Annex 5 of British memorandum):—

"I have absolutely not given any deed in connection with the island nor in regard to the mines thereof; all I did was to relinquish the income to him in the way of financial assistance . . . ."

There was no stipulation or mention that the income to be left for Salim was to be restricted to that of the mines. This was obviously not the case, because Sheikh Salim was also allowed to enjoy the fees for landing and storing mubar and zinni oyster shells for export (*vide* Annex 5, British memorandum). Also see Annex 1 British memorandum, in which Salim writes:

"You were kind enough to place Abu Musa under my supervision so that I might cultivate therein and reap from it the means of subsistence."

The position no doubt was that Sheikh Sagar relinquished to Salim all revenue that might accrue from the island, so long as Salim did not importune him for money, and so long as the income did not become so considerable as to be more than Sagar's interests could allow him to relinquish or Salim could expect to receive. (See also penultimate paragraph of Enclosure 6 of first British memorandum.)

16. The Imperial Government regret that they are unable to accept as unobjectionable testimony the letter of Sheikh Salim to Sheikh Sagar, dated the 21st February, 1908.

The reasons of the German Government for this attitude are that the letter was written at the time the case was in progress, and that I, Major Cox, was at Shargah just at that time. This a very convenient way of disposing of a difficult piece of evidence, but this argument, I hope, can be resisted. Obviously there was no reason for Salim to write such a letter until he learnt of the way in which his name was being used and of the claims on Abu Musa Island with which he was being credited.

The argument of the German Government in regard to the objectionability of the evidence to this document would apply to a number of the annexes to their rejoinder. Although they bear each other no affection at heart, the two sheikhs have been quite of one mind in regard to the behaviour of Hassan Sandeh and the expediency of withdrawing the concession, and if it had not been withdrawn by Sheikh Sagar it would have been withdrawn by Sheikh Salim. In any case Sheikh Salim absolutely adheres to what he then wrote.

(*Note.*—His own letter was read over to him in the presence of myself and the residency agents of Lingah and Shargah, and he said he absolutely adhered to it.)

17. The sheikh's letters to the British resident in 1884 (Annex 3 and 4 of the British memorandum) are no evidence of Sagar's ownership of the island.

The arguments used in support of this statement seem to be a good deal laboured. The position was clearly as stated under item 12 above.

Sheikh Sagar had just been created ruling sheikh by the voice of the tribe, who were tired of Sheikh Salim; Sagar was obviously in a very strong position and able to turn Salim out of Abu Musa if he had a free hand, but the resident told him that if in doing so he broke the maritime truce, he would be suppressed. Sheikh Sagar replied with a good deal of force: "If you do not want us to fight, please remove Salim from the island yourself; if you find it inconvenient to do that, then leave us to settle the matter and do not call me to account if we fight. At least, if you will not let me proceed to extremities with him, make him give a written undertaking, guaranteed by you, that he will behave himself, so that I need not bother about him."

I think any one reading Sheikh Sagar's letters under reference would regard them, especially that of the 14th February, 1884, as not only having in mind the need to preserve the maritime truce and put an end to the political conflict, but also as intended to form a specific assertion of his right of ownership as ruling sheikh and so to safeguard himself against any prejudice to that right which might otherwise result from the resident's sterilising action.

18. Abu Musa is our island and a dependancy of Shargah. We cannot spare it to others.

I gather from the observations made under this head and from the italicising of the word "our," that from the fact that the transaction quotes Sheikh Sagar as using the plural pronoun in reference to himself, it is sought to deduce that Sheikh Sagar was not referring to himself, but meant "we," *i.e.*, "the Jowasim," and only intended to claim that Abu Musa belonged politically to the territory of Shargah or the Jowasim. Whether or not this was the case cannot at all events be determined from the use or misuse of the pronoun. Generally, when writing formal letters, these sheikhs use the plural pronoun in reference to themselves. In this instance I find, on reference to the original, that it is the translator of 1884 who is responsible for the use of both forms in the one translation. In the original Arabic the plural pronoun is used throughout both letters.

With reference to the German arguments on this point. It is to be noted that when Sagar uses the plural pronoun they argue that by doing so he intended to show that he was not referring to himself, but to the Shargah State or the Jowasim; while when Salim uses it (*vide* p. 6 of English version of German rejoinder) and speaks of "our island," they say he meant "my island!"

I grant that there is no significance in the use either way and that both sheikhs probably meant "our" (Jowasmi) island, vested in the ruling sheikh.

19. The contention is evidently that Salim had no right whatever to live on Abu Musa, and, if he did live there, it was only owing to the kindness of Sagar.

Yes; this is the contention. No right except what he derived from the ruling sheikh and enjoyed subject to his pleasure and Salim's own loyalty.

20. Those letters then having nothing to do with the question of private ownership.

I am inclined to agree. According to my view there is, and can be, no private ownership of the island. Salim might conceivably own property on it, but if he did, he would have title-deeds for that property. The facts are that when ruling sheikh he built a house and planted some date trees. When he ceased to be ruling sheikh he ceased to own these except by his successor's favour. If Sheikh Sagar evicted him from Abu Musa he might choose to recompense Salim for his expenditure and trouble while tenanting the island, or he might not (see Annex 1 and item 28).

21. The letter, too, which Sheikh Sagar addressed to Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball on the 11th October, 1902 (Annex 7 of the British memorandum), seems on close examination to have a very different meaning from that assigned to it in the British memorandum. In order to understood the letter it would be interesting to know the purport of Kemball's enquiry . . . . which is not printed in the memorandum.

Colonel Kemball's letter (No. 75 of the 10th March, 1902) ran as follows :—

"A report has reached me that you wish to grant a concession to Haji Nákhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh for excavating and exporting red oxide from the Island of Sir Abu Nuair. I have therefore the honour to inform you that it would be advisable for you to let me see the draft of the concession before concluding the arrangement.

"I shall also be glad if you will let me see a copy of the concession granted to Haji Nakoda Ali for working the red oxide mines on the Island of Abu Musa."

I would remark in the first instance, for the information of Government, that Haji Nákhoda Ali, being a Persian subject, and a rascal, the alleged lease of oxide mines to him would appear to be a matter deserving more attention than was given to it at the time it was reported (1898)—but it was reported very casually at the time by the residency agent, and in any case Colonel Kemball was not resident then, and it was no responsibility of his, and he naturally spoke of the matter as a *fait accompli* when addressing the above letter to Sheikh Sagar.

The pointed suggestion in the German reply, that we had reason for not producing the letter, inclines me to suppose that they have seen it. This is quite possible. At the time the letter was written there was no German element connected with the concession, and Sheikhs Sagar and Salim, Abdul Latif, and Hassan Samieh, were all in each other's confidence, and the resident's enquiry and Sheikh Sagar's reply would have been of interest to and probably discussed by all of them.

I am not sure of the reason which prompted Government not to produce this document, but I should presume it to be this: Nakhoda Ali was a Persian subject, but no objection was then raised by the residency on that ground to his participation. The Germans might argue that if Sheikh Sagar had in 1898 granted a concession to a foreign subject, and we had not objected for four years, why should Sheikh Sagar object, as he now has, or we; to the entry of Wönkhaus into the concern.

As a matter of fact, Colonel Kemball was mistaken. Nakhoda Ali was not a sharer in the original concession, his name was dropped for a specific reason. As a a fraudulent bankrupt he was a disreputable person, and incidentally, over whom neither the sheikh nor Government had any ultimate control. I do not quite see what we have to lose by producing this letter, seeing that the position then was as explained in item 26.

22. Colonel Kemball certainly seems to have considered the sheikh's uncle, i.e., Salim, as the owner of the mines in question.

Colonel Kemball was not resident then—but Colonel Meade. The entry is obviously a very sketchy one. He does not even know then precisely what mines are referred to, but merely mentions the report, and says enquiries will be made later. These were apparently overlooked (*vide* item 21 above).

23. . . . . And the lease has remained up to now (also see footnote to this sentence in German case).

I think the interpretation placed by me on this in 17 above is the right one.

24. Presumably has a right to do so.

Yes; a right enjoyed by him from Sheikh Sagar, and subject to the latter's pleasure.

25. When asked by the dragoman of the Imperial vice-consulate at Bushire on the 28th November, 1907, "What harm is there in having made a contract with the German firm?" Sheikh Sagar replied, "We have made treaties with the English which prevent us from leasing any part of our territory *to foreigners other than British subjects.*"

The accuracy of the above quotation can be impugned, *vide* my letter dated the 12th January, 1908, to the Government of India, in which I gave Sheikh Sagar's version of what passed, and drew attention to the fact that the German dragoman did not know Arabic, and that the interpreter was Abdullah-bin-Hassan Samieh, one of the defendants in the dispute whose character is of the shadiest and whose motive in putting words into Sheikh Sagar's mouth is obvious. The then German dragoman, Mirza Hussein, was also a person of notoriously evil repute, who cannot be regarded as a trustworthy witness. He has since been exposed and dismissed from employment in the German consulate.

All the arguments under this count are thus based on an incorrect quotation.

26. This interpretation is evidently erroneous, as it gives the treaty a meaning which would be incompatible with the open door.

It may be a matter of opinion whether the theory that article 3 of the treaty of the 6th March, 1892, precludes the grant of a mining concession to a foreigner, is compatible with the principle of the open-door, but that question hardly arises here, because at the time when Sheikh Sagar addressed his letter of the 11th October, 1902, to Colonel Kemball, the only warning he had received on the subject was that contained in Colonel Meade's letter to the residency agent, Shargah, dated the 17th February, 1900, in which the former wrote :—

"You should inform the trucial chiefs separately that the resident would be ready to help them with advice in respect to any proposals made to them for trading privileges, such as mining concessions, &c. In doing so you would, of course, make it clear to the chiefs that the resident has no desire to interfere, but it would be to their advantage to obtain advice before concluding arrangements for monopolies and exclusive privileges, thereby protecting themselves against unscrupulous traders."

The whole object of this advice was to protect these unsophisticated sheikhs against all unscrupulous persons anxious to exploit their ignorance—whether British or foreign—by urging them always to consult the residency before entertaining applications for concessions.

It is true that later on (*vide* Foreign Department letter dated the 27th August, 1907), I was instructed to "warn the trucial chiefs that the grant of a concession of any sort to mine or otherwise exploit any portion of their territory is considered to fall within the scope of this clause," but with the approval of the Government of India the sheikhs were not formally notified to that effect for the time being, and action, pending the settlement of this case, was limited to a reminder to the sheikhs by the residency agent not to entertain applications from outsiders for mining rights without consulting the residency. For explanation of Sheikh Sagar's letter, see under item 12.

27. A *little* over that amount.

The word "little" has been interpolated. In the Arabic it is "wa ziyadeh," *i.e.*, "and over" or "and more."

28. Now if the revenue of an island was to be given to Sheikh Salim, would it not have been natural to give him that of the Island of Abu Musa?

The status of Sir Abu Nuair and Abu Musa Islands, in relation to the ruling Sheikh of Shargah, were precisely the same. The simple reason why Sheikh Sagar did not at that time intimate the grant of the revenue of Abu Musa to Salim in lieu of a cash payment, was, that that island then brought in no specific revenue. The fact was that the interest which Salim had taken in the place as ruling chief (*e.g.* Annex 1) and the money he spent in endeavouring to cultivate it had all come to nothing by reason of the

failure of the water supply. Thus addressing the resident on the 9th Zilkaadeh, 1297 (14th October 1880), the residency agent wrote that according to what he had heard from the Ruler of Shargah (then Sheikh Salim), regarding Abu Musa, "its water has altogether become salt and the trees have died away. He does not get anything from the place, not even a gaz" (small copper coin).

So the reason why the income of the Abu Musa was not mentioned is obvious (see also item 35).

29. Salim has always exercised the right to wreckage on Abu Musa.

These petty potentates of the gulf littoral do not concern themselves with abstract attributes of sovereignty, and in tracts were no postal or telegraphic communications exist and effective administrative control, according to our ideas, is lacking, practice is necessarily conflicting with theory. The right to jetsam and flotsam is exercised on the basis of "might is right." The local inhabitants exact it when they can, and the sheikh of the principality levies or foregoes his royalty as his inclination and ability may dictate. Abundant testimony to this effect is forthcoming.

The cases connected with the Island of Abu Musa, quoted in the German argument, were never reported to the residency, as an amicable solution was arrived at locally. I have no reason to doubt the facts, but may mention in connection with the first case quoted, and German Annex No. 6, that Salim was at that time acting as Regent so that he might have been writing as ruling sheikh. He admittedly shared the proceeds of wreckage with the inhabitants of the island for the time being—migrants from the Shargah suburb of Khan for the most part, and thus full subjects of the Ruling Sheikh of Shargah—but he exercised this right in virtue of the dispensation from Sagar which permitted him to enjoy the produce of the island (*vide* Sheikh Sagar's statement in Annex 2). As far as the residency is concerned we have always, as a matter of course, recognised the position of the ruling sheikh in the matter.

Thus, on the 17th May, 1894, the residency agent, Shargah, reported the wreck of a Bahrein boat on Abu Musa, and its detention by the inhabitants thereof pending payment of half the value (Annex 3). It will be seen that it was "the Sheikh of Shargah" that the Chief of Bahrein proceeded to entreat, and "the Sheikh of Shargah" whom the residency recognised (Annexes 4 and 5).

Again, in the case of the stranding of the British Indian Steam Navigation Company's steam-ship "Bulimba," on the island (Annex 6), it is clearly the "Sheikh of Shargah" whose position and responsibility were recognised.

As a matter, under article 4 of the treaty of the 6th February, 1806, with Sheikh Sultan bin Sagar, father of Salim and grandfather of Sagar, the Jowasim, are not entitled to exercise their right in the case of British craft, but in practice the incident has usually happened and has been adjusted by local understanding before any news of it has transpired.

On the general question of the incidence of the right, and the position and practice in regard thereto, I offer the following evidence:—

(1.) Copy of a letter dated the 1st March, 1905, addressed by me to the assistant resident, Bunder Abbas, in reply to an enquiry on the subject (Annex 7).

(2.) Translation of Sheikh Sagar's own explanation of the position of himself and Sheikh Salim in reference to this question (Annex 2).

(3.) Question put to various Arab sheikhs of the coast on the subject of the ownership of Abu Musa and Sir Abu Nuair and the position as regards the right to wreckage. (Annexes 8, 9, 10).

(4.) Replies of the following sheikhs and notables:—

*(*a*.) Mahmood-bin-Tahnoon, agent of the Sultan of Muscat at Lingah.

*(*b*.) Abdullah-bin-Majid, Sheikh of Bostana, of the Sunni Arab tribe of Marzuq, who claims to be a branch of the tribe inhabiting Ajman on the Trucial Coast.

(*c*.) Haji Ali Mohamed-bin-Abdul Wahid, a notable of the same place and tribe.

(*d*.) Haji Mohamed-bin-Hassan-el-Maithoom of same place.

*(*e*.) Sheikh Khalfan-bin-Mishah, Sheikh of Dawwan, belonging to the Sunni Arab tribes of Al Ali, a branch of the tribe inhabiting Um-el-Kowain on the Trucial Coast.

*(*f*.) Sheikh Sultan-bin-Ahmed-bin-Rashid, Sheikh of Moghu, of the tribe of Marzuq (see (*b*)).

(*g*.) Haji Abdullah-bin-Ali, a notable of Hasineh and belonging to the tribe of Marzuq (see (*b*)).

* These are the more important.

*(*h*.) Sheikh Hassan-bin-Abdul Rahim, Chief of Hasineh and belonging to the tribe of Marzuq (see (*b*)).

(*i*.) Ali Abdullah-bin-Mohamed, notable of Hasineh, and belonging to the tribe of Marzuq (see (*b*)).

*(*j*.) Sheikh Saleh-bin-Mohamed-el-Ali, Chief of Charak.

*(*k*.) Sheikh Ahmed-bin-Abdullah, Chief of Muqam, of the Arab tribe of Hammadi.

°(*l*.) Sheikh Ibrahim-bin-Abdullah, Chief of Kalat, of the Hammadi tribe.

*(*m*.) Sheikh Abdullah-bin-Mohamed, Sheikh of Cheroo, of the Sunni tribe of Obaidli connected with Trucial Oman.

(*n*.) Sheikh Ahmed-bin-Mohamed, Sheikh of Quais, of the Sunni Arab tribe of Al Ali (*vide* (*c*)).

(*o*.) Haji Ali-bin-Abdullah Behzad, a well-known merchant of Keis.

(*p*.) Haji Isa-bin-Saleh, a well-known merchant of Keis.

(*q*.) Haji Mohamed-bin-Hyder, a well known merchant of Keis.

(*r*.) Haji Haji Isa-bin-Husein Jamani, a well-known merchant of Keis.

30. On the other hand the first agreement contains the passage "So long as I, my children, and my brothers live no one shall have a right to raise objection to it."

Regarding this rejected draft see Sheikh Sagar's observations (Annex 2) and Abdul Latif's note (Annex 11). It will be remarked that the draft was written by Abdullah-bin-Hassan Samieh. It was all very well for Abdullah cunningly to put such words into Sheikh Salim's mouth, but Salim knew well enough that he was not in a position to make such a pronouncement and the draft was rejected specifically on that account. Directly Abdul Latif saw it, he said that it would not do and wrote out an amended draft omitting the objectionable words. Until I showed it to him a few weeks ago, Sheikh Sagar had never seen or heard of it.

The cautious Abdul Latif also realised that the admission of Nakhoda Ali into the original agreement with the sheikh, which would have to be reported to the residency, was inexpedient as he had a bad reputation and was disapproved of by the residency, and his inclusion would probably be objected to.

His name was, therefore, omitted from the original agreement and it was decided to bring him in on a subsidiary agreement between the partners *inter se*. (It is very evident from all that has transpired how very much these two ignorant Arab sheikhs were in the hands of the more sophisticated people with whom they were dealing and how very necessary it is for us to look after their interests in such matters).

31. In the document of the 19th August, 1898, ... Sheikh Sagar . . . . expressly undertakes to pay a proportional part of the mother-of-pearl due. This is absolutely inconsistent with Sagar's assertion that he had granted to Salim *only the rent of the oxide mines* and, at the same time, shows that Salim had a right to the enjoyment in his own name of all sources of profit to be derived from Abu Musa, and that he could exercise this right even as against the reigning sheikh.

It has not been contended that Sheikh Sagar granted *only* the rent of the oxide mines (see item 15).

It was perfectly natural for Sheikh Sagar, entering this commercial concern as a private individual, on the same terms as the others, to share the payment of the ground rent. He would naturally have been debited with this share even if he had been taking the rent himself. Sheikh Salim only enjoyed the produce adversely to the private individual Sagar and subject to Sheikh Sagar's pleasure as ruling chief and to specific conditions (*vide* also items 32 and 37).

32. On the 26th December, 1898 . . . . Salim . . . . leased all the deposits of mica on Abu Musa.

Regarding this mica concession, see Sheikh Sagar's observations (Annex 2). (I may mention, for the information of Government, that the residency agent, Abdul Latif, made no report whatever of it, either at the time of its execution or at any other time; and during the progress of and discussions regarding this case he can only be regarded as having designedly suppressed all mention of it. His excuse that the project fizzled out and that he consequently did not think it worth reporting cannot be taken

* These are the more important.

seriously.) So far as Sheikh Sagar is concerned, I have no doubt that, the concession never having been taken up, and a decade having elapsed since it died a natural death, he had really forgotten all about it in 1908. This is not at all surprising with such feckless people as these sheikhs, who keep no records and live in the present.

I believe the history of the so-called "mica" project is this. The captain of one of Messrs. Strick's steamers, which took a consignment of oxide from Abu Musa, mistook some thin strata of gypsum, which is common on the island, for mica, told the oxide concessionnaires that it was valuable, and advised them to get a contract for it. It proved not to be mica. I think we should rely in regard to this item on the lines given in Sheikh Sagar's explanation, namely, that he was fully consulted and accorded his concurrence; he having admittedly allowed Sheikh Salim conditionally and within reasonable limits to enjoy the produce of the island, and being glad that he should derive sufficient therefrom to allow him no excuse for importuning his nephew for money.

33. On the 6th January, 1899 (23rd Shaaban, 1316), Abdul Latif sends to Hassan Samieh the draft of a memorandum of association respecting the working of both the oxide and the mica mines.

The memorandum of association as given in Annex 14 of the German rejoinder is not the one which accompanied Abdul Latif's letter of the 23rd Shaaban, 1316, to Hassan Samieh, but a modified version which Abdul Latif never accepted.

It will be noted that no signatures are given on the annex in question, for the reason that the document was never signed up, and the memorandum was never accepted nor became operative. For further details on the subject of this memorandum of association see Abdul Latif's statement (Annex 12) and item 50 of this report. All the original documents are in my possession.

34. In the documents relative to the mica mines there is also a stipulation of importance to the effect that the lessees and their employés may cut down Keshkeshuh trees, but no other trees. This provision, too, is evidence that Salim disposes of the island as owner.

The Keshkeshuh is a desert shrub used for burning. Firewood is a great difficulty on these barren islands, and if no express stipulation had been made there would have been a danger of the concessionnaires' coolies indenting on the date palms or other garden trees which Salim had tried to grow. This stipulation is no evidence that Salim disposed of the island as owner. He was admittedly the tenant and settler and was allowed to enjoy the produce as long as he was allowed to occupy that position.

35. Another document which is of importance as bearing on the question of ownership . . . . is the letter addressed by the British agent Abdul Latif to Hassan Samieh on the 12th November, 1898, ... Abdul Latif writes that a dispute has arisen between Salim and Sagar in regard to Sir.

The explanation of the dispute regarding Sir is a very simple one and disposes of all the arguments which the German memorandum basis on it.

Abdul Latif's note on the subject (Annex 13) explains the position fully and his explanation is corroborated by papers already filed with the case and is also confirmed by our records.

Abdul Latif had no hesitation about Abu Musa because Sagar had admittedly, in connection with the oxide concession, allowed Salim to enjoy what income he could get out of the island, but in the case of Sir there was no longer such an arrangement. The agreement of 1884 had been revised and another agreement (1889) executed, in which mention of Sir had been eliminated. So until the two sheikhs came to an understanding nothing could be done.

In effect, Salim said to Sagar "You gave me the revenue of Sir because it was supposed to bring in 200 dollars, but you never made it up to me when it did not; now that there is some chance of getting some income from it you won't let me have it."

Sagar replied to Salim: "The agreement (1884) under which I let you have the produce of Sir, lapsed, and in the existing instrument between us the income of that island is no longer included; meanwhile, I have since resigned to you the income of Abu Musa which is quite enough for you, and I am not prepared to give you that of Sir as well.

36. . . . . Three residents of Lingah have declared in writing that to their certain knowledge Abu Musa has always been and still is the free property of Salim.

The three residents referred to are:—

(1.) Abdul Muhsin-ibn-Ahmed-al-Mushari.
(2.) Abdarrahman-ibn-Muhammad-ibn-Kazim.
(3.) Hamd-ibn-Khalifa-al-Uymi.

They are all persons whose opinions would not be of the slightest weight on this point even if they were *bonâ fide*, but they are all objectionable witnesses.

(1.) Is a petty trader associated with Hassan Samieh in pearl dealings. His opinion is of no value whatever in regard to the question under reference. (See also Annex 14.)

(2.) Formerly French agent—dismissed from his post as unfit. Has been frequently subject of complaint from Residency in the past and is so at the present time, on account of his still trying to run a dhow under the French flag to which he has no right. (See also Annexes 14 and 15).

(3.) Was a petty merchant—always in a state of bankruptcy and receiving help from Hassan Samieh. He recently died insolvent. (See also Annex 14.)

In refutation of the above I produce statements (Annexes 8, 9, and 10) to an entirely contrary effect from various and important Arab sheikhs of the littoral, most of them of the same stock as the chiefs of the Trucial Coast. They belong to the category of maritime Arabs who up to comparatively recent years possessed and ruled the littoral on both shores of the Gulf. Their whole history has been bound up with the coast and islands of the Gulf, and their views must necessarily be of the greatest weight.

It will be seen that they are unanimous in the opinion that Abu Musa Island is the property of the ruling Chief of Shargah.

37. . . . . It cannot be questioned that he exercised with the consent of the reigning sheikh and even as against him the full right of disposal of the usufruct just like an owner—*et sequitur*.

It is admitted that as tenant he enjoyed the usufruct subject to the consent of the reigning sheikh, but not "as against" the latter, except *qua* private individual, and in so far as Sagar, as ruling sheikh, consented. We concede that in the case of the mica concession Salim was not acting as Regent, but was then acting in consultation with Sagar and with his concurrence.

The English view is not that "Sagar is the owner of the oxide mines," but that the ruling Sheikh of Shargah owns them, and Sagar occupies that position at present (see items 31 and 32).

38. "Sagar had no right, from the point of view of private law, to terminate the agreement of his own motion."

In this matter the ruling sheikh is a law unto himself. When he cancelled the concession he was dealing with persons subject to no jurisdiction but his own and that of the British Government, and was entitled to act as he pleased to the extent to which the latter Government chose to acquiesce as regards their subjects. The British Government considered his action warranted under the circumstances, and declined to intervene in behalf of their subject.

39. The lessees and especially Abdul Latif therefore wished to secure it (the concession) for as long as possible; accordingly the stipulation of a definite term of years was omitted in the second agreement.

In view of the terms of the first and rejected agreement, it is difficult to maintain the argument adopted in clause 2 of our first memorandum of the 10th July, 1908, or avoid the conclusion that the omission of the specified period was made by concessionnaires in their own interests. Having regard to the fact that Abdul Latif drafted the agreement in its final form, and that the right of the concessionnaires to use the mines as long as they wished was provided for in both versions, it can hardly be said that the time limit was omitted in the second instrument simply to safeguard the lessors' interests. I think the best line for us to take on this point is that it is difficult to gauge the exact

motive which prompted the omission, but if it was the one suggested by the German memorandum, and if the oxide business was then, as they say, considered very profitable, and if it was intended by the lessees to bind the lessors permanently in return for a nominal rent of 20*l.* per annum, then there was obviously all the more reason for Sagar to put his foot down and cancel the concession and for us to support him in so doing.

In omitting this time limit the astute concessionnaires thoroughly over-reached themselves, for it is clear from the abundant testimony of mullahs and merchants now forthcoming that, even if the lease were not revocable on any other grounds, it was rendered invalid both in clerical and mercantile law on account of this very omission of any time limit. For the rest, the mere fact that concession No. 1 was rejected shows that the irrevocability claimed was at any rate only comparative and not absolute.

40. The question whether, assuming that Sagar is the lessor, he is able to terminate the lease agreement, because the lessee has begun to earn money and the rent does not appear sufficient to him (Sagar) is one that cannot be discussed seriously.

This was a reason or a part reason suggested by His Majesty's Government and not given by the sheikh himself, but it is a very natural one. He and Sheikh Salim knew no more about the oxide prospects when the concession was granted than they did about the mica. They were simply exploited by three more astute business men. As soon as they came to realise that they had been "done," they wanted to upset the arrangement.

41. On the question of the termination of the lease agreement opinions have been obtained from the leading merchants at Lingah and Bussorah and the most important clergy of Lingah, Shargah, and Dubai (Annexes 19 to 24).

I append a separate note (Annex 14) regarding the identity of the merchants and clergy mentioned in the German rejoinder, from which it will be seen that the merchants quoted are by no means leading merchants, and that there are good grounds for regarding their testimony with suspicion; while the clergy are certainly not the "most important," nor compare in repute with some of those whose opinions I now produce.

42. All the opinions come practically to the same conclusion . . . . according to *commercial law* the lease agreement is valid; the lessor cannot terminate it.

As I have mentioned above the commercial evidence given in the German rejoinder is, in my opinion, impregnable, and in any case entitled to no weight. The German firm have evidently had recourse to, or introduced to their consul, not "leading merchants," as they suggest, or persons whose opinions are of any value, but just a particular clique of individuals in Lingah, who are notoriously hostile to British interests and influence.

In refutation of this evidence, I bring forward the opinions of eleven representative merchants (Annexes 17 and 18) from different parts of the littoral, all of whom express the view that the lease is invalid, according to the Commercial Law of Islam, because it lacks both specification of period and is devoid of any record of the pronunciation of the proposal and acceptance formulæ, considered to be a necessary feature of such documents.

43. According to *religious law* the lease agreement is invalid . . . . But any person who discovers or works the mines thereby acquires the right to exploit them . . . . Hussan Samieh or the company of lessees has by working the mines acquired a right to them.

I submit a quantity of weighty testimony from numerous members of the clergy, including the chief priests of Lingah and Bushire, both Sunni and Shiah (Annexes 19 to 23). They are unanimous in the opinion that the lease agreement is invalid for several specific reasons, *e.g.*:—

(1.) Non-pronunciation and record of the usual formula of proposal and acceptance;
(2.) Non-specification of period;
(3.) Non-specification of the amount of profit to be derived by the lessee.

It will be seen that two separate questions were put to the clergy (Annexes 19, 21, and 23).

In the first place:—

(*a.*) As to the validity of the document, according to Shara law.

Then afterwards, the invalidity of the document having been admitted,

(*b.*) As to the right of the lessor to cancel it and eject the lessee, and resume the control of his property.

The concensus of these opinions entirely supports the view that the lease was invalid, and that the lessor of the property is entitled to cancel the lease and resume his property. I would especially point to the opinions recorded by Abdarrahman-bin-Abdul Ghafoor-el-Mufti, who has a very high reputation among the inhabitants of the littoral and islands.

As regards the clerical contention, relied on in the German rejoinder, viz., that in Islam mines are the common property of all Mahommedans, and that anybody who works them has thereby acquired an indefeasible right to them. The clergy of Islam may continue in the abstract to cherish this ancient and chimerical tenet, which had its origin in the interested aim of the Mahommedan hierarchy to keep matters concerning mines and the exploitation of minerals in their own control, but no one can pay serious attention to such an exploded claim at the present day, much less contemplate giving effect to it in practice. It seems waste of time to discuss it.

The conclusion to be drawn from the opinions now produced is that the lease was bad in law, whether commercial or religious; that Sheikh Sagar or Sheikh Salim (they were both of one mind, so it matters not which) had the right to cancel it, and eject the lessees; and that it ceased to be operative from the moment it was cancelled. I may record the personal view that the cancellation by a ruling sheikh of a concession granted to British subjects is not a matter which we should allow to be decided by a round robin of recorded views either of merchants or clergy, and that I regard both as mere padding. As, however, the German claimants have had recourse to it, we produce similar stuff in refutation.

44. The sale to foreigners is not a breach of the agreement.

No. It was not suggested that the sale of oxide to foreigners was a breach of the agreement, but the grant of a monopoly to a person not under the control of the sheikh or ourselves was, in the opinion of the sheikh, a breach of the understanding on which the concession was granted.

(B.)

Remarks on the German Exposition of the Position of Sheikh Sagar with respect to the Company of Lessees from point of view of Public Law.

45. The British memorandum further remarks that the principal object of Sagar was to administer justice, as between the partners of the company, "on the strength of his sovereign rights of jurisdiction."

The above is a misquotation. What we said was that Sheikh Sagar cancelled the lease on the strength of his sovereign rights of jurisdiction. We went on to express the view that his principal motive was the desire to administer justice between the partners and render nugatory the unauthorised action of Hussan Samieh. This has not quite the same bearing as the German quotation of us.

46. Could the sheikh cancel the lease agreement by a judicial decision? . . . . A judgment can only be given by a judge appointed by a Sovereign.

This dispute will not be solved by reference to abstract principles of Mohammedan law, to which not the slightest attention is paid locally. All these Arab rulers, the Sultan of Muscat, the Sheikhs of the Trucial Coast, Bahrein, Koweit, &c., administer justice themselves, only referring to the Shara points which obviously concern them.

Although the German Government are pleased to consider it surprising, it seems a very natural thing to us, in a case which primarily concerns only the sheikh and three British subjects, to allow the sheikh as ruling chief to take such measures as he may

see fit to regulate the matter, with what we consider is due regard to the interests of our subjects. But he has not given a judicial decision as between the partners (*vide* items 48 and 66).

47. Hassan Samieh resides not in Shargah but at Lingah, in Persian territory, and therefore in the judicial district of the British consulate-general at Bushire.

In bringing forward this argument the German Government renew the attempt which they made before to bring the dispute away from the jurisdiction of the Government of India and the resident in the Persian Gulf, into the sphere of the consulate-general at Bushire and His Majesty's Legation at Tehran. The point is an important one, and it is very necessary for us to maintain our present attitude in regard to it.

The actual document was executed at Shargah, and the partial reason for the inclusion of Esa-bin-Abdul Latif in the concession was in order that one of the concessionnaires might reside at his head-quarters, and so be in touch with the sheikh. It is a pure accident that the Samiehs, who are of Bahrein origin, happen to live at Lingah. They might equally well be residing at Bahrein or Koweit. Abu Musa appertains not to Lingah or Persia, but to the Trucial Coast and to the jurisdiction of the British representative at Bushire in his capacity of political officer accredited by the Government of India to the sheikhs and principalities of the Arab coast and islands of the gulf.

As I urged in my note of the 12th February, 1910, as long as we deal with the matter as one concerning the Government of India's residency jurisdiction we are in a much stronger position to lay down what the sheikh, who is a law unto himself, can do and can be permitted to do. I may mention that in the case of a current claim on the part of Hassan Samieh for compensation for loss of gear alleged to have disappeared from Abu Musa, I was careful when holding the enquiry to take all the parties over to Abu Musa and make the investigation there in the presence of the Sheikh of Shargah's representative.

48. It still remains to consider the further question whether his decision, *i.e.*, cancelling of the lease agreement and withdrawal of the mines was in itself legally admissible.

This is a question concerning the sheikh and the British authorities only. The British Government hold that the sheikh's action was fully justified by the circumstances. The sheikh and the Government of India were prevented from going further and making any adjustment between the three concessionnaires *inter se* by the ill-advised action of two of them in attempting to drag in the German firm and Government. When the matter is allowed to take its natural course it may be possible to regulate matters as between the concessionnaires.

The legality of Hassan's action was a matter for the sheikh and the Government of India to decide. If Messrs. Wönckhaus's commercial interests were prejudiced by Hassan's action it was for him to seek commercial relief in the usual way.

This argument has all been stated before, and it seems superfluous for me to go over the ground again.

49. . . . . The (British) memorandum starts from the assumption that Hassan Samieh's proceedings were culpable.

Yes; this is so. The German quotation which follows of the argument of the British memorandum is not quite a correct one. The argument of the British memorandum was that "there is nothing in the documents in possession of His Majesty's Government to indicate that Hassan Samieh occupied the post of the managing partner and that there was every reason to believe that in any case any authority he had did not extend to the grant of such a contract as this (which tied the hands of the company for an indefinite period) without first consulting the partners.

50. The Imperial Government, however, maintain that the partners did, as a matter of fact, sanction the agreement between Hassan Samieh and Wönckhaus, but this sanction was not really necessary as Hassan Samieh is the manager of the company.

Our reply to this has been (1) that Hassan is proved to have deliberately misled the partners as to the nature of the contract and withheld the text from them; and (2) that their sanction was necessary.

Hassan had nothing else to work on by way of authority than the conditions laid down in the document admitting Nakhoda to partnership (Enclosure 2 to first German memorandum). It is shown in item 33, that the memorandum of association (Annex 14 of German rejoinder) was never signed up and never became operative, and that the concern was being worked on the conditions prescribed in Enclosure 2 above mentioned.

Furthermore, it will be noted that Hassan Samieh never attempted to contend that he was under no obligation to consult the partners, but that he had consulted them and that they had approved—the fact being that when communicating with them he had deliberately withheld the text and the important feature in the contract to which he knew perfectly well they would object. His letters to Nejef (Annexes 24 to 27) show clearly that on ordinary occasions he did feel under the obligation to consult the partners and that Nejef demurred to his failure to do so in this case.

51. . . . . It is disputed that Nejef was a partner. . . . . This partnership was connected with personal services and therefore ceased when the services came to an end.

This conclusion is not demonstrated by the documents quoted.

The subsidiary deed admitting Nakhoda Ali as a partner in the expenditure and profits of the company makes no such suggestion but on the contrary clearly places Nakhoda Ali (among the partners *inter se*) in precisely the same position as his fellows. Nor can the question, or rather the answer, be begged from the disingenuous query and suggestion made in Abdul Latif's letter to Hassan of the 23rd June, 1905 (German Annex 32). Abdul Latif himself states that Hassan's reply to that letter indicated that they did not recognise Nejef and that he, therefore, dropped the suggestion.

52. This view (that Nejef was not a partner) is shared by Hassan Samieh and Abdullah and the former energetically denied to the Imperial vice-consul at Bushire that he had ever recognised Nejef as a partner.

I have a considerable number of letters from Hassan and Abdullah to Nejef, of which I submit a selection (Annexes 24 to 30), which give the lie to the above denial and conclusively show that they both recognised Nejef as having donned his father's mantle, as a partner in the company.

53. . . . . He (Nejef) said to Abdullah, son of Hassan Samieh, in the presence of the dragoman of the Imperial vice-consul at Bushire, that he entirely approved of the agreement with Wönckhaus.

(*Vide* also the note to this passage.)

Reliance can neither be placed on the statements of Abdullah-bin-Hassan nor on those of the then dragoman of the Imperial German vice-consulate (since dismissed).

As regards the declaration of the British subject Brown that Nejef expressed approval of the contract and offered to sell his share, this being a retraction of what he stated in his petition to Lieutenant Gabriel on the 16th February, 1908, I can only say that the statements which Mr. Brown understood him to make must be regarded as having been retracted by the affidavit subsequently recorded before Major Trevor. (Annexes 31 and 32). It can hardly be doubted that, had he been so inclined, Nejef would have been induced both to part with his share in the company, and to give a written acquiescence to the contract with Wönckhaus; not that from our point of view either the one transaction or the other would have been of any value when obtained months after the concession had been cancelled. (See also Enclosure 18 of first British memorandum).

54. No objection to the agreement with Wönckhaus was raised by the British protégé T. J. Malcolm of Bushire, of whom the British memorandum only says that the lessees had "engagements" with him while, as a matter of fact, he had entered the company two years after the concession of the lease agreement.

Mr. Malcolm as a matter of fact did complain that Hassan had entered into the contract without consulting him and had refused to give him a copy of the document

(*vide* his letters of (1) the 23rd August, 1906, and the 17th October, 1906, included in papers submitted by me on the 1st March, 1908). He then asked my advice as to what course he should take, but I said I could express no opinion without seeing his deed of partnership. This he was then unable to produce. Mr. Malcolm is almost stone blind and at that time had just got rid of his Persian clerk and was, consequently, unable to find any of the papers bearing on the precise terms of his partnership in the company. It was for this reason, namely, that we had not seen his papers, that the British memorandum only referred so briefly to his connection with the concern.

He has since found the deed of partnership and I now append a translation of it (Annex 33). It proves of considerable importance and shows that his position, like that of Nakhoda Ali, was one of absolute equality among the partners *inter se*.

55. No doubt Hassan Samieh ought not to have made use of the excuse that the agreement was in German.

After making this casual observation the German rejoinder goes on to endeavour to explain away or belittle Hassan Samieh's tactics in concealing the text of the contract from the knowledge of his partners. They were demonstrated sufficiently clearly in the summary of Hassan's correspondence submitted by me with the material for our first memorandum on the 1st March, 1908, and under item 7 of that memorandum. There can be no doubt of Hassan Samieh's sustained endeavours, all through, to suppress the plain fact of the monopoly or so to gloze over it that it would not be noticed. While the German argument here makes out that it was only Malcolm (as a possible rival in his capacity of Strick's agent) whom Hassan wanted to keep in the dark, it would appear from Hassan's letter to Malcolm dated the 14th October, 1906, that it was in reality Abdul Latif from whom he was anxious to conceal the terms of the contract, for he wrote to Malcolm :—

"In truth it is not my intention that anyone should come to know about it except myself and you."—(Enclosure 14, British memorandum).

The reasons for his perseverance in withholding from Abdul Latif the precise terms of the contract were obvious. He had been repeatedly warned by Abdul Latif that while there was no objection to the mere sale of the stuff to any body, he should not commit himself to any deed or formal contract without consulting him, and he (Hassan) knew well enough that both the execution and the terms of the document in which he had bound himself would be objected to by Abdul Latif directly he saw them. To discount this opposition from Abdul Latif his obvious course was to postpone the delivery of the copy and the objections of Abdul Latif as long as possible, so that he could then plead that the contract had been in operation now to such an extent that it was impossible to go back on it. This is precisely the line he took. Thus, writing to Malcolm on the 9th May, 1907, he said :—

"A long period has elapsed since I made the contract with the German, and I have been engaged in doing the work, our labourers have been working there and heavy expenses have been incurred . . . . They did not make any objection all the time!"

That the execution of such an instrument was incompatible with Abdul Latif's repeated injunctions and Hassan's own protestations is clearly demonstrated by the correspondence submitted on the 1st March, 1908. Among the latter I would point to Hassan's letters of the 30th January, 1905, and the 5th July, 1906, which did not form enclosures to the previous memorandum presented to the German Government.

56. He (Malcolm) further expressly states : "If we are not sure of getting a higher price we shall not get the former agreement cancelled."

Mr. Malcolm did not favour me with a copy of this letter, and the line of argument or persuasion used therein is unfortunate, but it will be noted that it was written in reply to Hassan's letter to him dated the 14th October, 1906 (Enclosure No. 14 of British memorandum), and after Malcolm's communications to me on the subject of Hassan's intrigues with the German firm and his refusal to supply a copy of the contract (*vide* his letters to me referred to in item 54 above). The object of the missive was simply to allay Hassan's suspicions and induce him to send a copy of the contract, and I suppose Mr. Malcolm worded it in the terms most likely in his opinion to have the desired result.

57. When Malcolm later on received a copy of the agreement he said no more about it, and accordingly acquiesced in it.

It will be seen from his letter to me that he did not acquiesce, but by the time he got the copy (not till December), I had also then got one, and he was awaiting informal advice from me as to what action he should take. I could give him none because he had not produced his deed of partnership.

I think we might say that Malcolm did protest to the residency both at the conclusion of the contract without his being consulted and at the refusal of Hassan to supply him with a copy, but that being unable at the time to find his deed of partnership there was nothing on which he could base a formal complaint against Hassan.

58. As the correspondence shows Abdul Latif agreed to this.

Neither Abdul Latif nor any one else had any objection to the mere sale of the stuff to Messrs. Wönckhaus. All Abdul Latif's expressions of approval were made in ignorance of the precise text and bearing of the contract and in the belief (a natural one after his repeated admonitions) that nothing more than a sale of the mineral had been agreed upon.

59. It is not till about four months later that Abdul Latif . . . . begs Hassan to send him a copy of the agreement.

For the simple reason that up to now Abdul Latif had trusted to Hassan's good faith but had now received news which aroused his apprehensions, namely that Hassan had granted a monopoly and bound himself for a number of years.

60. He (Abdul Latif) goes on to say, "It is better to try to cancel the agreement than to do as he (the German) wishes" . . . . The British memorandum translates the passage in question as follows: "The nullification of this agreement is better than its acceptance."

In the German memoranda a great deal of argument has been based on the wording of this passage translated in the sense which they contend should be attributed to it. In support of their version they quote the opinions firstly, of a young American missionary at Bussorah, and secondly, of a German professor of Berlin. Both opinions are theoretical and conjectural and do not profess to pay any regard to local usage.

In refutation of them I bring forward—

(1.) A statement from Abdul Latif that what he meant was "the annulment of this contract is better than its acceptance." (Annex 34.)

(2.) Proof that Hassan Samieh understood him in that sense and repeated his words back to him but more grammatically and unmistakably. (Annex 34.)

(3.) The opinion of the well known missionary, the Rev. S. M. Zwemer, who has laboured for some fifteen years among the Arabs of the Gulf and probably knows their local peculiarities of speech and writing better than any living man. He has no hesitation in saying that the meaning intended, and the natural interpretation to place upon the sentence is "The annulment of this contract is better than its acceptance." (Annex 35.)

This collective testimony disposes of the arguments which the Germans have based on the forced interpretation which they sought to place on the words. The translation "compliance with the German's wishes" was quite a second thought. (*Vide* Enclosure 8 of the first German memorandum.)

61. The facts cited above show that Nejef . . . . as well as Malcolm and Abdul Latif declared their approval of the conclusion of the agreement.

We contend that after seeing the text of the agreement none of them approved of it—such approval as was expressed having been induced by the deliberate suppression of facts by Hassan.

62. The memorandum of association and the extent of Hassan's powers to act for the partners.

The answer to the arguments on this point is that the document quoted as Annex 14 of the German Rejoinder is not a completed document and bears no signatures. It was not accepted by Abdul Latif and was never completed or signed up. It has

never been seen by Sheikh Sagar, Malcolm, or Nejef, and has never been quoted or acted upon by any of the parties, and no accounts have ever been rendered by Hassan Ali Samich as would have been required had it been operative. (Annexes 40 and 42.)

I append a statement by Abdul Latif on the subject (Annex 12) and would also refer to the statement of Isa-bin-Abdul Latif, dated 17th Muharram, 1326 (20th January, 1908), forming an enclosure to my letter of the 1st March, 1908. Esa and Abdul Latif have never suggested that Hassan was not the managing partner for the sale of the oxide "with the knowledge of all."

But this deed which granted a monopoly for a number of years to Wönckhaus, was a new and radical departure from the practice of the past; it was clearly a privilege which it was not within Hassan's competence to grant without consulting his partners and by his tactics in endeavouring to keep the terms of the document secret from his partners, Hassan showed that he knew very well that he had acted *ultra vires* and that they would object as soon as they understood the effect of the document.

The ground for Esa's action was (*vide* his letter of the 20th February, 1907, to Sheikh Sagar) that "Hassan Samich has no deed of authority from me giving him any general power in regard to the action which he might take respecting the lease, &c."

Nor had he. His conduct of affairs, *e.g.*, his refusal to render any accounts, his inclination to ignore his partners and his readiness to buy up their shares, warrant the conjecture adumbrated by Nakhoda Ali (Annexes 36 to 39) that his aim was to tire out, or to buy out, the others and get the concern into his own hands.

> 63. . . . . He, Malcolm could not do anything although he was a partner, because an individual partner had no right to act . . . . it could not be stated more distinctly that Hassan Samich is the managing partner.

I attach a copy of an affidavit made by Mr. Malcolm which explains his attitude towards the concern and towards Hassan Samich. It is clear that he did, in practice, treat Hassan as managing partner, up to a certain point. (Annex 40.)

In this regard generally I would observe that the British memorandum said no more than that there were no documents in their possession to indicate that Hassan was managing partner.

Other documents, such as Malcolm's deed of partnership (Annex 33) are now forthcoming which show that Hassan did act as managing partner for the ordinary sale of oxide "with the knowledge of all," but that does not alter the fact that his execution of his exclusive contract with Wönckhaus, and the terms of that contract were both *ultra vires*. He had no authority to warrant such a step.

> 64. It appears from the books of the company which were kept very neatly, clearly and well.

In this case it is the more curious that Hassan should have persistently neglected to furnish any accounts to his partners, and should always have put them off with vague promises that he would soon make them up. There is good reason to believe from the reports of the residency agent Lingah at the time that these nicely kept accounts were concocted by Abdullah and Brown at Lingah (Enclosure to residency letter of the 21st March, 1908, to India).

> 65. Hassan Samich was acting entirely in the interests of the company when he concluded the agreement with Wönckhaus.

If he thought this and thought they would approve, where was the need for secrecy and prevarication?

> 66. Accordingly Esa's complaint was entirely unfounded and there was no legal ground for Sheikh Sagar to give any judicial decision unfavourable to Hassan Samich.

It is not contended that Sheikh Sagar has given a judicial decision as between the partners. He merely exercised the right which he enjoys, as a law unto himself in regard to his own territory, by cancelling a concession in what he believed to be the interests of the partners and himself. (See also items 46 and 48.)

As soon as the German Government has ceased endeavouring to drag the matter

into the realm of politics, such measures as are necessary in order to arrive at an adjustment of interests or claims among the concessionnaires, who are all British subjects, will become possible. This is purely a matter concerning the sheikh and ourselves.

> 67.—(2.) Could Sheikh Sagar cancel the lease agreement of his own motion in the interest of the administration of the country?
>
> * * * * * *
>
> In the first place it is not easy to understand how the agreement of the 1st June, 1906, can be regarded as a letting of the mines to Mr. Wönckhaus.

Stress cannot be laid on the precise bearing of the particular English word used. Remember it is a question of the translation of a vernacular word. In this case it is the word used by Esa, Sheikh Sagar, and Abdul Latif in reference to the document passed to Mr. Wönckhaus. The word is "ijareh," or "ijar," the latter being merely a contraction of the former. The word has a much more elastic signification than our word "lease." It includes "hire," "rent," "farm," "a privilege or income of variable amount sold or let for a fixed sum." Similarly, "ijareh-dar," in Persian, and its equivalent, "mustajir," in Arabic = "a farmer or renter of land or revenue," "a leaseholder," a monopolist," "a hirer." Perhaps "farm" would be more appropriate than "let" or "lease" in the present case.

We are indebted to first German memorandum, Enclosures 6 and 8 for rendering "lease."

The reason why the persons above mentioned have applied this term "ijar" to the instrument in this case, and have not merely called it a "contract" or "deed of sale," is plain from their letters (*e.g.*, Enclosure 12 of first German memorandum and 17 of British memorandum), namely, that the deed granted a monopoly and left the partners no power of control of the output or modification of the contract. It was thus an "ijar."

> 68. Sagar's fear that the agreement may lead not only to the property in the mines being gradually lost to the owner, ... but even to the separation of the island of Abu Musa from Shargah, is so senseless that it is really not worth while to discuss it.
>
> * * * * * *
>
> It is also strange that . . . . Sheikh Sagar should wish British subjects to be treated differently from those of other Powers.

Sheikh Sagar's apprehensions are not so baseless in practice as they seem to be to the German Government in theory. These Arab sheikhs have no speedy means of communication with their outlying possessions, no men-of-war to cruise and keep an eye on them. As late as 1904 Sheikh Sagar was put to a great deal of anxiety and inconvenience because an over-zealous Belgian director of customs anxious to make history, went over to the island in a Persian customs steamer and hauled down his flag, hoisting the Persian flag instead.

The British Government, which protects these sheikhs in regard to their external affairs, speedily took the matter up and had it righted to the sheikh's satisfaction, but the incident naturally gave him a fright and made him suspicious.

The action of the German firm and German representatives in this case has certainly not been calculated to allay those suspicions. Although in the arguments adduced in this case they have repeatedly declared that the contract entered into by Hassan was simply a sale of oxide by Hassan and a purchase of oxide on delivery by Wönckhaus, yet their conduct towards the sheikh has shown him clearly how readily a very different complexion is introduced into the transaction.

Thus—

(1.) On the 13th October, 1907, Messrs. Wönckhaus wrote to Sheikh Sagar:—

"We consider the mines and the concession for them as a security for the advances paid. If you force Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Somayah and Co. to withdraw their coolies and representatives we shall have to send over some men ourselves to protect our property."

(Consul, Bunder Abbas, to Government of India, dated the 25th October, 1907.)

(2.) On the 28th October, 1907, Lieutenant Gabriel, assistant resident, Bunder Abbas, reported :—

"The local representative of Wönckhaus, Mr. Brown, and about twenty-six men, left for the island on the 22nd October.

"A German flag which he intended to place on the accumulation of oxide was also taken."

(Consul, Bunder Abbas, to Government of India, telegram dated the 28th October, 1907.)

(3.) On the 19th November, 1907, addressing Sheikh Sagar direct, the German vice-consul, Bushire, threatened the sheikh with a claim of a lakh of rupees, and claimed for Messrs. Wönckhaus the right of direct entry (or concern) in the working of the mines.

(Residency telegram to India and Tehran dated the 13th December, 1907).

(4.) On the 16th March, 1909, Hassan Samieh, no doubt under advice from his German supporters, wrote a threatening letter to Sheikh Sagar, in which he said :—

"All the oxide mines which are on the Abu Musa belong to us and our syndicate, and are under our control and in our possession."

(Residency letter dated the 4th July, 1909, to India.)

As regards the apparent differentiation between British subjects and other foreigners, I would explain :—

The British Government are as anxious to protect these unsophisticated Arab sheikhs against unfair exploitation by British subjects just as much as other foreigners, but from the sheikh's point of view it is very natural that they should regard British subjects in a different light to other foreigners. They know that the British subjects if not subject to their own jurisdiction are subject to that of the British political authorities, with whom they are united by close ties of treaty and obligation. They trust to the British Government to keep their own subjects in hand, and give the sheikh's immunity from worry or imposition. They have no such guarantee in the case of other foreigners, neither under the complete control of themselves nor of the protecting Power.

Even Hassan Samieh until it suited his book to change his ideas, had strong views on that point, and at one time was all against the admission into the concern of any foreigner.

(*Vide* Annex 41 and following item.)

> 69. . . . . (The company) was only doing what was necessary in the defence of its legitimate interests, when it endeavoured to acquire a share in the company, and so to exercise a direct influence on the fortunes of the latter.

Apart from what we have already maintained, namely, that the concession had already ceased to exist for eight months, when Brown went through a form of purchase of Sheikh Sagar's share; and the evident fact (*vide* Enclosure 11 of first German memorandum and other papers) that when he went into that transaction he had full knowledge of the previous cancellation of the concession; we now have the text of the deed of partnership admitting Malcolm (Annex 33), and the inclusion therein, in Abdullah-bin-Hassan's handwriting, of the express condition that "it is not open to any one of the partners to sell his share or to admit any one therein except in consultation with Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Samieh, and with his signature together with those of the partners." This again is emphasised in Hassan's letter on the subject to Abdul Latif (Annex 41). It would be quite open to us to argue from this emphatic condition, brought into operation on the 13th Shaaban, 1316 (27th December, 1898), that the sale by Sheikh Sagar of his share to Yusuf-bin-Abdullah a month later (17th Ramzan, 1316 (the 30th January, 1899)), was invalid, because it did not bear the signature of any of the partners, and that the sale* of the same share by Yusuf to Hassan on the 15th Shaaban, 1318 (the 8th December, 1900), was doubly illegal.

In this connection the bearing of the letter of Hassan Samieh to Abdul Latif, of the

* Enclosure 4 c to first German memorandum.

7th January, 1900, is particularly important. It will be seen that it was specifically in connection with the Yusuf Abdullah share, then in the market, that Hassan introduced the prohibition against any partner selling his share, or admitting an outsider without consulting him and all the partners. He congratulates Abdul Latif for preventing Yusuf from selling the share to a foreigner, and says, we are better entitled to take the share, and it will then go to the partners.

Notwithstanding this, he very soon afterwards bought Yusuf's share himself and refrained in connection therewith from fulfilling the necessary condition which he himself had made but a few months before. Neither the signature of Esa, nor Malcolm, nor Nakhoda Ali was taken on the transfer, and no one heard anything about it until Hassan went somewhat out of his way to inform the residency agent, Lingah, of the fact in October 1906, and the latter reported it to me on the 2nd November (see Annexes 31 and 40).

> 70. . . . . The Imperial Government for the reasons stated in the memorandum are convinced of the illegality of the cancelling of the agreement.

Our reply to this is that the question of the cancelling of the agreement between three British subjects and a sheikh in treaty relation with us is a matter concerning us and him alone, and that the German Government have no *locus standi* to pronounce upon it.

> 71. It was evidently the aim of Sheikh Sagar's action throughout to render the rights enjoyed by M. Wönckhaus under the agreement for the supply of the oxide illusory for the benefit of his competitors.

This is an unfounded assumption. Sheikh Sagar had no ideas of the kind.

> 72. His proceedings are an infraction of the "maritime peace," to the preservation of which in those regions His Majesty's Government devote particular attention.

On the contrary it was precisely in order to prevent any lawlessness, or any unnecessary rough handling of British subjects that the presence of the "Lapwing" was ordered (see also item No. 1).

Annex 1.

Letter from W. Guthrie, Commanding H.C.S. "May Flower," to Captain Prideaux, Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

(Extract.) *September 4, 1876.*

* * * * * *

Leaving Sirree noon of the 24th, we anchored at Bu Musit by 6 same evening.

The Chief of Shargah has found good, fresh water (three wells) close to Bu Musa peak (300 yards east of peak). Wells are 24 feet deep. Several other wells, after digging 14 feet, had to be abandoned, although they were distant 1 mile from sea. They had dug through 6 feet fine mud, then a small conglomerate shingle and shell beach followed by more compact limestone. Salt water came up. Strange that there are some of these failures within 400 yards of sweet water. The island is covered with a luxuriant grass in some places 1 foot wide, it is chiefly level land, a few hillocks near the margin of the sea. Chief has sent over forty mares and some foals, one horse, and eleven camels to give milk for the latter. Horses get 2 lb. of barley and 2 lb. of dates daily, are turned adrift at 7 A.M. to go where they like; they come home in the evening and are tied up. There are eleven men with them, they have camels' milk, 2 lb. of dates daily, one day in seven a feed of rice. As for days of the week they know only when the sun gets up and goes down—what need to know more—and are perfectly happy. In the season they catch a turtle or two, and have a glorious feast. The beach on the seaside of the island was strewn with countless numbers of seagulls' eggs, hatched by the sun by day, birds sitting on them at night.

Annex 2.

Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khaled-bin-Sultan to Lieutenant-Colonel Cox.

(Translation.) *Shargah, 23rd Rabi I*, 1329 (*March* 25, 1911).

After compliments and enquiries after your health, I beg to address you in regard to your enquiry regarding the undermentioned three points connected with the Abu Musa case:

1. You say that it is claimed that on the 12th Shaaban, 1316, after my return from the Hajj, Sheikh Salim granted to three persons an agreement for the extraction of mica from Bu Musa Island without any permission from me, and you enquire from me that if I was aware of the same, how was it that I did not mention this agreement to you on the 19th Moharram, 1326, when I presented to you a statement of my relations with Sheikh Salim in regard to the Bu Musa Island.

2. You also mention to me the question of jetsam and flotsam on the Bu Musa Island, and state that it is claimed that Sheikh Salim was receiving the income on this account; and

3. You have also shown me the translation of a paper which is claimed to be dated the 4th Zilkhadeh, 1315, and to be the first draft of the oxide contract which was altered to another form on the 19th Zilkhadeh, 1315.

This is my reply with regard to three points:—

Firstly, in regard to the mica agreement, I was fully aware of it, and Sheikh Salim consulted me [about it] and it would not have been possible that the said agreement could be issued without coming to my knowledge as ruling chief. But as I informed you two years ago, I had left to Sheikh Salim all the income which he could obtain from the aforesaid island, and consequently I did not trouble [myself] to object to this [agreement]. At the same time, when I presented to you the said statement regarding my relations with Sheikh Salim in respect of Bu Musa, the question of this mica contract did not occur to my mind at all, for, as you must be aware, the mica affair produced no result whatever. As regards the sum of 1,500 dollars, payable by instalments, to Sheikh Salim, I have no information as to how many instalments were received by Sheikh Salim. I did not trouble to make enquiries about the instalments, nor did I demand anything from Sheikh Salim on that account. It was my wish that he should get something from it, and that he should not trouble me about his expenses.

Secondly, as regards the right to jetsam and flotsam on Bu Musa Island and all the Islands of Kowasim, it is not open to doubt that it is due to the chief of the Kowasim, but the usual custom on the Oman coast is that the inhabitants of the place exact their rights on the scene of the wreck, and when the chief comes to know of it he settles the matter according to his own opinion; sometimes he takes his own share from his subjects and sometimes he does not take from them. In the case of Bu Musa, as I had left all the revenue to Sheikh Salim, I treated my right of jetsam and flotsam as a part of the income to go to him and used to ask no questions about it.

Thirdly, with regard to the rejected draft of the oxide agreement, I have now noted its wording, but had neither seen nor heard of it before. The reason for its rejection is obviously because Sheikh Salim could not write about Bu Musa in these terms, namely, "So long as I, my children, and my brothers live, no one is entitled to raise objection to it." No doubt this was the cause of the draft being changed. This is what was necessary to be stated, and salaams!

(L.S.) SAGAR-BIN-KHALED-BIN-SULTAN.

Annex 3.

The Residency Agent, Shargah, to Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

May 17, 1894.

A letter reached me from the residency agent residing at Bahrein, enclosing a copy of a letter from the Chief of Bahrein regarding a jolly boat belonging to one of Sheikh Isa's subjects, named Mohamed-bin-Saleh-bin-Jebara, which stranded on the Isle of Abu Musa. Your servant endeavoured to release the jolly boat from the hands of the

inhabitants of Abu Musa for the sum of 70 dollars; at the time Mohamed-bin-Saleh-bin-Jebara was present with me the inhabitants of Abu Musa refused, but [would] only accept half [of the value of the boat and cargo], according to custom. Mohamed-bin-Saleh-bin-Jebara departed from Bahrein to inform his chief [and point out] that should he desire to entreat the Chief of Shargah on account of friendship or [for] other reason [the latter would release it]. When the [Bahrein] agent's letter reached me I returned an answer according to what had passed on this subject, but no reply has come [to it] According to what is noticed by me [*i.e.*], that the inhabitants of Abu Musa voyage in the jolly boat and convey cargo, it has become necessary to inform you, as probably that an accident may befall the boat. It is better that the owners of the jolly boat should strive to release the boat. Bahrein agent's letter, a copy of the Chief of Bahrein's letter are enclosed.

Annex 4.

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to Residency Agent, Shargah.

Bushire, June 22, 1894.

Your letter dated the 17th ultimo, together with its enclosures, regarding the boat of Mohamed-bin-Saleh-bin-Jebara rescued by the inhabitants of the Island of Abu Musa has been received.

If no previous agreement has been made by the parties regarding the amount of salvage, and if the circumstances of the case show that the claim for a half share of the boat and cargo is exorbitant, you may use your good offices with the Chief of Shargah to induce to salvers to accept such remuneration as may be just and reasonable according to local custom and usage.

Annex 5.

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to Residency Agent, Shargah.

Bushire, June 22, 1894.

With reference to the correspondence between you and the residency agent, Shargah, regarding the salvage claimed by the people of the Island of Abu Musa for rescuing the boat of a Bahrein subject, by name Mohamed-bin-Saleh-bin-Jebara, I enclose a letter I have addressed the Shargah agent on the subject, which please transmit to him after perusal.

Annex 6.

Residency Agent, Shargah, to Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

April 14, 1907.

I beg to state that the chief officer of the British Indian Steam Navigation Company's steam-ship "Bulimba" came to me on the 1st April, 1907, reporting that the steamer had stranded on the Bu Island and asking me to notify the Shargah merchants to send lighters to Bu Musa for the purpose of landing the cargoes they had on board her. I notified the merchants accordingly. The officer then proceeded to Dubai to meet the ship's agent, Mohamed-bin-Ibrahim, and arrange for the dispatch of lighters to Bu Musa. I was informed by the officer that the islanders had not agreed to render the vessel any assistance unless they received half the cargo.

The agent, Mohamed Ibrahim, having asked me for assistance to be rendered to the steamer, I sent with him my brother, Muaraj-bin-Abdul Rahman, to Bu Musa lest the islanders may do something irregular towards the ship's crew and the cargo, which

it may be desirable to discharge on the island in order to launch the vessel. I took likewise a letter from the Chief of Shargah to the islanders ordering them to refrain from raising objections against the ship's crew, and to give them such help as they can. However, by God's grace and the company's good fortune, the sea remained calm and waveless while the vessel was stranded until arrangements were made for launching her. According to Maaraj's report to me, His Majesty's ship "Highflyer" had visited Bu Musa just as the stranded vessel was being launched. Thank God nothing unpleasant occurred in the vessel's stranding, but if a storm had taken place she would have incurred some damage having stranded on hard rock.

Annex 7.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, March 1, 1905.

I have the honour to reply to your letter of the 14th February, 1905, regarding salvage fees.

I would first observe that the usual local custom is for the Nakhuda of a boat in distress to apply to the local authorities or people for assistance and to agree with them on the amount of salvage money.

If the vessel is in serious danger, the persons rendering assistance claim half the value of the goods salved, a procedure sanctioned by local usage, but this residency has refused to recognise that they have any absolute right to demand such a share in the absence of agreement with the Nakhuda of the vessel. Local customs in this matter, as in others, depend more on "might" than "right," and efforts are always made to mulct the owners and Nakhodas of vessels as much as possible.

Annex 8.

Form 1.

Question put regarding the Jurisdiction and Ownership of Abu Musa Island, and the manner of the exercise of the Rights of jetsam and flotsam on the Islands of the Gulf.

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

As you are familiar with the traditions of the past and the rights of the Arab sheikhs in regard to the coast and islands in the Gulf, what is your opinion on the following points:—

1. The islands of Bu Musa and Sir Bu Nuair, to the jurisdiction of which sheikh do they belong and in which sheikh are the rights of ownership vested?
2. The right to jetsam and flotsam in the islands, by whom is it exercised?

Answer.

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

Firstly, I am familiar with the matters about which you ask me. It is well known amongst the Arabs of the Gulf that the islands of Bu Musa and Sir Bu Nuair are islands belonging to the territories of the Jawasim of Oman and that their owner is the ruling sheikh of the Jawasim who resides at Shargah and who is at present Sagar-bin-Khaled-bin-Sultan.

Secondly, as regards the question of jetsam and flotsam it is always taken at the time by the inhabitants of the scene of the wreck and when the chief comes to know of it, he is entitled to take a share; sometimes he takes it and sometimes he foregoes it, as he may deem fit.

MUHAMMAD-BIN-TAHNOON,
Agent of the Sultan of Muscat.

(L.S.)

Note.—The word "loth" which I translate "jetsam and flotsam" is one commonly used by all inhabitants of the Gulf Islands and littoral, for all stray things found floating in or cast up by the sea—the meaning to this given in the dictionary is "something rolling or floating in water."—P.Z.C.

Annex 9.

Form 2.

Question put regarding the Jurisdiction and Ownership of Abu Musa Island, and the manner of the exercise of the Rights of jetsam and flotsam on the Islands of the Gulf.

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

As you are one of the Arab sheikhs of the Persian Gulf and are familiar with the traditions of the past and the rights of the Arabs in regard to the coast and the islands in the Gulf, what is your opinion on the following points:—

1. The islands of Bu Musa and Sir Bu Nuair, to the jurisdiction of which sheikh do they belong and in which sheikh are the rights of ownership vested?
2. The right to jetsam and flotsam in the islands, by whom is it exercised?

Answer.

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

Firstly, I am familiar with the matters about which you ask me. It is well known amongst the Arabs of the Gulf that the islands of Bu Musa and Sir Bu Nuair are islands belonging to the territories of the Kawasims of Oman, and that their owner is the ruling sheikh of the Kawasims who resides at Shargah and who is at present Sagar-bin-Khaled-bin-Sultan.

Secondly, as regards the question of jetsam and flotsam, it is always taken at the time by the inhabitants of the scene of the wreck and when the chief comes to know of it, he is entitled to take a share; sometimes he takes it and sometimes he foregoes it, as he may deem fit.

(Signed and sealed) SALEH-BIN-MUHAMMAD-EL-ALI,
Chief of Charak.

Answers in a similar sense recorded by the following also:

Ahmed-bin-Abdullah-el-Hamadi, Chief of Merbakh and Mugam.
Ahmed-bin-Muhammad-el-Ali, Headman of Keis Island.
Abdullah-bin-Majed-el-Marzooki, Headman of Bustaneh.
Khalfan-bin-Misbah-el-Ali, Headman of Dowwan.
Sultan-bin-Ahmed-Marzooki, Chief of Moghu.
Abdullah-bin-Muhammad-el-Abeideli, Chief of Armeki and Cheeroo.
Ibrahim-bin-Abdullah-el-Hamadi, Chief of Kolat.

Annex 10.

FORM 3.

Question put regarding the Jurisdiction and Ownership of Abu Musa Island, and the manner of the exercise of Rights of jetsam and flotsam on the Islands of the Gulf.

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

As you are an Arab merchant of the Persian Gulf and familiar with the traditions of the past and the rights of the Arab sheikhs in regard to the coast and islands in the Gulf, what is your opinion on the following points :—

1. The islands of Bu Musa and Sir Bu Nuair, to the jurisdiction of which sheikh do they belong and in which sheikh are the rights of ownership vested?
2. The right to jetsam and flotsam in the islands, by whom is it exercised?

Answer.

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

Firstly, I am familiar with the matters about which you ask me. It is well known amongst the Arabs of the Gulf that the islands of Bu Musa and Sir Bu Nuair are islands belonging to the territories of the Kawasims of Oman and that their owner is the ruling sheikh of the Kawasims who resides at Shargah and who is at present Sagar-bin-Khaled-bin-Sultan.

Secondly, as regards the question of jetsam and flotsam, it is always taken at the time by the inhabitants of the scene of the wreck and when the chief comes to know of it, he is entitled to take a share; sometimes he takes it and sometimes he foregoes it, as he may deem fit.

(Signed and sealed) ALI-BIN-ABDULLAH, *Belizad in Keis.*
(A well known and reliable merchant of the Keis Island)

Answers in a similar sense also recorded by :—

Haji-Isa-bin-Saleh, resident of the Keis Island :
(A well-known and reliable merchant of the Keis Island.)
Haji-Muhammad-bin-Hydar, resident of Keis :
(A well-known and reliable merchant of the Keis Island.)
Haji-Isa-bin-Hussein-Juman ;
(A well-known and reliable merchant of the Keis Island.)
Muhammad-bin-Ahmed, resident of the Keis Island :
(A well-known merchant and notable of Keis.)
Ali-bin-Muhammad-Abdul-Wahid-el-Marzooki :
(A notable of Bustaneh.)
Abdullah-bin-Ali-el-Marzooki, resident of Hasineh :
(A notable of Hasineh.)
Hassan-bin-Abdul-Rahim ;
(A notable of Hasineh.)
Ali-bin-Abdullah-bin-Muhammad-el-Marzooki :
(A notable of Hasineh.)
Muhammad-bin-Hassan-el-Meithooni-el-Marzooki ;
(A leading merchant of Bustaneh.)

Annex 11.

Note by Khan Bahadur Abdul Latif giving history of the rejected Preliminary Draft of the Oxide Concession and explaining the reason of its rejection.

With reference to the translation which you have shown to me of what purports to be a rejected preliminary draft, dated the 6th April, 1898, of the oxide concession executed on the 10th April, 1898, I beg to make the following observations :—

I note that the document purports to be signed by (1) Hassan-bin-Ahmed and (2) Ali Ahmed Saleh.

The Hassan-bin-Ahmed mentioned was a retainer of Sheikh Salim. Ali Ahmed Saleh is the man whose identity you know as Nakhoda Ali. I had nothing to do with the writing or drafting of this document.

I remember that I had been absent on duty at Bushire during the spring of the year in question, and it was on my return to Shargah that the project for an oxide concession was discussed. The draft had been drawn up by Abdullah-bin-Hassan Samich, and it was he who showed it to me. At the same time he and Nakhoda Ali, who was also there, asked me to let my son Isa come into the concern as they needed some one on the spot at Shargah in order to keep in touch with Sheikhs Sagar and Salim. I agreed; but pointed out that the terms of the proposed concession as at present drafted were quite impossible, and that neither Sheikh Sagar would confirm it nor would the Government approve it. What I especially objected to was (1) the sentence in which Sheikh Salim is made to say : "so long as I, my children, and my brothers live, no one will be entitled to raise objection to it," and (2) the inclusion of Nakhoda Ali as a signatory on the document.

With regard to (1), I would explain that Salim was an old man of 70, who might be expected to die at any time, and I was taking into account the fact that if he died, we should thenceforth have to deal with Sheikh Sagar.

As regards (2) I thought the inclusion of Nakhoda Ali was inexpedient, as I had just been visiting Bushire and knew him to be in very bad odour with the residency in connection with his Bushire affairs, and he was also at loggerheads with the well-known Muin-ut-Tujjar of Tehran, holder of the Hormuz concession, and I feared the latter would be likely to give us trouble if he came to know that Nakhoda Ali was a partner in a rival oxide enterprise. I also omitted the twenty-year time limit, as I saw no object in inserting any fixed period of time.

ABDUL LATIF-BIN-ABDURRAHMAN.

March 25, 1911.

Annex 12.

Note by Khan Bahadur Abdul Latif with reference to the Memorandum of Rules of Partnership, purporting to be dated 26th Shaaban, 1316 (*January* 9, 1899), *and on which Hassan Samich bases his title to represent the Company.*
March 25, 1911.

The history of the paper purporting to be the rules of partnership is as follows :—

The drawing up of the original draft was done by me, the reason being that the oxide mining work had been in operation for nearly a year without any definite plan of operations having been arrived at. I was anxious to put the work on a more business-like footing, and therefore drew up some rules and sent them to Hassan. The latter made certain additions and had five documents drawn up including the additions and signed by himself, Abdullah, and Nakhoda Ali, and he forwarded them all to me for completion by the attachment of the signatures of Sheikh Sagar and myself. When completed I was to return three of them to him, one for himself, one for Abdullah, and one for Nakhoda Ali. Of the remaining two I was to give one to Sheikh Sagar and keep one myself. I did not, however, care about the extra condition which he had inserted and wrote back and said so. There the matter ended. These deeds were never completed nor were any revised documents drawn up. I never showed them to Sheikh Sagar, and produce them now in the state in which I received them. These rules never having become operative, Esa and I always considered and presumed that the document on which the concern was carried on was that of Zilhijjeh, 1315, in which Nakhoda Ali was admitted to partnership, and in which it is laid down that the sale, loading, and shipping should be carried out with the knowledge of all the partners. By reason of Hassan's neglect to consult us properly, and his failure to render any accounts, we became dissatisfied with his conduct of affairs.

Annex 13

Note by Khān Bahadūr Abdūl Latīf on the reference to a Dispute between Sheikhs Sagar and Salim regarding Sir Abu Nuair Island (made in his letter of the 27th Jumadi II, 1316 (November 14, 1898).

Your honour enquires from me to what I referred in my letter dated the 27th Jumadi II, 1316,* when I wrote the following sentence :—

"As regards, Sir, a dispute has arisen between Sheikhs Sagar and Salim. It is Sagar's intention to lease without mentioning Salim's name and to give some advantage to Salim, but Salim would not agree to this."

The explanation of the above passage is as follows:-

It will be remembered that in the second agreement between Sheikh Sagar and Sheikh Salim (dated 1884), at which my predecessor was the intermediary, Sheikh Sagar granted to Sheikh Salim an annual pension of 400 dollars together with the revenue of Sir Bu Nuair, which was expected to bring in some 200 dollars.†

Up to 1889, however, this island did not produce any revenue as was expected and consequently no mention was made of it in the third agreement dated the 5th Shaaban, 1306 (1889), and Sheikh Salim ceased to take any interest in it. When, however, it became probable that the island might produce some revenue as the result of the concession alluded to in my letter to Hassan Samich now under reference, Sheikh Salim's interest was naturally revived and he wanted to claim the revenue under the obsolete agreement of 1884, which Sheikh Sagar was altogether unwilling to agree to on the ground that under the last agreement (1889), which was now in force, the revenue of Sir Bu Nuair Island was not an item of the settlement. The sheikhs failed to come to an understanding on this point, with the result that the project for the concession fell through. This is what had to be represented.

ABDUL LATIF-BIN-ABDUL RAHMAN.

March 26, 1911.

Annex 14.

Note for the information of Government on the Identity of some of the individuals whose opinions, as "Leading Merchants," are quoted in the German Rejoinder.

1. Hamid-ibn-Khalifa. (German Annex 19).

An obscure and insignificant person of Bahrein origin. Was formerly a petty merchant, but went bankrupt, and afterwards endeavoured to make a living as a news writer by writing gossip to various native notables in the Gulf and getting occasional presents from them for his trouble. Used to receive help from Hassan Samich and died insolvent. Was in Hassan Samich's pocket and his opinion not of the slightest value in any case.

2. Abdurrahman-ibn-Muhammad-ibn-Kazim. (Annex 20.)

A Persian of Bastak. Well known as an inveterate intriguer, and especially hostile to the British agency at Lingah and to British interests generally, owing to the fact that the residency has been obliged from time to time to make serious complaints against him. He was for some years consular agent for France at Lingah, but in 1907 he was proceeded against by the Customs for smuggling a large quantity of tobacco; and in January 1909, Abdurrahman having circulated a silly story to the effect that the French were going to seize the port of Kung near Lingah, His Majesty's Minister on receiving the report communicated it to his French colleague, who must also have received it from the French consul at Bushire, and replied that he had already had occasion to complain of Abdurrahman, and a little later gave him his dismissal.

I have quite recently had to complain against him under The Hague Award in the French flag arbitration for unlawfully flying the French flag—he having got himself registered at Muscat. I attach a copy of a letter which I addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Minister regarding him on the 16th November, 1907.

* Annex 15 of German rejoinder.

† *Vide* my Memorandum of February 28, 1908 (Enclosure 6 to first British note).

3. Abdullah Muhammad Hassansal-Khadja (German Annex 21).

The German memorandum says of this individual that he is "a man who, on account of his experience and reputation, is a recognised arbitrator in commercial matters whose opinion is asked for by Persians and Arabians of the Persian and Arabian coasts as far as Bahrein, and to whose decisions they willingly submit."

This description is greatly overdrawn. Abdullah Khadja is a Persian subject and a merchant of Lingah. An old man of 80 or 85. He is the father and supporter of one Mohamed Abdullah Khadja in regard to whom, among others, I addressed the Government of India in my letter dated the 4th July, 1909, of which I append an extract. In spite of the action taken against him, Mohamed Abdullah has not ceased to intrigue by using the spurious seal and endeavouring to fly a Turkish flag. He has been able specifically to give us trouble by attempting to treat Arab visitors from Muscat, Trucial Coast, Bahrein, and Koweit as Turkish subjects and thrust upon them Turkish passports or visas, and it has only been by the vigilance of our agent at Lingah and continual pressure on the local Persian authorities by the residency that Mohamed Abdullah has been prevented from achieving much practical success. Naturally, the family bear us ill-will, and their testimony in a matter like this is objectionable.

4. Abdulmuhsin-ibn-Ahmed-ibn-Mushari (Annex 22, *vide* also Annex 16).

A petty trader of Bahrein origin residing in Lingah. His grandfather settled in Kais Island and dealt in pearls. Abdulmuhsin's father was one of the several brothers, and had practically nothing. Abdulmuhsin only inherited a dhow, which he sold for about 8,000 rupees to realise capital for his sustenance. He is a man of straw, who on his last visit to Bombay is said to have had to borrow 100*l.* to pay his way back. He eks out a livelihood through the kindness of one or two friends, of whom Hassan Samich is one. They give him a little money wherewith to speculate on their behalf in pearls. If he makes a profit he gets a share, if he makes a loss it falls on them. (See also item 36.)

5. Abdullah-bin-Hassan-Kalladari.

A fairly well-to-do merchant of Lingah. Is a Persian by birth, and son-in-law to Abdurrahman-ibn-Muhammad-ibn-Kazim. Although he claims British protection against Persian oppression on the strength of a Bombay passport, nevertheless he is always in tow of persons hostile to British interests. He was a prominent member of a troublesome Nationalist anjuman three years ago, the chief propaganda of which was pronounced hostility to British interests; and on another occasion he joined in an intrigue to get one Safar Ali reinstated as Deputy Governor of Lingah, who had been removed at the instance of the residency for neglect of British claims and interests. He is a close friend of Hassan Samich, and has recently been appointed by the German firm agent of their steamers at Bunder Abbas. He is the third person referred to at the conclusion of the extract given under No. 3, Abdullah-bin-Mohamed Khadja.

6. Kasim-al-Khadairi and others (Annex 24).

Kasim-al-Khadairi himself is a well-known merchant of Bussorah; but I do not know who his associates are. I would point out, however, that they are Bussorah Arabs, and profess to make a pronouncement on an instrument which, according to them, "was concluded in the land of Persia."

In the first place, the agreement was not concluded in Persia, and so their opinion is formed on a wrong premise. In the second place, as Turkish subjects of Bussorah, their views on such a matter as this can carry little weight.

As regards the individual clergy who recorded opinions for the German firm I have little to say, except that collectively they do not carry anything like the weight which the views of those we now produce are entitled to be accorded.

P. Z. COX.

May 23, 1911.

Annex 15.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Mr. Marling.

Sir, *Bushire, November* 16, 1907.

With reference to your telegram dated the 30th November, 1906, and previous correspondence in which I was desired to afford good offices to Haji Abdul Rahman,

French consular agent at Lingah, I have the honour to forward, for your information, copies of the correspondence marginally noted.*

Haji Abdul Rahman is an undesirable character who gives us a good deal of trouble in many little ways in Lingah, and I venture to take this opportunity of placing the fact before you in case at any future time the French Legation should repeat their request for our good offices in his behalf.

I may mention at the same time that during the recent troubles at Lingah, Haji Abdul Rahman has been one of the prominent confederates of the objectionable Mudir Ala-es-Sultaneh whose chief title to notoriety has been his active hostility to British interests.

Annex 16.

(Enclosure to Annex 14.)

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Government of India.

(Extract.) *Bushire, July 4, 1909.*

Our agent at Lingah has for years past experienced a great deal of trouble from the vagaries and intrigues of a Persian named Muhammad Abdullah, who though carrying no commission and though the Tehran Government have refused to agree to his appointment, has nevertheless managed, by flying a Turkish flag and using a spurious rubber seal, to pose as a Turkish consular official, and under this guise, to make difficulties for our agent by encouraging visitors from Oman or Bahrein to accept his protection, and in other ways. We have repeatedly complained to the Governor of the Gulf ports of the conduct of this Persian and also to His Majesty's Legation. While Muhammed Abdullah has always been repudiated he has never been suppressed, until last year when the Darya Begi in pursuance of orders received from Tehran took the opportunity afforded by a personal visit to Lingah to have Muhammad Abdullah's flagstaff removed. Soon after this incident, the Vali of Bussorah, who properly speaking would appear to have no status to interfere in affairs on the Persian coast, sent a representative down to Lingah whom Muhammad Abdullah took steps to cram with garbled stories of his ill-treatment by the Darya Begi, and this has now resulted in a complaint against the Darya Begi by the Turkish Legation and a demand that the Governor of the Gulf ports should give satisfaction. A telegram recently received by his Excellency from the Persian Foreign Minister quotes Hassan Samieh as being one of the persons who had furnished statements on which the Turkish demand for satisfaction from the Darya Begi was based. The other two persons who are quoted by name are also individuals with pronounced anti-English proclivities, one of whom has lately been removed from the post of French consular agent which he formerly held.

Annex 17.

QUESTION (A).

As put to the Members of the Mercantile Community.

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

To the respected and honoured merchants. May God the Highest prolong their good fortune!

What do you say in regard to a lease which has been given, according to the following copy, by a certain party to another, and in which no specification of the period has been made, and also no legal formula has been pronounced? Can such a lease be considered proved and binding, and accepted according to the rules of Islamic commerce?

It is requested that you will record the true position in accordance with the

* To French Vice-Consul, Bushire, October 17; to Haji Abdul Rahman-bin-Mohamed Kazem, October 17; French Vice-Consul, Bushire, October 20, 1907.

commercial rules in Islám, and adorn and seal it with your august seal. Please explain and be rewarded, your reward being with God.

(Here follows imaginary deed of lease, in same terms as that given in Annex 29 of German rejoinder), as under:—

In the Name of God the Most Merciful.

Let all know who may see this: I, Zamil-ibn-Ibrahim-ibn-Isa Addossi, have leased the mine which is situated in Assaline to the following persons: Alhadj Abdulhamid-ibn-Abdal-Karim and Mustafa Kerim and Assayid Habib-ibn-Ibrahim, from this date for so long as they are interested in the aforesaid mine. They are to pay £ T. 150 for every year. I have likewise agreed with them that, if they wish to ship dried and fresh dates for trading purposes at the place mentioned, they are to pay us £ T. 100 each year as rent. We authorise them to dig wells for drinking water for their employés working in the aforesaid mining district. Friendly assistance is to be given by us to their employés working in the mining district. It is possible that I may have concluded agreements before this present one; any such are to be invalid, and this agreement alone is to hold good. It has been drawn up in duplicate. Let this be known.

Done the 18 Dulkade, 1320 (16th February, 1903).

(Signed by Zamil-ibn-Ibrahim.)

Witnesses:
SALIH-IBN-HAMDAN.
ABDALKERIM-IBN-ABDULLAH.

Annex 18.

Opinions recorded by Members of Mercantile Community in reply to Question (A).

1. The essential basis of every transaction of the nature of a mortgage or lease, according to the rule of the enlightened Shera, is the pronunciation of the formula and the specification of the period.

(Signed and sealed) HAJI ABDUL RASUL BUSHIRI,
Bais-i-Tujjar.

(*Note.*—Recognised by Persian Government as head of the Persian mercantile community of Bushire.)

2. The commerce of Islam proceeds in accordance with the rule of the Holy Shera law. It is obvious that a lease without specification of period and without the pronunciation of the formula is null and void.

(Signed and sealed) HAJI MUHAMMAD REZA BIN GHULAM ALI, *Behbehani.*

(*Note.*—One of the firm acting as agents of the Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company, and E. D. Sassoon and Co., and a member of the Persian Chamber of Commerce at Bushire. One of the four chief merchants of Bushire.)

3. The commercial principle of Islam is in accordance with the rule of the enlightened Shera (law). It is obvious that a lease without the specification of period and without the pronunciation of the formula is null and void.

(Signed and sealed) HAJI MUHAMMAD BAGER,
Behbehani.

(*Note.*—Head of the firm acting as agents of the Bombay and Persian Steam Navigation Company, and Messrs. E. D. Sassoon and Co., and a member of the Persian Chamber of Commerce at Bushire. One of the four chief merchants of Bushire.)

4. The commercial principle of Islam is in accordance with the rule of the enlightened Shera (law). It is obvious that a lease without the specification of the period and without the pronunciation of the formula is null and void.

(Signed and sealed) SEYYID JAFFAR-EL-MOOSEVI,
Behbehani.

(*Note.*—A well-known and respected merchant, whose opinion carries much weight in local public affairs.)

5. The principle for every transaction, such as sale, purchase of lease, according to the rule of the enlightened Shera (law), depends on the formula.

(Signed and sealed) ALI AKBAR-BIN-ABOOL KASEM, *Shirazi.*

(*Note.*—A well-known merchant of good repute in Bushire.)

6. Whereas the commercial principle of Islam is based upon the sacred Shera law, therefore the said lease which lacks the pronunciation of the legal formula and the specification of the period is null and void, and is invalid.

(Signed and sealed) IBRAHIM-BIN-MUHAMMAD ABDUL WAHID.

(*Note.*—A leading Sunni pearl dealer of Lingah.)

7. Yes; all the commercial affairs of Islam are according to the enlightened Shera. The said lease is null and void owing to the absence of the specification of the period and of the pronunciation of the legal formula, and is not valid.

AHMED-BIN-YUSUF MUHAMMAD HASSAN KHADJA.

(L.S.)

(*Note.*—A member of the same Sunni family as Abdullah Muhammad Hassan-al-Khadja, *vide* Annex 21 of German rejoinder.)

8. Whereas the commercial principles of Islam are based upon the sacred Shera law, therefore the said lease, which lacks the pronunciation of the legal formula and the specification of the period is null and void, and is invalid.

SEYYID IBRAHIM-BIN-SEYYID ISMAIL-EL-MOOSEVI.

(L.S.)

(*Note.*—A principal Shia merchant of Lingah.)

9. Yes; all the commercial affairs of Islam are according to the enlightened Shera. The said lease is null and void owing to the absence of the specification of the period and the non-pronunciation of the legal formula, and is not valid.

IBRAHIM-BIN-HASSAN-EL-OMMANI.

(*Note.*—A well-to-do Sunni merchant of Lingah.)

10. Yes; all the commercial affairs of Islam are according to the enlightened Shera. The said lease is null and void owing to the absence of all specification of the period and the non-pronunciation of the legal formula, and is not valid.

MUHAMMAD-BIN-ALI SHAH.

(*Note.*—A well-to-do merchant of Lingah.)

11. Whereas the commercial principle of Islam is based upon the sacred Shera; therefore the said lease, which is without the pronunciation of the legal formula and the stipulation of the time, is null and void, and is invalid. Let it not be hidden.

(Signed and sealed) MUHAMMAD HASSAN-BIN-HAJI ISMAIL, *Bushiri.*

(*Note.*—A well-to-do Shia merchant of Lingah. Was deputy Karguzar of Bunder Abbas for a long time.)

Annex 19.

QUESTION (A).

As put to the Members of the Clerical Profession.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

To the illustrious presence of the distinguished ulemas (priests) and venerable lawyers. May God multiply the like of them!

What do you say in regard to and of a lease, which has been given, according to the following copy, by certain party to another, and in which no specification of the

period has been made and also no legal formula has been pronounced? Can such a lease be considered proved and binding and accepted according to Shera law?

It is requested that you will write the true position in accordance with the precepts of the holy law of Islam, and adorn it and seal it with your august seal. Please explain and be rewarded, your reward being with God.

[Here follows imaginary deed of lease in similar terms to that of which a translation is given in Annex 29 of German rejoinder, *vide* Annex 12.]

Annex 20.

Opinions of Clergy in reply to Question (A).

1. In the name of God, the Merciful and Compassionate.

Reply.—And God is the guide to what is right. The lease will not be valid without proposal and acceptance by legal formula and without the specification of a fixed period. And God knows more.

Written by Ibrahim-bin-Abdullah.

(L.S.)

(*Note.*—Chief Sunni Mullah of Bushire.)

2. In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

According to the question, this lease is null and void.

Written by Mohimmed Ali Al-i-Oshor.

(L.S.) Confident in God the Bounteous. His slave, Mohamed Ali-bin-Muhammad Taki.

(*Note.*—Imam Juma, the official High Priest of Bushire.)

3. In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

Amongst the conditions for the validity of a lease are the specifications and record of the period of the lease. Supposing, for instance, he were to say, "I have let the house at the rate of 1 tomun per mensem," such a lease is legally null and void, and if the lessee says a prayer in such a house the prayer will be futile. And as to this question there is no difference of opinion between the distinguished ulemas, and God is aware of His precepts.

Written by the humble Mohamed Ali-el-Moosevi-el-Dehdasty-en-Nejafi.

(L.S.) The hopeful Mohmmed Ali-el-Moosevi.

(*Note.*—The most venerable Shia Mullah in Bushire.)

4. It should be understood that the conditions for the validity of a lease are six, by the absence of any of which six conditions the lease is null and void. The first [is] the compact, *i.e.*, the proposal and acceptance, intended to indicate the fact of the assumption of the profit for a fixed period in return for something specific. Secondly, the legality of the possession. Thirdly, the taking cognizance of the rent or the measure or weight or number. Fourthly, the specification of the profit by time or by the job. Fifthly, the retention of the profit in possession or its coming under that category [of possession]. Sixthly, the defining of the period of the lease in such a manner that it shall become neither less nor more. The subject-matter of the question [under reply], being void of certain of the conditions, namely, the compact and the period, and the cognizance of the amount of the profit, is not valid, and God is aware of the truth of affairs.

Written by the humble Abdullah-el-Moosevi-el-Baladi.

(L.S.)

(*Note.*—The chief mullah of the Ussuli sect of Shias in Bushire. His opinions are greatly respected.)

5. In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

The distinguished ulemas—may their blessings amongst the people endure—have defined "lease" to be the taking possession of an ascertained profit in return for something specific. So whatever is like giving possession of original property, for instance by selling it, is a thing extraneous to a compact of lease, and so is anything in which the profit is not defined, either in itself—such as by the act of sewing of a certain garment or the riding of a certain animal to a certain place—or by the fixing of a period such as a full year. And thus, as regards the subject of the question, whereas, it is not a case of taking possession of a profit, but of the original property and, whereas, the profit is not fixed by either of the two methods aforesaid, the lease is accordingly null and void, on both counts, and it is obvious that while there is no contradiction in the said two rulings, it is recorded that the majority set store by the last. And God is aware of His Commands.

Written by this humble servant of the Shera, Murteza-el-Moosevi, Sadr-el-Islam.

(L.S.)

(*Note.*—Seyyid Murteza-el-Moosevi is the stipendiary "Sadr-el-Islam," of Bushire, much respected for his piety.)

6. Praise be to God.

This lease as it is written is null and void and is not valid. The conditions for the lease, viz., the formula of proposal and acceptance and the stipulation of the time are not (made) therein. Further, if the mines are open they cannot be turned into property and the lease is not proper.

This, and God the Highest knows more.

Written by the humblest Muhammad Mohdi-bin-Abdullah.

(L.S.)

(*Note.*—Identical with the priest mentioned in Annex 26 of the German rejoinder.)

7. In the case of the omission of the formula of the lease and the non-stipulation of the time, the lease is null and void and is not valid. And God knows more.

Written by Yusuf-bin-Mohamed-bin-Abdullah, servant of the law, at Lingah.

(L.S.) The dependent on God, Yusuf-bin-Muhammad-bin-Abdullah.

(*Note.*—Identical with the priest mentioned in Annex 28 of German rejoinder.)

8. Praise be to God, the Leader to the right (path).

The said lease, apart from being null and void, is not a lease originally, because a lease without formula and a fixed period is not a lease.

Written by Abdurrahman-ibn-Yusuf. May God forgive both of them.

In Rabi-el-Mauelid, 1329.

(L.S.) SULTAN-UL-ULEMA.

(*Note.*—Identical with the priest figuring in Annex 27 of German rejoinder.)

Endorsement.—The answer of our lord Shaikh Abdul Rahman, Sultan-ul-Ulema, is correct and is according to the Mahommedan law.

Written by the humblest of God's creatures, Muhammad Mehdi-bin-Andullah.

(*Note.*—Identical with the priest figuring in Annex 26 of German rejoinder.)

9. Praise be to God.

The aforesaid lease, being void of the pronunciation of the legal formula and being without the specification of a fixed period, is null and void and cannot be acted upon.

(Signed and sealed) JASEM-BIN-AHMED.

(*Note.*—Sunni Arab Kazi of Bustaneh on the Persian coast.)

10. In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

And God is the Guide. The aforesaid lease, being void of the pronunciation of the legal formula and being without the specification of a fixed period, is null and void, and God knows more.

Written by the humblest Mohammad-bin-Abdul-Rahman, servant of the august law, at Dowwan.

(*Note.*—Sunni Arab Priest of the Port of Dowwan.)

11. O God, lead to what is right.

The lease mentioned in the question is null and void and does not hold good for the reason that the legal formula has not been pronounced and the period of the lease has not been specified; also the owner of the property has the option to immediately prevent lessee from holding the property in his possession. And God knows more.

Written by the humble servant of the august law, Abdul-Rahman-bin-Muhammad, at Moghu.

(*Note.*—Sunni Arab Kazi of Moghu on the Persian coast.)

12. *Answer.*—And O God, guide to the right.

The aforesaid lease, being void of the pronunciation of the legal formula and being without the specification of a fixed period, is null and void and cannot be acted upon.

Written by Muhammad-bin-Salman, servant of the law, at Hasineh.

(*Note.*—Sunni Arab Kazi of Hasineh on the Persian coast.)

13. O God, guide to the right in the answer!

Praise be to God alone, and peace and blessing be on him after whom there is no prophet.

And afterwards, the aforesaid lease is null and void and cannot be acted upon owing to the absence of the legal formula and the non-specification of the period and owing to the ignoring of the period.

Written by the humblest of the members of the clergy, and God knows the right better.

(Signed and sealed) ABDULLAH-BIN-MUHAMMAD SAEED-EL-ANSARI, *Resident of Kelat.*

(*Note.*—Sunni Arab Kazi of Kalet on the Persian coast.)

The answer.—The lease has conditions; if a single condition thereof is violated the lease is spoiled. How is it now that (several) conditions are omitted? The first is that a lease requires bond such as proposal and acceptance; and the second of the conditions thereof is that it should be for a known period. So this, which is written in the question, should be nullified for several reasons, and it cannot be valid in this condition which is stated. And God knows more.

ABDUL KERIM-BIN-AHMED
(Servant of the august law, at Keis, by his own hand).

15. In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

Praise be to God, Who leads to the right.

The said lease is invalid and illegal in several respects and does not contain all the conditions. The first of the reasons for its invalidity is that the period of the lease is unspecified. The second reason is that the formula of the lease has not been pronounced therein. The third reason is that, legally speaking, the right to any ground rent, in the manner mentioned in the question, is unknown (*i.e.*, inadmissible) from all points of view. To take interest on unknown articles for an unknown period, and to compare it to rent is unlawful. In short, this lease, as quoted in the question, according

to "the following copy," is not compatible with the precepts of the august Shera law. And God knows best.

(Signed and sealed) By this humblest and poor,
ABDUL RAHMAN-BIN-ABDUL GHAFOOR, EL MUFTI.

(*Note.*—Chief Kazi of the Sunni Arab community, who is highly respected by all the inhabitants of Bunder Abbas, Lingah, the Shib Kuh Ports and all the outlying ports.)

Annex 21.

QUESTION (B) (i.)

As put to the Members of the Clergy.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

To the learned ulemas and distinguished lawyers. May God multiply the like of them!

As regards a deed of lease which has been given by a certain party to another, and in which, owing to the absence of the specification of the time and the non-pronunciation of the legal formula, the learned lawyers and Islamic divines have, in accordance with the rules of the Sacred Shera of Islam, issued and recorded a judgment nullifying the lease, can the lessor, who is the owner of the property, cancel it and turn the lessee out of his property?

It is requested that you will record the true position in accordance with the precepts of the Sacred Law of Islam and adorn and seal it with your august seal. Please explain and be rewarded, your reward being with God.

Here follows copy of the said lease (an imaginary one) as under:—

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

Let all know who may see this, I, Mohammad-bin-Abdullah-bin-Hassan have leased all the mines situated in the island of Kaem to the following persons: Haji Yakoob-bin-Mohamed-bin-Saleh, Abdul Kerim Mohammad, and Seyyid Sadek-bin-Ali from this date for so long as they have a disposition (to work) in the aforesaid mine. They are to pay us 150 French dollars for every year. I have likewise agreed with them that if they wish to ship dried and fresh dates for trading purposes at the place mentioned, they are to pay us 150 French dollars as warehouse fee; and we have authorised them to dig well for drinking-water for their employés working in the aforesaid mine, and friendly assistance is to be given by us to their employés who work on the mine. It is possible that I may have concluded agreements before this present one, but they are not to be acted upon, and this agreement, which is written in duplicate, holds good.

Dated 18th Zilkadeh, 1315.

MOHAMMAD-BIN-ABDULLAH-BIN-HASSAN.

Witnesses:
SALEH-BIN HAMDAN.
ABDULLAH-BIN-MOHAMED.

Annex 22.

Opinions recorded by Clergy in reply to Question (B) (i).

1. Praise be to God the Most High!

There is no doubt that when a lease is not proved and legalised the owner of the property has the control over his property and can turn the illegal lessee out of his property. And God the Most High knows more.

Dated Rabi II, 1329.

Written by Abdul Rahman-bin-Yusuf. May God forgive both of them!
(L.S.) SULTAN-UL-ULEMA.

(*Note.*—The same mullah who passed opinion forming Annex 27 of German rejoinder.)

2. Praise be to God the Most High!

Answer.—O God (give) success to the right and guidance to truth!

In the case that the conclusion of the agreement is not perfect as regards the conditions, the said lease is not correct legally and is null and void, and the lessor, who is the owner of the property, has, according to the Shera, the right to turn the lessee out of his property immediately, and God knows best.

Written by Yusuf-bin-Mohamed-bin-Abdullah, servant of the Shera at Lingah—the Guarded.

(L.S.)

(*Note.*—The same mullah who passed the opinion forming Annex 28 of German rejoinder.)

3. Whereas the said lease is null and void owing to the absence of the pronunciation of the legal formula and the non-specification of a fixed period, the owner of the property has the right, according to the Shera law, to turn out the lessee from his property immediately.

(Signed and sealed) JASEM-BIN-AHMED,
Kazi of Bustaneh.

4. In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

And God is the Guide. Whereas the aforesaid lease is null and void owing to the absence of the pronunciation of the legal formula and the non-specification of a fixed period the owner of the property has the right, according to the Shera law, to turn out the lessee from his property immediately. And God knows more!

Written by the humblest Mohammad Abdul Rahman, servant of the august law at Dowwan.

5. O God give guidance to the right!

The lease mentioned in the question is invalid for the reason that the legal formula has not been pronounced between them and also the period has not been specified. It is for the owner of the property to turn out the lessee from his property immediately. And God knows more!

Written by the humblest servant of the Shera law at Moghu, Abdul Rahman-bin-Muhammad.

6. *The Answer.*—O God give guidance to the right!

Whereas the aforesaid lease is null and void owing to the absence of the pronunciation of the legal formula and the non-specification of a fixed period, the owner of the property has the right to turn out the lessee from his property immediately.

Written by Bin-Mohammad-bin-Salman, servant of the Shera law at Hasinah.

7. O God give guidance to the right in reply!

Praise be to God alone and peace and blessing be on him after whom there is no prophet!

And afterwards. The said lease is null and void and cannot be acted upon owing to the absence of the legal formula and the non-specification of the period which is a necessary condition of the lease; and it is for the owner of the property, according to the Shera law, to turn out the lessee from his property immediately. And God knows the right better.

Written by the humblest of the members of the clergy, Abdullah-bin-Muhammad Saeed-el-Ansari, of Kelat.

8. *The Answer.*—A lease has several conditions and if a single condition (thereof) is violated, the lease becomes invalid, and how it would be now that several conditions have been omitted therefrom. Firstly, it becomes binding by a known period. This has been omitted, however. Secondly, a lease becomes binding by proposal and acceptance. Should these conditions be absent, the lease is null and void, and when

the lease is nullified it is for the lessor to take possession of his property and to lease it to another; and God knows best.

(Signed and Sealed) ABDUL KERIM-BIN-AHMED
(Servant of the august Shera law, by his own hand.)

And if the owner of the property wishes to turn out the lessee, he can turn him out immediately.

(Signed and sealed) ABDUL KERIM
(Servant of the Shera law at Kois).

9. *The Answer.*—Praise be to God, who leads to the right!

This lease as it is mentioned in the question is not in accord with the precepts of the august Shera, and is null and void and invalid. So, the owner of the property has the option to return to his property, and he has the absolute possession thereof, and can use his property in any manner that he may wish. He has the option (to do so), and the lessee has no right or title in that property. And whatever is invalid according to the august Shera is to be considered as non-existent. Should the proprietor desire to turn out the lessee from that place he can do so, and there is nothing to bind the owner of the place. And God knows more!

(Signed and sealed) The humblest and poor
ABDUL RAHMAN-BIN-ABDUL GHAFOOR, EL-MUFTI.

(Chief Kazi of the Arab community of the Shib Kuh ports—*vide* Annex 20.)

Annex 23.

(Question (B) (ii).

As put to the Members of the Clergy.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

To the learned ulemas and distinguished lawyers, may God multiply the like of them!

What do you say as regards a certain man who leased certain property to a certain party and did not stipulate a fixed period in the deed of lease, wherein also no legal formula was pronounced between them, and after some time the owner of the property cancelled the lease. Has the owner of the property the right of cancelling (it) and expelling Zaïd, the lessee, from his property or not?

It is requested that you will explain the true position according to the precepts of the enlightened Shera, and be rewarded, your reward being with God.

Answer.

Yes, the owner has the right to expel the lessee from his property because the said lease contains nothing binding according to the Shera.

Immediately the owner cancels the lease, the lease becomes dissolved.

Written by Shubbar-bin-Ali-el-Moosevi.

(L.S.)

(*Note.*—Seyyid Shubbar is the Shia Mujtshid of Lingah who is much looked up to both by Shias and Sunnis.)

Annex 24.

Hassan-bin-Ali Samieh to Nejef-bin (late) Haji Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh.

(Translation.) *Lingah, 5th Rajab*, 1323 (*September* 5, 1905).

In the most auspicious hour and the best time, your letter dated Jamadi II reached us and we noted it with pleasure, and what you had stated was duly understood

by your friend. Especially as regards the long absence of news from me, I was in poor health. May God the Most High protect us against all the distempers and may you not see anything unpleasant.

You have stated about the house that it should be under our supervision. It does not matter.

I have already notified you that a discussion took place a few days ago between us and the German, who wishes to take about 500 tons oxide more or less, and we have settled with him for it. Coolies have been working for one and a-half months now and if the remaining portion is cleared up, his steamer will come to ship. Our object is to carry on the business. I have arranged as he desired, and, God willing, if it went to Hamburg and was approved by them, they will ask for another consignment.

Let it not be hidden from you that my son Abdullah has an intention to come at the end of September. He will come to Bombay to settle Salman's account with the Bania Jetta because the court will be closed nowadays for two months. When the court opens, he will appear in the court together with his antagonists before the auditor and will settle their account if God wishes. Now there remains but little work, and he will then come to our side. You know court affairs. A day means ten days (*i.e.*, a day's work will take ten days) and no one can help it. But, God willing, patience is the key of relief.

This is what was necessary (to be said), and please convey our compliments to Haji Muhammad Hussein and Abdullah-el-Mulla.

On this side, all our friends send you greeting. And may you continue to remain preserved and guarded!

Annex 25.

Hassan-bin-Ali Samieh to Nejef-bin (late) Haji Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh.

(Translation.) *Lingah, 8th Jamadi II*, 1325 (*July* 19, 1907).

In the most auspicious time your valued letters reached us, and we noted with pleasure that your health continues to be good; and what you have stated was duly understood by your friend.

[Here a reference is made to the differences which existed at that time between Nejef and one Muhammad Ali in connection with the post of Hamal Bashi, landing contractor, at Bunder Abbas.]

My son, Abdullah, was sent by us to the island, a few days ago, in the German steamer to ship oxide, and he has not returned up to now. He will, God willing, come to us this morning. The steamer shipped oxide and left. We have not yet settled with them the account of the cargo so that we may let you know how much has been shipped.

The news of our side is tranquil, and there has been no report which should be communicated to you, except that all is well.

Give my salaams to those who are with you.

Annex 26.

Hassan-bin-Ali Samieh to Nejef-bin (late) Haji Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh.

(Translation.)
(After greeting. *30th Safar*, 1325 (*April* 14, 1907).

In a most fortunate time I received your letter, dated the 25th Safar, and noted it with pleasure. I have understood what you have stated, especially as regards the receipt of our letter by you. This is satisfactory. As regards my son, Abdullah, it was firstly his intention to come by steam-ship "Mohamedi"; but God did not will this. He will, if God pleases, arrive by the steamer "Naseri," which is due in three to four days, and he will certainly meet you at Bunder Abbas.

You had stated that the German steamer visited the Bu Musa Island and shipped 1,000 tons. There had not been such a report with us, nor has any steamer visited the island. Had any steamer visited there, how could I have omitted to write by letter to that effect. This news is false. You have also heard that the steamer "Mohamedi" will arrive at Bu Musa. This has not become known, and no communication has been made with them (*i.e.*, the agents of the company) regarding the arrival of the steamer.

You had stated that you required Omani tobacco. Tobacco is absolutely unavailable at Lingah nowadays. It cannot be procured even at 6 rs. 8 a. per maund. God willing, I will send you [some] as soon as I obtain it. I have understood all about Abdul Mohsin. May God facilitate the affairs of the Moslems!

The news of our port is quiet, and nothing has transpired that may be mentioned to you, except what is good. Please give my compliments to all those who are dear to you. May you remain preserved!

Annex 27.

Hassan-bin-Ali Samieh to Nejef-bin (late) Haji Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh.

(Translation.)
(After greeting.) *Lingah, 16th Zilhijjeh*, 1325 (*January* 21, 1908).

I beg to advise you that I could not leave home for a period of forty days as I was sick, and that I am, God willing, better nowadays. I have heard from Abbas Haji Ali Akbar that you had written to him requesting him to speak with this humble in regard to Bin Musa. Indeed I did not expect that such a message would come from you by anyone, before you come to me in person and receive the facts and go into the matters (*i.e.*, learn the circumstances). Then you will come to know the account; and every thing with me is kept in proper order. And I consider you like a son and in the same position as my son Abdullah, and you know what friendship existed between us and your father, Haji Ali deceased, who did nothing except after consultation in our business. And you yourself have [nevertheless] forgotten his attitude towards us while we were hopeful that you will follow his footstep. What is certain to me is that you will not keep such things (*i.e.*, such ideas) in your mind, and that you will personally come to me and receive the facts of the matter from my own mouth, verbally, and it will become clear to you. And as regards the affairs of the island, they are pending up to now, and no settlement has as yet been made with the antagonist. I am on the same friendly terms with you as with your father, and it is my hope that your mind will not be annoyed with us. You are [however] of a hasty temper, and listen to the statements of jealous parties; [but] the matter should not be misunderstood by you. You are like a son in my estimation, owing to the friendship which I had with your father. In my opinion, you should come to us at Lingah for a week's time and, God willing, all will be well in our interview. This is what was to be stated, and may you ever remain preserved and guarded.

My son Abdullah sends you salaams.

(*Note.*—This letter is in the handwriting of Abdullah-bin-Hassan Samieh.)

Annex 28.

Hussin-bin-Ali Samieh to Nejef-bin (late) Haji Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh.

(Translation.) *Lingah, 22nd Shaaban*, 1322 (*November* 1, 1904).

I have sent you a letter by the last mail, enclosing a letter from my son Abdullah, and I hope that they have found you in good health.

I have notified you that my son Abdullah has arranged with David Sassoon for a compromise, and that they have demanded of him a power of attorney from you on behalf of your late father, Haji Nakhoda Ali, stating that you are his attorney, and that you constitute my son Abdullah as attorney on your behalf in Calcutta. My son Abdullah has written a power in your name and forwarded it to you by registered post. God willing, you will, on receipt of the power, record your signature therein, and cause it to be sealed by the resident or by the assistant resident or anyone who represents the resident, and sealed by the director [of customs], testifying that my son Abdullah is attorney on your behalf. You should forward it to Calcutta soon, because they have delayed the documents of compromise until they receive the power from you.

God willing, you will forward it to him and inform me of it.

This is what was necessary, and please convey my compliments to Haji Mohammad Ali and all those who are with you, and may you continue to remain preserved and guarded.

Annex 29.

Abdullah-bin-Hussin Samieh to Nejef-bin (late) Haji Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.) *Calcutta, 1st Shaaban*, 1322 (*October* 11, 1904).

It is now a long time that I have received no letters from you. Perhaps the cause which prevented it is good. I am always receiving letters from my father, Hassan, who gives me the news of your health. You should, God willing, inform me of your health and the news of your side by every mail.

O my brother, I beg to advise you in connection with the dispute which was between us and Sassoon. We have settled with Sassoon, and it has been arranged that a compromise should be effected. And we have written papers of compromise for the settlement of the dispute. And whereas your father was one of the partners and he has now passed away, and whereas you are in his place and are his executor, it is necessary that you should give a power of attorney from yourself in my name so that I may affix in the documents your signature with the signatures of the partners which are [recorded] in the documents held by me in the case v. Sassoon, as Sassoon knows that Haji Ali has passed away, and that I, Abdullah, was his agent at Calcutta. Now, after Haji Ali's death, it is obvious that you are his executor, and it is necessary that you should write a power of attorney for me [saying] that I am your agent in Calcutta in all the affairs which may occur in Calcutta, as I was before in the affairs of your father.

For this purpose I have now written a power of attorney in English in accordance with the law which will be accepted by the court; it is a power of attorney from you in my name. There is also an affidavit testifying that you are Nejef-bin-Haji Ali, his executor and attorney, and that you are now in his place. This certificate, together with the power, should be taken by yourself to the British resident or assistant resident at Bunder Abbas, and you should, in his presence, admit that you are the son of Haji Ali, and are in your father's place, and that you have made this power in the name of Abdullah-bin-Hassan, who is to be your agent in Calcutta, as he was before in the lifetime of Haji Ali. Also the resident or the assistant resident should certify in the affidavit that you are Haji Ali's son and his representative.

You should also take a writing from the Belgian director of customs that you are Haji Ali's son and his representative, and obtain another certificate from the postmaster and expedite sending them to me by registered post soon and without delay, and write on the cover my address in English as follows:—

A. H. H. Samieh and Co.,
34/1, College Street,
Calcutta.

You should not delay the power and the documents, but send them to me at an early date. I have also advised my father, Hassan, who will also let you know and urge upon you. I know that at the moment of their arrival you will expedite sending them on. I have written you by this post, and I now intend going to the solicitors, so that I may write the power and the affidavit and send them to you by registered post. I need not urge you further that you should expedite doing what I have advised you. This is what was necessary. The letter was written most hastily.

Your humblest friend,
ABDULLAH-BIN-HASSAN SAMIEH.

P.S. (in red ink).—I was unable to send the power by this mail as it was not prepared. God willing, I shall send it to you by the next mail. Let this be known to you, I shall send it by registered post by the next mail.

A. B. H. S.

Annex 30.

Abdullah-bin-Hassan Samieh to Nejef-bin-Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh.

(Translation.) *Calcutta, 1st Shaaban*, 1322 (*October* 11, 1904).

After compliments and enquiries after your health. I have this day written you a letter by post and enlightened you therein of what was necessary to be stated. God willing it will find you in good health.

I have informed you especially that a settlement has been made between us and David Sassoon by compromise and reconciliation. And let it not be hidden from you that owing to the fact that Haji Ali has passed away, there is need for a power from you so that I may sign for you in the papers appertaining to the compromise, because, in the beginning there was in our hand a power from your father, Haji Ali, [stating] that I was his agent in Calcutta, and after your father's death I informed [them] that you were in your father's place; and the court demanded that you should write a power for me setting forth that you are the attorney and executor of the will of your father, and also that I am agent in Calcutta on your behalf in the Sassoon case, and for the oxide, &c., and the power should be [written] in English in accordance with the law, because Haji Ali has passed away and it is necessary that the court should understand that Haji Ali has no son beside you. Therefore, in order to settle the affairs I have written in your name a special power in the case of oxide and our dispute with Sassoon [saying] that what we now arrange with Sassoon for settlement by compromise is agreed upon by you. I intended sending the power by registered post by this mail but it was not ready. This is for your information, and, God willing, it will reach you by registered post next mail.

You should act upon the instructions which I will now explain to you:—

When you receive the power, you should take it to the resident or British vice-consul and assistant resident at Bunder Abbas. He will read it over to you and you should admit before him that this power is from you to me and that I am your agent in Calcutta in the same way as in the days of your father, and affix your signature—Nejef-bin-Ali-Ahmed-Saleh—in the place which is marked in pencil, then the resident or vice-consul will record his testimony and seal it with the Government seal. You should forward it soon and avoid procrastination and delay and you should send it to me by registered post to Calcutta soon and without delay. On the same day when it reaches you, you should take it to the resident or the assistant who is now present at Bunder Abbas. I have written you this letter by this mail so that you may know that you will receive the power by registered post. I am sending you this letter in my father's letter and have forwarded another letter to you by post. Surely I will write you by the next mail also with the power.

Your letters to me should continue without interruption as before when Haji Ali continuously kept me informed of the situation and of the reports. This is what was necessary to be said at present. God willing, I will settle matters after the receipt of the power and proceed to your side in Shavval.

This is what had to be stated, and may you remain preserved and generous.

Your friend,

ABDULLAH-BIN-HASSAN SAMEH-

Annex 31.

Affidavit of Nejef-bin-Nakhoda Ali, dated March 19, 1910.

Nejaf-bin-Haji Nakhoda Ali states on solemn affirmation:—

I solemnly declare the following to be the facts regarding my interviews with Mr. Thomas Brown, of Messrs. Wönckhaus and Co., and, if necessary, I am prepared to confirm this statement by oath on the Koran before a mujtehed.

I have had several conversations about the Abu Musa case with parties interested. The first was when Abdullah-bin-Hassan Samieh came to see me accompanied by Mirza Hussein "Germani."* They came to Bunder Abbas and stayed in the house of Haji Amin-ut Tujjar. Abdullah, on landing from the ship, came to my house and asked me to come over and have a talk about the matter at Haji Amin's house. I went over to Haji Amin's house, and there Mirza Hussein, Abdullah, and Haji Ali "Germani"† were present. Abdullah asked me to give him a paper stating that I handed over my share of the concession on Abu Musa to Abdullah-bin-Hassan. The paper was to be given a date prior to the date of the contract between Messrs. Wönckhaus and Hassan. He also asked me to give him another paper saying that I was quite satisfied with the contract. I refused, saying that I would not do anything of the sort unless they settled up my account with David Sassoon, that is, my father's, on account of oxide, carpets, &c. I said if they did not give me back the carpets they should pay me

* The dragoman of the German Consulate.

† Factotum of the firm in Lingah.

20,000 rupees and settle my account, and then I would give them the paper. However, they did not give me the money, and I mentioned the matter to the British consulate. These two persons came to Bunder Abbas not long after the British consul, Lieutenant Gabriel, returned there from a trip he made to Shargah, &c. Some months later Mr. Brown came to Bunder Abbas. The exact date can be ascertained from the consul, Bunder Abbas, as I reported the matter to him at the time, but it was just about two years ago. Mr. Brown had two interviews with me, once at the house of Jamshidian's agent and once at the custom-house. At the first interview Agha Ghulam Ali Khorassani was present, at the second Mr. Moses Khan, the customs director. Agha Ghulam Ali is agent of Messrs. Wönckhaus and Co. Mr. Brown had a long talk with me. Before beginning to talk about Abu Musa he dismissed two Hindoos, Gulshan and Asanand Ghulab. Mr. Brown asked me why I had not signed the paper shown me by Abdullah and Mirza Hussein. I said there appeared to be no advantage for me in doing so, and therefore I hadn't. Mr. Brown said he had bought the share in the oxide company belonging to Sheikh Sagar for 250 reals. I replied that Sheikh Sagar had never made anything out of the business, and so would sell cheap. Mr. Brown said he wanted to buy my share, and said that he would settle up all my accounts with Hassan-bin-Ali and Abdullah. I never offered to sell my share to Mr. Brown. In fact, as I reported to the consulate at the time, Mr. Brown offered to buy my share. I would swear to this on the Koran. This took place in the presence of Agha Ghulam Ali Khorassani. At the second interview, and after Mr. Moses Khan tried to persuade me to go to Lingah to settle with Mr. Brown, he continued to endeavour to make me do this for a long time, and, on my refusing, he got annoyed with me, and worried me to such an extent that I finally had to resign my post as Hamal Bashi at Bunder Abbas.

(Mark of Nejef-bin-Haji Nakhoda Ali.)

Declared and signed before me this 19th day of March, 1910.

A. P. Trevor, *Captain*,
First Assistant Resident.

Nejef admitted and affirmed on oath what is recorded before the humblest Khalaf-bin-Yusuf Al Osfoor.*

Dated the 28th Rabi II, 1329.

Sub-Annex to 31.

Affidavit made by Nejef-bin (late) Haji Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh, dated May 27, 1911.

I, Nejef-bin (late) Haji Nakhoda Ali state on solemn affirmation:—

With reference to the paper which has been translated to me purporting to be Memorandum of Association or Rules of Partnership, I beg to say that I have never seen it before, nor have I had any copy of it, nor have such rules ever been acted upon so far as I am aware.

Secondly, with regard to the sale by Yusuf-bin-Abdullah of his share in the concession to Hassan-bin-Sameih, I beg to say that I have not heard of such a sale until to-day, and was never consulted or informed regarding it in any way.

(Signed and sealed) NEJEF-BIN-ALI AHMED SALEH.

Dated 28th Rabi II, 1329.

Before me this 27th day of May, 1911.

P. Z. Cox,
Resident, Bushire.

Nejef-bin-Nakhoda Ali affirmed, on oath, what is recorded in the presence of the humblest sinner, Khalaf-bin-Yusuf Al Osfoor.

(L.S.)

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* Chief Shia Priest of Mohammerah, where Nejef is serving.

Annex 32.

Mr. T. J. Malcolm to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Bushire, December 24, 1907.

I hear Abdullah-bin-Samieh and Mirza Hussein of the German consulate when in Bunder Abbas lately, approached Nejef, the son of the late Nakhoda Ali and one of the partners in the Abu Musa affair in order to obtain a declaration to the effect that he, Nejef, was and is still agreeable to the continuation of the contract concluded between Samieh and Mr. Wönckhaus. I am further told that Nejef had declined to give Samieh the required declaration.

Annex 33.

Translation of Deed admitting Mr. T. J. Malcolm into partnership, dated 13th Shaaban, 1316 (*December* 27, 1898).

In the name of God the Highest.

We do agree and take upon ourselves, Hassan-bin-Ali Samieh, Abdullah-bin-Hassan, Isa-bin-Abdul Latif, Yusuf-bin Abdullah and Ali Ahmed Saleh, that we have admitted amongst us Mr. Tigrane Malcolm in the company for the oxide and mica mines in the Bu Musa Island, which we have leased from Sheikh Salim-bin-Sultan at 250 dollars per annum for the oxide mines, and 1,500 dollars for a five years' period on account of the mica mines, on the condition that he will use endeavours in disposing of and shipping what is excavated from the said mines in steamers from Bu Musa to other countries for sale, and afford full assistance for the non-stoppage of the work on the said mines. And whatever the said expenses may amount to, they will be borne by all the parties, and the profits will also be (divided) proportionately amongst all. And on this (understanding) the agreement is concluded; so that it may not be hidden.

And it is not open to any one of the partners to sell his share or to admit any one (therein) except in consultation with Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Samieh, and with his signature, together with those of the partners.

Dated 13th Shaaban, 1316.

(L.S.) YUSUF-BIN-ABDULLAH.
(L.S.) HASSAN-BIN-ALI-BIN-SAMIEH.
(L.S.) ABDULLAH HASSAN.
(L.S.) ISA-BIN-ABDUL LATIF.
(L.S.) ALI AHMED SALEH.

(*Note.*—The first part of this document is in the handwriting of Abdul Latif. The concluding condition is in the writing of Abdullah-bin-Hassan-bin-Ali Samieh himself.)

Annex 34.

Note by Khan Bahadur Abdul Latif on the meaning of the doubtful passage in his Letter to Hassan Samieh, dated 8th Zilhejjeh, 1324 (*January* 23, 1907).

I beg to refer to the sentence in my letter dated 8th Zilhijjeh, 1324 (23rd January, 1907), which runs as follows:—

استبطال هذه المقاولة خير من اجابته

and about the meaning of which there have been arguments.

I beg to say that my meaning when I wrote the sentence was:—

نقض هذه المقاوله خير من اجابة (يعني تبوانيّة) هذه المقاوله

("The annulment of this agreement is better than the acceptance of this agreement.")

It is not hidden from your Honour that I received my education in the Gulf, and that I am not an expert in the niceties of grammar and the shades of meaning of various measures of words. When I write, I write according to the usages and understanding of the community in which I live.

As regards the use of the measure استبطال, as synonymous with ابطال, the use is quite an ordinary one in these parts, and I can mention many other instances of the same, such as استراحة ("reposing"), استدامة ("continuance"), استخراب ("being ruined"), استدراج ("advancing"), استقامة ("remaining"). There is no idea of a "desire to" here.

Again, you will note that in the letter from my son Isa, dated 7th Moharram, 1325 (20th February, 1907), to Sheikh Sagar occurs the sentence:—

و اطلب من جنابكم المساعدة فى نقض و استبطال هذه "الورقة"

("Va atlub min jenabekum almosaadeh fi naqz va istebtal-i-hazehel varaqah.")

("And I beg your Honour for assistance in the breaking up and annulling of this document.")

This shows that the words نقض and استبطال were used synonymously.

Furthermore, when writing to me on the 23rd Moharram with reference to my letter to him (dated 8th Zilhejjeh, 1324) enjoining on him the نقض و استبطال هذه المقاوله, Hassan used the same form of words as I had, thus:—

"You particularly wrote about the deed of contract which I executed with Wönckhaus, the German, for the sale of oxide from Abu Musa Island. I understood what you said, namely, that your son Isa was not agreeable to the execution of a document of this purport for the reason that I had not consulted you and that it was necessary that the partners should not enter [into transaction] without the knowledge of the other partners; that this humble one had entered into this transaction without consultation, and that Isa feared that complications would result owing to the admittance of foreigners [into the concern], and استبطال هذا المقاوله خير من اجابتها."

("The annulment of this contract is better than its acceptance.")

Again, in writing to me on 15th Safar, 1325 (30th March, 1907), Hassan suggested that I had better, if I thought fit, write to the German myself and explain to him regarding the annulment of the contract. His precise words were:—

تكتب له كتاب و بتبين له من طرف ابطال المقاوله

It will be seen that he here used ابطال, and not استبطال. It is clear therefore that Hassan understood me fully in the sense I intended to convey.

Secondly, the explanation of the use of the spelling اجابته is as follows in my opinion:—

It is rendering into writing of a colloquial construction of speech. Thus, in conversation, if referring to a masculine object, such as "zaid," I should not say آسْتَقَامَتُهُ, but آسْتَقَامَتْ, leaving out the "zamah" after the "h," but substituting the "zamah" for "kasrah" after the "t." Similarly, if I were referring to a feminine object I should not say آسْتَقَامَتِهَا, but آسْتَقَامَتِهِ, substituting the "kasrah" after the "t" for the feminine pronoun "ha." Likewise, in writing a colloquial letter I should render the above sounds into writing.

The word اجاب, or اجابه, is constantly used, in my parlance, in reference to a thing in the sense of قبولية.

It is also evident from Hassan Samieh's reply above quoted that he uses it in this sense:—

خير من اجابها

("Better than its acceptance," *i.e.*, better than the acceptance of the contract.) The pronoun is used in the feminine, and could only refer to the contract.

ABDUL LATIF-BIN-ABDURRAHMAN.

March 23, 1911.

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* Curiously enough in this passage Hassan Samieh makes "mukawileh" masculine (هذا المقاوله) at the beginning of the sentence and feminine at the end (اجابتها).—P. Z. C.

† This is the letter forming Enclosure 11 to the first German memorandum, but the translation is inaccurate and these important words have been omitted. Correct translation was sent with my letter of March 7, 1908.—P. Z. C.

Annex 35.

The Rev. S. M. Zwemer to Lieutenant-Colonel Cox.

Bahrein, May 29, 1911.

With reference to the meaning of the Arabic sentence and the probable intention of the writer in using those words concerning which point you asked my opinion, I take pleasure in replying as follows:—

First, it is evident that whoever wrote the sentence was not a thorough scholar in Arabic, as he confused the masculine and feminine forms in the last word of the sentence. To my mind the obvious translation of the phrase is, "the annulment of this agreement is better than its acceptance." I do not think it is at all obvious or possible to translate the sentence "the annulment of this agreement is better than to comply with (his wishes)." This translation is, to my mind, a forced one, and not the natural significance of the words in question, whatever be their connection.

I am confirmed in this opinion after consulting with one or two Arabs concerning the popular use of the pronoun in such a sentence, and I find that they agree with me that there is a great looseness in the use of the feminine or masculine pronoun at the close of a clause or sentence. I am sure that nine out of ten Arabs would give the preference to the former translation of the sentence as the obvious and natural intention of the writer.

Although my opinion does not carry weight beyond that of others who have a speaking and reading knowledge of Arabic, yet I feel confident that in this case it is not a matter of experi. grammatical opinion, but of everyday usage in the Persian Gulf, and I have no hesitation in saying that the first translation is the right one.

Annex 36.

Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh to Messrs. A. and T. Malcolm and Co., Bushire.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.) *20th Rabi II*, 1320 (*July* 29, 1902).

I hope you are in good health. Should you be asking after me, I arrived at Lingah safely by the last mail and had no time to furnish you with news by that mail. Now I shall comply with such orders as you may have.

As regards Abdullah's circumstances at Calcutta, of course, they have themselves informed you of them.

My going to Calcutta was quite thrown away. The profit resulting from the expense and the hardships to which the sea voyage put me, all went to prostitutes. Should the affairs continue in this state, nothing will be obtained from this business and the progress of the enterprise and the popularity of this mineral will not be achieved by such behaviour. I state this confidentially for your information.

May God himself ordain that relief should be obtained in another place.

Annex 37.

Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh to Mr. T. Malcolm.

(Translation.) *13th Jumadi I*, 1320 (*August* 16, 1902).

I hope you are keeping well. Your letter which was forwarded by the regular mail has been received and noted. I wrote a reply thereto and sent it in the steam-ship "King Arthur" through Zair Hassan for delivery to you, and I hope that you have received it.

As regards what you have written about Khadheiri and the firm of Hotz, no reply has been received up to now. It is a long time that no letter has been received from Khadheiri, and when I saw that no letter came from him I also did not write to him. The same happened in the case of Hotz's firm. God is generous. At last the matter will not remain as it is. God will find a way. I am now in communication with a Hindu [who wishes] to purchase [the oxide] at Bombay at 6 rupees per gindi; and we offer it at 7 rupees to be delivered at the Bombay harbour, the customs duty and

warehouse fee to be paid by the Hindu himself. He wants 2,000 gindis and wishes to make a contract afterwards for India. If he contracted 4,000 tons per annum for India at 7 rupees per gindi to be delivered in the Bombay harbour, Haji Hassan will agree. Let me see what happens. I will let you know. This price for which he buys means that the bag and freight to Bombay should be payable by us. If the bags are new they will cost 12 rupees per 100, and if they are old they cost 6 rupees per 100. Old and new should be mixed so that the oxide may duly reach Bombay. It should be weighed in the steamer. May God wish that these terms should be agreed upon. If Abdullah does not spoil [the matter] it will be good. He (Haji Hassan) has intimated to Abdullah but has written that he (Abdullah) should not speak about it but should intimate if it is not detrimental to his Calcutta oxide market. Let us see what reply is received from Abdullah. We have also given a draft for 1,000 rupees so that new bags may be purchased.

I stated [the above] for your information so that you may be aware that the affairs have not progressed up to now. It was all due to themselves. Wherever the matter is arranged, Abdullah will at last spoil it.

As to the matter of Khadheiri and the firm of Hotz, I know he (Abdullah) has written something, owing to which they will not write any letters hereafter. Greetings!

Annex 38.

Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh to Mr. T. Malcolm.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.) *9th Jumadi II*, 1320 (*September* 13, 1902).

Your letter has been received, and I have understood its contents.

As regards Mr. Zeytoon, you have written that he will be coming to Lingah by the mail steamer, but he did not come. I have heard that the agent of Khadheiri's steamers is Agha Ali Haji Muhammad Amin, but so far he has not spoken to any one regarding freight. I am making enquiries.

With regard to the 2,000 gindis oxide which the Hindu wanted to take at 6½ rupees per gindi, Agha Abdullah has written to Haji Hassan that he should not give [this quantity]; as, if he gave, the Calcutta market will be injured. And so far, he (Abdullah) has also sold nothing. Six months have now passed and he has done nothing. I told Haji Hassan that we should sell 2,000 gindis and pay the value thereof to Abdullah, so that we may redeem the oxide pawned with the [other] Hindu; but he did not agree. Another Hindu wants 1,000 gindis at the same price. Haji Hassan has not agreed [to supply him], and they are now in negotiations to buy from Hormuz, and they will do so. They will, in the end, ship from Hormuz, and take the stuff where they like, and this chance will be lost by us.

[As regards] Hotz's agent, we left together for the island of Bin Musa. When we took our departure we had no men to work on the boat, and there were not sufficient men. We were on the sea for four days and four nights, and did not even then reach the island. We returned to Lingah. If he had supplied efficient men, or if, I myself, had engaged efficient men, we should have reached the island. This is the way Haji Hassan goes on. I do not know whether he wishes that I should get tired, and that the island should be for himself. Other facts will turn out.

Greeting.

Annex 39.

Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh to Mr. T. Malcolm, Bushire.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.) [*Undated, but written some time in* 1902.]

As regards the Sir Island, if you can make arrangements with some one in Calcutta besides the firm of Sassoon, it will, in my opinion, be better. No one will then raise any claim in Calcutta, and the claimant's statement will not be listened to. There are many words which cannot be written. The circumstances in connection with the Calcutta oxide are all due to the London firm, because one year ago they rumoured at Lingah that we are no longer able to work the oxide in the Bin Musa Island; and it was written from London that they should spend as much as they can and take the island out of our hands. In my opinion, an opportunity has now been offered to them,

because I was myself at Calcutta, and a Hindu offered to buy all the oxide, and the value was also arranged. He also paid 1,000 rupees, and was to pay 4,000 rupees more, and take delivery of the goods. They cancelled it (however) for the sake of one month's respite. So far four months have elapsed and the oxide has remained unsold. Had I not been afraid of the bank, I would have gone myself to Calcutta and disposed of the oxide in any way. When I was at Calcutta there were many buyers. The oxide will now remain (unsold) like a horse in Bombay, which will eat so much that it will be lost at length.

You will of course say that I knew this from the beginning. The oxide which was shipped has been consigned to Mr. Brady. If you had brought to their office it had to be consigned to them.

According to what Abdullah has written to Haji Hassan and myself, the Calcutta Office says, "tell Malcolm not to write any letters to the Bombay Office." It becomes evident that as you know well the courses of affairs and the answers due to every one, and as you grasp facts, it is for this reason that he says you should write no letters for us (*i.e.*, on our behalf). Otherwise, what is the object? Every letter requires an answer.

I do not know what to write concerning the state of thing which has been brought about. It is now about three or four years that despite all my endeavours to get oxide shipped to London as a sample, it cannot be done.

What further should I represent to you, and salaams.

Annex 40.

Mr. P. Malcolm's Statement.

[Will follow by next mail.]

Annex 41.

Hassan-bin-Ali Samich to Abdul Latif-bin-Abdul Rahman.

(Extract.) *Lingah, 5th Ramzan*, 1317 (*January* 7, 1900).

[The first portion of this letter refers to certain private matters, such as Hassan's claim against two persons of Abu Dhabi, the hire of boats, &c.].

* * * * * *

And then, you stated to me what you have learned, namely that a letter has been received by our friend Naser (bin-Loota) from Bahrein asking him to purchase such of the shares of the oxide company of the Bu Musa Island as he can; and that Naser had consulted friend Yusuf with a view to purchase [his share] from him and made suggestions to him that he, Yusuf, was a pearl-dealer and was unable to take part in the business of the oxide company, &c., and so on. [You add that] Yusuf agreed to sell, and that the deal had reached the figure of 400 dollars, and that Yusuf had stood to this as his final answer and Naser asked for a slight reduction, *i.e.*, to 350 dollars. And when you learned this, you told Yusuf not to sell. You have acted very well. We are the better entitled to take the share from Yusuf and it will then go over to the partners. My brother, it is not our intention that foreigners should be included with us. God willing you will settle the price of his share with Yusuf and let us know; and henceforward no one has authority to sell a share or anything else without our permission. I have notified Malcolm to that effect in the very document of partnership so that it might be clear.

This is what I had [to be stated], and do not discontinue from us the news of your health. Give our salaams to Isa and those with you; and greeting.

[24230] No. 112*.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 235.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, June 22, 1911.*

VALI of Bussorah and Lynch's steamers.

We have received information from Messrs. Lynch that permission has been refused by the vali for the "Blosse Lynch," one of the company's steamers, to start for Bagdad instead of the "Julnar," the latter being in need of repairs. The company state that 10,000 tons of cargo are delayed at Bussorah as a result of this unjustifiable action.

Vali states that he cannot give the necessary permission without previously receiving instructions from Constantinople. You should urge Porte to give the necessary instructions, which should be sent to the vali viâ Fao, as the company state that the Turkish overland telegraph is not working.

[24175] No. 111.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 144.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, June 20, 1911.*

REVOLT in the Yemen.

From telegraphic messages (which are not altogether clear) received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah, it appears that the Turks suffered a serious reverse at Yeezan about a week ago, losing 100 wounded, 1,000 killed, and four mountain and two Maxim guns. A force of ten battalions under the Shereef of Mecca is apparently being sent from Confuda, and another of eleven battalions is being organised by the vali at Loheja. The rebels command the water supply of Yeezan, but the town itself has been destroyed by bombardment from a gun-boat.

The situation in Albania may also be affected by this news when it becomes known publicly.

[24230] No. 112.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 21.)

3, Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, June 20, 1911.

Sir,

WE have received telegrams from our agents in Bussorah, dated 16th and 19th instant, to the effect that the Governor of Bussorah refuses to permit our steamer "Blosse Lynch" to take her place in the service between Bussorah and Bagdad in substitution for the steamer "Julnar," which is in need of certain alterations in her machinery. The "Julnar" arrived in Bussorah from Bagdad a few days ago, and the "Blosse Lynch" is waiting to take her place. There are about 10,000 tons of cargo delayed in Bussorah, of which no less than about 3,000 tons are in store on our wharves. It is therefore urgently necessary that the "Blosse Lynch" shall be permitted to start on her voyage without further delay. Unfortunately the overland Turkish telegraph line between Bussorah and Constantinople is interrupted, and we understand that for this reason the governor is unable to communicate with Constantinople.

I have the honour to refer you to your despatch of the 17th ultimo, dealing with this question. The Governor of Bussorah states that he cannot allow the substitution to take place until he has received permission from Constantinople. No other reason is given for his refusal, and there can be no reasonable ground upon which such a refusal could be based, as it is clearly necessary from time to time to substitute one steamer for another.

Under these circumstances I have the honour to request that a telegram be despatched, if possible during the course of the day, to His Majesty's Ambassador in Constantinople, requesting his Excellency to have instructions sent to the Governor of Bussorah to permit the "Blosse Lynch" to proceed upon her voyage. We should at the same time be grateful if his Excellency could persuade the Central Government to authorise the governor to refrain in the future from continuing to pursue the purely obstructive policy which at present he would appear to consider it his duty to adopt towards the operations of our company. In the event of the telegraph line between Constantinople and Bussorah remaining closed, it would be necessary that the Central Government should send their instructions by way of Fao.

We have, &c.
H. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

[24394] No. 113.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 145.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, June 23, 1911.*

LYNCH'S reserve steamer.

In reply to your telegram No. 235 of yesterday, the requisite instructions were dispatched on the 22nd June.

[24605] No. 114.

The Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received June 24.)

3, *Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, June* 21, 1911.

Sir,

WITH reference to the congestion of traffic on the Tigris, I have the honour to inform you that several of our steamers from Bussorah to Bagdad have towed two barges on recent voyages, and that this allows us to carry larger quantities of cargo, but we have no confidence that it will enable us to meet the need of the expanding trade of the region. The accumulation of cargo at Bussorah still continues, and in order to endeavour to meet the complaints of our clients at home and on the Continent, we have instructed our agent in Bagdad to apply to the acting vali of Bagdad to allow us to run an extra steamer (*i.e.*, our reserve steamer) under the Turkish flag, and subject to the same conditions as have been stipulated in the case of Agha Jaffar, and of others who have applied for permits. One of these conditions, we understand, is the payment of a commission or royalty to the local administration on the freights earned. We have requested our representative in Constantinople to communicate with the proper Government Department in Constantinople in support of our agent's application to the vali.

We have, &c.
H. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

[24639] No. 115.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 428.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June* 19, 1911.

I TOOK an occasion on the 16th instant to press the Minister for Foreign Affairs to pay at least something substantial on account of the British claims for the illegal demolitions at Bagdad, and I pointed out to him that in the case of Messrs. Lynch delay in doing so would, as explained in your telegram No. 221 of the 13th instant, involve an increase of the claim against the Turkish Government. Rifaat Pasha replied that he would gladly see this group of claims settled, but that in the face of the assertions of Nazim Pasha, who is now, as you are aware, in Constantinople, that all the proceedings of the municipal authorities had been in strict accordance with the law, it was impossible for the Government to meet our wishes, and that no action could be taken until the arrival in Bagdad of the new vali, Jemal Bey, who had been instructed to report in detail on the case. I pointed out to his Excellency that Nazim Pasha had all along denied by telegraph and in writing that any illegality had been committed, and that in spite of those denials the Porte had, in a general way, admitted that compensation was due. It was not to be expected that Nazim Pasha would now recede from his former statements, and I could not see why the Porte should change their attitude. But I was unable to induce his Excellency to agree to any immediate payment.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[24640] No. 116.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 429.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June* 21, 1911.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 144 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report that for some days past the local press has been publishing reports of what appeared to be a serious reverse of the Turkish troops in the Yemen. The Government, however, have persistently denied these reports, but from telegraphic information just received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah it would appear that they were by no means devoid of foundation.

Dr. Richardson learns that about a week ago a Turkish force was surprised by the rebels outside Yeezan; a panic ensued among the Turkish troops, of whom 1,000 were killed and 400 wounded, the small proportion of the latter being accounted for by the fact that the Arabs used daggers. Four mountain guns and two Maxims were also captured, and the Turkish commander is reported missing. Four whole battalions were practically driven into the sea. Dr. Richardson does not mention how many Turkish troops were engaged.

The town of Yeezan has been since destroyed by bombardment from a Turkish gun-boat, but the rebels remain in command of the water supply.

The vali, who left Hodeidah on the 14th June, is apparently preparing to start with a force of eleven battalions from Loheija against the rebels, and another expedition, composed of ten battalions, left Comfuda last week, under the command of the Shereef of Mecca, for Yeezan.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[24642] No. 117.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 431. Confidential.)

Sir, *Therapia, June* 19, 1911.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 228 of the 16th instant and to my telegram No. 143 of yesterday respecting the proposed sale of the treasures of the shrines at Kerbela and Nejef, I have the honour to report that the Persian chargé d'affaires, in the course of a conversation, stated that the Grand Vizier had given him a verbal assurance that the Turkish Government had given up the idea of selling these treasures, and would not revive it without the consent of the Persian religious dignitaries.

As regards the fetva, Feradjullah Khan said that the officials at the Porte had avoided any acknowledgment of its existence, so that there has been no question of its formal withdrawal. In any case, he seemed quite satisfied with the assurances given him.

He added that in discussing the matter he had followed two lines of argument, one based on the Turco-Persian convention of 1840 concerning the custody of the treasures and the other on the undesirability of provoking a war of fetvas between the Sheikh-ul-Salam and the erudite Persian theologians (mujtehids), who might have the best of a theological controversy, and so suggest doubts as to the validity of Constantinople fetvas issued in much graver matters. He seemed to think that the latter argument had powerfully impressed the Porte.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[24643] No. 118.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 432.)

Sir, *Therapia, June* 20, 1911.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 149 of the 30th ultimo, enclosing certain papers relative to a proposed concession for railways in Asia Minor, I have the honour to observe that the scheme referred to in these documents is, as you are aware, the one which was originally submitted to the Turkish Government in 1909 by a certain Dr. Glasgow.

This scheme at first met with some favour in Government and parliamentary circles, but the negotiations were suspended and eventually ceased when Mr. Chester came forward with his proposal to construct the same network of railways on conditions which appeared more favourable to the Government than those offered by Dr. Glasgow.

Mr. Chester's project has been before the Government for nearly two years, and negotiations had advanced so far that, as I had the honour to inform you in my despatch No. 383 of the 2nd instant, the Government was in a position to lay all the papers as well as the convention drawn up and agreed to by the Public Works Department and Mr. Chester, before Parliament in the early part of last month. Owing, however, to the approach of the closure of the session, the House was unable to devote any time to the examination of the project and the matter has consequently been placed on the agenda for early discussion when Parliament meets for the next

autumn and winter session. It is understood that the long negotiations between Mr. Chester and the Public Works Department resulted in changing some of the proposals first made by Mr. Chester, and that the convention as finally drawn up and presented to Parliament, embodies a considerable number of modifications favourable to the Government. A copy of this draft convention has so far not been procurable, and it is therefore impossible to compare the proposals, as they now stand, with those of the Glasgow scheme contained in the papers communicated by Lord Denbigh.

The Government is now so far committed to the Chester project that I think there is little chance of other proposals being considered, unless they offered conditions clearly more advantageous than those which now stand in Mr. Chester's name. The region of country through which the proposed railway is to pass is mostly mountainous, and the cost of construction would consequently be high; the railway will enjoy no guarantee, and the return on expended capital will have to be derived solely from traffic receipts and such problematical profits as can be made out of the working of mines which the concessionnaire may chance to find within a certain zone on either side of the line. Whilst unable to form an opinion as to the real merits of such a concession, I am inclined to believe that although the construction of such a network of railways will be beneficial to the country, the conditions offered for carrying out such an undertaking are altogether of too speculative a character to engage the attention of serious capitalists.

Lord Denbigh and his friends will, however, have to satisfy themselves as to the soundness of the scheme now before the Government and in the event of a favourable view being taken they will have the option of either joining hands with Chester or submitting proposals more favourable than those to which the Government seems at present committed.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[24648] No. 119.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June 26.*)

(No. 437.)
Sir, *Constantinople, June 21, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 413 of the 13th June, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum reporting further details re troops sent to restore order at Khuyt.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 119.

Consul MacGregor to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 40. Confidential.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, June 9, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 39 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Mr. Safrastian, acting vice-consul at Bitlis, giving further details regarding the recent murders of Armenians in the district of Khuyt, and commenting on the recrudescence of Kurdish violence in the region. Satisfactory as it is to learn that troops have been despatched to Khuyt, Mr. Safrastian seems to doubt whether this expedition will achieve any useful result in view of the equivocal attitude of the Government.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

Enclosure 2 in No. 119.

Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul MacGregor.

(No. 12.)
Sir, *Bitlis, June 6, 1911.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 11 of the 25th May last, and with reference to my telegrams of the 1st, 4th, and 5th instant, respecting the state of affairs in Khuyt, a mountainous district west of this town (sanjak of Bitlis), I have the honour to report that the condition there has, in the course of the last few days, developed into an open rebellion of Kurds against the Government, and a massacre of defenceless Armenians of the district at the hands of Belekli and Khuytli Kurds.

The central Government is none the less to be blamed for the murder of the eight Armenians of Taghavank, in Khuyt, who in the last five days have fallen victims to the savage Kurds of Khuyt in a most atrocious manner.

As I had the honour to inform you by my despatch above referred to, the Armenians of Taghavank and Lordentzor recovered their lands after a long struggle. While endeavouring to plough their property, they met the opposition of one, Hadji Amaré, their oppressor, and his Kurds, who would not recognise the decision of the courts. Priest Dar Sarkis of Taghavank, the headman of the village, and one other, left again for Bitlis on the 31st May to protest to the Government. At a distance four hours from Bitlis, all three were brutally killed by the Kurds of Hadji Amaré, the priest was burnt, the eyes of the headman was burst out and carried to Hadji Amaré, who, it is reported, gave the bearer a sum as reward, and the skin of the third man was pulled off.

Then, in spite of tribal feuds existing between the various Belekli sub-tribes, they united to shut all roads leading to Bitlis and Mush, so as to prevent the passage of Armenians to Bitlis for asking for protection from the authorities. Almost all Armenian population in Khuyt fled to mountains, which were mostly surrounded by Kurds, leaving everything they possessed at the disposal of Kurds.

Seeing the road to Bitlis closed by the murderers, six relatives of the murdered Armenians took the road to Mush to beg the Government's help. On descending the steep and wooded hills overlooking the plain of Mush, they were surprised on the 1st instant by the men of the notorious Hadji Faris, of Kolossig, five of them were killed, including the sons of the above priest and headman, and one of them who possessed a revolver fired at the murderers and fled. Their corpses were then monstrously mutilated and insulted. The next day some gendarmes discovered the remains and took them to Khaskeui, a village in the plain.

During the first four days of this month absolute anarchy and insecurity prevailed throughout the district. The mudir of the Nahie of Khuyt, his gendarmes, and subordinates witnessed the violent proceedings of the Kurds without daring even to go out of their houses. Wildest rumours of a wholesale massacre of the Armenians in Khuyt created a profound impression in this town, women and children were reported as being massacred, which happily proved to be untrue. On the 3rd instant a detachment of gendarmes was sent to Khuyt with definite instructions to keep the order "in some way," but never to use force. They, however, did not venture to enter the disturbed region.

Military Expedition to Khuyt.—Ismail Hakky Bey, the vali, who was on a tour at Sairt, is reported as having proposed to the central Government either to accept his resignation or to allow him to proceed to Khuyt with a sufficient military force. Three battalions of infantry were thereupon ordered from Bitlis, Mush, and Sairt to proceed immediately to Khuyt. The battalion here left yesterday morning. Two pieces of mountain artillery has been hastened from Mush, and the vali himself is marching towards Khuyt at the head of the Sairt battalion.

It was reported that the martial law would be proclaimed in Khuyt with a view of stamping out once for all the rebellion in the district; but Tchsin Bey, the acting military commandant here, told me last night that unhappily he did not expect much from the present expedition, at least in view of the instructions which they have received.

It remains to be seen whether the vali will be authorised to deal properly with the situation, to employ force in case of need in order to capture old and new murderers and rebels of Khuyt.

Any other delay on the part of the Government in the way of taking prompt and effective action against the rebels might lead the Kurds to an anti-Armenian outbreak on a much larger scale. The lives of eight Armenians murdered should certainly

have been spared, had the measure of an expedition been taken on the first opportunity a fortnight ago, when Hadji Amaré threatened them with murder and violence. (My despatch No. 11.)

It is a pity that most of the Armenians of Khuyt have not been able to sow much this season—a great suffering may follow indeed during the next winter—and that they lost a priest and a headman, who had been their self-sacrificing leaders under most difficult circumstances.

Origin of the Present Outbreak.—Several factors seem to have been at work for bringing about the present outbreak resulting in the murder of eight Armenians, first of all the encouragement which the Kurds have naturally derived from the impunity granted to them, even after the murder of two soldiers in July last, and of three gendarmes in December last, then the encouragement which the notorious Musa Bey of Khevner, and even some Government officials (facts and names are at hand), have surely given to them, finally, as I had the honour to inform you by my last report, the land disputes, which seems to have deprived Hadji Amaré and some others of their means of livelihood.

An exemplary punishment of the Kurds of Khuyt, and the summary execution of at least some notorious chiefs, would only establish the order and the peace in the district.

I have, &c.
A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

[25023] No. 120.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 27.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Earl of Crewe, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures received from the political resident in the Persian Gulf regarding the Abu Musa case.

India Office, June 26, 1911.

Enclosure 1 in No. 120.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to the Earl of Crewe.

Bushire, June 4, 1911.

Sir,

IN continuation of my letter of the 27th May, I have the honour to forward two copies, with enclosures, of my letter to the Government of India in connection with the Abu Musa case.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure 2 in No. 120.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir H. McMahon.

Bushire, June 10, 1911.

WITH reference to my letter by last mail forwarding report on the Abu Musa case, I have the honour to enclose a memorandum on the subject of the German dragoman, Mirza Husein, whose statements are relied upon in the German rejoinder.

It might perhaps be added to the papers forwarded by me as Annex 42.

I am sending two copies to the political secretary, India Office.

Enclosure 3 in No. 120.

Annex 42.

Note on the History and Character of Mirza Husein "The Dragoman of the Imperial Vice-Consulate at Bushire," referred to at p. 5 of the Foreign Office Print of the German Memorandum, and in Item 25 of Resident's comment thereon.

THE dragoman in question is the man referred to in the report submitted by me on the 27th June, 1909, in connection with the disturbances at Bushire of the spring of 1909, when troops had to be landed from His Majesty's ships for the protection of foreigners.

I beg reference to that report from which point my present note takes up the thread.

At that time (the summer of 1909) I considered that I had a good deal to complain of in the attitude towards me of the acting German consul, Herr Wassmuss, and in this view Sir George Barclay fully concurred on seeing papers which I showed him personally in Tehran; I attributed this mainly to the fact that Herr Wassmuss as a new comer with no knowledge of the country or language was necessarily in the hands of his dragoman.

Both he, however, and Dr. Listemann, the permanent incumbent, placed implicit reliance on the man and neither would hear a word against him. This, of course, was not unnatural.

As will be seen from what follows, the man has since been entirely exposed, discredited, and summarily dismissed.

On the termination of the disturbances and the expulsion of Seyyid Murteza, Mirza Husein gave up his leisure to local politics, and by judicious bribery among the community of harbour boatmen (his father was a local nakhoda) got himself elected a member of the Bushire Anjuman. Later on, in January 1910, he was able to contrive his selection and that of his ally, Mirza Ali Kazeruni (see my report of June 1909), as candidates for two of the seats in the Tehran Medjliss allotted to the Gulf ports. The governor, however, intervened on the ground that the election was not a *bonâ fide* one, and their deputation never took shape.

Meanwhile, Mirza Husein's operations in arms dealings in association with Haji Muhammad Hassan, the local broker of Messrs. Wönckhaus, proceeded as usual, but some of the captures of arms by His Majesty's ships were reported to have involved the pair in heavy losses and put them in some financial difficulty. In March 1910, owing to the stagnation of trade in Bushire and other causes, Messrs. Wönckhaus withdrew their European agent for a time and left the broker, Haji Muhammad Hassan, in charge. The jealousy evinced by Mirza Husein at not being given the agency himself resulted in a split between him and Haji Muhammad Hassan, which led to a good deal of mutual recrimination and consequent exposure of their shady business affairs. In September 1910 a sum of 1,700*l.* odd, which Messrs. Wönckhaus had despatched through the medium of Haji Muhammad Hassan to the neighbouring coast by sailing boat for the purchase of grain for export, was lost. The money disappeared in transit and suspicion, fostered by Mirza Husein, fell on Haji Muhammad. The latter eventually absconded to Tangistan and Mirza Husein was appointed in his place as Wönckhaus's agent. The firm, however, soon came to the conclusion that Mirza Husein was implicated and Muhammad Hassan more sinned against than sinning, and induced the latter to return from Tangistan. A short time afterwards they preferred a claim on his behalf against Mirza Husein for misappropriating, in the broker's absence, a cargo of arms which the latter had ordered out. These arms Mirza Husein is said to have sold to various dealers, of whom one, Abdul Karim, bought and secreted ten. These arms having been traced and seized, the Director of Customs, having obtained proof of their import by Mirza Husein, took up the case against him with the governor and the German consulate. At the same time the German firm convinced their consul of Mirza Husein's dishonest behaviour in connection with the disappearance of the 1,700*l.* and the defalcations of Haji Muhammad Hassan, with the result that Dr. Listemann at last decided to dismiss his retainer. To this end Mr. Krumpeter, Messrs. Wönckhaus' then agent, armed with a letter from the German consul intimating his dismissal and enclosing his pay to date, proceeded with the consul's authority to the Mirza's house with the intention of arresting him or seizing certain important documents which he was believed to hold.

Mirza Husein, however, escaped by a back door and took bast with a local mullah.

M. Constant, the Belgian Provincial Director of Customs, Bushire, about this time received instructions from Tehran to report to his Administration concerning the case against Mirza Husein, and informed my commercial adviser, Mr. Chick, of the purport of a telegraphic report which he had sent towards the latter part of March, which was to this effect, viz. :—

"Herr Krumpeter had been deputed by the German consul to hand Mirza Husein a letter of dismissal and the salary due to him. The Mirza took to flight, realising that he had been unmasked and convicted of extensive robberies on the German firm.

"Mirza Husein is now spending large sums of money in order to procure false evidence from the mullahs.

"Mirza Husein has long since been known to the Customs as an importer of arms, and is at the moment being prosecuted by the Customs for smuggling ten rifles, and in this connection the Governor of Bushire has informed me that 'Mirza Husein had sent him 150 tomans as a bribe.' He, Mirza Husein, was now haggling as to the amount of fine which he should be called upon to pay. Mirza Husein is an agitator and a rogue whose downfall will be welcomed by all honest members of the community."

Charges against Mirza Husein are still pending, and meanwhile the German consul is withholding the rent of the German consulate premises, which belong to Mirza Husein, in connection with his debt to the German firm.

Lastly, his old friends of the spring of 1909 have since turned against him and recently got up an extensive round-robin (signed among others by his Nationalist accomplice, Mirza Ali Kazerumi) in which they accused him of being Seyyid Murteza's instigator and evil genius, and demanded that he should be made to disgorge or refund the money which he had prompted Seyyid Murteza to plunder from the Government customs.

It will be seen that Mirza Husein has been thoroughly discredited, denounced by the local Government, prosecuted by the Customs and the German firm for dishonesty, and summarily dismissed from his post in the German consulate.

I submit that we have ample grounds to mention in our reply to the German rejoinder that, since the penning of it, they must admit that the dragoman upon whose integrity they relied has been proved to be a thorough rogue, and that they will appreciate our inability to place reliance on his statements.

P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure 4 in No. 120.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to the Earl of Crewe.

(Confidential.) *Bushire, June* 4, 1911.

ANNEX 40 was not included among the annexes to the Abu Musa report sent with my letter by last mail. I enclose two copies now and will ask you kindly to have them inserted in their place. I had no opportunity of examining Malcolm since he produced his deed of partnership (quite recently), and now since his statement is dated the 30th May, perhaps the date of my notes in "brief comment" which prefaced the papers had better bear that too.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX.

Enclosure 5 in No. 120.

Annex 40.

Statement of Mr. T. J. Malcolm.

MR. TIGRANE MALCOLM appears before me this 30th day of May, 1911, and makes the following statement :—

"The history of my entry into the Abu Musa oxide concern was as follows :—

"I had been for some years connected with the trade in oxide from Hormuz in association with Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh, in whose name the concession then was.

He, however, lost the concession and then, in consultation with me, he set to work to obtain a concession for extracting Abu Musa oxide, having first made a trial shipment. It was Nakhoda Ali who first started the Abu Musa mining,* Hassan Sameiyeh knew nothing about the oxide trade until Nakhoda Ali introduced him to it. The latter had at this time a very bad name with the local authorities and in commercial circles in the Gulf ports,† and so he found it convenient to work through Hassan Sameiyeh.

"After securing the Abu Musa concession the parties thought it would be to their advantage to bring me into it with a view to my arranging the shipments to Europe and elsewhere, and so I came into it. Nakhoda Ali was the moving spirit in the acquiring of the concession, Hassan Sameiyeh was only used as a screen. The former was in charge of the mining work and always complained greatly of the obstructiveness of Abdullah Sameiyeh and his father Hassan, and their ignorance of matters connected with the oxide trade. Owing, however, to his own state of bankruptcy Nakhoda Ali could not take a prominent part in the concern, and so Abdullah and Hassan gradually began to dominate it. Nakhoda Ali managed the work on the island, I was expected to manage the sales and shipment to Europe, and Hassan acted as corresponding member of the company.

"No particular basis of authority existed, so far as I know, on which Hassan was entitled to act, and to the best of my belief (and I have an excellent memory) I have never heard of or seen the so-called memorandum of association which you have now shown me, much less did I ever sign it or receive a copy of it.

"Nor was I consulted at all or informed regarding the sale of a share in the concern by Sheikh Sagar to Yusuf-bin-Abdullah, or by Yusuf to Hassan, or Hassan to Brown ; it is all news to me.

"In any case, Hassan Sameiyeh never acted according to the rules now shown to me. He has never rendered any accounts at all. In fact, the mismanagement of the Sameiyehs and the extravagance of Abdullah have always been a great cause of complaint both to me and Nakhoda Ali."

T. J. MALCOLM.

Bushire, May 30, 1911.

Before me :

P. Z. Cox, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
British Resident in the Persian Gulf.

[25419] No. 121.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 30.)

(No. 440.)

Sir, *Therapia, June* 26, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 438 of the 23rd June, I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's acting consul at Bussorah reported by telegraph on the 23rd instant that His Majesty's ship "Alert" left Bussorah on that day.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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* It will be seen that Mr. Malcolm states that it was Nakhoda Ali and not Hassan who first started the mining work at Abu Musa. A point might be made of this statement when dealing with the German argument (p. 9 of Foreign Office print) that according to religious law Hassan Sameiyeh, as discoverer of the mine, has an indefeasible right to work them.—P. Z. C.

† Nakhoda Ali was a defaulter and owed large sums of money in Bushire, and had evaded his obligations by going bankrupt.—P. Z. C.